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THE

THEOLOGICAL ECLECTIC,

A Repertory,

CHIEFLY OF FOREIGN THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

A SERIES OF PAPERS SELECTED FROM THE PERIODICAL AND OTHER LITERATURE OF GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, GERMANY, HOLLAND, ETC.

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I.—THE DUKE OF ARGYLL ON THE REIGN OF LAW.*

The very thoughtful volume † which suggests this essay, consists of a number of papers on subjects widely different, and most of them written at considerable intervals. And yet there is in these various chapters a "uniformity of thought and design which will always be found in the writings of the same person when he writes with simplicity and in earnest." This reflection of Bishop Butler upon his own discourses is eminently applicable to the Duke of Argyll's meditations.

He has endeavored to discover a definition or description of Law which will extend to all possible cases; not merely to the ordinary operations of nature, but to its extraordinary manifestations; not merely to men in masses, but to men as individual free agents. The facts of nature and the mind of men, the history not only of the world's preservation, but of its creation, is embraced in the writer's views, and forms part of his theme.

What, then, is his conception of Law, and how can he find any description of it so universally applicable? Surely the ordinary course of nature, the Christian miracles, and the free will of man, cannot be comprised under the effects of Law in any one definite sense. Perhaps not; and yet whenever we submit ourselves passively to the author's argument, he guides us so dextrously along the smooth surface of his graceful and lucid style, and displays upon all sides such novel and interesting facts, that we are almost beguiled into believing that we have turned no sharp corners in our voyage, or incurred risks from collisions with our best established beliefs. Factory girls and humming birds, woodcocks and orchids, albatrosses and balloons, a thousand curious facts and fancies, attest the author's large information and wide sympathies. And it is this very quality which cannot be adequately treated in a review. The book itself must be consulted for the many details of beauty with which it abounds. We must here concern

* From the *Contemporary Review*, May, 1868.

† *The Reign of Law.* By the Duke of Argyll. Second Edition. London: Alexander Strahan. 1867.

ourselves with the argument; we must, so to speak, examine the foundation and supports of the fair structure before us. And the objections we shall make to the author's arguments will not prevent us from acknowledging fully the earnestness and piety of his mind, and the nobleness of his project. But it would seem as if the desire to make his idea of Law applicable everywhere, had misled him into questionable views, both as to man's free will and as to the special miracles attested at the origin of Christianity.

In the chapter on the definition of Law (which we should consider first, though it stands second in order in the book), we have an enumeration of the various senses of the word, especially in its non-political acceptation. And if we endeavor to bring the details together, and illumine them by the views expressed in the other chapters, it will be found that by Law the Duke of Argyll means—*order* produced by *contrivance* for a *purpose* by *will*. Evidently such a definition must be maintained everywhere by controversy. "How will you explain the Christian miracles by contrivance?" exclaims the theologian; or, "How can you reduce to order the eccentricities of free will?" adds the metaphysician. "Show us clear proof of purpose in the apparent waste of ingenuity in nature? And how do you know that it required a Will to originate species on this globe?" inquires the naturalist. These are the principal questions discussed in the volume, and discussed with fairness and honesty.

At the very outset the Scottish atmosphere which the Duke breathes leads him to approach the question of the Supernatural and its relation to Law. He complains that theologians have increased the difficulties of Christianity by not insisting everywhere on the possibility of miracles being, after all, cases, not of disorder, but of order. Why should a miracle differ *generically* from a human act?

"Beyond the immediate purposes of benevolence—the only other purpose which is ever assigned to them is an *evidential* purpose, that is, a purpose that they might serve as signs of the presence of superhuman knowledge, and of the working of superhuman power."

And again:—

"Extraordinary manifestations of His will—signs and wonders

— may be wrought, for aught we know, by similar instrumentality (that is, by the choice and use of natural means), only by the selection and use of laws of which man knows and can know nothing, and which, if he did know, he could not employ."

In fact, the supernatural is only the *superhuman*. Locke had seen long ago that a miracle cannot be defined except by its relation to the knowledge of the spectator. The spectator must judge the event to be contrary to his own notion of the laws of nature. The Duke of Argyll suggests that Locke omitted to mention the relation to the *power* of the spectator. For a miracle is the result produced not only by superhuman knowledge, but also by superhuman power. Even if we knew the necessary conditions, "yet a work performed by the bringing about of conditions which are out of human reach, would certainly be a work attesting superhuman power."

If this view be correct, we are led to conclude that when Christ wrought a miracle, He used some contrivance or adjustment of natural means, which those about Him did not understand, or if they did, could not accomplish, and that they from hence judged him to be not man, but God. When He walked upon the water, it was by some natural agent, known to His superhuman wisdom, that he enabled His body to resist the force of gravity. When He raised Lazarus from the dead, it was by the use of some natural remedy unknown, and never since discovered by man, that He manifested His divine power.

Is this a satisfactory account of Christ's miracles? Does it not in this respect contradict our historical documents, that Christ nowhere pretended to use any means except in a very few cases where they were obviously insufficient? or else, it must needs imply that He concealed His means of action. For He always professed to cure the ills of man by a simple act of will. The preface, "I will," is generally the only means which he uses. If then the result was brought about by natural antecedents, either Christ deliberately misled his audience to believe that no other means were employed, or shall we say that a series of adjustments of natural agents had been previously so combined and arranged, that the miraculous result must ensue naturally, and that Christ at the time only foresaw the exact moment of the result, and adjusted His expression of will to the critical moment?

Surely nothing can be farther from the truth, if we are to trust historical evidence. The very point in which Christ's miracles differ from those of any other wonder-worker is this, that such men have always made an ostentation of occult means, they have not professed to dispense with natural assistants, they have only claimed a knowledge of causes more advanced than their fellows, and in that sense superhuman. We may add accordingly that miracles, consisting of such use of means as is beyond that of the age, are not in any sense a proof of *Divinity*. They are a proof of extraordinary sagacity, of special illumination by the Divine wisdom, and nothing more. It is the alteration of some fixed physical Law by the simple exercise of will, that is indeed beyond the knowledge and power which man can ever hope to attain. If Christ's miracles be not such, we may some day hope to discover the means of performing them, and if we do, it will immediately be said that Christ was not God, but some extraordinarily endowed man, who anticipated his age by centuries. And if at the present time any worker of miracles should arise, and endeavor to persuade us of his divinity by apparently contradicting the laws of nature, we should not for one moment concede his claim, if we suspected him of using any means which we did not understand or perceive. The only possible proof which we should now concede would be a demonstration that he could violate the usual order of things by a simple exercise of Will. That we should now obtain such a proof is almost inconceivable. And hence it is, in the providential arrangement of the history of Christianity, that we are not now called upon to believe on the evidence of such miracles. As already quoted, the author shows that miracles may either be such that we can perceive no antecedent cause, or they may be such that we can understand very well the combination of natural agents, but are totally unable to effect it ourselves from want of power. They may transcend both our knowledge and our power, or our power only. Now at the origin of Christianity, the former description were more useful. Men had not the idea of Law so ingrained into their mental texture as they have now. They lacked the knowledge and grasp of mind which we now have, to understand the extraordinary manifestations of the Divine power in history and in physical science. Hence none of the miracles of Christ are of the latter description. On the contrary, the miracles which carry

most weight now-a-days in favor of Christianity, are those great historical anomalies which have been accomplished through the adjustment of natural agents by the Divine power.

These latter have chiefly occupied the attention of our author, and it appears that he rashly extended his analysis of these wonders to the supernatural in general. His reflections on this special class of miracles are true and highly interesting, and afford him excellent examples wherewith to illustrate his favorite idea of *adjustment.*

"It is not surprising that the preservation of the Jews, partly from the relation in which it stands to the apparent fulfillment of prophecy, and partly from the extraordinary nature of the fact itself, is tacitly assumed by many persons to come strictly within the category of miraculous events. Yet in itself it is nothing more than a striking illustration how a departure from the 'ordinary course of nature' may be effected through the instrumentality of means which are natural and comprehensible. An extraordinary resisting power has been given to the Jewish people against those dissolving and disintegrating forces which have caused the disappearance of every other race placed under similar conditions. They have been torn from home and country, and removed, not in a body, but in scattered fragments, over the world. Yet they are as distinct from every other people now as they were in the days of Solomon. Nevertheless, this resisting power, wonderful though it be, is the result of special laws, overruling those in ordinary operation. It has been effected by the use of means. Those means have been superhuman; they have been beyond human contrivance and arrangement. But they belong to the Natural. They belong to it not the less, but all the more, because in their concatenation they seem to indicate the purpose of a living Will seeking and effecting the fulfillment of its designs."

All this is very true, and the author has done well in calling attention to this sort of miracle, a miracle which to thoughtful minds is of great weight, but which is often overlooked by objectors to the supernatural in Christianity. Yet even here our author applies it indiscriminately to such cases as that just quoted, and to creation. Now adjustment from pre-existing forces and matter

is not creation, and when the author points to the scriptural account of the Creation "out of the dust of the ground," does he hold the eternity of matter, or if he believes that it ever came into existence, surely its creation cannot come under his conception of Law.

These strictures upon the author's theology are not made from any desire to lay down narrow limits of orthodoxy, to which we desire to adhere without discussion, but rather to show more clearly than is expressed in the volume, or than the author seems to feel, the inconsistency of this theory with the ordinary plain view of the Supernatural. And above all, theories must be confronted with historical facts. The facts in the particular case of Christ's miracles all tend to show that He meant His followers to believe that the result was preceded by no antecedent save a pure act of His Divine will, not working by natural means. We thus revert to the old notion of the evidences of Christianity, as twofold—Miracles and Prophecy. Miracles depend on the power of the Divine will to suspend, either with or without using natural means, the ordinary course of nature. Prophecy, on the contrary, is based on the superhuman knowledge and power of the Deity, in so adjusting and contriving, by natural means, as to produce exceptional results, and to foretell them as being the necessary consequences of his own pre-arrangement. The author's attempt to reduce these two to one principle, is, we think, not successful.

We turn with pleasure from this abstruse subject to the author's most interesting and beautiful meditations on the reign of Law in ordinary nature. The scope of his argument will be seen by recurring to his definition of Law, already stated—Order produced by contrivance for a purpose by a will. In the case of the supernatural, the action of Will and the purpose are plain, order and contrivance were the points of doubt and difficulty. In the course of nature, on the contrary, order is confessed by all, contrivance cannot be denied; but are they produced for a purpose, and does this purpose imply a Will? These are the points upon which the Duke of Argyll is bound to meet his adversaries. But with great good sense he paves the way for his side of the controversy by enforcing on his readers' minds the just and proper appreciation of order and of contrivance. Law and order, he constantly tells us, do not exclude variety and multiplicity.

On the contrary, the very certainty of each natural agent causing its own proper effect, the very fixity of Law in nature, makes contrivance a necessity, for it is by modifying, or even counteracting these agencies, that it produces that wonderful multiplicity and variety of structure and function, which at first sight almost blinds us to the stern character of the Laws which are its real causes.

"Nothing is more certain than that the whole order of nature is one vast system of contrivance. And what is contrivance but that kind of arrangement by which the unchangeable demands of Law are met and satisfied?"

The analogy of this method to the action of the human will is unmistakable. Hence—

"Every instance of contrivance which we can thoroughly follow and understand has an intense interest, as casting light upon this method of Divine government, and upon the analogy between the operations of our own minds and the operations of the Creator. And those instances will strike us most which stand in some near comparison with our own human efforts of ingenuity and contrivance."

He accordingly proceeds to investigate the machinery by which a great purpose has been accomplished in nature—a purpose which man has never been able to accomplish in art, and that is the navigation of the air. "If we wish to see how material laws are bent to purpose, we shall study this problem." The limits of this paper will not admit even an inadequate sketch of the beautiful and lucid chapter which follows on the subject. The gravity of the bird giving it momentum; the resisting power of the atmosphere, to which its form presents the maximum of resistance vertically, and the minimum horizontally; the elasticity of the air, which reacts against the downward stroke of the wing, supplied as it is with bones, muscles, and feathers of extraordinary strength, and extraordinary lightness; the arrangement of feathers in the wing, which makes it impervious to air in its downward stroke, while in the upward stroke the same pressure has precisely the opposite effect; the texture and the angle at which the wing is placed, so that a downward stroke produces

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forward motion—all these, and a dozen other arrangements, are brought together with the greatest clearness, and illustrated with some excellent drawings by Mr. Wolf. More especially the illustration of the kestril hovering (p. 166) is a model of art in its way. We desire to call attention to this part of the work, not merely as enforcing the author's object, and as affording admirable confirmation of his principle of adjustment in nature, but also as manifesting a love of nature, and an interest in her ordinary operations which are the characteristics of a kindly and sympathizing disposition. There are stray touches introduced among his description of facts which show that the author is himself an observer, and a thorough lover of the various beauty and the myriad contrivance of nature. And we therefore recommend this and the two following chapters not merely to the philosopher, but to the ordinary practical man, as affording him, without any great mental exertion, illustrations of nature which will edify him in his leisure walks, and throw interest around the most ordinary occurrences. We recommend them also to parents and teachers who have intelligent children under their care. How many a dull walk could be made interesting if men would keep their eyes open, and use even the most commonplace events to such excellent advantage! How often would the dormant taste for study and research be awakened in the minds of children if the first elements of natural science were instilled into their minds as if it were accidentally, and as a part of their recreation! How few educators remember the advice of Aristotle: "Wherefore childish sports should consist in the frequent imitations of things which are ultimately done in earnest." Why can a hawk or a seagull soar, while a duck or a partridge find it impossible? How is it that little birds pursue a sparrowhawk through the air, while they never attempt it with a merlin? Why does the flapping of a hawk's wing when poising not urge him forward? What intelligent boy would not seek with curiosity for the answers to such questions?

The succeeding chapters lead to other more curious and interesting observations. And first of all comes the question of color as manifested in birds and animals for two opposite purposes, for that of ornament and that of concealment. Having illustrated contrivance at sufficient length, our author proceeds to answer objections against purpose in nature, founded on apparent ex-

ceptions. "How, for example," asks Mr. Darwin, "can we infer in other cases that a peculiar color is intended for the purpose of concealment, when we see this idea violated in the case of woodpeckers, many of whom indeed are admirably concealed by their green color, while others are of the most gaudy hues?" To this our author replies, and with good reason, that there can be adequate causes shown for most of the supposed exceptions; that adaptive coloring is never applied except to animals which are subject to special dangers, and from which they have no other effective means of escape. There is no greater shelter than woods, and this added to their swift, silent and cunning motion, shows that woodpeckers, at all events, can, according to this rule, lay no claim to adaptive coloring. But the other purpose in nature which has relation to the coloring of birds, is the purpose of variety and beauty, upon which the author everywhere insists. Hence the bright coloring which applies to forest birds in general, and to woodpeckers in particular. On the contrary, all those birds which inhabit open moors and fens, and are especially exposed to the pursuit of birds of prey, show adaptive coloring. Examples are endless:—

"In the case of the common grouse, as the ground is nearly uniform in color throughout the year, the coloring of the bird is constant also. But in the case of the ptarmigan, it changes with the changing seasons. The pearly grays, which in summer match so exactly with the lichens of the mountain peaks, give place in winter to the pure white which matches not less perfectly with wreaths of snow."

And so the woodcock:—

"Its color exactly corresponds with a particular stage in the decay of fallen leaves—I mean that in which the browns and yellows of the autumn rot away into the pale ashy skeletons which lie in thousands under every wood in winter."

Again, while the upper surface of its tail is of a dull, ashy color, the under surface is decorated with brilliant white and black velvety bars.

But there are other animals where the principle of imitation with a view to concealment is carried further than mere coloring

—where it extends to form and structure. The most remarkable instances of this are the leaf-insects, of which he notices two species, the *Mantidæ* and *Phasmidæ*. Many of the *Mantidæ* are made exactly to imitate vegetable growths:—

"The legs are like leaf-stalks; the body is elongated, and notched, so as to simulate a twig; the large wings are exact imitations of a full-blown leaf, with all its veins and skeleton, its color and texture complete."

The purpose of the imitation is in this case a purpose of destruction, the *Mantis* being "a predacious insect, armed with the most terrible weapons, hid under the peaceful forms of vegetable life." Here the most curious point and the most remarkable proof of contrivance and adjustment to attain its purpose, is that no new members are given to the *Mantis*.

"There is no departure from the plan upon which all other insects of the same order are designed. The whole effect is produced by a little flattening here and a little swelling there; a little dwarfing of one part and elongation of another. Even the nervation of the leaf is a mere modification of a structure common to all flying insects—a filmy material stretched upon a stronger framework. This framework is designed in a great variety of stronger patterns, more beautiful than the tracery of Gothic windows. In the *Mantis* this tracery, instead of being a mere pattern, is drawn in imitation of a leaf."

Still more wonderful and beautiful is the structure of the *Phasmidæ*, which are vegetable feeders, and accordingly can only require it for concealment from danger. In some species not only is the imitation as perfect as in the *Mantidæ*, but they are tinted at different seasons of the year with the varying colors of spring, summer and autumn. And as if even this were not sufficient, a specimen in the British Museum, to which our author refers, had its wings covered with marks exactly resembling those bleached and faded spots produced in ordinary leaves by the ravages of minute larvæ. After this we are hardly surprised to hear that the purpose of imitation is carried into effect consistently through all the stages of the creature's metamorphoses. Its eggs are exactly like vegetable seeds. In the larval form it is like a bit of stalk or chip of a leaf.

There is, however, a more important objection to Purpose in the natural world: that from the existence of "silent" members. If there be an intelligent purpose in nature, whence come those aborted, dwarfed, and useless limbs? In answer, our author shows that there is evidence that the bony skeletons of animals have been so combined, as to mold them upon one universal plan: and this being established by comparative anatomy, a kindred science shows it to be applicable even to the innumerable creatures which have existed in past ages and are now gone.

"When we have grasped this fact, all the lesser facts in subordination to it assume a new significance. In the first place, a plan of this kind is itself a purpose. When carried through so many ages, and such varieties, it is only as an order of thought that the doctrine of Animal Homologies is at all intelligible. It is a Mental order, and can be only mentally perceived."

And this reference to an ideal standard is a universal instinct in the human mind. Dr. Livingstone found African savages debating to which fingers in man the two toes of the ostrich corresponded. These savages were, indeed, astray, not in being led by the instinct of Homology in Structure, but by not recognizing the great coördinate principle of Analogy and Variety in Use. The impediments which would naturally be caused by adherence to one type are met by the greatest possible variety in adaptation. Let us remember, for example, the form which in the whale and porpoise has been, so to speak, *put on* round the mammalian skeleton, and which covers organs as separate from those of fishes, as those of the hippopotamus or giraffe. The same limbs are converted into paddles, and wings, and legs and arms. Every conceivable contrivance is resorted to rather than to depart from the one great universal plan.

"When we speak then of use in the economy of nature, we must both include ornament, and we must also include not merely actual, but potential use, or the capacity of being turned to use in creations. Hence we should read aborted and now useless organs, either in the light of history, or in the light of prophecy. They indicate either what has been, or what will be."

Here, again, we find Law working—not by totally new crea-

tions, out by the contrivance and adjustment of pre-existing natural means and forces, arranging them for a purpose. Starting from these premises, it will not be difficult to refute Mr. Darwin's theory of the origin of species, so far as that theory tends to deny the exercise of will and purpose in the creation of new species. It is true, indeed, as a matter of fact, that Creation has had a history, that it has been going on through a long series of years. It is also probable (and maintained by our author) that the orderly gradation of forms discovered to us by Geology has been systematically progressive. It is also true that definite types have been adhered to; but the Duke strongly contests the theory that any known physical cause can be assigned which produced this order and this systematic variety.

"The introduction, indeed, of new species to take the place of those which have passed away, is a work which has been not only so often, but so continuously repeated, that it does suggest the idea of having been brought out by the instrumentality of some natural process. But we may say with confidence that it must have been a process different from any that we know—a process not the same as that, obscure as it is, which produces the lesser modification of organic forms."

Mr. Darwin's celebrated theory of the origin of species from natural selection, for example, never attempts to account for the appearance of a new form, but only to explain how such an unusual form (when once produced) would maintain its ground and triumph over its neighbors. He speaks of the original variation as the result of chance, meaning by that term to acknowledge plainly our ignorance. This, then, is the first criticism which our author makes on Mr. Darwin's theory. Secondly, the great naturalist takes no account of beauty and variety as a possible final cause of the origin of species, and even denies that any such purpose can be proved to exist in nature. Now this point is one which the whole volume before us tends to refute, and in which every intelligent reader will feel convinced by the Duke of Argyll's reasoning. It was Mr. Darwin's error to set up a law, true in many cases, and accounting for sundry lesser variations within species, as the universal law of their origin, admitting no cause of variation but use in the struggle for life. Not content with

the many curious instances of variety for beauty's sake already introduced, our author proceeds to give a conclusive example in the case of the great family of the humming birds. In wondrous beauty, in number of species, in precise and clear distinction of their species, in their limitation to one continent of the globe, and in their myriad variety in that continent, these little birds prove to demonstration that the creating Will did not regard simple use or advantage in the struggle for life. We must here deny ourselves the pleasure of citing particulars, but refer the curious reader to the volume before us, or to Gould's "Trochilidæ," which is quoted as an authority. Indeed, we have delayed so long over this, the most entertaining part of the book, that we cannot pause to notice the refutation of the idea that what is called correlation of growth can account for the creation of species. Some known forces, indeed, do operate in this work of nature, but they are combined with others mysterious and unseen, which man has so far in vain attempted to discover, but which in our ignorance we should never fail to recognize.

We now turn to a more unsatisfactory subject—the Reign of Law in the Realm of Mind. The author confesses that he shrank from the religious aspect of the question; and yet his doubts have not prevented him from dogmatizing a good deal in what he has said. In an early part of his work he approaches the question of Prayer, and its supposed incompatibility with the Reign of Law in nature. Even on our author's theory that Law is the result of Will, acting always by the adjusting of natural agents, the objection appears a formidable one. For if the Supreme Will uses none but natural forces, and if even the adjusting of these forces is not produced by miraculous but by natural means, surely to pray to Him to alter some result in nature is to ask him to have so pre-arranged the collocation of natural causes from eternity, that an exception shall naturally result in answer to our supplication. It is absurd to say that each cause produces a certain fixed effect, but that by miraculous interposition of another cause it may be counteracted, if at the same time the place, condition, and existence of the second cause is naturally determined by its own antecedents; and this is felt so strongly by men that they give up praying against a result in nature which has been established by a good induction. Accordingly, as the belief in the reign of Law, even in the Duke of Argyll's

sense, increases, the objects for which men pray will diminish. No man now thinks of praying to God for the life of a friend whose disease he knows must be fatal; and if the laws of weather ever come to be better understood and reduced to certainty, men will give up praying for rain and for fair weather. If we heard by telegraph that a fierce storm, traveling upon its eccentric but fixed course, were about to assail our neighborhood, should we even now use our prayers to attempt to change its course? Most probably we should pray that God might save us from injury; yet the truest and proper sense even of this supplication would be, not that the material world around us might be put into an abnormal state of strength, but rather that our minds might be directed to take the best precautions; for here we hit upon quite a different order of ideas. We believe that men's minds are not determined by fixed laws. It might chance that one man's free will led him abroad, while another's kept him at home; and while we concede to God a miraculous power of directing this free will, we still believe that it may, and often does, act completely for itself.

But our author differs from the common view altogether, and denies that the human will is free except from compulsion. Beguiled by Mr. Mill's "limpid evasion" of the difficulties of the question, he thinks he can reconcile his notion of Law with the phenomena of mind by adopting a gentle and attractive form of necessity. He reverts to the old objections against the freedom of the will as asserted by consciousness. He shows that the mind depends necessarily on certain bodily conditions; he shows that certain mental peculiarities are obtained by inheritance; he pleads that bystanders often know a man's motives better than he does himself. All this he illustrates with great beauty and force. Hence, he infers, we are deceived when we think we act simply as free agents. The immense complexity of our motives hides the true facts from us. Had we the few and simple motives of the lower animals, we should perceive as plainly in ourselves as we do in them that we must act according to motives, and motives only.

Leibnitz saw all this long ago. Perceiving that the mind was capable of latent modifications, that many states of consciousness were certainly caused by them, he applied the same principles in explaining the phenomena of the will, and concluded that we are

not free agents. But he went on logically to pronounce evil only a negation, to declare the world to be arranged on optimist principles, and so necessarily to deny moral responsibility. And this is the point on which all these systems must founder. It is an argument within the reach of any plain man. If we are responsible for our actions, if we are to be rewarded and punished for them, must we not be free? If we are necessarily determined by motives, how can we be punished for yielding to them? You have in your power the selection between conflicting motives, says our author. This statement contradicts the former, except in those rare cases in which the motives are exactly equal, and moral excellence consists not in choosing between two equal motives but in rejecting what is to most men far the stronger one. Still, says our author, you must be determined by motives, for even in such a case, the mind creates a new motive, the sense of right and wrong, and making it the strongest, or excluding the opposed influence decides the question. For this, he adds, is the

"Secret of that boundless difference which separates man from the highest of the animals below him. He is exposed, indeed, to the lower motives in common with the beasts. But there are others which never can or do operate upon them, which operate largely on him. Foremost among these are the motives which man has the power of bringing to bear upon himself, arising out of the power of forming abstract ideas, &c., and above all, out of his sense of Right and Wrong. So strong are these motives, that they are able constantly to overpower, and sometimes almost to destroy, the forces which are related to his lower faculties."

Surely the author has fused together two opposite theories under the ambiguous meaning of *motive*. Is it not an abuse of language to say that the man who resists temptation by creating within his breast a strong feeling of moral responsibility is determined by motives? We shall end in hopeless confusion except we refuse to use the word, motive, of the action of the will upon itself. Anything brought to bear upon the will from without itself, even from the intellectual part of the mind, is a motive, but it is absurd to speak of the will being determined by law, when it creates principles of action for itself. What makes the will do this? Is it compelled to do so by some other motive? If so, the

will does not *create* the motives. And if it is not, what does the author mean by saying *if* we knew all the external motives, and *if* we knew all the internal motives, which the mind evolves out of itself, and *if*, &c., we could predict exactly what the mind would do in any given case? As Mr. Mansel already had told him, all this merely means "that the prevailing motive prevails." Our author can see no answer to this reasoning, and confesses himself dissatisfied even with Mr. Mill's reply. But at all events, he adds, in a note, Mr. Mill has refuted Mr. Mansel in some other controversies! A most naïve *ignoratio elenchi*. And what shall we say to the following sentence?—

"Caprice implies not only changeableness, but, so to speak, a double degree of changeableness—one which has no rule or reason in its shiftings. It is a fact that there are human wills of this character, and the mischief they have done in the world arises from the power they possess, in common with all other wills, of changing phenomena after their own unreasonable nature."

In the sequel he goes on to show that even such wills act on phenomena through natural antecedents, and so far by law, but in the mean while he has forgotten that they are not made to act by law, at least that this cannot be proved, and that therefore here his reign of Law suffers exception. Grand as is his conception, mighty as is the idea which he unfolds, it is no bed of Procrustes for which facts must be tortured. As we found exception to his analysis of the supernatural, when applied to the Christian miracles, so we object to his psychology.

Yet within proper limits, and with due exceptions, what can be more important in politics, what in education, than a just appreciation of the sway of motives upon the minds of ordinary men? Statistical tables of suicides, and other such acts of will, as would appear perfectly free, while they show sufficient variation to corroborate this belief, still exhibit so close an approximation in their yearly numbers, as to lead irresistibly to the conclusion that in the great majority of cases the same circumstances will induce the same actions.

II.—THE AGE OF ST. PAUL.*

BY THE BISHOP OF LONDON.

Domitian had ascended the throne A. D. 81. Nero had been driven from it thirteen years before, A. D. 68. If St. John was about seventy at the time of Domitian's accession, he would be fifty-seven at the death of Nero. He was, therefore, still in the vigor of his manhood when St. Paul, and very probably also St. Peter, was put to death. We are now in the immediate age of our Lord's contemporaries. The Roman world had groaned under Nero for fourteen years.† What shall we say of this monster in human form? It would be impossible for any man of the slightest modesty to read aloud Suetonius's account of his life, so abominable are his recorded acts of vice. No wonder that the popular traditions of the Church regarded this man as the incarnate Antichrist; there is hardly a crime mentioned in St. Paul's memorable picture of the degradation of the heathen, in the first chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, that was not in him carried to excess. No wonder that he should have been a persecutor of Christians, for he was a persecutor of the human race. The only intelligible account to be given of him is that charitably suggested by Niebuhr, that he was mad. Yet, for fourteen years, he ruled the civilized world. Strange that he should have been so long endured! It will not be useless to recall the exact circumstances of Nero's fall, as they are detailed to us by his biographer, Suetonius.

It was at Naples, on the anniversary of the day on which, nine years before, he had murdered his mother, that Nero heard of the revolt of his armies in the Gallic provinces. For a time he made light of the danger; but soon messenger after messenger arriving, and matters appearing serious, he determined to return to Rome; and when he heard that the armies in Spain had joined in the Gallic revolt, his levity gave way to despair. The Romans believed that, in those days of consternation, he meditated the most outrageous cruelties—to murder all connected

* From *Good Words*, July, 1868. [H. B. H.]

† A. D. 54—A. D. 68.

with the Gallic provinces who happened to be in Rome, as implicated in the conspiracy of the revolted armies—to invite the whole Senate to a feast, and poison them—to set fire to the city, and turn loose the wild beasts of the Amphitheatre amongst the citizens, that he might the better prevent them from exerting themselves to extinguish the flames. But if he really entertained such mad schemes he abandoned them, and began to prepare for war. The spirit of revolt was, however, fast spreading from the provinces to Rome. The people were suffering from scarcity, and soon broke out into seditious murmurs. Horrid dreams are now said to have disturbed Nero's guilty conscience: everything seemed to his excited imagination to predict that his end was near. The news from the revolted provinces became worse and worse; and, terrified lest the people should rise against him, he provided himself with poison and began to prepare for flight. But the soldiers immediately about his person, whom he wished to accompany him, now excused themselves, or openly disobeyed him. He passed a miserable night, meditating vain schemes to avert the public vengeance. About midnight he sprang from his bed, found that the guard had withdrawn from the palace, sent to the houses of his chief favorites, and receiving no answer, went forth himself to implore their aid; but every door was now closed against him. He returned to his chamber, which he found plundered, and even his poison was gone. He now called in vain for some one to slay him, and when he could not find an executioner, rushed forth, as if determined to throw himself into the Tiber. His courage, however, soon failed him, and now, at the suggestion of a freedman, he set forth on horseback, half-dressed as he was, covering his face, and disguised in a threadbare cloak, and with only four attendants, one of whom was the infamous companion of his lust. There was the shock of an earthquake that night, and lightning, as if to terrify him with omens of still greater evil. As he passed the camp, he distinctly heard the soldiers imprecating disasters on his head. Some passengers who met his party on the road, whispered, "They are in pursuit of Nero;" others asked, what news of Nero in the city? One soldier whom he passed recognized and saluted him, as the stumbling of his horse forced him for a moment to disclose his face. And now his party approached his freedman's villa, four miles from Rome. They dismounted, and scrambled through the

shrubs and briers to the back of the house. Here he was forced to hide himself underground; his friends urged him to die by his own hand and save himself from the insults that awaited him. Hesitating, he bade them dig his grave, and gave the measure of it for his stature, telling them to put some pieces of marble and prepare water and fine wood for his corpse, while he shed many tears, and lamented that the world should by his untimely death be deprived of so famous a musician. And now a messenger arrived from Rome to tell his freedmen that the Senate had declared Nero a public enemy, and decreed that he should die by the most disgraceful execution. In terror he seized two daggers, but when he had tried their edge, he sheathed them, and said that his hour was not yet come. Then he begged his companion to show him the example of a brave death, and reproached himself for his hesitation. And now the men approached who were ordered to bring him alive to justice, when at last with the help of one of his companions, he wounded himself in the throat. In a moment the officer of the pursuing soldiers entered and tried to staunch the wound, but it was too late, and the soldiers drew back in horror from the sight of the staring eyes which started from his head, and told that he was gone beyond the reach of human justice. He perished thus miserably in the thirty-second year of his age,* having been born within a few years after our Lord's crucifixion.

In this wretched history of his cowardly death, we seem to read that God had determined even in this world to mark his sense of the atrociousness of Nero's crimes. Though born of the most ancient and noblest family of Rome, he died without a spark of Roman courage or nobility. The biographer has noted that he died on the anniversary of the death of Antonia, the daughter of his predecessor and benefactor, whom three years before he had caused to be slain because she refused to marry him. Doubtless his troubled conscience must have called up during that long night the thought of many a victim of his cruelty. Nine years had passed since he murdered his mother, and six since he murdered his first wife Octavia; and the same year in which he slew Antonia, he had killed his second wife, Poppæa, whom he wished Antonia to succeed. That was the same year

* Clinton, *Fasti Rom.*, A. D. 68.

in which there had been a violent persecution of the Christians. But the number of the victims of Nero's cruelty was so great—many of them, as we said, persons most nearly allied to himself, whom he had been bound to protect and cherish from claims of kindred, or of gratitude—that we can hardly suppose his hardened heart to have cast a thought on the unknown barbarians from the distant East, whose deaths he would scarcely remember, if he had ever known their names, amid the crowd whom he had wantonly condemned. And if he did remember the Christian sufferers, the recollection could hardly disturb his conscience, for the heathen biographer* has recorded amongst his good deeds, along with his attempts to add to the splendor of the city, and restrain the license that had prevailed in chariot races, that he visited with punishment the Christians, men addicted to a new and pestilent superstition.

And now we turn back four years, to the days when Nero was in the zenith of his mad career. He was at Antium, a Latin town on the sea-coast, when news reached him that a dreadful fire had burst out at Rome. It began on the 19th of July,† in some shops where fuel was sold, between the Palatine and Cœlian hills, and raged without any check for six days amid the thickly peopled, irregularly built streets of the ancient city, first destroying the houses on the low grounds, and afterwards rising to the buildings on the hills. No more vivid picture of such a calamity can be drawn than that in which Tacitus has set before us the hurry, consternation, and misery which followed everywhere in the track of the devouring flames, while in the midst of the universal ruin many wretched incendiaries hindered the citizens from defending their property, and even cast brands to spread the conflagration, perhaps only to increase their own chance of plunder, but loudly proclaiming that they acted under orders from the Court.‡ Nero himself did not return to Rome till danger approached his own palace, and when he arrived his attempts to save it were ineffectual. On the sixth day the fire was brought under by throwing down a great number of buildings; but it burst out again and seems to have raged for three days longer,§ spreading now in the more open parts of the city, and

* Suetonius, *Nero*, c. 16. Cf. c. 19 *ad fin.*

† A. D. 64. Cf. Tacit. *Annal.*, xv. 39. ‡ Cf. Tacitus, *Annal.* xv.

§ Cf. Ibid., 40, and the inscription mentioned in Ernesti's note on the 40th ch. of Tacit. *Annal.*, xv.

therefore with less loss of human life and private property, but involving more of the temples and porticoes in destruction. Nero, on his return, while the fire lasted, had exerted himself for the relief of the sufferers; had opened his gardens for their reception, caused temporary dwellings to be erected for them, and taken steps to cheapen the price of corn. But these considerate measures failed to conciliate the multitude, for amongst them the story was commonly believed that while the conflagration was at its worst, he amused himself by a scenic representation, in which he sang the burning of Troy, as if in mockery of the destruction of his own capital. It was believed also that at least the second outbreak of the fire had not been accidental, and that Nero had sought for himself the glory of building a new city from the utter ruin of the old. Of the fourteen districts into which Rome was divided four only remained uninjured; three were utterly leveled with the ground, and the seven others contained little but smouldering ruins. All the ancient temples were consumed, with the whole store of the great remains of Grecian art, and other memorials of a thousand victories. When the time came when men had recovered from the calamity, Nero sought to restore the city with much greater beauty, taking every pains that it should be made more healthy as well as splendid. He sought also to show the people that he attributed the calamity to the anger of the gods, whom he now strove to propitiate by every rite of heathen worship. Yet the historian tells us men could not be persuaded that he was not himself the author of the fire; and then follows a well-known passage, which it may be well to give entire.* To free himself from this suspicion, Nero accused and delivered over to the most unusual tortures, as authors of the late calamity, the people commonly called Christians, whom all hated for their crimes. "These men," says the historian, "took their name from their leader Christ, who in the reign of Tiberius had been executed under the Procurator Pontius Pilate. Their destructive superstition, repressed for a time, had afterwards burst out anew, and spread not through Judea only, the first seat of the malady, but even in the Imperial city, where all that is pestilent and vile in every country is sure to collect and grow. Some of these Christians then were at first seized, who confessed their crime,

* Ch. 44.

and afterwards on their testimony a great multitude were convicted, not so much because the charge of having caused the fire was brought home to them, as because they were regarded as enemies of the human race." (How strange that a man of great ability, priding himself on his philosophic impartiality as an historian, should thus write). "These persons," he continues, "were not only put to death, but exposed to mockery in their execution. They were sewn up in the skins of wild beasts and exposed to dogs, crucified, or given to the flames, being wrapped in pitch when day failed, that, as they slowly expired, they might serve as torches to lighten up the darkness." (This is the persecution which the biographer before quoted reckons amongst the good deeds of Nero). Nero gave the use of his own gardens for this spectacle, and celebrated on the occasion the games of the circus, himself mixing with the people, or borne along in his chariot in the garb of a charioteer. Hence, says Tacitus, though the men were criminals and deserved the worst punishment, they gained compassion as being sacrificed, not for the good of the public, but to glut one man's cruelty.

And here we must ask, where was St. Paul while these atrocities were perpetrated against his beloved brethren of the Roman Church? for history certainly tells us that he was at Rome both shortly before and shortly after this fire. It has been observed that it is not improbable that the Christians had given some cause to the heathen for fixing on them the charge of having been in some way connected with the conflagration. We know both from our Lord's prophecies in St. Matthew, and from the tone of almost all the Epistles, that they looked forward to a day not distant when God would visit the wicked world in judgment, and the earth should be burned with fire before Christ came back to make all things new. When, therefore, they saw the great capital of the world, and the center of its vices, thus involved in apparently hopeless conflagration, we cannot doubt that many of them believed this calamity to be the ushering in of the great day of judgment. It cannot be doubted that such would sternly rebuke the heathens around them, and some might forget what spirit they were of, and point exultingly to the progress of the devastating flames as the fulfillment of warnings which they had often utttered to deaf ears.* This may account for Nero's conduct, and for the hatred

* Cf. Milman's *History of Christianity.*

which seems already to have been felt by the people of Rome against what they would naturally have otherwise regarded at this time as an inoffensive and contemptible sect. Certainly the persecution raged severely, and did not end with this year.

St. Paul had come to Rome from Judea some time before. We may place his first arrival in the capital in the year A. D. 61, the eighth of Nero; the fire was in A. D. 64. At that time he remained there two whole years, living in his own hired house, though a prisoner under military restraint, "preaching the kingdom of God, and teaching those things which concern the Lord Jesus Christ with all confidence, no man forbidding him."* Doubtless many of those who endured the tortures we have just read of, had received their knowledge of the doctrine which now made them constant in suffering from the Apostle's own lips. St. Luke's history in the book of the Acts fails us at the end of these two years of St. Paul's imprisonment; that is, one year before the burning of the city; and we are left to gather from the Epistles what had become of St. Paul during that one year. Most probably he had been acquitted on his trial before the Emperor, and had left Italy.† Before his martyrdom he had time, there is reason to believe, to accomplish his projected journey to Spain, revisit his beloved converts in Asia Minor and in Macedonia, and spent the winter at Nicopolis on the coast of the Hadriatic, over against Italy, within an easy journey of Rome. We cannot say with exactness when, or for what specific reason, he returned to the capital, but history tells us that he was not absent more than four years. He probably left Rome at the close of his first imprisonment, shortly before the fire: he had returned, and was again a prisoner, and closed his second imprisonment by his martyrdom a few months before the death of Nero.‡ St. Paul at Rome, preaching the Gospel in the days of Nero, brought almost into daily connection with the palace where the tyrant dwelt, presents one of the most thrilling contrasts in all history. We have seen what Nero was; we know St. Paul from his Epistles.

During the two years of St. Paul's earlier imprisonment, the

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* Acts xxviii, 30, 31.

† Cf, Milman's *History of Christianity*, vol. ii, book ii, ch. iii. Howson and Conybeare's *St Paul*, vol. ii.

‡ Here we depart from Clinton, who places the death of St. Paul in A. D. 65. See the reasons in Howson and Conybeare.

tyrant, who at first, under the influence of Burrhus and Seneca, had reigned with some show of moderation, was bursting forth without restraint. Burrhus and Seneca were the guardians of Nero's youth, and were able for a time to retain their influence when he had ascended the throne. It was generally believed that Nero chiefly owed his elevation to Burrhus, who had great authority amongst the Pretorian Guards.* He was a stern soldier, whose virtue may on the whole be admired, considering the times in which he lived. Seneca was an accomplished man of the world and philosopher, and certainly knew what was right, and respected goodness, whatever were his own habits of life, as to which there is considerable doubt. Burrhus held the second office in the empire, that of prefect of the Pretorian Guards. It must have been into his hands that St. Paul was delivered by the centurion, who brought him from Judea, as we read in Acts xxviii: 16, "When we came to Rome, the centurion delivered the prisoners to the captain of the guard;" in other words, the prefect of the Pretorians, Burrhus. But Burrhus's influence expired with that very year. Nero hated the restraint of his uprightness, and tried to deprive him of his power. Burrhus had not acted as he ought in the matter of the murder of the Emperor's mother. He was, though perhaps reluctantly, an accomplice before the fact in this unnatural crime, and he could scarcely complain if now he whom he had allowed to murder his mother deserted his early friend.† In A. D. 62, shortly after St. Paul came to Rome, Burrhus died; as many believed, poisoned by the Emperor's command. The death of Burrhus shook the power of Seneca; he was henceforth quite unable to restrain his former pupil; indeed, there were certainly some flagrant defects in the character of this philosopher very inconsistent with the sentiments which posterity to this day admires in his writings; and while the tyrant could not shake himself free from the influence which his former tutor exerted over him, he still could scarcely feel for him that respect and care which might have been a security, even when he began to hate him. Seneca had been Nero's tutor, and with Burrhus, had generally contributed to his elevation to the throne. He is supposed to have written the Emperor's early addresses to the Senate; but one of these, at least,

* *Vide* Niebuhr's *Lectures*, lxiii.

† *Vide* Clinton, A. D. 62. Tacit. *Ann.*, xiv, 51. Ibid, 52.

cannot have increased the pupil's respect for his master. Seneca made the young man, in his first public oration after his accession, speak in terms of high-flown praise of the deceased Emperor Claudius, when it was well known that both tutor and pupil despised him; indeed, Seneca did not hesitate afterwards to publish a bitter satire on the man whose memory he had thus insulted by his eulogy. Again, Seneca, was by profession a rigid Stoic, yet he had used his influence in the state to acquire a fortune, such as few subjects ever possessed, while the splendor of his houses imitated even that of the Emperor. Doubtless, a philosopher, holding the chief seat of influence in such a court, was much out of place, and his position must have called for many unworthy compromises. Nothing, for example, whatever we think of Burrhus, can justify Seneca's conduct in reference to Nero's murder of his mother, Agrippina. Agrippina had been the benefactress of Seneca, and, abandoned woman as she was, she had a right to expect that he never would give his consent to her being sacrificed to the unnatural hatred of her still more abandoned son; yet when Nero, as the great historian has described,* attempted to rid himself of his mother by the horrible device of enticing her to visit him at Baiæ, and sending her home at night, after an evening spent amid all appearances of respect and returning affection, in a vessel which he had prepared by machinery to go to pieces in the water, and the wretched woman had escaped from the waves almost by a miracle, Seneca, called with Burrhus into the Emperor's counsel, to quiet his terror on the prospect of his mother's vengeance, was the first to suggest that the sword might more surely accomplish the purpose in which the waves had failed. The deed was done that very night —in the villa on the coast of which she had been born—as the mother lay in bed exhausted by the perils of her shipwreck, waiting, not without strange forebodings, for some message to convey the congratulations of her son. The sailors, who had failed in their first attempt, now ordered to make all sure in the second, soon dispatched her; but the wretched matricide, who awaited the intelligence at Baiæ, was overwhelmed when he thought deliberately of what he had done. He fled from a spot full of horrors, for he dared not, we are told, look any longer upon that sea

* Tacit. *Ann.*, xiv, 3—8.

which had been the witness of his cowardly and unnatural crime And there Seneca was at hand to aid him in the perplexity, which doubtless increased his remorse; for Agrippina's influence was great with the soldiers, as springing from the ancient lineage of the Cesars, a daughter of their most beloved commander. A story was invented, and deliberately embodied in a letter to the senate, written, to judge by the fragment of it which has come down to us, in a rhetorical style, and which the historian tells us Seneca himself composed.* The story seems to have been that Agrippina had sent an assassin to destroy her son, and that she had died by her own hand when she discovered that her crime had failed. All this had happened in A. D. 59. Burrhus died in A. D. 62. Seneca did not follow his friend to the grave till A. D. 65, the year of the persecution of the Christians. Seneca, therefore, was living during the whole time of St. Paul's first imprisonment in the capital. But he had lost his power to restrain Nero.

From what we have now said, it will be observed that Seneca might well have seen this remarkable prisoner, who was teaching with a power of which his luxurious life knew nothing, and on heavenly motives, which his stoical philosophy would have despised, because it could not comprehend those very lessons of a self-denying, upright life which he delighted in embodying in his writings, seeking perhaps to forget the misery of the vicious scenes around him, while he spake of what his nature, reason, and conscience told him men ought to be. Seneca may have seen St. Paul. His brother Gallio certainly once saw him in his proconsulate of Achaia, when, as we read in the eighteenth chapter of the Acts, nine or ten years before this time, the Jews of Corinth had made insurrection, with one accord, against Paul, and brought him to the judgment-seat (of Gallio, the proconsul), saying, "This fellow persuadeth men to worship God, contrary to the law." Gallio had refused to listen to the questions thus attempted to be forced upon his notice, and had interrupted Paul when about to address him. And if Seneca ever met the apostle, we cannot doubt that he regarded him as his brother did, of whom it is written, that, despising what seemed to his philosophic

* Cf. the fragment given by Quintilian, Quintil., Orat., viii. 5: "Salvum me esse nec credo, nec gaudeo."

heathen pride a contemptible squabble between two contending sects of fanatical Jews, he drove or dismissed the disputants from his judgment-seat.

The fertile imagination of antiquity has pleased itself with inventing fourteen letters from Seneca to St. Paul; these, however, must be regarded as forgeries. If the philosopher knew anything of Christianity (and he could not have been living, as we know he was, in the memorable year 65, the year of the persecution, without hearing much of the sufferings of the Christians), the plausible and self-satisfied Stoic probably looked upon it with feelings not unlike those which we have already seen exemplified in the passages we have quoted from the biographer of Nero and the great historian.

During the two years of St. Paul's residence in Rome at this time, Seneca's power was fast declining. The tyrant's marriage with his infamous mistress, Poppæa, to pave his way for which seems to have been one of his motives in the murder of his mother,* followed quickly upon the death of Burrhus, and, as if in righteous retribution for the part Seneca had taken in abetting this atrocious crime, all the influence of this unprincipled woman as well as that of the new favorite Tigellinus, would seem to have been now used against the philosopher. Accusations had crowded thick upon him before the emperor's marriage. To meet these he had sought an interview with the Emperor, and in a studied address demanded permission to retire into private life, offering to give up all the vast possessions which exposed him to the continual assault of envy. But Nero answered him with hypocritical marks of regard, and even affection, and reserved his complete ruin till a later time. This interview took place a year after the date we have assigned for St. Paul's arrival in Rome. And Seneca now retired from public life, busied himself with literature, and soon, as the Emperor's flagrant acts of wickedness grew more and more atrocious, terrified lest he should be in some way involved in the odium of his crimes, on plea of failing health, shut himself in his own chamber. Two years, however, had scarcely passed before the long-expected blow fell, and he received his imperial pupil's commands to cease from annoying him by living any longer.† The philosopher, as is well known, met

* Tacit. *Ann.*, xiv, 1. † Cf. the passage in Clinton, *Fasti Romani*, A. D. 65.

death with all that collected resolution which so often gave grandeur to the last moments of the better Romans, showing that they were by nature Stoics, even when they knew nothing of the teachings of that sect. In that trying hour he presented a marked contrast to the wretched pusillanimity shown, as we have seen, three years afterwards in the death of his unnatural murderer. It is remarkable that Seneca and his brother Gallio died each by his own hand in the same year. No wonder that suicide was then common, and the heathen philosophers of the Stoic school were then loud in pronouncing it an act of virtue; for men living then in the Roman court were in the midst of a very pandemonium, from which, as heathens, they could not think it wrong to escape by any means; and the power of escaping from life seemed to them to be the only independence left to each in the universal slavery—the only certain defense for each against suffering the last extremities of unendurable tyranny.

But we return to St. Paul's history. Those self-satisfied philosophers might have learned a better and nobler lesson had they been willing to be taught by the old man, broken down by years and infirmities, who looked forth in those same days—not like them, from the luxurious gardens and villas in which they treated of the noble endurance of hardships—but from some humble home, probably in an obscure region of the town, where he was forced day and night to endure the presence of the coarse soldier, according to the customs of the Roman law, to whom his arm was chained. Such is the meaning of the expression that St. Paul lived, in his first imprisonment, in his own hired house. Though he lived in his own lodgings, and all had access to him while waiting for his trial, he was always under the guard of a soldier, to whom it was the custom that the prisoner should be chained. This was a great indulgence, compared with the misery of being cast into the common prison, but it was still felt by him to be a severe trial, as the many allusions to his chain in his Epistles, written at this time, show. The state of Rome, we have seen, was now fast approaching to its worst phase. Nero's mad cruelty and lust were fast bursting forth to those excesses which soon afterwards exhausted the world's patience. It is a striking thought—well expressed in that work, the name of which we have prefixed to this paper, which cannot be too strongly recommended, as giving a vivid picture of St. Paul's life, in its connection with

all that antiquity has told us of the history and geography of the days in which he lived,—Conybeare and Howson's *St. Paul:* it is a striking thought, I say, how the soldier, who, one day, was thus watching St. Paul, was obliged to be present at the assembly of the Christians at his house while he prayed and preached, might next day, be keeping guard at the door of Nero's chamber, or be sent forth to execute one of those deeds of blood which spread terror almost daily through the city.*

Circumstances which we can only conjecture delayed St. Paul's trial for a long time; and God used this comparative rest of his servant for the edification of his Church. We have seen that he was daily engaged in building up the faith of the Roman converts and adding to their number. Many of those who died a few years afterwards in Nero's savage persecution, no doubt owed their knowledge of the truth to their admission to this kind home in which the Apostle received all who came to him. Here also he wrote many Epistles, which have cheered and edified the Universal Church ever since; for in his bonds, as much as in the days of his liberty, there pressed upon St. Paul the care of all the churches. He wrote now and dispatched from Rome his Epistle to Philemon—a most precious document, as showing how the Apostle, amidst his many anxieties, did not neglect the very least and poorest. Onesimus, a runaway slave, reckoned one of the most abject of mankind in those days of barbarous slavery, had been brought to join the company that worshipped in Paul's house. The Apostle had known his master, Philemon, at Colosse, in Asia, and he sends the man back to him with a letter that breathes the very essence of Christian consideration both for the master and the servant who had deserted him. With this letter he sent also his Epistles to the Colossian church and to the Ephesians. Soon afterwards he wrote to the Philippians—an Epistle, as all will remember, full of the tenderest expressions of regard, to a church which well deserved his praise. This Epistle is, for our present purpose, much to be noted for the two allusions it contains to the progress Christianity was making in the very palace of the abandoned Emperor, and amid the rough soldiers of his guard. Ch. iv, 22: "All the saints salute you, chiefly

* See the passage, Conybeare and Howson, vol. ii, pp. 447, 448, speaking of the Epistle to the Philippians, and referring especially to the passages, i, 13, and iv, 22.

they that are of Cesar's household." Ch. i, 12: "But I would ye should understand, brethren, that the things which have happened unto me have fallen out rather unto the furtherance of the Gospel; so that my bonds in Christ are manifest in all the palace," or, as the word may be better translated, in all the Pretorian camp.

Time wore away amid these varied labors; but at last the day for the trial came. Very striking is the picture drawn in the same work to which I have before referred, of the scene which must have here been presented, when at last St. Paul's appeal came on for hearing, and he stood in the immediate presence of the tyrant:*

"Nero, after the example of Augustus, heard appeals in criminal causes in the imperial palace, whose ruins still crown the Palatine. Here, at one end of a splendid hall, lined with the precious marbles of Egypt and of Libya, we must imagine the Cesar seated in the midst of his assessors. These councilors, twenty in number, were men of the highest rank and greatest influence. The judge in this case, now at the age of twenty-five, had, besides many other victims, murdered his innocent wife (his first wife, Octavia) and his adopted brother, Britannicus, and had dyed his hands in the blood of his mother. Yet even these enormities had disgusted the Romans less than his prostitution of the imperial purple by publicly performing as a musician on the stage, and as a charioteer in the circus.† His degrading want of dignity and insatiate appetite for vulgar applause drew tears from the councilors and servants of his house, who could see him slaughter his nearest relatives without remonstrance. Before the tribunal of this blood-stained adulterer, Paul the Apostle was now brought in fetters, in the custody of his military guard. We may be sure that he, who had so often stood undaunted before the delegates of the Imperial throne, did not quail when he was at last confronted with its master (one so deserving of his contempt). His life was not in Nero's hands: he knew that while the Lord had work for him on earth He would shield him from the tyrant's sword, and if his work were over he would gladly depart and be with Christ, which was far better.

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* Conybeare and Howson, pp, 455, 407.

† *Vide* Conybeare and Howson, p. 437.

"We know not whether in his defense he entered on this occasion into the peculiar doctrines of that sect to which he belonged, basing them, as he ever did, on the resurrection of the dead, and reasoning of righteousnes, temperance, and judgment to come. If he did, he had one auditor, at least, who had more need to tremble than Felix. But doubtless a seared conscience and a universal frivolity of character rendered Nero proof against emotions, which for a moment shook the nerves of a less audacious criminal."

The trial ended, we have every reason to believe, in St. Paul's acquittal. The charge against him was threefold. This we gather from the accusation made before deliberately by his countrymen, and his answer to it, when to avoid their unjust judgment, he appealed from the provincial governor to the Emperor. He was accused of heresy, sacrilege, and treason. The first—his heresy against the Jewish religion—though it had endangered his life in his own land, would be very lightly, if at all, regarded when he came to stand before the heathen rulers; but the other two, even the second, were grave offenses according to the Roman law. The Jewish religion was at this time under the protection of the state. St. Paul was accused of having disturbed the Jews in the exercise of their worship, by attempting to profane their temple. But the third charge was by far the most serious. He was a ringleader of a new and seditious sect, and was everywhere disturbing the peace of the empire by agitation.

We have no means of stating, except from conjecture, what the circumstances of the trial were. Nero, according to the usage of the day, must have himself presided. About this time, as we learn from history, a deputation of Jews on other matters, came to Rome, and some of these were perhaps the Apostle's accusers. It is surprising that the influence of the infamous Poppæa, whom in 62 we have seen Nero had married, and who in 63 was, from the birth of her daughter, at the very height of her power, should not have prevailed to cause the Apostle to be put to death. For this infamous woman was, strange to say, a Jewish proselyte, and in intimate communication with leading Jews of the times. It has been conjectured that perhaps another influence equally corrupt, strove in this instance to resist her.* Nero had at this time a favorite freedman, put to death by the succeeding Emperor, of

* Cf. Conybeare and Howson, p. 460.

whom we read in the 16th chapter of the Romans 11th verse, that he had Christian converts in his household. "Greet them" (says St. Paul, writing to the Roman church a few years before) "that be of the household of Narcissus, which are in the Lord." The influence of this Narcissus, Nero's freedman, may have been put forth against Poppæa, and thus one corrupt influence may have counterbalanced the other, and left Nero to do an act of justice. This, however, is also conjecture. All we learn with tolerable certainty is that the trial ended in an acquittal.

And now that he was acquitted he went forth, we may suppose, with a thankful heart—old and infirm as he was (he was near seventy)—still revolving great schemes of what he would do on earth for his beloved Master. The few years passed quickly amid his abundant labors, and he moved with great rapidity from place to place, visiting all the countries we have before mentioned in east and west, adding also to the legacy for posterity which he was accumulating in his writings—for in these years he wrote the 2d to Timothy and the Epistle to Titus. At the end of this time we find him again within an easy journey of Rome, on the coast of the Hadriatic. In the interval, as we have seen, had happened the fire of Rome and the dreadful persecution of the Christians which followed. Why St. Paul came again to Rome, whether he came willingly to finish work which in his last visit he had left imperfect, or whether he was seized at Nicopolis on the charge of having been concerned in the fire, we cannot tell. All we know is that he certainly came to Rome, and was again a prisoner, probably in the summer of 68, the year of Nero's death. Neither can we say for certain to what sort of imprisonment he was now subjected. It was certainly severe. We have the authentic record of his feelings in the second Epistle which he now wrote to Timothy: that noble Epistle—the last dying words of the great Apostle—which breathes the very spirit of his martyrdom.

Nero had made a long tour in Greece, in which he gave unrestrained vent to his almost insane love of being praised for his proficiency in music and poetry. And while the imperial player wandered from place to place, visiting the games, and astounding the world by the spectacle of an Emperor on the stage, he left the care of Rome and Italy to his freedman Helius, a fit representative of such a monster. It was probably before this man that St. Paul was summoned to appear. 2 Timothy iv, 16: "At my first

answer no man stood with me, but all men forsook me: I pray God that it may not be laid to their charge." The first three chapters of the Epistle are full of exhortations to his son in the faith, showing how he is to bear himself in the dangerous days that were coming on; and he expresses an earnest desire and hope that as he has escaped from his first interview with Nero's representative, he may still be spared long enough to see his son once more when he returned from the East. Ch. iv, 21: "Do thy diligence to come before winter." He seems to be making preparations for his trial. "The books I left at Troas, and especially the parchments, bring with thee." But he seems to have no expectation that he will now escape with life. Ch. iv, 6: "I am now ready to be offered, and the time of my departure is at hand. I have fought a good fight, I have kept the faith: henceforth there is laid up for me a crown of righteousness, which the Lord, the righteous judge, shall give to me at that day." He expected, no doubt, to live till the winter; but there is every reason to believe that God had decreed otherwise. All history makes the Apostle fall before the death of Nero. We know not where, during the short interval, he was imprisoned; perhaps again in a private house, though strictly watched; perhaps, as the old tradition says, in the Mamertine prison below the Capitol, that gloomy monument of guilt and misery preserved from the earliest times of the old Roman kings, seven or eight hundred years before, in which the Moorish usurper, Jugurtha, had been starved to death—the accomplices of Catiline strangled—and where Sejanus met his death. There is a cell still pointed out in this prison, said to have been occupied both by St. Peter and St. Paul. But this is all uncertain tradition. In his prison, wherever it was, he was visited by the brethren: most of them, doubtless, of low degree, but not all unknown. "There salute thee," he says to Timothy, writing from his prison, "Pudens, Linus, and Claudia,"—Linus, afterwards bishop of the Roman Church; Pudens, whom there is good reason to identify with the son of a Roman senator commemorated in the poetry of the age; Claudia, his bride, sung by the same poet, perhaps the daughter of a British king. But soon the prison-gates opened; Paul, we may suppose, was heard again before the prefect of the city, and condemned. Being a Roman citizen, he was spared the indignity of crucifixion or of being thrown to the wild beasts. He went forth, history tells us, without the city on the Ostia road; and there his head

was severed from his body by the sword. A spot is marked out by tradition as that on which he fell, called, from a legend connected with his death, the "Three Fountains." The gate which leads to it is still called by St. Paul's name, and the great church of St. Paul stands hard by, first erected by the Emperor Constantine, in memory of the martyrdom. The body was probably conveyed away by his weeping friends to be buried secretly in the catacombs.

Nobly, doubtless, St. Paul bore himself to the last as he had lived, and died rejoicing. Almost his last authentic words are those of 2 Timothy iv, 17, 18: "The Lord stood with me and comforted me, and I was delivered out of the mouth of the lion. And the Lord shall deliver me from every evil work, and will preserve me unto his heavenly kingdom." There is a contrast in these burning words to the cold stoicism of Seneca. What a contrast to the dark fate of his detested persecutors, of both of whom God relieved the world the very summer after St. Paul fell, within a few miles of the spot which saw his calmly rejoicing Christian end!

Who that reads the history of St. Paul's labors, preaching, epistles, and martyrdom, interwoven as they are in the very center of the history of the empire in those days, can doubt the heavenly power of the Christianity which raised him to protest—first by his life and afterwards by his death, against the utter degradation of the age, and in the very city which was the center of the world's wickedness?

This paper will have served its purpose if it lets us see how indissolubly the history of the church is intertwined with that of the Roman empire in the days when Christianity arose. To write a history of the reign of Nero without recognizing the presence and influence of the rising religion, would be as great an absurdity as to describe the reign of the emperor Charles V. in Germany without any allusion to Luther and the Reformation. Christianity arose with gigantic power in those days—was fast spreading itself over the empire—was known and felt in the imperial city as in all the provinces; and Paul, the real great historical character of this age, is proved, both from what history tells of him, and from his own undoubted writings, to be far greater, not only than the degenerate soldiers and politicians of the wretched court, but than all the vaunted philosophers and men of letters who were living in the same age.

III.—CAMBRIDGE CHARACTERISTICS IN THE 17TH CENTURY.*

Prize essays are not for the most part very inviting productions. Even when written, as they sometimes are, by men of real learning and ability, their style is so ambitious, the desire for display is so painfully evident, that they are seldom read except by those on whom the duty falls of deciding upon their merits, or by those feeling a personal interest in the writers. There are of course exceptions to the general neglect to which this class of literature is consigned, and Mr. Mullinger's essay † deserves the exceptional favor due to a sensible and pleasant book. Although written in the first instance to obtain the approval of academic judges, it is free from pedantry and rhetorical display. So far from obtruding himself unduly on the notice of his readers, the essayist frequently hides himself altogether behind well-chosen quotations, and allows contemporaries and eye-witnesses to tell the story of the eventful times to which his subject carries him. By this means, and by his own well-written sketches, he has contrived to give us, in the compass of a very small volume, many a pleasant glimpse of those scenes and characters which, however familiar, Englishmen feel they can scarcely look upon too often. The essayist was certainly fortunate in his subject. Cambridge was a well-chosen point from which to survey England during the 17th century. The historian of Cambridge, without going out of his way, may touch upon almost everything that was most important in the political and intellectual life of England in the period; for Cambridge was in one way or another connected with it all. Macaulay, in his Essay on Bacon, has claimed for his own university a larger and more honorable part in the great movements of the 16th century than for its more ancient and splendid rival. "Cambridge," he says, "had the honor of educating those celebrated Protestant bishops whom Oxford had the honor of burning; and at Cambridge were formed the minds of all those statesmen to whom chiefly is to be

* From the *British and Foreign Evangelical Review*, July, 1868.

† *Cambridge Characteristics in the 17th century.* By JAMES BAAS MULLINGER, B. A., St. John's College, Cambridge. 1867.

attributed the secure establishment of the reformed religion in the north of Europe." In the 17th century the position of Cambridge was scarcely less important; then, as formerly, it could claim connection with many of the foremost men of the age. Mr. Mullinger thus pleasantly introduces us to some of the notable men who were to be found in the streets and colleges of Cambridge some years after the beginning of the century:

"Let us, then, step back two centuries, and endeavor to reproduce to our mental vision, the Cambridge of those days. We shall miss many a noble structure as we move through her streets; we shall meet here and there some familiar face which the painter's canvas has preserved to posterity; and we may mark not a few in the humble garb of a studious undergraduateship, destined to leave to their countrymen a bright example, and to win a deathless fame. We see Milton with his maiden face, hardly on the best terms with the authorities at Christ's, but already gaining credit by his epigrams and exercises; Fuller, the future church historian, the quaint humorist, to whom is reserved the task of chronicling with filial affection the history of his own Alma Mater; Henry More, the Platonist, 'a tall, thin youth, of clear, olive complexion, and a wrapt expression;' Seth Ward, my future lord bishop, with his flaxen hair, and boyish stature, winning, sadly to his own discomfiture, the attention of grave seniors whenever he ventures beyond the walls of Sydney; Cleveland, the satirist, and Crashaw, the sweet lyric poet, both already giving promise of their future powers; Pearson, the interpreter of the faith to many a succeeding generation; Cudworth, destined to a foremost place in philosophic thought; Mede, now a senior fellow at Christ's, deep in astrology and apocalyptic studies; Jeremy Taylor, just elected to his fellowship at Caius; all these, two hundred and thirty-five years ago, might probably have been met on the same day in the streets of Cambridge."

Notwithstanding the great names to which Cambridge can point as adorning her halls of learning at this time, we shall greatly deceive ourselves if we imagine it to have been a scene of cloistered peace and innocence. Reckless and wicked living prevailed, even among the younger students, to a great extent. Sir Simond D'Ewes, who was afterwards a member of the Long Parliament, has left in his diary a damning record of the state of

matters in his day. Writing as a fellow commoner of St. John's in the year 1620, he says, "But the main thing which made me weary of the college, was that swearing, drinking, rioting, and hatred of all piety and virtue, under false and adulterate names, did abound there, and generally in all the university. Nay, the very sin of lust began to be known and practiced by very boys, so that I was fain to live almost a recluse's life, conversing chiefly in our own college with the honester fellows thereof." Although Mr. Mullinger, as a true son of the University, endeavors to soften in some degree the dark shadow of this picture, he is obliged, as a candid historian, to own that it is in all probability substantially correct. As a timid and somewhat austere man, D'Ewes may have judged some things rather severely but in the main we must accept his account as the view that most good men in England at the time took of the state of Cambridge. "What such men as Hampden, Digby, Capel, Palmer, Hyde, and Falkland would have said of Cambridge, is probably very much what D'Ewes did say."

One cause probably of the demoralized state of the university at this period was the relaxation of the ancient discipline. In former times the conduct of the students had been regulated by very strict rules. They were forbidden to go into taverns, or to attend fairs. They were not to be seen at boxing matches, skittle playings, dancings, or at any similar amusements. And to enforce the observance of these rules, no student was permitted to go into town unaccompanied by his tutor or a master of arts. These regulations had latterly been very much relaxed; probably with altered times, it was found impossible to preserve them in their ancient rigor; and except in the rare cases where there existed self-restraint and high principle, the removal of the restrictions appears to have been followed by evil consequences. The dramatic entertainments, which were at this time so popular, in which the students took part, and which were patronized by the authorities, had probably something to do with the loose state of morals. Dr. Isaac Barrow said of these entertainments somewhat later, "that they were a principal cause of the licentiousness then prevalent." And it is not likely that at this period their influence was more healthy. There evidently existed, however, a party in the university who were opposed to the prevailing frivolity. In 1632, when Charles I. and his Queen paid a

visit to Cambridge, a play was acted before them by the students. D'Ewes, whose testimony we have cited above, has left us an account of his feelings on the occasion. "The King and Queen," he writes, came from Newmarket to Trinity College. Whilst they were at an idle play there, which gave offense to most of the hearers, I went into Trinity College library, and there viewed divers ancient manuscripts, which afforded me as much content as the sight of the extreme vanity of the court did sorrow." Milton has likewise left on record the impression which the university theatricals made upon him in his earnest college days. "But since there is such necessity to the hearsay of a tire, a periwig or a vizard, that plays must have been seen, what difficulty was there in that, when in the colleges so many of the young divines, and those of next aptitude, have been seen so oft upon the stage, writhing and unboning their clergy limbs to all the antics and dishonest gestures of trinculoes, buffoons, and bauds, prostituting the shame of that ministry, which either they had or were nigh having, in the eyes of the courtiers and court ladies, with their grooms and mademoiselles? There, while they acted and over-acted among other young scholars, I was a spectator; they thought themselves gallant men and I thought them fools; they made sport, and I laughed; they mispronounced, and I misliked; and to make up the Atticism, they wore out, and I hissed."

We have from various quarters evidence that there existed at this time at Cambridge, an earnest minority, opposed to frivolities and devoted to grave studies. Curiously enough, theology appears to have had no authorized place in the curriculum; and the reason of this strange omission was, not that no interest was felt in the subject, but that the interest was of so fervid and fiery a kind, that the college authorities with true Anglican caution, judged it better to ignore the subject altogether, than "to introduce what might prove an element of discord into the daily routine of instruction." But there were men in Cambridge for whom theology possessed too absorbing an interest to permit them to rest satisfied with the safe silence which was regarded by the authorities as the highest wisdom. Mr. Mullinger gives us some pleasant pictures of the labors of those unrecognized teachers. We get glimpses of young men meeting in their tutor's room each morning and evening to read the scriptures together. We hear of a certain Mr. William Chapell, fellow of

Christ's College, who *arminianised* his pupils, and of another who "did commend unto them to read the lives of all the holy men of old time, and saints of God, the good fathers of the church, and of those good men in our own later times, even in the Church of England, the saints and holy martyrs." Of Whichcot it is said that "he studied to raise those who conversed with him to a nobler set of thoughts, and to consider religion as a seed of a deiform nature (to use one of his own phrases). In order to this, he set young students much on reading the ancient philosophers, chiefly Plato, Tully and Plotin, and on considering the Christian religion as a doctrine sent from God both to elevate and sweeten human nature, in which he was a great example as well as a wise and kind instructor." And about Henry More, "the angel of Christ's church," his biographer has given the following account:—"A very sober person and quondam pupil of his told me what pains he would take with those under him; and, among other things, what excellent lectures he would deliver to them of piety and instruction from the chapter that was read on nights in his chamber." Such traits relieve the somewhat dark picture we get of the condition of faith and morals in the university at this period. Not a few of the better influences of the place may be traced to the Puritans, who still possessed considerable power. During the reign of Elizabeth, in Cambridge as well as in Oxford, the Puritans, though a minority, were an active and influential party. Their doctrines were sometimes preached in the most uncompromising form from the pulpits of the universities, and although the Queen herself was not favorable to them, many of her ablest ministers, Cecil among others, had strong Puritanical leanings, and gave to the party what support and countenance they were able. When, in the beginning of the century, the great Queen died, and the crown of England was placed upon the head of a Scottish king, hopes were entertained that the lovers of the theology and church government of Geneva would receive the royal countenance. So far as the question was purely theological, James might have been disposed to favor Calvinism. Indeed, he appears to have been intellectually a Calvinist; he was, as is well-known, a determined and somewhat unfair promoter of the decisions of the Synod of Dort. But James was guided in his public as well as in his private dealings, far more by personal feeling than by the abstract

claims of truth and righteousness. From the first he had recognized in the Puritan clergy an ominous resemblance to the unbending northern ministers, by whom he had been so often thwarted and rebuked, and he resolved if possible to crush them. His sentiments very soon became apparent. In the second year of his reign, he presided in his own drawing-room at Hampton Court, at a conference of the leaders of the opposing parties. At this conference the Puritans were in every possible manner humiliated and insulted by the royal president. He told Dr. Reynolds, their distinguished leader, that if a schoolboy did not answer better than he had done he would be flogged. It was at this conference that James made his famous declaration about Presbytery. "If you aim," said he, "at a Scotch Presbytery, it agreeth as well with monarchy as God and the devil. . . . for no bishop, no king." The bishops fully repaid the royal patron for the favor he showed to them. They declared that he spoke by the special inspiration of God's Spirit, and one right reverend prelate fell on his knees on the drawing-room floor and exclaimed, "I protest my heart melteth with joy that Almighty God of his singular mercy hath given us such a king as since Christ's time hath not been seen."

It was not unnatural that the Puritans should be disappointed to find that the theological sovereign regarded them with so hostile an eye. It is difficult for us now to realize the importance which in those days attached to the smile or frown of a king. But it was in reality a most fortunate event for the moral influence of the Puritans in England, that the weak and worthless son of Mary Stuart did not take to patronizing them. Under such a patronage, Puritanism might have easily degenerated into a thorny scholasticism, and ceased to be a power over the consciences of men; but standing as it did apart, disapproving and disapproved, it silently won to itself the sympathies of the noblest and most patriotic Englishmen of the time. The other party enjoyed the royal favor, but as Mr. Mullinger justly says "not much to their own advantage. The prestige of a Church whose supreme power ordained that the Book of Sports should receive the sanction of her pulpits, was lowered in the eyes of all religious men; and it must be owned that it henceforth appears as the misfortune rather than any part of the strength of the Church of England, that her reputation seemed necessarily to some extent involved

in that of her temporal head." And another Anglican historian tells us, "Grave divines danced attendance at the levee of a profligate favorite, and thought it necessary to be continually at hand to watch that the reversion which had been promised to them was not snapt up by another."

To return, however, to Cambridge and its studies. The barren logic and rhetoric which had excited the wrathful contempt of young Bacon half a century earlier, were still the leading studies of the place, and the disputations at the schools remained the accredited road to academical distinction. "The enthusiasm," we are told, "elicited by one of these encounters, when taking place between antagonists of much reputation, almost equalled that which in modern times a contest for the champion's belt excites in the admirers of the ring." But other and more useful studies had also, since the previous century, found a place in the curriculum. The classics were still studied with something of the enthusiasm which attaches to the exploring of a newly discovered region, and if the scholarship of the time was not equal in elegance and refinement to that which was afterwards reached by English scholars, there never was a period when the reading of the students embraced so wide a range. The fathers and the Neo-Platonists, as well as the ordinary classical authors, were at this time familiar to the scholars of Cambridge. Mathematics were taught, but only in their elements, and physical science of course not at all. Modern enlightenment may be disposed to regard such a range of study as narrow and pedantic, but it ought not at all events to be forgotten, that not a few of those trained in this system left a broad mark in the literature of England. One school of the writers of the time call for special notice from their connection with Cambridge. "It would make a delightful and instructive essay," says Mr. Coleridge, "to draw up a critical, and where possible, biographical account of the latitudinarian party at Cambridge, from the close of the reign of James I. to the earlier half of Charles II." Mr. Mullinger, without attempting all that Coleridge desired, has made a contribution towards it. He describes them "as a distinct school of religious thought and legitimate growth of the Cambridge training of that day; a class of thinkers inured to habits of close reasoning and subtle distinction, by the study of Aristotle and the logicians; to lofty and glowing speculation by the perusal of

Plato and Cicero, of Plotinus and Porphyry: and taught to cultivate a deeply reverential spirit in matters of religious belief, by the example of such writers as Augustine and Chrysostom."

The bond of union between More, Smith, Cudworth and others of his school, was not political, nor even theological, but philosophical. In their political, and even in their theological leanings, they appear to have differed, but they were at one in their desire to form a Christian philosophy, and the same vein of mystic speculation may be traced in all. Coleridge says that although they called themselves Platonists, they were more truly Plotinists, and this criticism appears to be correct. The influence of the Neo-Platonists, and of the Church fathers, who had imbibed the spirit of the schools of Alexandria rather than of Plato, is to be traced in their writings. One of the best known, at all events one of the most typical of the school, was the gentle tutor of Christ's Church, Dr. Henry More. Born at Grantham, in Lincolnshire, in 1614 and educated in strict Calvinistic principles, which he abandoned however in later life, More became a tutor in Christ's church in 1631. In Christ's church all his days were spent; for, though often solicited to accept preferment, he could never be persuaded to leave his thoughts and his books. He was passionately, we might say self-indulgently, fond of contemplation. As he says himself, he made a "paradise" of his own studies and reflections. At times, his biographer tells us, he was swallowed up in rapturous warmths, and was entirely lost in joy and happiness. This genial teacher soon gathered disciples around him, and became the center of an admiring circle. His writings, although mystical and not very intelligible, appear to have won a considerable popularity with the religious public of the day. This, we should imagine, was far from displeasing to him, as judging from his writings, we should say that there was a considerable vein of quiet vanity in his character. In the introduction to the "Mystery of Godliness," he says that in his earlier studies he had occupied himself with inquiries into the nature of the human soul, "which I pursued," he says, "chiefly by the guidance of the school of Plato, whose philosophy to this very day I look upon to be more than human in the chief strokes thereof." "A dangerous sickness," he continues, "that made me suspect that the time did near approach of quitting this earthly tabernacle,

urged me more carefully to bethink myself what reception I might have in the other world. And praised be God, such was the conviction of my soul, though then much overrun with melancholy, that my presage concerning my future state was very favorable and comfortable, and my desire was to be gathered to that Body of which Jesus Christ is Head, even he who was crucified at Jerusalem and felt the pangs of death for the propitiation of the sins of the world, who was there represented to me as visible a Prince and as distinct a Person and Head Politic as any king or potentate upon earth." The result of these sick-bed meditations was that he resolved to devote his pen more directly than he had hitherto done to the service of his "Head Politic." In the "Mystery of Godliness," this purpose was carried out. In this work the incarnation of our Lord in all its bearings is reverently discussed and illustrated with many curious and interesting thoughts, derived from philosophy and history. Notwithstanding the Platonic dress in which he loves to array everything, More holds firmly and expounds reverently and lovingly all the great doctrines of Christianity. He protests most energetically against the tendency to spiritualize away the reality of the gospel history. "That the human person of Christ," he says, "is not to be laid aside, is evident from the whole epistle of the author to the Hebrews. For he that there is said to be a high priest for ever, is that very man who was crucified on the Cross at Jerusalem." And again, "I have, with all earnestness of endeavor, and with undeniable clearness of testimony, from reason and scripture demonstrated the truth and necessity of both Christ within and Christ without." It would appear that he did not altogether relish the phrase "imputative righteousness," but his views on justification did not really differ from those of the other divines of the period; he was perhaps fonder of laying stress upon this, that "the end of the gospel was to renovate the spirits of men into true and real inherent righteousness and holiness," and he spoke of it as a "great scandal and effectual counterplot against the power of the gospel, the nullifying and despising of moral honesty by those that are great zealots and high pretenders to religion." "For what an easy thing it is," he exclaims, "for a man to fancy himself an Israelite, and then to circumvent his honest neighbors under the notion of Egyptians." As for the Roman Catholic Church, he considered that the economy of that

church "naturally tends to the betraying of souls to eternal destruction," but adds, nevertheless, "not that it is possible for me (who cannot infallibly demonstrate to myself that all that lived under paganism are certainly damned) to imagine that all that have gone under the name of Papists have tumbled down into hell."

The above extracts will give an idea of the spirit of More's speculations, and indicate, with sufficient clearness, the class of modern thinkers with which he and others of the school had most affinity. We are aware that many earnest and conscientious Christians regard with suspicion all endeavors to construct a Christian philosophy as likely to end in unbelief and heresy. We cannot deny that examples can be cited from ecclesiastical history, which give at least an apparent plausibility to this view. Nor can we say, even for More and his friends, that they never transgressed the limits of legitimate Christian speculation, that they never forgot that there are some questions which have been raised in theology, the decision of which ought to be referred, according to the advice of Erasmus, not to a general council of divines, but to the day of judgment. No man, however, not blinded by prejudice, can look into the works of the Cambridge Platonists without being struck and touched by the genuine piety and simple love of truth by which they are distinguished, while the poetic glow of their style and manner is often very charming. Had we no better plea to offer in their defense, we might, at all events, say that teachers so gentle and genial are a pleasing phenomenon in the dark and troublous times in which they lived,—like

> "Moonlight on a troubled sea,
> Brightening the storm it cannot calm."

But they are entitled to recognition on other grounds. It has been said most justly of Cudworth by a recent critic that the thinker who, in the age of Hobbes, enunciated the proposition that the will of God is essentially righteous, that power is only its accident, its attribute, did thereby win a title to canonization among the moralists of England. And all the writers of the school were earnest assertors of the reality of eternal truth and righteousness. To say that a Christian philosophy is impossible, that all attempts to reconcile the teachings of our faith

with the lessons of life and history are mischievous and vain, is to forget that to all true vocations of man there is a place allotted in the service of that faith which is wide as humanity, for it came from Him who knoweth what is in man. It is also to forget many an honored name in the pages of church history; for, from the time when Justin Martyr wore the philosopher's gown and witnessed for the Christian's creed, down to the present day, not a few true and able defenders of the faith have spoken in philosophic language. Among such the Platonists of Cambridge deserve no unhonored place.

The times of the Civil War form a rough episode in the academical history of Cambridge. According to the royalist accounts, the university was loaded with "a whole Iliad of miseries," and we can well believe that Cromwell and his troopers sadly fluttered the timid academical birds in their quiet nests. Mr. Carlyle has sketched the situation with grim humor. "Of course," says he, "the academic stillness is much fluttered by the war drum, and many a confused brabble springs up between gown and garrison; college tippets, and, on occasions, still more venerable objects getting torn by the business. The truth is, though Cambridge is not so malignant as Oxford, the surplices at All Hallowtide have still much sway there, and various heads of houses are by no means what one could wish, of whom accordingly Oliver has had and still occasionally has, to send by installment, as the cases ripen, a select batch up to Parliament; Rev. Dr. this, then also Dr. that, who are lodged in the Ely House, in Lambeth or elsewhere in a tragic manner, and pass very troublous years."

In 1643, copies of the Solemn League and Covenant were sent down to Cambridge, and the names of those who took this test, and of those who refused it were returned to Parliament. In the following year college offices implying trust were restricted to those who had signed the covenant. At a later period "the engagement," a test of similar import was imposed upon the members of the university. This may be regarded as very hard and oppressive; no doubt from one point of view it was, but it must be apparent that when once the questions between King and Parliament were referred to the wager of battle, neither party could be expected willingly to suffer a place of such importance as Cambridge to be ruled by its enemies. But there was never, we believe, any desire on the part of the Parliament to

interfere with Cambridge and its studies. In the first year of the war, we find Essex issuing a special order to all colonels, lieutenant-colonels, and captains of the Parliamentary forces, warning them "not to offer any damage to the university of Cambridge, or to any of the schools, colleges, halls, libraries, or other places belonging to the said university." Cambridge afterwards assisted the king with plate and money which may have brought upon it somewhat harsh treatment, but nothing recorded can justify the lamentations of such writers as Walker. We read, it is true, that on one occasion when a preacher was going in his robes through the streets to deliver a Latin oration in one of the colleges, the troopers followed him and cried, "a Pope, a Pope," and when they came to the chapel and found the sermon was to be in Latin, they exclaimed that preachers ought to preach in English, that all might understand: we are not sure but the preacher's gown got torn, but nothing more serious, and this is the nearest approach to an outrage we can remember as having occurred. When the civil war was over, and the supreme power was placed in the strong hands of the Protector, Cambridge, as well as other places had occasionally to take very distinct orders from the "Col. Cromwell" it had known of old. We find him writing on one occasion to the Vice Chancellor and Senate of the University as follows:— "Whereas we are informed that you cannot by the statutes, and according to the customs of the university, admit any to the degree of Bachelor of Music unless he had some years before been admitted in a college; and whereas we are also certified that Benjamin Rogers hath attained to eminence and skill in that faculty, we, willing to give all encouragement to the studies and abilities of men in that or any other ingenuous faculty, have thought fit to declare our will and pleasure by these our letters, that, notwithstanding your statutes and customs, you cause Benjamin Rogers to be admitted and created Bachelor in Music in some one or more of your congregations assembled in that our university, he paying such dues as are belonging to that degree, and giving some proof of his accomplishments and skill in music."

That academical use and wont should have to give way to plain common sense, was doubtless felt to be a great hardship by many of Cambridge's doctors; but we live in times when men

are beginning to whisper that more than one ancient and venerable institution might be rendered considerably less useless were common sense once more armed with sovereign power.

Mr. Mullinger, fair and candid as he usually is, evidently cannot contemplate with any patience the idea of Puritans ruling in his beloved Cambridge. Little interest, he says, can be felt in a period so abnormal, and he quotes with approval Lord Macaulay's contemptuous description of university studies during these times. *

Unfortunately our information regarding the state of the university during this period is extremely scanty; but the impression conveyed by Lord Macaulay and other writers, that the ordinary studies were discontinued, appears to be erroneous. Oliver Heywood was a student of Trinity at this time, and it is from his account of himself that this impression appears to have been derived. "My time and strength," says he, "were more employed in practical divinity; and experimental truths were more vital and vivical to my soul. I preferred Perkins, Bolton, Preston, Sibbes, far above Aristotle, Plato, Magirus, and Wendeton, though I despise no laborious authors in these subservient subjects." This extract certainly informs us that Oliver Heywood loved to spend his time over books of experimental divinity rather than over the classics, but the inference is by no means necessary that either he or his fellow students neglected secular studies. We know that through the whole of the period Duport was lecturing on the classics.

The Puritans, as was to be anticipated, took especial care to provide what they judged to be sound and religious teaching for the students. The Scriptures were expounded daily, sometimes by the masters, sometimes by the fellows in the college chapels. Mr. Samuel Hammond, who preached in the pulpit of St. Giles, appears to have exercised a wide and salutary influence. He preached, we are told, "with that pious zeal, pungency, and Christian experience, that from all parts of the town, and from

* "The muses were banished from their own favorite haunts, Cambridge and Oxford. Cowley, Crashaw, and Cleveland, were ejected from their fellowships. The young candidate for academical honors was no longer required to write Ovidian epistles or Virgilian pastorals, but was strictly interrogated by a synod of lowering supralapsarians as to the day and hour when he experienced the new birth."—Macaulay's *History of England.*

the most distant villages, his useful ministry was attended on, and it was crowned with the conversion of some scores, I might have said hundreds, of scholars." Heywood says of Hammond's preaching, "I usually met with a suitable searching word, and one that warmed my heart." There is surely nothing in all this to justify the assertion that the Puritans made Cambridge a very Münster. What the universities might have become under Puritan rule it may seem vain now to conjecture. Their rule lasted too short a time to allow their system to have a trial; but those who imagine that university studies must necessarily languish under the guidance of men holding such views as the Puritans, may be referred to the case of the University of Halle, which, founded under the auspices of the Pietists of Germany, became in a short time one of the most renowned places of learning in the North of Europe. Opportunity was not granted, however, to the Puritans either to fail or to succeed in the experiment which they had commenced. The Restoration brought back Charles II, and the rule of the Puritans came to an end.

Mr. Mullinger has devoted much less space to the latter part of the century, than to the more picturesque period which went before. It is, however, a time full of interest for the historian, and contained in it seeds of future change. Cambridge had not a little to boast of in this time likewise. Barrow was lecturing on Mathematics, and exhorting the students with all the force of his manly eloquence to pursue with diligence the "divine mathesis." Newton was bringing honor to his *Alma Mater* by his splendid discoveries, and exciting a wide-spread interest in pursuits which had formerly been almost unknown in universities. Towards the close of the century, the students of Cambridge, as well as every one else, were beginning to read the works of a Mr. John Locke, who wrote of the human understanding, of the nature of government, and of toleration, in a manner which would probably have been equally distasteful to Puritan, Platonist, and High Churchman, but from which they all might have learned something. The philosophy of Locke and the theology of Paley, which was its offspring, are by no means the noblest and highest efforts of the human mind; and it is not to the century which was ruled by their spirit that we look for the saints and heroes of European history. Nevertheless, we do owe to that period, and to its philosophy, certain homely and useful ser-

vices, to which it is unjust to deny due acknowledgment. Yet we do not wonder that it is with a certain feeling of regret, that men come to the conclusion that the spread if not the origin, of just views on the nature of government and the duty of toleration, is to be traced in no small measure to the decay of ancient loyalty and the cooling of religious zeal.

BRIEF NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

The second volume of Drs. M'Clintock's and Strong's *Cyclopædia of Biblical, Theological, and Ecclesiastical Literature* * is a worthy successor of the first, in its wide scope, the proportion of its several parts, and the general thoroughness, accuracy and candor with which the several articles are worked out. Under each important article the best and latest literature of the subject is given. If the same proportion is observed throughout the entire work, it will be brought within the compass of ten volumes. It now promises to deserve a place in every well-furnished theological library. It is worthy of inquiry whether biographical sketches of persons of no special significance in the history of theology or the church, might not be advantageously omitted.

— The sixth volume of the American edition of *Lange's Commentary on the New Testament* † contains the two Epistles of Paul to the Corinthians, by Dr, Kling, the first of which is translated by Rev. D. W. Poor, D. D., of Newark N. J., the second by Rev. C. P. Wing, D. D., of Carlisle, Pa. The translators have made large critical, exegetical and homiletical additions, and evidently expended much labor upon their work. The principal editor wisely allowed them to take larger liberties with the original than was prescribed in the former volumes. We certainly need to study greater condensation in com-

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* *Cyclopædia of Biblical, Theological, and Ecclesiastical Literature. Prepared by the* Rev. John M'Clintock, D. D., and James Strong, S. T. D., vol. ii.—C. D New York: Harper & Brothers, 1868. Royal 8vo. pp. 938.

† *A Commentary on the Holy Scriptures, by* John Peter Lange, D. D. Volume vi of the New Testament: *The First Epistle of St. Paul to the Corinthians,* by Christian Friedrich Kling, Doctor of Theology and late Dean of Marbeck. Translated from the second revised German edition, with additions, by Daniel W. Poor D. D., Pastor of the High Street Presbyterian Church, Newark, N. J.: *The Second Epistle to the Corinthians* by Dr. C. F. Kling, translated, with additions, by Conway P. Wing, D. D., Pastor of the First Presbyterian Church, Carlyle, Pa. Royal 8vo. pp. 394 and 220. New York; Charles Scribner & Co., 1868. $5.

menting upon the sacred books, with a wise, scholarly exhibition of what is exegetically decisive in respect to their meaning, rather than discursive remarks upon the opinions of authors whose judgment must now be regarded as of inferior value. In our day the commentaries of De Wette, Meyer, Alford, and Hodge on the Corinthians, which the translators have kept before them, have thrown most others into the background. Stanley's work has very little critical value, and hardly deserves to be referred to so often as it is in this volume.

— Since the publication of Henderson's *Commentary on Jeremiah and Lamentations* in 1851, it has justly been regarded as the best critical commentary on these books in the English language. A good service has therefore been rendered by making it in this American edition* accessible to American students, but the benefit would have been greater if it had been revised by some competent scholar with the help of later works.

— The completion of Mr. Barnum's edition of the Abridgment of *Smith's Dictionary of the Bible* † affords us an opportunity to reiterate the favorable opinion produced by an examination of the earlier numbers. Down to the last page of the work, the evidence of the same pains-taking accuracy everywhere appears. This with the numerous additions in the text and the many new maps and cuts, renders this volume much more valuable than the English edition.

— It was a happy thought of the author of "the Life and Times of John Huss" to throw into a popular form the results of modern researches in respect to the places made prominent in the prophetical Scriptures and the fulfilment of the Scriptures respecting them. ‡ The spirited style, and the interesting nature of the subjects treated of, with the pictorial illustrations, render this an attractive as well as instructive work.

— Malcolm's *Theological Index* § though a valuable work of reference to a wide range of subjects in theological literature, and giving evidence of great industry on the part of the author, is unfortunately defective in accuracy. The most singular errors abound on nearly every page, and the recommendations of books which are borrowed from other writers are now generally anti-

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* *The book of the Prophet Jeremiah, and of the Lamentations, translated out of the original Hebrew, with a Commentary, Critical, Philological and Exegetical.* By E. Henderson, D. D. Andover: W. F. Draper, 1868. 8vo. pp. 315.

† *A Comprehensive Dictionary of the Bible, mainly abridged from Dr.* Wm. Smith's *Dictionary, but comprising important additions and improvements.* Edited by Rev. Samuel W. Barnum. Illustrated with 500 maps and engravings. New York: D. Appleton, 1868. Royal 8vo. pp. 1219.

‡ *Ancient Cities and Empires: their Prophetic Doom read in the Light of History and Modern Research.* By E. H. Gillett. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Publication Committee. 12mo. pp. 302.

§ *Theological Index. References to the Principal Works in every Department of Religious Literature. Embracing nearly* 90,000 *citations, alphabetically arranged under* 2000 *heads.* By Howard Malcolm, D. D., LL. D. Boston: Gould & Lincoln, 1868. $4.

quated. Still, those who have occasion to investigate particular topics requiring the consultation of a large number of volumes, will find this work helpful, notwithstanding its defects.

— To meet the wide skepticism in respect to the personal existence and agency of Satan, the Rev. Augustus Blauvelt has issued a series of essays on the subject. * They exhibit seriousness and earnestness, but are not sufficient in clearness of statement and force of demonstration to convince unbelievers.

— With much skill and good judgment the anonymous author of *Sua de Se* † has arranged our Lord's utterances respecting himself. Such a work is eminently timely now, when the person and character of Christ have become the center of theological thought and inquiry. It will be read with edification and profit by all.

LITERARY AND THEOLOGICAL INTELLIGENCE.

—The *Journal de la Libraire* reckons the whole number of books in Europe in round numbers at twenty million volumes, of which *France* has 6,233,000 (1,100,000 in the Imperial Library in Paris); *Great Britain*, 1,772,000; Italy, 4,150.000, generally old books with very few modern works; *Austria*, 2,488,000; *Prussia*, 2,040,000; *Russia*, 852,000; *Bavaria*, 1,268,500; *Belgium*, 510,000.

The following is a list of the most important books in Theology recently published in the

United States:—*Conant*, The Book of Genesis; the Common Version revised, with explanatory notes, $1.25.—*Felsenthal*, Practical Grammar of the Hebrew Language, $1.—*Uhlhorn*, The Modern Representations of the Life of Jesus, $1.—*Butler*, Ecclesiastical History from the First to the Thirteenth Century.—*Dexter*, on Congregationalism. 2d ed., $3.—*Wheeler*, Letters from Eden, or Reminiscences of Missionary Life in the East, $1.50—*Nevin*, The Age-Question or a plea for Christian Union, $1.25.—*Stier*, The Words of the Lord Jesus, (Translation revised by Strong & Smith) vols. 2 and 3. The set $13.—*Porter*, The Human Intellect, with an Introduction upon Psychology and the Human Soul, $5.—*Bushnell*, Moral Uses of Dark Things, $2.—*Bain*, Mental Science, a Compendium of Psychology, and the History of Philosophy, $2.—*Baird*, History of the New School, and of the Questions involved in the Disruption of the Presbyterian Church in 1838, $2.—*Wise*, (Rabbi), The Origin of Christianity and a Commentary on the Acts of the Apostles, $1.50.—*Wickes*, The Son of Man.—*Weninger*, The Apostolic and Infallible Authority of the Pope when teaching the Faithful, and on his Relations to a General Council, $1.50.—*Barnes*, Commentary on the Psalms, vol. i. $1.75.

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* *The Kingdom of Satan.* By Augustus Blauvelt. New York: P. S. Wynkoop & Son, 1868. 24mo. pp. 170.

† *Sua de Se*: or *The Words of the Lord Jesus Concerning Himself.* Cincinnati Western Tract & Book Society. 1868. 12mo. pp. 82.

The following works are announced as soon to be issued in

Great Britain:—*Bleek*, Introduction to the Old Testament.—Annals of St. Paul's Cathedral, by the late Dean *Milman*.—*Alford's* Greek Testament, with English Notes, intended for the upper forms of Schools, and for Passmen at the Universities; abridged from his larger work, in one volume, Crown 8vo.—A Memoir of Sir William Hamilton, Professor of Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh, by Professor *Veitch*.

Already published:—*Leathe*, Witness of the Old Testament to Christ, (Boyle Lectures for 1868) 9s.—*Malan*, Life and Times of Gregory the Illuminator, Patron Saint and Founder of the Armenian Church, 10s. 6d.—*Garbett*, The Dogmatic Faith: an inquiry into the relation subsisting between Revelation and Dogma (Bampton Lecture for 1867), 5s.—*Alexander*, Moral Causation, or, Notes on Mr. Mill's Notes on "Freedom," 4s.—*Keil and Delitzsch*, Commentary on the Minor Prophets, 2 vols. 21s.—*Smeaton*, The Doctrine of the Atonement as taught by Christ himself, 10s. 6d.—*Williams*, Lives of the English Cardinals, 2 vols. 32s.—*Nicholson*, St. Patrick, Apostle of Ireland in the 3d Century, 5s.—*Armstrong*, The Apocalypse and St. Paul's Prophecy of the Man of Sin, critically examined, 8s. 6d.—*Müller*, The Christian Doctrine of Sin, (Revised translation) 2 vols, 21s.—*Romanhoff*, Rites and Ceremonies of the Græco-Russian Church, 7s. 6d.—*Wordsworth*, Commentary on Job, Psalms, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes and Song of Solomon, 34s.—*Lightfoot*, Commentary on Philippians, 12s.—*Ramsay*, Pulpit Table Talk, containing Remarks and Anecdotes on Preachers and Preaching, 3s. 6d.—*Gell*, On the New Birth, with an Appendix by Rev. Henry Alford, 2s. 6d.—*Maurice*, The Conscience; Lectures on Casuistry, 8s. 6d.

France, Germany and Holland:—*De Cupély*, Esprit de la Philosophie scholastique. 2 vol. 1868. pp. 684.—*Grimm*, Die Einheit der vier Evangelien. pp. 788. 3¾ Thlr.—*v. Kremer*, Geschichte der herrschenden Ideen des Islams. 8vo. pp. 472.—*Oswald*, Eschatologie, die letzten Dinge dargestellt nach der Lehre der katholischen Kirche. pp. 384. 1⅓ Thlr.—*Stemler*, Het evangelie van Johannes. Zijne echtheid, zijn historisch karakter en leerbegrip. 2 delen. *Amsterdam*. pp. 642. 4¼ Thlr.—*Weill*, Le Judaïsme, ses dogmes et sa mission. 2e partie. La révélation. pp. 494.

IV—CHRISTIANITY AND MODERN PROGRESS.*

BY REV. ALEXANDER RALEIGH, D.D.

Revealed religion—or as we now say, Christianity—while the chief, is not, and was never intended to be, the *sole* instructress of man for this world. It might be possible indeed, by a comprehensive formula, to include within the term "religion" every human interest—just as a great absorbing empire contains many particular provinces and states, which are permitted to retain their own traditions, customs, and laws, on condition of giving obedience always in the last result to the one superior power. In this way, religion, in the last analysis, and *only* religion, is "the whole of man"—his whole "duty," dignity, happiness, glory. But there is a well-known, and for practical ends, a sufficiently just distinction, between religion and other things which properly belong to man's life and progress. Those other things have had separate existence from the beginning, but have been co-operating, as they were designed to do, with revealed truth in the whole work of human advancement.

I wish not, on this occasion, to commit you or myself to any narrow or precise view of the opening chapters of the book of Genesis, but surely it is remarkable that the verse in the sacred record which comes next after that in which we are told that God created man, and that he made him in his own image, tells us that he was made *for this world*, by very express appointments:—as we may say, an earthly man in the higher sense: reproductive, progressive through the ages, industrial, scientific, artistic, conquering, lordly. "So God created man in his own image: in the image of God created he him; male and female created he them. And God blessed them: and God said unto them, Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it; and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth." But this is not all: the first chapters of Genesis are full of art and science. Poetry, music, metal-working, husbandry, archi-

* *The Address delivered from the Chair of the Congregational Union of England and Wales, at its Annual Meeting, May 12th,* 1868.

tecture—a whole city is built almost before Eden has had time to wither. So far is it from being true that natural knowledge is the natural enemy of revealed religion. We see them here in their cradle, and they are twin sisters.

Ever since that early time, these natural things have maintained themselves in the world, it is true amid varying fortunes, sometimes growing, sometimes declining, or flourishing here, while corrupted and withering there; but none of them have ever died out of the world, and they have all, in different ways, been contributing towards the one grand thing—human progress by the design and under the rule of God. And of course it has been the will of God that they should so contribute. In nature, genius, design, they have been *for* divine glory and human welfare. That they have often been perverted from these high uses, and changed by the evil dispositions of men into ministrants of evil, and fountains of misery, does not affect their essential nature, nor lessen the continuing need for them in the great world-progress. Nor does the lamentable fact of a nearly constant antagonism, practically, between religious faith and natural knowledge. In no age or country has there been a perfect agreement. There has been too much reason always for natural men of the higher class to say to spiritual men, You are narrowing the limits and repressing the powers of human life with your self-made rules and prohibitions: too much reason for spiritual men to say to natural men, Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom. But surely it follows not from this that either must be ruled out of the field—that one shall yield, "without terms," and give in to the other an unlimited and ignominious submission. Considering this world as a Cosmos there is a gradation, subordination, harmony of all the parts, but not subjection of one to the despotism of another. The State is not to be vanquished by the Church, nor the Church by the State: science by religion, nor religion by science: politics by Christian morals, nor Christian morals by politics: secularism by spirituality, nor spirituality by secularism. "There are diversities of operations, but it is the same God that worketh all in all." These are all integral and necessary parts of a mighty whole—organs of the great body of humanity—factors and elements from the conjunction and co-operation of which will come at length the perfect realization of the world-plan—

"Glory to God in the highest, and on earth peace, good will toward men."

It is, then, a service proper to every time, to seek, in what ways are possible, the conciliation and harmonized action of these things. But such a service is peculiarly appropriate to this present age, and to the very time that is passing over us; for we are in the heat of intellectual conflicts between religion and other things; in the pangs of many social strifes in which religion is vitally concerned. We may be disposed to cherish hope far more than to yield to fear as to the issues. But we cannot fail to be aware—every educated person knows—that the present relations between things spiritual and things natural are, to say the least, uneasy—that the mutual attitude is apprehensive and distrustful—that the notes of war even are heard, words of warning, anger, pity, passing from camp to camp—the theologian ready enough, perhaps, to insinuate the charge of ungodliness against the scientific or political fellow-laborer in a case where a clear argument, addressed simply to the reason of man, *for* God and his truth, would be so much more apposite and effectual :—the man of science ready enough on his part to put his theological brother, with his terms, distinctions, doctrines, up among the fossils, as a man who really has nothing to say to the culture and progress, the hunger and thirst of a living age.

There are not a few on both sides who take no part in this unworthy war, because they see no reason for the strife—men of serene faith and high intelligence, who can rise above the dissonance of the hour, and transport themselves forward into the great and sweet harmony of the future. But that there is a general and felt conflict is only too manifest. Although we have no fear as to the issues at length, it is not the less our duty, while the conflict continues, to do what we can to make it fair, rational, wholesome. It is our duty, if we can, to moderate susceptibilities, to rectify misunderstandings, to give and take explanations—in one word, to help on, by however little we may be able, the coming harmony.

But if that harmony is to come, and is to be declared, it must have already a real elemental existence. Fundamentally, these things *are now agreed.* We have not to make the harmony—we have only to discover it; and it may therefore be a seasonable and useful service if I now proceed to specify and insist upon

certain points of agreement between religion and the sciences: or to phrase it more generally, if I now try to strike some of the notes of harmony between what we call modern civilization, and our evangelical, historical Christianity. What I shall seek to find and recognize to-day, is the common principle that underlies religion and culture alike, and those common methods and ways by which they work their machinery and seek their ends.

I.

Let revealed religion and positive science lie together in our sight, and it will be seen by a careful observer that one principle of agreement between them—a principle which we may even say so far identifies them is this, *that each is grounded upon a basis of unchallengeable fact.* * There are facts of science; there are facts of Christianity. That they are not *formally* identical is true; but they both come fairly under the common designation of "fact." Inwardly and essentially they are of the same nature. Sought for by different instruments, tested by different criteria, they have in common the one substance of rational certainty. We can be sure of both. There are facts in science that are now never questioned. There are facts in history beyond dispute; and, as we allege, among the most indisputable of all historical verities are some of the leading facts of Christianity. Now here is certainly a grand point of agreement, which, if it were followed by both parties to its proper issues, would, in a high degree, promote the conciliation that is so much to be desired. The need is just this, that each party (if we may speak of parties in the matter) shall accept frankly the facts which are universally accepted by the other. Religious men shall accept all received scientific findings. The men of culture shall accept all historical Christian facts. How otherwise is conciliation possible?

* I cannot help referring here to an admirable article which lately appeared in one of our monthly Reviews, from the pen of Mr. Frederic Seebohm, "On the Christian Hypothesis, and the Method of its Verification." I think it right to say, that I had laid out my whole line of thought for this Address before I saw or heard of that article; the reading of which, however, has confirmed my conviction of the validity of the argument, at the one point especially, where there is coincidence between the article and this Address, and of the seasonableness of its presentation at this time.

I do not say that it is quite as easy for one who unhappily doubts the authenticity or genuineness of the Christian narratives, or the credibility of the things these narratives record, to obtain rational and full satisfaction of his doubts, as it is for one who, perhaps obstinately, questions some of the most settled facts of the scientific phenomena. Positive science is a present thing. Its facts, if questioned, are bound to submit themselves to scrutiny. They can be scrutinized. The tests and proofs are all at hand. The star will lie under the telescope; the moon will not withdraw her shining; the earth is here to be examined, and will not cast her crust, or shift her strata, or change the conformation of her creatures, living or dead. The laboratory is open; the fire can easily be kindled, the elements cast into the crucible, the issues accurately seen and recorded. The appeal is to the senses, or to the reason by means of the senses, and is of such a kind as, at least in the case of all the main accepted facts, to extinguish doubt in every intelligent mind. It is not quite so within the province of history. We have to depend on channels of transmission. We have to accept the validity of human testimony. We have to "receive the witness of men." But as this is just what all men do every day, and all day long, both in respect to contemporary and past events, as this is that without which human society were quite impossible—without which the world would be chaos to-morrow—we have the right to look for, firmly believe in, and openly declare, *historic certainties.* We can be rationally, utterly sure that certain men did live; that certain things did happen. We ask for our Christian facts, as facts, no favor, no other trial or treatment than that which is given to all other averments of the like kind. But we ask that, when they do pass the bar of historic criticism, and when they are settled, to say the least, on the highest ground of probability—such ground of probability as rules men in other things—they shall not be waved off into the region of incertitude, but loyally accepted as facts proved and established.

Now, I think, on our part of this process there will be little or no difficulty. Surely we all do accept scientific facts, which are clearly proved to be so; the proof to us being, not that we ourselves have the scientific knowledge of them—that we, necessarily, know them by experiment and observation, but that the most instructed and competent men are agreed in their opinion.

We take the facts on their averment. We "receive the witness of men." Of course we cannot be expected to believe, unless there is something like unanimity among the witnesses. So long as a point is contested by those who ought to know best, we are justified in suspending our judgment, and withholding our belief. To do so is not to oppose light and knowledge, and "the scientific spirit." It is simply to wait for evidence; it is to occupy a position of honorable neutrality until a conflict, in which, perhaps, we are not fitted to take any active part, has been brought to some decisive issue. And if some of the combatants make it no secret that they wish, not only to establish certain facts, but also to draw from them certain religious or non-religious inferences—we are the more bound to hold our judgment in suspense until the conflict is ended, and the facts stand *proved* in the light of day. But when so proved, we have but one thing to do—accept them, frankly, joyfully. No matter what they may seem to involve or bring after them. No matter what cosmogonies, ethnologies, chronologies, the facts may seem to favor or frown upon; if they *are* facts, professed and declared as such by the whole scientific world, I make bold to say, that from the intelligent part of the Christian world there will come no opposition; nothing but a thankful and loyal welcome to these real and permanent additions to human knowledge and power. I speak but for myself when I say that I have never met among my ministerial friends one single man who would confront a scientific fact, and call it false or ungodly; who would not, in a measure, give it reverence, as to one of the eternal decrees. There may be, here and there, a man of some culture, who, by force of superstitious training, or ruled in his thinking by the necessities of some theological system which he has adopted, or fearing for the safety of the great book which carries the hopes of the world in it—or, more likely, fearing for the validity of some particular interpretation of a passage of the book, which, after all, may not be the right interpretation;—there may be, here and there, some such man who will dare deny the very facts; or—bolder still—say, "All the worse for them if they are true." But such men are simply odd and exceptional, in no way representative of their brethren, who, as far as my knowledge extends, repudiate the principle that the truth must be on their side, who do adopt and act on the principle that they must be on the side of the truth. "They can do nothing against the fact, but for the fact."

Here, however, we arrive at a point of great importance; for it is sometimes exceedingly difficult to distinguish facts from opinions which are supposed to be grounded upon them; from inferences which are professedly drawn out of them. The transition from the one to the other is often so delicate and insensible, that it is hardly possible to tell where the one ends and the other begins. Opinions grow out of facts in the minds of thinking men as branches out of trees. Inferences are drawn from them by what seems to them a faultless logic, and it is therefore not surprising that they should sometimes set out the whole—facts and inferences—in complex presentation, as, substantially, what they believe to be ascertained science, which has a right to command universal, unquestioning belief.

But I need hardly say that there may be here a very great fallacy. Under the broad shelter of the fact there may be slipped in easily what has not been proved, what has not even been tested and put in the way of being proved, what ought therefore to be left quite out in the open arena, to do battle as it can in the conflict of opinion. They may *think* it quite sure and true. Very well. Let them give the reasons of such certitude on their part, amply, and win what success they may in the great realm of argument. *We* shall never warn them back from such encounters within the limits of what we may choose to describe and assign them as their own proper realm; as we ourselves have been warned back within what is supposed to be ours. We are no monopolists of truth, in any of its forms. We do not recognize the principle of an exclusive priesthood either in science or religion. We hail every generous rivalry, and think it for the world's good that there should be intellectual interchanges and free commerce of human thought without limit, fear, or toll of any kind. While, therefore, we do not for one moment question the entire and undoubted right of scientific men to form and maintain their own opinions as well as to set out their own facts, however much these opinions may clash with the long-established convictions of the religious world, we yet venture to remind them, with all respect, that when they thus enter the field of general thought, they are not likely to go far without meeting their equals. It is even not improbable that their superiors may soon appear. Few men are found to be of equal excellence in many spheres, especially in diverse ones. A passion for materialistic study, while

of immense value in one department of modern progress, is no guarantee that the person possessing it shall have a sound logical faculty, and an eye for *all* relations. You may sit down with becoming humility at the feet of some of our greater physicists to hear what they can tell you of light, sound, motion, structure; to see how they follow matter through its changes, until they enter the very penetralia of nature, to look upon the face of the long-kept secrets and tell them out to men. But, if they shall choose to connect with clear and positive teachings about which there can be no reasonable dispute, quite other things—improved theories of creation, assertions regarding the *essence* of matter, views of the nature of life, disrespectful estimates of Scripture, confident declarations concerning the origin and the end, or the no-end, of the world—let them not expect you to listen any longer with the docility and reverence of the disciple. You rise up then and take your place beside them. You, too, are a reasoning man. You can judge of the relations of things as well as they, and of their tendencies. Any one can so judge whose reason is clear and who is accustomed to think, compare, decide, in other matters. In one word, you accept the facts because they have been tried; you try the reasonings because they never can be imposed by authority, but must in each case pass anew the bar of the individual judgment, receiving there the stamp that shall seem most suitable—true, probable, possible, doubtful, false—as the case may be. But in all this you abate nothing of your loyalty to the facts themselves. They are "the powers that be" of physical nature; physical or intellectual. "Let every soul be subject to the higher powers; for there is no power or force but of God. Whosoever, therefore, resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God; and they that resist shall receive to themselves sentence. Wherefore we must needs be subject not only for wrath, but also for conscience' sake."

Now we turn to the other side. We, too, have our facts, which are very dear to us; and, if they be what we think them, very precious to the world. They are facts which affect mankind—all men, in their highest relations, and which will have a decisive influence one way or other upon their immortal destiny. This indication of the nature and the potency of the Christian facts, and of our own feelings in relation to them, is, of course, not intended to bar criticism, but rather to invite it. The case

is such that we have a right even to *demand* the most earnest and searching scrutiny from every one who concerns himself with human welfare and progress, and especially from those who venture to write or speak in any manner unfriendly to the Christian truth and cause. It is not fair, it is not scientific to push these facts aside, or to ignore their existence. They are such and so great, at least in form and pretension, and they so traverse and touch all scientific inquiry, and all literary culture, and all moral and social relations of men, and all hopes for future time, in this world and the next, that the whole world is immensely interested in having them proved true—or false. They cannot be allowed to die out, or to be quietly withdrawn from public notice, (not that we have the least fear of any such issue); they must either be proved true, and thus made regnant in human history—all other events, so to speak, falling into their train; or they must be proved false, and branded as integral parts of the most gigantic imposition that has ever been practised upon mankind.

Now, I assert that our case is well-nigh as simple as any chemical experiment or any scientific observation can be. The process of examination may be much longer, but it is all of one kind, and, so to say, along one line. It is a question of historic truth by the application of the self-same tests and criteria by which we arrive at assured knowledge of the great and unquestioned facts of human history. Perplexing elements may easily be put into the problem. False issues may easily be raised. Adjacent difficulties may be shunted into the historic line. But in itself the case is simple. It is not *e.g.* (to mention but one misleading form into which the question between science and religion is often put) that we come before the world with a book —a Bible, which is the binding together of more than sixty little books, tractates, letters, written at sundry times, in different countries, in successive ages of the world—claiming for the book, just as we have it now, divine infallibility in every letter and line. We need not wonder—we may rejoice that such a pretension is decisively rejected by thinking men, as a pretension which, in fact, *can* only be verified by the co-ordinate supposition of a constantly inspired and infallible authority somewhere in the church. No. It is just as certain that there are errors and mistakes in the Bible, considered as a human book, as it is certain that fallible men wrote the several parts of it, distinguished and

selected them one by one from other contemporary writings, copied them from manuscripts, translated them from one language into another. But here is our case: That out of this book as history, and out of other histories, contemporary and subsequent, there rise up to our view, first dimly in type and shadow, then clearly in personal life, the great facts which stand at the heart of Christianity—the birth, the labors, the miracles, the sufferings, the death, the resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth. These, by emphasis, are our facts. These proved, we consider that, substantially, *all* is proved. These disproved, all is lost.

In this aspect of the case then, which we think is fair, and which, indeed, is manifestly the only one that can bring about the conciliation we so earnestly desire, we press for a settlement. The question is one of fact. What say you, Yea or nay? We aver that the life and death and resurrection of Christ are as clearly proved as any facts of history have ever been. We aver that it is not more sure, that it is not *so* sure, that Alexander the Great or Julius Cæsar lived and warred, as it is that Jesus of Nazareth lived, and taught, and wrought wonders, and died, and rose again. We cannot prove these facts by mathematical demonstration, or by chemical experiment, or telescopic observation. It is enough that the rational rejection of them is far more difficult than the acceptance; that for one difficulty that is evaded by such rejection many are encountered; that *e.g.* in refusing to believe the resurrection of Christ, presented as it is to the world with such testimony—so various, so simple, so cumulative, so full of undesigned coincidence, in the end, as we think, so irresistible—we inevitably bind ourselves to believe what is far more incredible, that chance or delusion could have thrown together, and into a unity so beautiful, the parts of a story so marvellous as this; or that so many men could have been induced by any intelligible motive to fabricate the false and baseless tale, and then—without the prospect of one single worldly advantage, with the probability, in many cases amounting to certainty, of encountering constant opposition, suffering, imprisonment, and death itself—to give their whole life to the publication of the story they had fabricated.

We press forward the facts. We ask acknowledgment for them, frank and fair acknowledgment from the men of culture, just as they expect from us and from all men a loyal acceptance

of all their facts on their own proper evidence and proof. No thanks to us; no thanks to them. This is not a matter of concession or courtesy; it is a question of truth in its simplest and clearest forms, where, as I believe, we may find a common ground, and reach a mutual friendly understanding.

Such is our case. And I think we have some reason to complain of the way in which it is sometimes met. No categorical answer is given, or attempted. Nothing beyond a vague and almost disdainful allusion to "the Christian evidence arguments," as things, in the form of them utterly antiquated and inapplicable to modern thought. But how? If they will show us how, we will alter the form of our pleading. We will no longer fight as those that beat the air. But if they will only say it is so, and yet not show us *how* it is, we must go on to believe that "the evidences of Christianity," as they have been presented now for some ages, are unanswered, and—we have the right to say, so far—unanswerable. As to that part of the evidence which is historical, I see not how it is ever to change even its form. Historical evidence is the same in every age, and must be tried in the same way. Men have lived, or they have not lived. Things have happened, or they have not happened. Our yea must be yea, or our nay must be nay.

Nor, again, is it enough to assume a respectful and reverent attitude to these facts, expressive, so to speak, of *a desire* to believe them *if* they can be proved. It is not difficult to suppose that, within the bounds of Scripture or of human thought, there are many things which may be, and especially to persons in a certain state of intellectual or moral development, the proper objects of what we may call a *provisional faith*. These things are believed conditionally—*if* they are true. There are certain doctrines, more or less orthodox, which some of us may be willing enough to put in that category. But the great central facts never can be placed there. Without them no Christianity can be. With regard to them it must be a plain alternative. They are true or false. They are "worthy of all acceptation," or of decisive reprobation and rejection.

Nor, yet again, can it be right, or consistent with the scientific spirit, to allow this great question to remain in abeyance, vague and undetermined, laying the flattering unction to the soul, that,

at least, the doubts entertained concerning it are *honest.* Surely the very air is, by this time, weary of hearing that—

> "There lives more faith in honest doubt,
> Believe me, than in half the creeds."

I have an "honest doubt" of that, and therefore I won't believe you; and there lives more faith in my honest doubt, believe me, than in all *that* creed. Doubt, even regarding these great facts, may be honest for a while. Honest it cannot continue to be, if the doubter is not meanwhile earnestly seeking its solution. There are many striplings now-a-days, and even some gifted writers, who seem to think that that couplet of our great poet has material enough in it to make religious dress for them in which to live and die. A man may live in it; but it will make a black winding-sheet. He may sail through life, merrily enough at some times, in that little skiff, trimming her slim sails to catch the changing breeze: but it is a frail and a treacherous craft to venture in through the death narrows, and away over the eternal seas. If doubt in such a case is honest, it will stir, and throb, and make unrest. It will lead to examination. It will generate "persistent thought." It will collect all available criteria. It will grasp with joy the discovered certainty, and expire, in peace, on its breast.

Here, however, "that there may be equality," it must be allowed that the admission of the historical facts does not imply a corresponding assent to what is called "the dogma," as well. If *we* claim the right to reason on the scientific data, to draw our own deductions and make our own applications, sometimes even in opposition to the views or manifest predilections of scientific men, shall we deny that they have exactly the same right to reason freely from the Christian data—the historical facts relating to our Lord Jesus Christ?—drawing out of them what general conclusions or doctrines seem to themselves true and right? I think not. We are surely bound to allow exactly the liberty we take. They may use it ill, just as we may reason viciously in any department of knowledge; and if they, accepting the facts, yet conclude against "the truth," they must have all the disadvantage and harm of that great error. But that possibility cannot be helped. It is incident to the use of human freedom. No class of men, in any sphere, have immunity from error. The earnest, the diligent, the lowly of heart, are nearest infallibility

They are sure, at least, of safety. "The meek will the Lord guide in judgment; the meek will He teach His way." But the point in hand just now is this: that facts and doctrines are clearly, at least in a measure, separable things; and that, while facts, proved, are imperial and authoritative, demanding assent and full recognition —from each person alike the same quality of mental act—the doctrines cannot be placed in the same category, and require, in fact, quite different faculties for their verification. To claim for the whole body of orthodox doctrine (if, indeed, any one could tell exactly what that is), the same authority in kind and degree as is claimed for the actuality of the leading personages and events of gospel history, is to supersede altogether the free action of human reason on religious truth, and to extinguish at a stroke—that as like a Papal stroke as anything can well be—the right and duty of private judgment.

Of course, you will know that I am not, by this, insinuating the loose, detestable sentiment, that one doctrine is just as good as another. Nor am I for a moment forgetting that the Scriptures are didactic as well as historical, and that narrative and dogma are much interwoven—some whole Epistles being engaged with simply the development of fact into doctrine. There are true, mixed, false, doctrines: "doctrines of devils," "doctrines of men," and "doctrines of God." But what then? We are still left without any infallible instrument of verification, except that which, happily, each individual *may* attain in the right use of his faculties, and in right personal relation with God. But each must discern and decide for himself: cannot—absolutely *cannot* transfer this responsibility to another, since the professed transference would be, in fact, *the use* of the power; would be, if it were a rational act at all, deciding that another had ability and authority to decide. If men think and decide at all, they must use a private judgment, and therefore, instead of contesting the point by seeking to impose a whole system of authoritative doctrine along with the facts, the part of justice and wisdom is to concede, frankly, the broad practical distinction that exists between facts and doctrines; that there may be agreement in the first, and yet divergence in the second; that the frank acceptance of the first will put a man in the way of truth and safety; and, that we may trust to the free action of the human intellect, to the advancement of knowledge, to the teaching of the Scriptures,

and to the influence of the Spirit of God, to elucidate the true doctrines, companions of the true facts, in the end.

In all this I am supposing that the facts cannot be accepted *alone*. Some doctrines must grow out of them. I suppose even the simplest and severest facts of science have some blossom of doctrine on them. They lean towards some inference. They suggest some generalization. The heavens are full of dogma. "Day unto day uttereth speech; night unto night showeth knowledge." Much more is this the case with the grand facts of evangelical history. Each is, like man, a microcosm. A man is a fact, measurable enough to the sense, but he is a fact which carries a thousand other—a whole universe of fact, relation, possibility, expansion, destiny. The birth of Christ is a fact, but it is a fact that touches in some way every child born of a woman along all the weary ages of time. His death is a fact, but a fact which in some way affects all Divine law and all human sin. His resurrection abolishes death, and brings life and immortality to light. His ascension anchors earth fast to Heaven, and makes it possible for the poorest passenger in all this world-ship to have profitable merchandize with the better country, and in due time to go up as a happy settler upon the eternal shore. He who does not perceive the inner significance of the facts, who does not at least perceive that they do carry an inner meaning, and that that meaning *must* be great, and for the world all-important, does not really see the facts at all. But if they *be* so seen—if they be held in seriousness, examined with diligence, allowed to develop and grow in the thought, into relations, duties, habits, hopes, and all under the formative influence of the teaching of the word of God, we need have but little dread of heresy; we may be sure that such a one is in the new and living way to truth and God.

II.

Let us rise now from the solid ground of fact into the more abstract realm of Law; and, if I mistake not, we shall find other most important facts of agreement. Revealed religion and natural knowledge meet in continuous agreement *along the whole line of law*. Modern science is a system of law. So is evangelical religion. The invariabilities of nature are matched by the regularities of grace.

I will not stay to define the term "law" with any exactness, or to distinguish the different senses in which it may be legitimately employed. That general sense which is the first we entertain, and which is comprehensive of the rest, is sufficient for our purpose now. Uniformity of order—regularity of sequence—the same things happening always under the same conditions—as we say, the same effects flowing from the same causes throughout the great realms of matter and mind—this is law. And all modern discovery goes to prove, or to confirm rather, by a multitude of fresh instances, what was proved before—the reality of the operation of such a principle throughout the physical and intellectual worlds.

Possibly, a severe analysis might lead us to make some objection to the phrase "reign of law," which I need not tell you is the title of a very admirable book; especially as in some parts of that book there seems a willingness to make what would surely be a perilous concession, viz., that God *may* be in such relation with His own laws and works as to be absolutely confined to certain methods of action, reserving no power of operating by express volition without what is called the use of means; *i. e.*, that there may be, for what we know, not only an administration, but a literal, actual "*reign* of law." Now we can see very well that *moral* laws, being the transcript of God's moral nature, must, like Himself, be changeless and perpetual. But surely it cannot be presumed that *physical* laws have the same dignity, and authority, and unchangeable constancy. Are we prepared to allow that matter, with its inhering forces, *may* be beyond the power of God's immediate manipulation? In that case, do we not put force for God—or on the throne *with* God? Do we not, as has been said, "shut him up in His works like the mainspring of a watch?"

But accepting the phrase in the general and popular sense, it expresses what is undoubtedly true, and what, in the educated world, is now all but universally believed. There *is*, through all physical nature, and through the intellectual world as far as philosophical observation can descry, the calm, steady reign of Law. This constitutes the sole source of what we call "experience." It is the spinal nerve of all the industries. It is the spring and constant nourishment of human progress in every sphere.

Now, what I want to point out, in order that we may clearly

note the analogy, is, *the existence and action of the same principle, in its highest, divinest form within the sphere of evangelical religion.* This, too, is a grand system of law. It is law, indeed, with a thousand tender and delicate applications, with endless variety of adaptation to meet all variety of human need, law softened and made beautiful with the flushings, and the impulses, and the whole indwelling soul of love. But still it is law; from first to last—from its inception in divine thought before all worlds, before all ages, to its consummation, evermore renewed, through all ages of the far future, and through all worlds of the heavens, in the presence of a manifested God—*it is law.*

How often is the very word used in the Scriptures? It is a venerable, majestic word. We hear it rolled out in thunder-tones from the cloudy darkness of Sinai as over a hushed and trembling world. A whole tribe in Israel is devoted to the teaching of it: nay, every father and mother are solemnly enjoined to be keepers and teachers of the law; while now and again prophetic men, full of celestial vehemence and fire, like Him of Horeb, flash into the world's sight, and burn their way through the inconstancies, duplicities, illegalities of men, lifting up to its rightful place of rule and honor the unchanging truth of God. "For he established a testimony in Jacob, and appointed a law in Israel, which He commanded our fathers, that they should make them known to their children; that the generation to come might know them, even the children which should be born, who should arise and declare them to their children; that they might set their hope in God, and not forget the works of God, but keep His commandments." And when at length there arises to the sight the most majestic personage of all history, "the Desire of all nations," He comes to "magnify the law and to make it honorable;" never to slight it or throw it aside. He who is "mighty to save," "speaketh in righteousness," which is the eternal substance of law. When "sacrifice and offering" were in vain, all fruits of the earth, all blood of beasts, nobler blood of man offered on heathen altars, then He came, who did not need to break in upon the continuity of law, or to operate upon it from any position exterior to itself; but who, being Himself its fountain and security, could come along the line of its continuity—"He came," bearing in His own being all its sanctions and all its sacredness—the Living Sacrifice, the self-conse-

crating Lamb, the perpetual Atonement; and this is the note that tells the purpose of His coming: "Lo I come: in the volume of the book it is written of me, I delight to do thy will, O my God; yea, *thy law* is within my heart."

Of course I am not going to enter here upon any argumentative statement of the atonement as manifesting and upholding the righteousness of God in the salvation of man. It is sufficient to note the fact that this has been the uninterrupted, and, we may say, universal faith of the Church from the beginning until now. All believers have, in one form or other, believed this. In no point has the unity of the faith been kept more steadily. The universal Christian conscience has gravitated towards this, settled in this. There have been many *theories* of atonement, and controversies but too bitter on a subject which in its higher aspects would seem to require nothing so much as reverence, and faith, and humility, and to forbid nothing so much as sharp and envenomed intellectual collisions undergone for its sake. But in all this long strife—which is not ended yet, which in fact has become in our day, more than ever before, a strife, or sacred questioning, about the very essence of atonement—we may recognize an unchanging fidelity to the moral law of God in the perceptions and convictions of religious men. There has been a continuity of moral sentiment in the mind of the Church, a conviction that has never wavered that God is just and holy in forgiving the sin and renewing the nature of man, and that, in some way or other, the life and death and resurrection of Christ embody and conciliate all Divine attributes; while, at the same time, they form the object, desire, and satisfying goal of all human affections and hopes. There is no ground, therefore, for the imputation that the chief Christian doctrine is immoral, or arbitrary, or inconsistent with the spirit and genius of universal law. There is ample ground for the contrary opinion, that it reveals, confirms, makes beautiful the moral law of God; and so puts itself, and all its adherents, into an attitude of friendliness and conciliation towards *universal* law and truth. Let everything old, and steady, and settled, come to the cross! Let all the sciences, truly so called, and the philosophies that are sincere and thoughtful; and the arts that have principles and health in them; and all taste, and culture, and refinement, come to the cross—not to be rebuked and humiliated, but to stand there in the confraternity of universal

truth, and to breathe, as they can do nowhere else, the spirit of everlasting law. The redemption of this world by Jesus Christ is a temporal act, but that act is the fruit of an eternal thought. It is "according to the counsel of God's will"—a "counsel" always informed by absolute prescience, always advised by infallible wisdom, always animated with infinite love—and therefore always in complete harmony with everything in every sphere that deserves the name of law.

The practical operations of religion as a power of regeneracy among men, correspond with this its fontal principle and animating source. There is, of course, in every life-problem, that indeterminate quantity the free-will of the individual, and so far an element of uncertainty; which, however, will become an element of certainty *to him* the individual, the very moment he begins to will aright; for "he that doeth the will of God abideth forever." We have here, therefore, within the sphere of practical religion, just as in the great realms of nature, truths that never change in their own substance, although they are endlessly modified in their effects on individual character by the characteristics, and by the existing circumstances of the individuals. We have forces that act steadily, of which wise and willing souls steadily avail themselves. There are tides of living influence that rise and fall in the Church and in the world—to superficial observation it may seem capriciously, as if the linked chain of cause and consequence were all broken, and the whole phenomena were resolvable only into chance, or the despotic acts of a supreme and irresponsible will, but, to a more patient thought and observation keener-eyed—by the normal action of the spiritual gravitations, which vary as little as do those of sun and moon upon the tides of the ocean. There are "spirit-gales," which "blow" indeed "where they list," but which always list to blow where we may find them—on the uplands of life, where, just as surely and as often as we set foot we shall feel the breezy influence, and catch the freshening bloom. There are trade-winds of eternity, as we may call them, generated in the tropical heavens, in the region of celestial calms, which blow over the seas of human life along their several courses, and whoso will, may steer his life-ship where every sail will fill and bend before the wholesome, home-compelling breeze. There are promises that shine like stars in the night, and will live far longer, the promiser Himself telling us that they are sure as

the ordinances of heaven; and that they will be remembered and kept when heaven and earth pass away. Do we not know, my brethren, is it not our joy sometimes to tell, how tearful eyes look up at these promises, seeing their "clear shining" through chilling mist and darkening rain; and how hearts that *would* break with anguish and perish in the gloom of despair, by looking to them bear up and hold on through every cloudy day, and through all night-darkness of earth and time, towards the land of lights, and the beautiful city that hath need of neither sun nor moon?

And have we not, in gospel fields, just as in the fields of the farmer, the labors of husbandry, according to the "seasons" of the spiritual year? Is there not the breaking up of the fallow ground? and the sowing of the seed, and weeding it, and watering it, and watching it through the different stages of its growth, and the changes of the providential weather? And are not the workers and watchers steadfast and unmovable only because *they know* that their labor shall not be in vain in the Lord? Underlying all Christian nurture we have this unchanging principle, that if we "train up a child in the way he should go, when he is old he will not depart from it." The eternal powers will bear him up. The reign of law will be his salvation; or shall we better the expression, and say that "Grace shall reign in him through righteousness, unto eternal life, by Jesus Christ his Lord." "THE LAW of the Spirit of life, in Christ Jesus will make him free from the law of sin and death."

Let there be no mistake. I hope we all thoroughly believe in the doctrine of spiritual conversion. No one who knows men as they are, can fail to perceive that many of them need nothing so much as complete conversion—a turning of the whole man, inner and outer, from self and the world to God. And this turning or change is sometimes (not so often now as once) still, accomplished speedily, and as by manifest supernatural power. Indeed, metaphysically considered, there must be in each case, *a turning point*, a moment of decision, known or unknown to the person. But it still is true that the beginnings of all life are hidden from us. "We know not the way of the Spirit." What we observe is this, that life—even spiritual life in such cases—comes by law. We teach. We tell the message. We tell it again and again. We invite, expostulate, warn. We pray, we live, we wait, and so pull them round—drawn ourselves the while by the higher powers,

"the powers of the world to come," while we, as instruments, draw them—into the orbit of grace.

My brethren, I am increasingly persuaded that the dispensation of the Gospel, which as unworthy instruments we administer, is not a system of excitements and surprises, and mysterious preferences, and selections of some who are taken, from others who are left; but that, as a system—as a rational and spiritual system of truth and influence—it is the meet instrument of Him "who is no respector of persons," who "desireth not the death of any sinner," who "will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of truth."

III.

I have spent the most part of the time I dare occupy on this occasion, in tracing the analogies which exist between revealed religion and natural knowledge within the two spheres of *fact* and *law*. But there are other agents of progress—other, and in some ways still mightier than the facts of positive science and the laws of nature and philosophy. We have *e.g.* the whole realm of natural ethics full of powers, instincts, sensibilities, which are all operating in the general direction of human advancement. *With them all we claim intimate and friendly alliance.* Some, indeed, have been bold enough to deny that the natural moral faculty in man has any function whatever in the promotion of civilization. Mr. Buckle has said somewhere in his book on the history of civilization, that the world is indebted solely to the intellectual, and not at all to the moral principle in man, for all the progress it has hitherto made. Of course, if this were true, it would make but little in favor of evangelical religion to claim for her any close affinity with natural morality. But it is not true. The ethical faculty it may be granted, does not *discover* truth: but it appraises truth, when found, puts it into its highest relations, draws human duty out of it, and lays its obligations effectually on the individual and on society alike. The ethical faculty, moreover, clarifies the judgment, gives motive and spur to the inventive faculty, and holds the active powers so well in balance and use, that, although she herself does not actually discover—which is not her function, she directly and powerfully *promotes* discovery by means of the faculties which she thus corroborates and preserves.

It is true, that if you have human conscience acting strongly without advisory influence and due ministerial help from the other faculties and feelings—without light, and charity, and tenderness, you will have fruits of *such* action, much to be deplored. But, even so, I hold that the conscience, of the person and of the community, acting itself freely out, amid whatever mistakes, and unconscious wrongs done to others, is, in a lower sense "the salt of the earth."

This attempt to discredit the ethical faculty in the estimate of what constitutes progressiveness in the individual and society is one of the worst instances that could be cited of man striving to put asunder what God has joined together. It is the old attempt to lop off some chief and necessary member from the living organism. It is the eye proud of its vision, saying, not to hand or foot merely, but to heart herself, "I have no need of thee." The intellect and the moral faculty are eternally allied. We need have no fear that the world will ever be reasoned out of its conscience, or persuaded to put that faculty permanently down into any inferior or secondary place. Now and again a moral epidemic may sweep over society, poisoning as it were, for the time, the blood of the whole body politic. Then, a nation will do wrong and boast of it. A Parliament will go staggering beneath the weight of its own meanness, laughing and making light of the burden. Merchants who have disgraced the honorable name, having made fortunes by fraud, will light all their lamps, and dress their retainers, and caparison their horses to tell the inglorious tale. But, conscience is not therefore dead. The disease works off. The time of convalescence sets in. The wrong is redressed. A sense of the meanness steals in upon the people. The right stands out, once more, defined. The wrong is no more mixed with it, but darkens over against it, eternally distinct.

Now, need I say that evangelical religion, both in principle and precept, is always on the side of the right, and that it claims every healthy human conscience as a responding witness and a faithful ally? All who preach it truly take this as the moral rule that guides them—that they renounce the hidden things of dishonesty, that they "handle not the Word of God" nor the things of man "deceitfully," but "by manifestation of the truth" in its relation to all human conduct—trade, and speech, and be-

havior—Parliamentary bills, English suffrages, Irish churches—that they "commend themselves to every man's conscience in the sight of God." One perpetual function of the true religion is just this: a constant and efficacious dealing with conscience. It brings confirmation of its testimony, release from its penalties, cleansing of its pollution and guilt, light and liberty and freshness for its perpetual life. "Faith and a good conscience" are to be held in one everlasting bond.

IV.

But I pass from this into another region, where there will be much less possibility of controversy—the region of social sympathy and practical benevolence. One of the most signal, and at the same time one of the best, characteristics of the present age, is the prevalence of a spirit of social universal sympathy. We see the display of the spirit almost equally in many spheres—in things political, philanthropic, religious. Men everywhere are becoming more conscious of their fellow-men. The educated, the rich, the privileged, are beginning to be conscious of the ignorant, the poor, the unenfranchised, and even the vicious. The conviction is spreading fast and far, that a nation includes *all* its inhabitants, and that they ought all in some way or other, to have share in the common liberty, and function and place, for the doing of the common work. The amount of activity with just and benevolent purpose in it, in this age, is really something wonderful. The nation, and not one nation alone, but many—it would seem that even Humanity herself—that fair, sweet, mother and mistress of the world, whose face has never yet been fully seen, whose presence in many parts of her own house has never yet been felt—is now beginning to show herself, and to move up and down among her children with regal grace and motherly tenderness. She is looking especially, and with a sorrowful and loving eagerness, after those who have been neglected, or who have wilfully wandered and fallen. Like the symbolical woman of the gospels, she has lighted her candle and is sweeping the house, and looking diligently until she finds the pieces that are lost. Not one in ten only, but more than half the number have been missing. Now she is finding them, one after another, here and there. Some covered with dust which she can almost blow away; some with a dimness on them which has touched the

metal; some deeply tainted;—but the "lost" are being "found," not here alone, but the world over. Slaves are becoming citizens. Serfs are growing into men. The whole law of service is undergoing change in civilized communities, change which, in the end, we may hope will be much to the advantage of the servant, and scarce of less to the master and the mistress. Institutions with every charitable purpose are growing and multiplying. There are retreats for aged pilgrims, and homes for little boys; asylums for the fatherless, for the orphan, for the blind, for the incurable. The haunts of thieves are explored by adventurous little travelers through the dark realm of human crime and need—fragile women who are brave and trustful, and who believe in the possibility of "finding" whatever has been "lost." Midnight walks of sin and sorrow are trodden now, not only by the feet weary often well-nigh unto death, of the sinners themselves, but by the following feet of a pitying purity, seeking to win them back to industry and home. The health of the community is the care of the community, as it has never been before. The ignorance of the people—of the uneducated portion—whatever we may think of the present condition of the education question, stands out as it has never yet done in the public sight, and, we may hope, will never be forgotten until it is removed.

But now the question—"Whence all this?—this deep and far-spread agitation—this inner universal stir?" Is all this born in the heart of humanity herself, by spontaneous generation, without aid or suggestion from without, or from above?—without seed-word or vital power dropped in? Nay, verily. This is one of the latest and one of the choicest fruits of the Christian spirit. We recognize in all these things the begun answer of the world to the gospel. True, it is the heart of humanity that answers, and, therefore, there must be an innate capacity and susceptibility of all this in man; but if the man Christ Jesus had not spoken "as never man spake," such answers as these had never been heard; if He had not walked the earth with tireless feet long ago, this fair form, which we call humanity, now beginning to move so tenderly and with such a grandeur of grace among men, had never been seen. In this "dispensation of the fullness of times," Jesus Christ is "gathering together in one all things in Himself." We see the gathering begun. The gospel is all-related, and these, I verily believe, are the echoes to some of its

principal words, beginning to come now from every part of the wide sphere of this world's life. "God is love." "God so loved the world that He gave His only-begotten Son." "Go ye into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature." "Whosoever will let him come." "By this shall all men know that ye are my disciples, if ye love one another." "Whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, do ye even so unto them." Do we not hear political echoes of these words in the march of the myriads who are on their way to political power? And intellectual echoes from schools and colleges and universities, which soon will throw open their gates to admit the youth of the land without respect of persons? and patriotic echoes from Abyssinian mountains where ten thousand men risk limb and life for a few poor captives, because in them the honor of the country and the well-being of nations is touched? And, as I have said, every kind of social echo, from all the busy and tender ingenuities of a universal beneficence? The cross is at the center of the world, and all the world is beginning to yield to its sway. The empty tomb is hard by the cross, and with the risen Saviour all things rise.

Or, if this be disputed, if it be said that we arrogate too much for Christianity, allow too little for the inborn powers, and for the natural developments of man as man, then we can afford to take lower ground. Not that the higher ground is untenable, or that we shall not return to it in the end, but simply for the argument's sake, and with a view to conciliation. Be it then that all this is, more largely than we think, natural progression. We rejoice in it. We look with no jealous eye. We cast no shadows of malign distrust. We have no bitterness of disappointed ambition. We do shame to our Master if we are not frank and ready in the acknowledgment of all we see in the world that is just, and true, and fair, and kind, and good—if we have not "God-speed" living always in our heart, to be spoken to all who seek to spread light, or liberty, or peace, or temperance, or comfort, or any good among men. If they will take our benediction, we are ready, on our part, to say, "We bless you in the name of the Lord."

I dare not occupy more of your time. In so large a question, what any one person may think or say can be but of little moment. My word, of course, has no pretension to authority; I am sensible of being quite incapable of dealing with *all* the terms

and elements of so great a case. I speak from the ranks; or if out of the ranks, by your kindness, for the year, it is because you found me working the Master's work, and thought I might, by His help, speak to you of something, which is exercising the common mind, or is in some way related to "the common salvation." If I can hope that I have in any measure faithfully expressed *your* thought in the matters that have come under our consideration, I shall be abundantly thankful. Scientific and literary men are, I suppose, mostly too much pre-occupied to be able, or disposed to give much heed to what practical men say. But if we cannot hope to have any appreciable influence on them, we shall not lose our pains if by this hour of meditation we influence ourselves into a temper of trustfulness towards universal truth, and of kindness and brotherhood towards all our fellow-laborers within any of her vast domains.

On the one hand, I am sure—and this concerns *us*—that we shall not make the highest progress with our own ministerial work, under Christ, for the salvation of men's souls, except in connection with advancing knowledge and culture of every kind. All attempts to push on to a higher general position in the great evangelical enterprise by *mere* fervency of spirit and continual iteration of the same truths, will fail. The thing to be done is as complex as man's nature and God's world, and we must take note of all the elements, and be willing to have help from all the workers in all the parts. Of course, in pursuing our own work in the select and "separated" sense, "attending continually upon this very thing," "giving ourselves wholly to the things of the Christian ministry," we shall have our reward, rich, and full, and everlasting. We shall save individual souls from death and have our share at length in the Saviour's joy. But again I say, that if we have not sympathy with *all* our fellow-workers, and with the various plan, so far as we understand it, by which this world is being educated to its manhood and perfection in every sense, we shall do little or nothing in helping to roll the mighty wheels of this world's providence "forward," in the way they are going; while, on the other hand, I am equally sure that the men of the world—chiefs of its parties and schools, whether of thought or action—will fail, and, in the end, far more miserably in all *their* attempts to carry on the world's progress without the hallowing and animating power of the Christian religion. Materialism is

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trying hard to give man back his lost dominion and crown him king of the world, simply by communicating to him the knowledge of material fact and force and law. But it cannot be. "The first man is of the earth, earthy." Materialism in its most refined forms has nothing but "earth" to give him; she can lead him out into it as a playground, and then open it to him as a grave. "Crowned with glory and honor, and set over the works of God's hands," he can never be, until—lifting eye and heart from earth altogether—he sees and hails, as his appointed head and leader, "the Second Man, the Lord from heaven."

Of the issue and end of all these questionings and strifes we cannot for one moment doubt. There must come a day of complete conciliation and harmony. In the sight of all the world, religion will one day stand in glad alliance with all the sciences and all the arts; with all the labors and joys of men; with all that is beautiful and true and good. That day may be distant, in time to us; but with Him who is presiding over the process, a century is but a morning hour, "a thousand years are as one day." To-day there is hot struggle, and falling shadow, and dark reverse; but to-morrow will come light, and song, and victory. In faith we apostrophize that day, as if already come—as if it were standing on tiptoe in the rosy East, eager to catch a last look of retreating sins and sorrows, as in dark troops they haste away:—

> "Sweet day, so cool, so calm, so bright,
> The bridal of the earth and sky,
> No dews shall weep thy fall at night,
> Thou shalt *not* die."

"O LORD, OUR LORD, HOW EXCELLENT IS THY NAME IN ALL THE EARTH!"

V.—THE ART AND MYSTERY OF PREACHING.*

Every minister should aim above all things to be a good preacher. If whatever is worth doing at all is worth doing well, no man should be content in this work without doing his best. And if, as Dr. Johnson said, every man born to excel is doomed to be ever reaching forth to an unattainable ideal, the minister's conception of preaching should be one to tax his very utmost powers, and disappoint them. He must fail, and miserably fail, who looks upon this service as secondary and subordinate to any. Other things in their place and order, but this first of all. Other things, if possible, but this must be possible. If Paul said, "God sent me not to baptize, but to preach the Gospel," much more may others say, "God sent me not to lecture, not to visit, not to to publish, but to preach the Gospel." To attain to excellence in this a man need labor. Counsels of wisdom are not unnecessary, nor suggestions of art. Some men are born preachers, as some men are born poets, but much needs to be done with people after they are born. Inspiration is a good thing, but the best inspiration is that which is sought and won. Will preachers pardon us if we suggest some things which we have learnt, by sad deficiency, the need of?

The great business of the minister being to declare God's mind and not his own, and to employ his own to the best advantage in declaring God's, the first requirement is that he should adopt the most effectual method of putting his people into possession of the Bible, of putting them into a position for understanding the revealed will of God. How he may do this to the greatest possible extent must depend upon natural faculty, training and habit, and different men will excel in different methods. A great step towards the better ministry of truth would be the abolition of texts, which, like creeds, hamper the conscientious, without binding the lax, and which are "preached *from*" as often by being avoided as by being discussed. Exposition, systematic exposition, either of Scripture, or of Scripture truths, is indispensable to "the full proof of the ministry" as a means of instruction. This involves the exposition both of what the Bible is, and what it

* From the *English Independent*, October, 1868.

says; the explanation of its true character and claims, and then of its contents, as a Divine revelation; its vindication as to what it is and was meant to be, and the exposure of the erroneous notions that have gathered round it in the course of ages, and then the scientific representation of its spiritual and permanent meaning. This is harder than discoursing on single and separate passages, and therefore better. It is the only way of giving a full view of the "living oracles," of securing a complete application of religious truth to the circumstances of men; of providing for the treatment without offence of many delicate and distasteful themes, or of their treatment at all; of bringing out the truth that is in texts, or, as a friend of ours once expressed it, "the truth that is *between* texts." But it must be done not with the idea that it requires less labor than common sermonizing, nor because it is more easy to deal with many topics than with one, nor with the conceit that he is a great artist who paints with a big brush. Exposition, instead of being dry, might be the most interesting of all kinds of public teaching. It has the inestimable advantage of variety both in the topics and the relations of the topics of instruction. And if it were practised with a power to sympathize with the writer's spirit, as well as understand his words, to interpret his soul as well as his syntax; if passages and parts of passages were treated according to their relative importance, and things subordinate were grouped round some central fact or thought, receiving and reflecting it like mirrors round a room, we believe that a taste for Biblical exegesis would be gradually developed, which would neither seek nor be satisfied with the Blondinism of the pulpit.

But if a "teaching priest" cannot expound, there is another thing, in our view, not less important—the systematic treatment of Scripture themes. It is of great consequence that a people should be kept continuously on the same subjects, and not only for impression but perception. A rapid passage of objects before the mind leaves no image and produces no effect. And subjects grow while they are being discussed; and the unity of truth is revealed by systematic treatment, while occasional topics must necessarily be dealt with in more or less of a fragmentary manner. Nor can full justice be done to them even in that manner. The minister's mind requires, to do its best, time and forethought, varied lights, and opportunities of revision. With con-

nected and consecutive themes, time is not wasted in looking for texts; minutes and hours otherwise lost may be profitably employed; a particular and profitable direction may be given to reading and to thought, and the eye may be on the look-out for "saws" and "instances." It is not necessary that the preacher's schemes should be announced, if he is afraid his people's studies should forestall his own, or they should be terrified with a prospect they have not yet learned to like. The preacher may keep his plans secret, and his mind unfettered, and leave the edge of curiosity keen, while ministering all the advantages of continuous instruction. We have known men whose preaching, to superficial thought, seemed to partake of the usual isolated character, and who were yet scarcely ever without one or two courses of subjects, which could be suspended or renewed, dropped or prolonged, narrowed or widened, and treated in all kinds of ways, according to their own will. We do not advocate the introduction into the pulpit of bodies of divinity, nor anything making such demands on space or time; nor think that religious teachings should be like Chancery suits begun in one generation and ended in another. We rather desiderate the use of concentrated essences of spiritual truth. A great deal may be done in a little while, if men have only time! and our suggestion would secure that along with other means of lessening quantity and heightening quality. The remarks in which we have now indulged respect the educational rather than the proclamatory functions of the ministry, the building up of the Church rather than the conversion of sinners, the Bible as a revelation rather than a message; as, indeed, is the case with most of our remarks.

In dealing with Scripture the great duty and difficulty too is to make men see and feel that it is a present voice of God, that the eternal in it is addressing them to-day as truly and directly as He addressed those to whom its contents were originally written or spoken. The Bible is not a new book nor an easy book. It belongs to ages and countries very different from our own. They who rendered it into English did but comparatively little to put us into possession of its wisdom, and the minister must be the translator still. There is a language of thought as well as of speech, a language of custom, of tradition, of natural scenery, of moral and religious ideas and characters, as needful to be understood as Greek or Hebrew, and which the finest Grecian or

Hebraist may be ignorant of. The history of the Bible is cast into types which long have passed away. And how to make all these, "being dead, yet speak," and speak "the present truth," is the great wisdom. It is easy to expatiate on the men and events of ancient Jewish history, and be as useful as if lecturing on the Enaliosaurus or Pterodactylus; but to do justice to the prophetic character of the Bible as a prophetic history, full of new things in old, newest things because in oldest, immortal truths in transient forms, immortal principles of Providence in the transactions of a time; to set the Scripture before men as a glass in which they may see themselves and one another, and the affairs and occurrences of their own day; to expound the true metempsychosis, the passage of moral qualities and religious dispensations into other characters and other systems; to show England in Judea and modern parties in ancient sects, and each man more or less in all,—this is a task for the full mind and the sharp wit. History is not "an old almanac," and the Bible is not a year-book, and they who treat them as such are chronological mistakes. They should have lived when the things of the Bible were fresh. There are multitudes who listen with great delight on Sundays to denunciation of Sadducean skepticism, compared with whom the Sadducees were very gluttons in belief; who exult in the exposure of Pharisaic pride and cold-bloodedness, compared with whom the Pharisees were men of morbid humility and excessive charity. They do so love faithful preaching, and think it such a wholesome thing that sins two thousand years old should be righteously chastised, but have no suspicion that

> "There in a glass their hearts may see
> How foolish and how false they be."

Perhaps they would resent any attempt to find modern types of ancient characters, and deem it dishonoring to God to suppose that there is aught in the things and people of His Book like to things and people now; holding the old idea of sacredness, that it is *separation*, but forgetting that nothing is so truly set apart to God, as that which is most truly useful to men. The Bible helps us here in its own interpretation, and teaches us that even the extraordinary things of old were patterns of the ordinary to the end of the world; that God's word to Abraham was a word

for all believers, His sparing of Isaac a lesson of common providence, and the miraculous conversion of Paul an example of universal grace.

Whatever the subject, it should be but *one*. Dr. Chalmers was quite right in dealing with one thought at a time; and if it be objected, as it was by Robert Hall, that it was motion without progress, like the swinging of a door, which goes round but not forwards, the answer is obvious, that doors would not fulfill their end in going forwards; and that if sermons teach and impress one thing at a time, the best progress will be secured. People need repetition in order to fix their attention, illustration to make them understand, and amplification and application to make them feel. The hasty crossing of the hand before the hottest fire secures no heat, and themes, however awful or tender, make no impression without continuous contemplation; while few truths or aspects of truth, can be presented with clearness and fullness to the intellect within the compass of a sermon. "Variety is pleasing" we all wrote as children and all prove as men; but it may not be always profitable, and doctors teach that it is best to feast on simple and single joints, and not to mix our drinks. The most effective services are those in which the mind is kept in the full view of one object, and the head is exercised in one course of feeling; in which a *unity of tone*, and perhaps even of topic, obtains throughout; in which Scripture, prayer, song and sermon, are baptized by one spirit, and conduce to one end. Instead of this being inconsistent with the best variety, it is essential to it. There is no sameness like that of a ministry which is always preaching about nothing in general, and nothing in particular, deems it necessary to declare the whole counsel of God in every sermon, and rattles over all the notes of human sensibility in every service. There may be endless diversity in the modes of exhibiting the same object. It may be seen from different points of view, and through different media. For mental and moral effect there is often more in the angle of vision than the nearness of the object. The sun is farther off us in summer than in winter, yet are the days then warmest and longest. A minister may have, or having not may acquire, this power of various representation, so as in each of several ministries, to supply in a measure the diversified wants of his people. With patience and persistency what Demosthenes did with his

voice we may do with our minds; we may develop hidden powers and strengthen feeble ones. We remember an example. It was of one whose natural tone and turn of mind was speculative and polemical. Fact was an offence to it. His sermons were made up, partly of things for men to doubt about, instead of believing, and partly of attacks on those who did not believe. But, convinced that God's mode was the best, he "forced himself to sacrifice" his natural tastes, and addicted himself to the concrete, until, if he had not facts, he made them, and, like William Jay, gave "parables." It is here that recourse may be had to art, which sincerity and earnestness make most deeply natural. Anything is lawful into which a man can honestly put his soul. This is the secret of success. With exquisite truth Fielding makes Partridge say of Garrick, "He's the best player! Why, I could act as well as he myself. I am sure if I had seen a ghost I should have looked in the very same manner, and done just as he did!" Garrick did see the ghost.

A. J. Morris.

VI.—THE LORD OF SABAOTH.*

A BIBLICAL STUDY. BY PROFESSOR PLUMPTRE.

I know not to what extent Mr. Grove's statement in the "Dictionary of the Bible" that the word *Sabaoth* "is too often considered to be a synonym of, or have some connection with, *Sabbath*, and to express the idea of rest," is based on evidence, but in whatever degree so erroneous an impression prevails, it is well that it should be corrected. And, further, as one of the motives that lead me to enter on the inquiry, I am obliged to mention my own dissent from the explanation given to the name in the article just referred to, to which, as occurring in what is now among the highest recognized authorities on questions connected with the Bible, most students would naturally turn for guidance. Mr. Grove's conclusion is that "there can be no doubt that in the mouth and mind of an ancient Hebrew, *Jehovah Tsebaoth* was the leader and commander of *the armies of the nation*, who 'went forth with them' (Ps. xliv. 9), and led them to certain victory over the worshipers of Baal, Chemosh, Moloch, Ashtoreth, and other false gods." My own conviction, based on the facts to which I now invite the attention of the reader, is that that thought, if it is found at all in the name as used in the Old Testament, is comparatively subordinate, and that it disappears from it altogether as it passes into the terminology of the Christian Church. As constantly happens in such investigations, the inquiry will be found, if I mistake not, to throw light on many of the obscure by-ways of Biblical research, and to gather round the word, which has hitherto been to many a name with little or no significance, a whole cluster of historical associations.

1. It is on every ground remarkable that the name in question does not occur even once in the Pentateuch, or the Book of Joshua, or in Judges, or in Proverbs, or in Ecclesiastes. In the Books of Samuel, on the other hand, it meets us eleven times; three times only in the two Books of Kings; three times in the two Books of Chronicles; fourteen times in the Psalms. In the

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prophets it appears with a prominence which, as compared with the scantiness of previous usage, is almost startling: sixty-one times in Isaiah; seventy-eight times in Jeremiah; not at all in Daniel; fifteen times in the Minor Prophets, from Hosea (once only in him) to Zephaniah, inclusive; fourteen times in the two chapters of Haggai; forty-eight times in Zechariah; twenty-five times in the four chapters of Malachi.

2. These numerical results are obviously significant. Those who, like Bishop Colenso, assign a comparatively late date to the writings of the Pentateuch, on the strength of the occurrence in it of the name JEHOVAH, which they assume to have come into use in the time of Samuel, are bound to deal with the problem of the total absence from every one of the five Books of Moses, and also from Joshua and Judges, of a name which was in current use in the days of Samuel, often in the lips of the Psalmists who had been trained in the schools of the prophets which he established, often used by the chronicler, obviously all but a contemporary writer, who tells the story of his life. And this absence, we must remember, is all the more remarkable from the fact that it was then, far more than at any later period, that the encampment of the Israelites with the Tabernacle in the center, embodied the thought which some have connected so closely with the Name, of an unseen King dwelling in that tent, as the Captain of the "hosts" or "armies" of Jehovah. Those again, who, with most German critics, with the school whose most conspicuous representatives are Ewald and Bunsen, assign a still later date to the Book of Deuteronomy, and treat it as the work of Jeremiah, or of his disciple Baruch, or of some unknown scribe in the reign of Manasseh or Josiah, have to explain how it came to pass that the name which was characteristic of the Josiah period, specially characteristic of the prophet of Anathoth himself, never once appears in the book which they look upon as breathing in every chapter the spirit of that age. Will they contend that the writer who wished to pass the book off as belonging to a remote time, had the critical acuteness to see that the name was of such late introduction that its presence would at once be fatal to the reception of the book as genuine? If so, they must assume a far greater development of critical sagacity than they commonly place to the credit of the scribes of Judah, and then they have to deal with the yet further question, If they saw that the

appearance of this one Divine name, the LORD OF SABAOTH, would be incompatible with the antiquity claimed for the books of Moses, must we not give some weight to the fact that they saw no such incompatibility in the presence in them of that other name of JEHOVAH, on the strength of which they have been ascribed, partly to the time of Samuel, and partly to that of Jeremiah?

3. The argument, as it stands, therefore, is just the converse of that which has been applied with so much force to establish the antiquity of the great mass of materials which we find in the Gospels, as being not the after-growth of the current thoughts and feelings of the Apostolic age, but lying in a past definitely behind them. In them there is one name applied to our Lord by Himself—"the Son of Man"—which meets us continually in St. John, as well as in the first three. It is the all but invariable title, rather than Christ or Lord, by which He chooses to describe his relation to mankind. In the Epistles that name is never so applied. The reverence of the apostles for the Master whom they believed to have ascended into heaven, led them to speak of Him as the Lord, the Lord Jesus, and the like, but never (with the exception of Rev. i. 13, xiv. 14) as the "Son of Man." And the inference from this is plain and clear. Had the Gospels been "mythical" in their character, had they embodied, that is, the thoughts that were current in the Church, they would have done so in its language. The constant presence in them of a name which had fallen into disuse within a quarter of a century* is a presumptive proof that they belonged in their substance, though not, it may be, in their form, to an earlier period. And so of this name of the LORD OF SABAOTH, it holds good, I believe, with nothing to set in the scale against it, that its presence in the later books of the Old Testament canon, and its absence from the Pentateuch and the two historical books that are connected with it, are a strong presumptive proof that they belong in their substance, though not, it may be, in their present form, to a much earlier date.

4. The name of the "LORD OF SABAOTH" stands, therefore, at

* Its use by St. Stephen (Acts vii. 56) is of course, intelligible enough on this hypothesis, and its presence in the narrative becomes there also a proof of authenticity. In Rev. i. 13, xiv. 14, the rendering should probably be "like *a* son of man."

the end of that series of divine titles which opened, as with the earliest name that meets us in the history of the Bible, with that of Elion or the Most High God. It remains for us to see in what way and with what significance it first came into use. It would seem from 1 Sam. i. 3, 11, to have been in use while the Tabernacle was at Shiloh. It is the name which Hannah used in her prayer. When the ark is carried forth as a talisman to secure victory against the Philistines, it is as "the ark of the Lord of Hosts that dwelleth between the cherubim" (1 Sam. iv. 4). At first sight, of course, this seems to favor the view from which I have said that I dissent, that Jehovah was thought of as the God of the armies of Israel. It may seem to have come into use with this significance as Ewald conjectures, under a warlike high-priesthood like that of Eli. The answer of David to the taunting boast of the Philistine giant, "Thou comest to me with a sword, and a spear, and a shield, but I come to thee in the name of the Lord of Hosts (Sabaoth), the God of the armies of Israel, whom thou hast defied" (1 Sam. xvii. 45), tends apparently to the same conclusion.

5. Let us look, however, a little more closely into the matter. Assuming, as we are justified in doing, the earlier date of the substance of the Books of Moses, what do we meet with there? In the record of the work of creation in Gen. ii. 1, we find it all gathered up in the words, "Thus the heavens and the earth were finished, and all the *host* of them." Sun, moon, and stars, the living creatures of God in all their boundless variety, are thought of as one vast army obeying the command of a supreme Controller. That idea was stamped upon the thoughts, and reappeared perpetually in the language, of Israel. Men were warned, as in Deut. iv. 19, xvii. 3, against worshiping these, or "any of the *host* of heaven." When the idolatry of the Chaldeans, closely connected as it was with their astrology, found its way into the kingdoms of Judah and Israel, their sin is again and again described as that of bowing down or offering incense to the "*host* of heaven," (2 Kings xvii. 16, xvi. 3; 2 Chron. xxxiii. 3, 5; Jer. xix. 13). So far, therefore, there seems sufficient reason for looking on that meaning as, at least, the starting-point of the associations that gathered round the new name. It was a protest against the worship of the "sun in its strength," and the "moon walking in brightness." It was adopted by

devout Israelites at a time when the fascination of that worship came to be the besetting peril of the nation. It rose into a new prominence in proportion as the people came into contact with the Assyrian and Chaldean races, by whom that worship of the heavenly bodies was systematized into a national religion, and was therefore perpetually on the lips of Isaiah and Jeremiah.*

6. There is, it will be admitted, a grandeur in the thought that looked up to the star-spangled firmament, and saw in all the bright multitudes the "host" or army of the King of Heaven. Sometimes as in the Song of Deborah, this mingled with the feeling that the storms and tempests which were ascribed to their influence came at that King's command. "They fought from heaven; the stars in their courses fought against Sisera" (Judg. v. 20). But soon there mingled with this thought—perhaps the two had been, as it were, born together—that besides this visible host there was one of invisible warriors—the guardians of the just, the chastisers of evil-doers, that these were the rulers of the stars themselves. The "angels of God that did his pleasure" were also his "*host.*" In the vision of Micaiah, the son of Imlah (1 Kings xxii. 19), the prophet saw "the Lord sitting on his throne, and all the *host of heaven* standing by Him on his right hand and on his left." And these are described as "spirits" (ver. 21). They are clearly identical with those called "sons of God" in Job i. 6, and ii. 1. So in Ps. ciii. 20, 21, we have in parallel clauses "Bless the Lord, ye his *angels* . . . . Bless the Lord, all ye his *hosts;* ye ministers of his that do his pleasure;" and in Ps. cxlviii. 2, "Praise ye him, all his *angels:* praise ye him, all his *hosts.*" And this thought is probably never absent from the word, even where, as in Isaiah and Jeremiah, the first meaning is the more prominent. In the New Testament it supersedes the other. The one angel who announces the Nativity to the "shepherds abiding in the field" is joined by a "multitude of the

* At a later period we meet with that worship under the name of "Sabaism.' Older oriental scholars, like Pococke, in dealing with a word of unknown origin, adopted the not improbable conjecture that it was derived from SABA, the singular of SABAOTH, "the hosts of heaven," whom the Sabaites worshiped. The *consensus* of modern Semitic scholars, Rénan, Chwolsohn, and others, is on the other side, and connects the word with the idea of "baptism" or "ablution." In ecclesiastical history the Sabaites are identified with a Gnostic sect who claimed to be disciples of John the Baptist, and this is received as a more probable explanation of the the word. But I cannot say that it seems to me altogether satisfactory.

"*heavenly host.*" Our Lord's words, "Thinkest thou that I cannot now pray to my Father, and He shall presently give me more than twelve *legions* of angels" (Matt. xxvi. 53), point to the same mode of thought. In the visions of the Apocalypse the "*armies* of heaven" are seen following their great leader "upon white horses, clothed in fine linen white and clean" (Rev. xix. 14).

7. It is interesting to note at this stage of our inquiry the equivalents which two great versions, the Septuagint and the Vulgate, introduced for the Hebrew word, in their endeavor to express the ideas which thus gathered round it. In the former we meet with a singular variety, sufficient in itself to show that the work was done by different hands, and, in some degree, on different principles. Thus, in 1 Samuel and Isaiah, it is almost always treated as a proper name, and "THE LORD OF SABAOTH" appears in the Greek with no indication of its meaning, and so passed into the language of the New Testament, in Rom. ix. 29 and James v. 4. In 2 Samuel, on the other hand, in many passages of Jeremiah, and throughout the minor prophets, they give "*Pantokrator*," the "Almighty," or rather the "All-ruling," to express the sovereignty over all things in the heavens and the earth, which the name implies. In Jeremiah, as a rule, and in some passages of other books, we have "the God of forces," or "powers," while the other Greek versions give the more accurate rendering of "the God of armies." In the Latin, on the other hand, "Sabaoth" appears once, and only once, in the Old Testament, in Jer. xi. 20, and "*Dominus exercituum*" is the equivalent commonly chosen in the prophets, "*Dominus*" or "*Deus virtutum*" in the Psalms. The latter is, of course, in the sense with which we are familiar through Milton's line—

"Thrones, Dominations, Princedoms, *Virtues*, Powers,"

for one of the orders of the heavenly hierarchy.*

8. We are now able to understand in what way the two ideas which have been connected with the name coalesced with that other thought which Mr. Grove and others look upon as the root-conception of the word. It was part of the spirit of the The-

* It may be worth while to note also the equivalents given in the chief modern versions.—(1) Luther, with the fondness for the grand ring of the word shown in his well-known hymn, gives, I believe, invariably "der Gott Zebaoth;" (2) The French gives, "le Dieu des armées;" (3) The Italian, "il Signor, or Iddio degli esercite."

ocracy of Israel that men thought of the same supreme King of the visible *host* of heaven, of the invisible *hosts* of the angels, as almost the commander of the armies, or "*hosts*" of Israel. So in words which really distinguish, instead of confounding the two thoughts, and place them in their right relation with each other, David tells the Philistine that he comes against him in "the name of the LORD OF SABAOTH" (*i. e.*, "the heavenly *hosts*), the God of the *armies* (lit. the *ranks*), of Israel" (1 Sam. xvii. 45). So, when the King of Syria sends "horses and chariots and a great *host*" to encompass the city in which Elisha had taken refuge, the eyes of the prophet's servant are open to see a yet greater host, "horses and chariots of fire" round about Elisha (2 Kings vi. 15—17). So in the grand climax of Psalm xxiv. the first answer to the question,—

"Who is this King of Glory?"

speaks of the power of that King as manifested on earth:—

"The Lord strong and mighty, even the Lord mighty in battle."

But the second answer, when the exulting praise reaches its height, is more than a mere repetition of that thought, and speaks of One who sits enthroned in Heaven:—

"Who is this King of Glory?
The LORD OF HOSTS, He is the King of Glory."

9. The view which I have maintained is confirmed, if I mistake not, by the appearance of another Divine name, not previously used, at the close of the Babylonian captivity, when the exiles of Judah had come in contact with the Persians. In the decree of Cyrus, as given in 2 Chron. xxxviii. 23; Ezra i. 2; in the prayer of Nehemiah, i. 4, 5, ii. 4, 20, we meet with the name of "the GOD OF HEAVEN." It was adopted probably as a common ground between them and the monotheistic Persians, in whom they found so much sympathy, and who worshiped (comp. Herodotus, ii. 131) the "Circle of Heaven" as God, while it at the same time bore its witness to the faith of their Hebrew fathers, and guarded against any abandonment of their belief in the Divine personality. They learnt to speak of "the GOD OF HEAVEN," just as they had previously, when brought into contact with the Syrian and Chaldean astrolatry, borne the same protest in the name of the "LORD OF HOSTS," the "LORD OF SABAOTH."

10. The name, like that of the MOST HIGH GOD, seemed to have done its work, and to be on the point of falling into disuse. In one section of the Old Testament it had never appeared, even after it had become familiar in the writings of Psalmists and Prophets. The books in which "Wisdom" is the keynote, and God thought of as the giver of wisdom, leave it entirely on one side. Not one of the three thoughts which it embodied fell in with their more spiritual and ethical conceptions of the Divine nature. It never once appears in the whole series of the Alexandrian books, which we group together as the Apocrypha, and which represent mainly the same tendency. It is absent from the writings of Philo, the Alexandrian Jew, and the great Alexandrian fathers of the Christian Church.* It is never once used in the New Testament, and was never used, I believe, by the Jewish Rabbis as a name of the Messiah. Once only does St. Paul introduce it, and then only in a quotation from Isaiah (Rom. ix. 29). St. James is the one apostolic writer who employs it in any utterance of his own, and he is led to it, apparently, because for the time his thoughts and his words are like those of the older prophets who had so constantly employed it. As Isaiah in his utterance of "Woe to them that add house to house, that lay field to field" by oppression and wrong, had said, "In mine ears saith the LORD OF HOSTS, of a truth many houses shall be desolate, even great and fair, without inhabitant" (v. 8, 9); as Jeremiah had throughout uttered his predictions of like desolation following on like sins in the name of the LORD OF HOSTS; so the Bishop of Jerusalem, in one sense the great representative of the Prophets of the New Testament, as distinct from the Apostles, speaks in the same name. The selfish and the proud are warned that those who have reaped their fields and whom they have robbed of their wages have still the same "LORD OF SABAOTH" as their protector and avenger (James v. 4).

* It is right to say that this statement is the result of a general impression as regards Philo and Origen. I write without the opportunity of access to full *Indices*. Its absence from Suicer's *Lexicon* is, however, fair evidence of the infrequency of its use by the Greek Fathers.

VII.—GODET ON JOHN XVI. 8-11.*

"*And when he shall come, he will convince the world of sin, and of righteousness, and of judgment: of sin, because they believe not on me; of righteousness because I go to my Father, and ye see me no more; of judgment because the prince of this world is judged.*"

Our Lord here describes the moral victory over the world which the Holy Spirit would obtain through the instrumentality of the apostles. The discourse of Peter on the day of Pentecost, and its effects, are the best commentary on this promise. The word ἐλέγχειν signifies *to convince of wrong* or *of error*, here both one and the other. The *world*, in which this conviction will be produced, is not as the Fathers, de Wette, and Brückner think, mankind considered as condemned and finally lost, to whom the Holy Spirit would show the righteousness of this condemnation. V. 11 shows that only the prince of this world is *in fact judged.* If the world is the object of the Holy Spirit's reproof, it is that it may be saved. The result of the preaching of the apostles as recorded in the Book of Acts, shows that this reproof may lead the world to repentance and conversion as well as to final blindness and perdition. The apostles, the instruments of the action of the Holy Spirit on the world, are not even mentioned: they disappear in the glory of the Divine being who works through them. The absence of the article before the words, *sin*, *righteousness*, *judgment*, leaves their meaning quite indefinite, but our Lord defines them by the use of *because* which follows.

In general, the Jews, when they spoke of sin, thought of the misdeeds of tax-gatherers, infractions of the letter of the law, Sabbatical transgressions, and the like. It was in this sense that that they were able to charge the Holy One with being a sinner (John ix. 24). This is the first point on which Jesus declares that the Holy Spirit will rectify the opinion of the world. The Spirit will show, that the real sin of mankind consists in the rejection of Jesus, the divine Messenger, because in this act they distinctly express the hatred of God which existed in a latent

* Translated from *Commentaire sur l'Evangile de Saint Jean, par* F. Godet. Paris, 1865. 2 vols.

form in all their previous sins (xv. 22, 24). Jesus is the Light; he is Holiness personally manifested. Whoever repels this, at once shows that he is in a state of sin, and that he means to persevere in it (iii. 19). This it was which Peter so sharply charged upon the Jews, (Acts ii. 22, 23, 36, iii. 14, 15); and those who were sincere, at once recognized the justice of this rebuke (Acts ii. 37).

If the world is wrong in its idea of sin, it must also be in its conception of righteousness. Righteousness in its view is represented by an irreproachable Pharisee, honored of God and man. The Holy Spirit would display another type of righteousness in the person of one whom the world declared guilty and treated as a malefactor, but whom God has exalted to his own right hand, and who having ascended unto heaven, reigns there with sovereign power. The Holy Spirit acts here as a kind of Court of Appeal. The Friday on which our Lord died had ascribed sin to Jesus, righteousness to his judges: the day of Pentecost reversed this sentence. It is to the condemned the righteousness belongs: the judges it is who are the malefactors. This explanation appears to me to be called for by the contrast between the terms *sin* and *righteousness*, and from the fact that as in v. 9, the Jews, the subject of the explicative clause, are those to whom sin pertains, so in v. 10, Jesus, the principal subject of the explicative clause, must be the person to whom righteousness pertains: comp. finally v. 11. We cannot then admit with Augustine, Calvin, Luther, etc., that righteousness means here that *which the believer finds in Christ*, and still less with Lange, that it means the *righteousness of God*, which deprived the Jews, in punishment for their unbelief, of the visible presence of the Messiah and his earthly reign, ("Ye shall see me no more"). Jesus continues: *of righteousness, because I go to my Father.* The ascension is in fact the grand demonstration of the righteousness of Christ, and at the same time the condition of the day of Pentecost. He adds, *and ye shall see me no more.* For, his departure does not assume the glorious character of a heavenly exaltation except by the disappearance of his body. If the corpse had remained, disgrace would have continued to rest on the pretender and malefactor. The opprobium of the punishment could not be effaced except by the glorification of the body. It is the same idea which Peter expanded to the Jews (Acts ii. 24–36) combining in a

single view the resurrection and ascension (v. 32, 33) as a divine testimony to the innocence of Jesus.

It would seem that when, at the close of the contrast between righteousness and sin, our Lord speaks of *judgment*, this judgment must be that which, emanating from righteousness, strikes the sin just spoken of. But it is not. The judgment which the Holy Spirit will manifest, will not be that upon the sinful world, but on its prince. For the world may yet be saved, if it accept the reproof of the Spirit, while the prince of the world has now filled up the measure of his sin. Down to the day of the crucifixion, Satan had displayed his homicidal hate only against guilty man; but on that day he was permitted to shed the blood of the perfectly Just One,—of a being who could say "he hath nothing in me." This murder, for which he could allege no excuse, as he might for all others, brought down upon him an immediate and irrevocable sentence. From that moment Satan was judged and consequently dethroned; from that moment earth had a new monarch. As Jesus expressed it (xii. 31), "Now is the judgment of this world; now shall the prince of this world be cast out." This invisible revolution, the principle of which is the cross, and the effects of which extend throughout the universe, is revealed on earth by the coming of the Holy Spirit. Every evangelical sermon is the proclamation of it. Every believer turned from sin and regenerated by the Spirit is its monument.

BRIEF NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

— Professor Cowles's *Commentary on Isaiah* * is the third of the series of popular expositions of the prophetical books of the Old Testament already issued. It has the same general character with his two previous Commentaries, and gives, like them, the result of the author's study of the original, in a compressed

* *Isaiah; with notes, critical, explanatory and practical, designed for both pastors and people.* By Henry Cowles, D. D. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1869. 12mo. pp. 552.

form and in a truly religious spirit. While his plan excludes a thorough discussion of the philological points on which the decision of the most difficult passages rests, and therefore will hardly satisfy critical students of the Scriptures, this exposition will justly be prized by the large number who desire the opinion of a competent scholar on the general meaning and connection of these ancient prophetical writings.

— In sixteen essays on the *Moral Uses of Dark Things*,* Dr Bushnell, with his wonted suggestiveness and freshness, has shed considerable light on the problem of evil in the familiar forms in which its existence is often so trying to the faith of theists. Whether all his solutions are accepted or not, the fundamental position he assumes that the key to physical evil is to be found in its moral relations, is one which Natural Theology must never forget, and least of all in our day when the tendencies to materialism are so visibly on the increase.

— Another contribution to Natural Theology in a popular form is *Ecce Coelum*,† a series of lectures on astronomy, delivered to his congregation by a Connecticut pastor, with the view of impressing upon them more deeply a sense of the existence and attributes of a wise and mighty creator. With a remarkably graphic and elastic style, which sometimes becomes, however, slightly exuberant, the writer brings out the wonderful facts of astronomical science in a manner so skillfully grouped and lucidly stated as at once to arrest attention and fasten them in the memory. The author possesses a rare gift of popularizing science, and his work, which has now reached a second edition, deserves the welcome it has so widely received.

— Luther's "Table Talk" is a work, which once read is not easily forgotten. From this and his letters and other writings the gifted authoress of the Schönberg-Cotta Family, has brought together under the title of "*Watchwords for the Warfare of Life*," ‡ a choice collection of the great thoughts of the reformer, which are eminently suggestive and stirring. Such subjects as the offices of Christ, the law, faith, prayer, preaching, the Christian graces, trials, sickness and bereavement, spoken of in Luther's hearty and often tender way, awaken a response in Christian hearts and stimulate both thought and feeling.

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* *Moral Uses of Dark Things.* By Horace Bushnell. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 12mo. pp. 360.

† *Ecce Coelum;* or Parish Astronomy. In six lectures. By a Connecticut pastor. Boston: Nichols & Noyes, 1869. 12mo. pp. 169.

‡ *Watchwords for the Warfare of Life.* From Dr. Martin Luther. Translated and arranged by the author of the "Chronicles of the Schönberg-Cotta Family. New York: M. W. Dodd, 1869. 12mo. pp. 330.

VIII.—SURVEY OF THE MOST RECENT APOLOGETICAL LITERATURE.*

BY DR. G. ZÖCKLER, PROFESSOR OF THEOLOGY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF GREIFSWALD.

I. LITERATURE ON THE HISTORY OF THE CREATION.

Of the apologetical productions in reference to the general basis on which the Christian revelation rests, those which attempt to solve the problem of the creation of the world continue to occupy a prominent place—a fact made very apparent by the frequent treatises on this subject in this periodical, as well as by the large number of lectures delivered in the course of the year on the same theme. The most remarkable attempt at a perfectly new and original solution of this question since the beginning of the year, is presented to us in the form of a stout volume, which, as the author announces, is to be followed within a twelve month by a second one of about the same size. We refer to the work of the Catholic theologian of Breslau, Dr. John Baptist Baltzer, (well known as an earlier adherent of Günther's Philosophy), entitled, "The Biblical History of Creation, especially the Cosmogony and Geogony therein contained, in their harmony with the Natural Sciences." (Leipsic, 1867).

From the learning, thorough philosophical culture, and relatively dogmatical impartiality of the author, we had reason to expect something important in the treatment of his theme. And, in fact, his investigations render a twofold service, since first, they subject former and present theories of the history of the creation to a rigid and instructive criticism (in which a number of the principal defenders of the so-called "concordance hypothesis" are dismissed with indecorous curtness; and some of the more important of the latest productions, for example, the *Schopfungsgeschichte* of F. W. Schultz, the author's Protestant colleague,—are passed over with almost total silence), and secondly, they do this from the standpoint of a decided opposition to the

* Translated from the *Beweis des Glaubens*: *Monatschrift zur Begründung und Vertheidigung der Christlichen Wahrheit,* Nov. and Dec., 1867, by the Rev. J. F. Hurst, D. D., Bremen, Germany.

Jesuitical "Neo-Scholasticism," the most extreme and repulsive form of modern Ultramontanism. Dr. Baltzer turns with noticeable energy against the attempts of Father Kleutgen to restore scholastic Aristotelianism in its most rigid medieval form; against the unscientific way in which another Jesuit, Bosizio, has undertaken to carry out the defence of the Hexahemeron from the standpoint of the so-called anti-geological hypothesis of the flood;* and against the theoretical as well as practical resistance of the Ultramontanists to every free scientific agitation in the theological camp of the Catholics. "In general," he exclaims, "the only alternative presented to the Catholic Episcopacy, and particularly that of Germany,—if it would not see the universal position of the Church thrust more and more into the background,—is this: that it either come out boldly for the progress of Catholic science, or perform new miracles; but since we cannot expect the latter, the former now remains for us; and it is high time that we make use of the means, which, indeed, cannot be attained by the establishment of a Neo-Scholastic University!" Again he says: "It is a great and grievous error to suppose, that with scholastic science in connection with the weight of authority, we can destroy the rapidly increasing unbelief of the century, together with its socially destructive consequences. This is just as impossible as to kill a swarm of gnats by the blows of a club. Shall the militant Church expect new miracles in order that it may preserve its universal position? He who would believe this cannot know that this hope, according to the *lex parsimoniæ* in the divine household, is vain so long as the champions supported inwardly by God's aid are directed to the means of progress in Catholic science to be acquired by intellectual labor. Only the most lamentable blindness would wish to apply the scholastic brakes to this progress within the Church. Let him who has eyes to see look about him! Never has there been a time when materialism verging to atheism, and clad in the robes of science, has been so preached from the house-tops, in the endeavor to bring the whole world into confusion as in the present century. . . . . But how shall skeptical science, which has declared the destruction of Christian faith to be its "pathos" (Strauss) be broken, and compelled to return to the desert of hopeless materialism and atheism, otherwise than by the higher thinking force

* Comp. Vol. I. of the *Beweis des Glaubens*, 1865, p. 30. sqq.

of the Christian view of the world which is acquired from the progress of science? It is only thus that the scientific knowledge misused by skepticism can be converted into value for Christian theology, and its proper position assigned it in the organism of the sciences; but this cannot be done by scholastic philosophy, with its doctrine of matter essentially dead."

Admitting the correctness of the principle here laid down, we are still unable to perceive either the Scriptural or rational character of any of the author's assumptions. Indeed, we feel obliged to pronounce utterly erroneous and perverted the way which he has taken to reconcile the Biblical and scientific doctrine of the creation. The peculiar ideal, or rather allegorical and spiritualistic method he has followed, he himself characterizes in the preface in the following words: "There are three principal ideas which need to be brought into connection with the sacred text and the cosmical and tellurian facts and results, in order to gain a proper understanding of their mutual import, and also to enable us to trace back the former to the divine thoughts there expressed: 1. the Augustinian idea of the creation; 2. the Augustinian idea of created substance capable of life; 3. the neptunian and plutonian idea of natural science."

First of all he lays especial weight on St. Augustine's doctrine of the creation, as gathered from the 12 Books *de Genesi ad literam*, and endeavors, in view of the results of recent natural science, to enrich and elaborate it by speculative considerations. Accordingly, the objective substratum of the creation of the world does not constitute a material dead in itself, a rough, lifeless and shapeless *creatura prima* in the scholastic Aristotelian sense, but a potential, mundane essence, that is, one that is capable of life, an original substance, which is at the same time physical and spiritual, and which is called "heaven and earth" (Gen. i). After this spiritual and material original cosmical essence had been primarily created out of nothing, it received, by repeated divine creative calls or "awakenings" (the "Fiat" of the hexahemeron), its temporal development and organization in the six days' work. And this took place in such a way, that the spiritual elements of the original creature were evolved for the spiritual heavens, and the physical elements for the physical heavens, together with our earth, and that to these two antithetical members of the universe there came a third and sympathetical

member of the world, in spiritual and material man. The creation of these three members of the universe proceeded *at once* (according to Sirach XVIII. 1, "*Qui vivit in æternum creavit omnia simul*") so far as all of them were comprised in the one original creature. And this simultaneous character of the creation of the world applies in a two-fold respect: (1.) In so far as God's idea of the world comprises all things without a succession of time; (2.) So far as the spiritual and physical mundane essence, created by God according to this idea, already contained in itself, *potentialiter* and *causaliter*, the whole six days' work, so that from the physical being (which is called "earth," but by no means merely comprises our earth) there sprang the whole visible cosmos, just as a tree is developed from its seed. But this development, without detracting from the truth of that "*omnia simul*," took place in six creative days, or "evenings and mornings," which are to be regarded as so many periods in the knowledge of the angels respecting God and the world, and therefore are to be distinguished from our present days of twenty-four hours as time-periods of a different character. They are the archetypes of the solar days that first came into existence for the earth and its inhabitants with the fourth day's work, which now proceed in constant succession in their periods of twenty-four hours, while those first six days "lie developed in the laws of the world in a manner with which we have no experience or acquaintance."* Baltzer, with a certain degree of right on his side, in opposition to Michelis and other recent writers, appears to hold that Augustine, according to this theory, regarded the days of creation rather as periods of great length than as short periods of time, or periods of about the same length as our solar days.

But the manner in which Baltzer, in a broader speculative elaboration of Augustine's ideas, seeks to explain scientifically and exegetically the nature and order of these creative periods, is so utterly arbitrary that he will find it difficult to enlist in his favor any prominent apologist of the present day who has made the history of creation a special study.

He here applies the third of the principal ideas previously men-

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* De Gen. ad literam I. 18, 32; *Unde probabilius est ista quidem septem dies, illorum nominibus etnumero, alios atque alios sibimet succedendes currendo temporalia peragere spatia: illos autem primos sex dies inexperta nobis atque inusitata specie in ipsis rerum conditionibus explicatos.*

tioned, "the neptunian and plutonian idea," as he calls it, or the idea of a simultaneous formative and vitalizing influence of two cosmical principles, the neptunian and the plutonian, on the growing creation of the world. He defines "neptunian" quite at variance with the usual meaning of the word in natural science, as that principle which is operative in ponderable materials, and, particularly as water, constitutes the groundwork for the change of matter. "The 'plutonian' principle," he says, on the other hand, "is that which is effective in the imponderable substances of light and warmth. In chemical conjunction, the plutonian imponderable qualities of warmth and light appear in coöperation with the neptunian material change of the ponderable substances. Also in vegetation the plutonian forces associate in coöperation for the emanation, springing from the neptunian principle, in the growing plant,—in the warmth and light for the development and colorization of stalk, leaf, and blossom. So in animalization, the principle of warmth and light acts in the most intimate co-operation with the neptunian emanation in the generative and developing process of the fœtal and later life, the animal which arises acquiring, with its neptunian and somatic nature, in the blood the organ of warmth, and in the eye the organ of light." In the geogonic primeval formation of rocks these two principles probably operated in such a way "that, with the formation of the original rocks, the chemical proportion of the earth,—although it had begun as a hydrogenous process in the previous supremacy of the neptunian principles,—was finally transformed, during the separation of the water by the incoming ascendency of the plutonian principle, to a so-called pyrogenous process, in which the neptunian principle, which conditioned the real change of material, was controlled by the plutonian principle."

In this design to adjust the well-known controversy between the neptunian and vulcanian geologists, which is only incidentally adduced in a note, the author is less acute in his investigation than when he applies his neptunian and plutonian idea to the Biblical history of creation, or to the single creative acts of the hexahemeron. What he says on this point may be summed up as follows:

On the first day (or, as Baltzer chooses to say, with Augustine, on *one* day) the "neptunian and plutonian original ether" came into existence through the separation of the cosmical original

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essence, by means of the two awakening calls: "Let there be water!" and "Let there be light!" It may be inferred from the waters of the deep, mentioned in Gen. i. 2, that a corresponding *Fiant aquæ* preceded the *Fiat lux* (Gen. i. 3), and that therefore a corresponding "neptunian law of original ether," had been promulgated before the "plutonian law of original ether," although the Holy Scriptures only give us an express account of that "call of light," and not also of this "call of water." While the first day of creation thus bears both a neptunian and a plutonian character for the whole six days' work, the five following days' work are either partially of a neptunian or partially of a plutonian character. The second and third days present neptunian formations, while the fourth, fifth and sixth days present plutonian formations. For, on the second, the physical heavens, as being still a dark planetary cosmos, with the sun and the fixed stars as planetary *nuclei*, are formed out of the neptunian and plutonian original ether; and the third day's work produces during its former half (the usually so-called "separation of the water from the land,") the transformation of the previously soft planetary mass of the earth and of the remaining heavenly bodies into mineral stability; while, in its second half, it effects the rise of the still predominant neptunian vegetation. On the other hand, on the fourth, fifth and sixth days, only acts of a plutonian distinguishing of the neptunian and plutonian forces, present since the first day's work, take place, so far as on the fourth day the hitherto dark planetary physical heavens "are elevated by means of the plutonian call of light, in the rise of the principle of light and warmth, to an illuminating physical heavens, that is, to a planetary and solar heaven" (Comp. Gen. i. 14–16); and so far as on the fifth and sixth days the higher steps of the plutonian distinction appear in the animalization of tellurian life (the creation of water and land animals), as is shown by the animal eye as the organ of light and by the blood as the organ of warmth. Those neptunian days' work (the second and third) precede these plutonian (the fourth, fifth and sixth), because the neptunian formative principle asserts priority before the plutonian. The order of the six days of creation in Genesis is therefore thoroughly logical, and corresponds in the best way to natural facts, notwithstanding the appearance of a certain absence of order, in that, by nature, the cosmogonical fourth day's work does not stand before, but after, the

geogonic third, and somewhat disturbs the order by being inserted between the creation of plants and beasts. Baltzer asserts, that by this application of his neptunian and plutonian idea to the speculative reconstruction of the six days' work, he has more completely and satisfactorily removed this difficulty,—as well as the one connected with it, that, according to the natural facts of paleontology, plants and beasts did not appear upon the earth in successive order, but simultaneously,—than any of his predecessors who have favored the concordant or restitutional tendency.

In all these expositions and speculative interpretations we can discover nothing more than an exceedingly clumsy machinery, in which the plain language of the Mosaic account of the creation is perverted in a manner as arbitrarily artificial as it is violent, and is distorted into a process utterly antagonistic to nature. The Holy Scriptures, in their wonderfully simple, fresh and delicately fragrant account of the process of creation, which, notwithstanding the breath of poetry pervading them, bear upon their face the seal of divine truth and inspiration, take no cognizance of a difference between cosmogonical and geogonical creative facts, of a fundamental neptunian and a succeeding plutonian distinction, or of a parallelism between vegetation and animalization, etc. They know nothing of a "water-call," *Fiant aquæ*, preceding the *Fiat lux;* they do not mean by the light created on the first day, the "neptunian and plutonian original ether," but simply the clear light of the day banishing the original darkness,—the bearer and supporter of which light for the earth, the sun was afterwards made. The Scriptures understand as little by the heavens in Gen. i. 1 the spiritual heavens, or the angelic world as, in the firmament between the upper and lower waters in ver. 6, they have in view either the "planetary cosmos" with a *nuclei* of suns and fixed stars, or, in general, establish a difference between a spiritual and physical heaven, or between a cosmical and planetary earth. Finally, they are so far from uniting with our author in transferring the creation of the first human beings to the seventh day that they comprise it in Gen. i. 26 sqq., in the clearest manner, with the creation of land animals, in one day's work, and then (after the declaration of a strengthened form of approval, "and God saw everything that he had made, and, behold it was very good," ver. 31, and the usual announcement

at the conclusion of the day, "and the evening and the morning were the sixth day") follows the account of "God's resting from all his work" on the seventh day. In addition to these exegetical difficulties, which we only briefly indicate here, there are not less important ones in the department of natural science, particularly the transferal of the ideas "neptunian" and "plutonian,"—a procedure in contradiction with the prevalent geological terminology,—to the antithesis between ponderable and imponderable substances; the arbitrary limitation of the term plutonian to light and warmth by passing over the two other imponderable substances of electricity and magnetism; the contradiction of the latest results of geological inquiry by establishing universal pyrogenous processes, which follow an original creation of water,* and the one-sided and imaginary conception of the creation of plants, as chiefly of a process subject to the influence of the "neptunian" principles and of the creation of beasts as of a process essentially under the influence of the plutonian principle, etc., etc.

In spite of these shortcomings, of whose presence Dr. Baltzer sometimes betrays a pretty clear knowledge, he prides himself greatly on laying down a theory which, simply because it professes to be an entirely new attempt to solve prevailing difficulties, is praised by him as a scientific discovery of incalculable range and of incomparable worth in a Biblical apologetical respect. He repeatedly compares himself, the discover of the "neptunian and plutonian idea," with Copernicus, the Canon of Frauenburg, who "discovered the heliocentric system in the light of ideal thought, and caused a new world to arise before the vision of the human mind." As that great author of modern astronomical science, "by his heliocentric theory, has laid bare the deceptive sensuous appearance in the physical cosmos, and thereby proved the Ptolemaic system of the world to be a deceptive one, without thereby abnegating from the cosmical appearance its claim for sensuous representation," so now "is the not less deceptive appearance of the letter in the Biblical account of the creation exposed by the neptunian and plutonian idea, and thus the asserted geocentric world-system of the Bible is likewise shown to be a merely apparent system, without doing violence to the letter of

* Compare on this point, as well as on the most recent refutation of the plutonian geological school by the opposing Neptunism, the essay; *Die neueste geologische Literatur,*" in Andrea's and Brachmann's *Allgem. literar. Anzeiger*, No. 1, p. 17 sqq.

the Biblical account, since, on the contrary the whole narrative, with the appearance which it unavoidably presents, clearly shows itself to be one that is ideally and correctly justified." And as, "notwithstanding the opposition arising against the heliocentric idea, progressive astronomy has made its way over the Ptolemaic system of the world and over the epicyclic theory accommodated to it, and, in the new course opened to it by Copernicus, continued its discoveries of the cosmical laws of the planetary world far beyond the solar system," so we may now hope that the neptunian and plutonian idea will prove to be the conqueror of an "error of many thousands of years, in which humanity has been involved down to the present day; that it will assume a similar relation to the six days' work in which the heliocentric idea stands to the solar system," and that this will take place "by means of the discovery of the unavoidable error of assuming a geocentric standpoint for the six days' work which must necessarily give way before the ideal standpoint of recent astronomy, which is hidden beneath the letter." Should there be opponents of this new discovery, who "would be inclined to visit upon it, at its first appearance, a fate similar to that of the Copernican," and should there "be some theologians, who, by appealing to the letter of the Bible, choose loudly to protest against the neptunian and plutonian idea, and say, that we must not touch the Biblical order of these days' work in their literal succession," these combatants for the authority of the Bible would "be saluted by the skeptics uniting with them in their theological protest, with great glee, as their best allies." They would, by this means, "carry arms into the enemy's camp, and, instead of defending the Bible against skepticism, only help to expose it to the ridicule of its enemies and destroy all its authority."

We can so little share the fear here expressed by the author, that we prefer to take our place unhesitatingly on the side of those opponents of his theory, and declare his "neptunian and plutonian idea" a much more improper and perverted way of defending the Biblical account of creation than most of the earlier methods adopted. Of them, the so-called "concordance hypothesis," instead of meriting the contemptuous judgment which Baltzer pronounces upon it, seems particularly deserving of praise, since it solves the problem of harmonizing geology and Genesis in a manner as accordant with natural science as with exegesis.

Professor Reusch, of the University of Bonn, a Roman Catholic, also like Baltzer, seems to us in more respects than one, to have approached this goal the nearest. His work, "Bible and Nature," which has recently appeared in an enlarged edition (1866), has been already characterized by us as one of the most recent apologetical contributions from the concordistic standpoint. Reusch, in an acute criticism of Baltzer's work in the Catholic theological *Literaturblatt*, 1867, No. 7, defends this position of his against "the neptunian and plutonian idea" and against the attacks of his Breslau friend specially directed against him.

U. Stutz, in his excellent lecture, "On the History of Creation according to Geology and the Bible," Zurich, 1867, also treats the history of the creation in accordance with the concordistic theory. It is essentially an ideal harmony between the two accounts of creation, the Biblical and the natural, which he attempts to prove and explain with scientific acuteness. According to him, both accounts harmonize, in spite of the thorough difference of their objects and methods, not only in their starting point but also in their exhibition of the same end in the described events of the creation. According to both accounts, in the beginning God by a free act of will created matter from nothing. With the Bible, the geologist finds that the earth was originally chaotical, inorganical, and lifeless; that it was waste and empty, and covered everywhere with water. Now if the geologist sees the first want removed, the chemical forces beginning to stir, and the dry land and flowing sea to separate, he knows that matter, with all its forces, is from God. Wherever there is matter, it is his work; where anything happens, it is his power. In the supply of the other want, the accounts of natural science and of Moses must irrefragably unite in arriving at the Creator, who first calls plants, and afterwards beasts into existence.* Sacred history lays stress on only one point in the geologically clear history of development,—and it is certainly the safest and most

* The priority of the creation of plants to that of beasts, affirmed by Stutz on p. 19 sqq., with great emphasis, is maintained by appealing to the numerous important results of paleontological inquiry in favor of that view of the process of the creation of organisms, which is also best assured by natural science, so far as "wherever the oldest strata of the transition rocks occur, vegetable petrifactions (that is, chiefly of sea-plants, as confervæ, cuchids, floridas, and other sea-weeds), precede those of animals.

indubitable of all: that the higher animals standing nearest to man, of which we may say that they present gleams of a soul, were created after the lower water animals. But both accounts agree that man was created last, the geological account mentioning merely the fact and the Biblical account mentioning also the cause of his appearance. In the presence of a material harmony of both accounts, at once so thorough and complete, the assertion of the contrary, which is established on the most narrow interpretation of the measure of time employed is, in fact, of no importance whatever. If we would not assert that the Biblical account cannot mean days of twenty-four hours before the measure for them has come, then is every measurement of time equally inappropriate before the timelessness and eternity which are here presented to us. Besides, the question is not in the least concerning measurements of time, but concerning creative acts; it is not a matter of days, but a work of days.

Pastor A. Hengstenberg, in a lecture published in a supplementary number of the *Beweis des Glaubens*, entitled "The Reconcilableness of Biblical Cosmogony with the established Results of Cosmological Science," carries out his proof also in the sense of the hypothesis of concordance. The only important difference between his assertions and those of the learned author of Zürich just mentioned, consists in his adoption of the plutonian theory of the formation of rocks, which is zealously opposed by Stutz (and, as we believe, with good reason), from the standpoint of modern chemical neptunism. In every other respect the most gratifying harmony prevails between the two, both as far as the method for adjustment adopted by them is concerned, and its special results. Moreover, the attempt at harmony made by the defenders of the hypothesis of concordance seems very recently to be continually gaining a well-developed form, in which the most important objections on the restitutional side against this theory disappear, and exclusively exegetical and scientific justification is becoming recognized in constantly widening circles.

II. APOLOGETICAL LITERATURE ON SACRED HISTORY.

Some further contributions to the defence of the Old Testament naturally follow immediately after the above works on the history

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of the creation. To this class belong the edifying lectures of the late William Remy, Chaplain to the Prussian Embassy at Naples: "The Fall of Man; four expository essays on the second and third chapters of Genesis," (Berlin, 1867); and the excellent monograph of Dr. Riggenbach, Professor of Theology at Basle, on the "Mosaic Tabernacle," a second edition of which has lately appeared (Basle), enlarged by an Appendix, consisting in part of improvements upon the edition which appeared five years ago, and in part of replies to the attacks of opponents. The conclusions on the credibility of the Biblical account of the nature and institution of the Tabernacle, both generally and specially, are of great apologetical importance. The Old Testament revelation in general is treated of in the little work of W. Kühn, a Seminary Director, "Contributions to the Understanding of the History of Redemption in the Old Testament," (Leipsic, p. 160), and by Pastor J. J. Dülberg: "The Old Testament in opposition to skepticism." pp. 133. The latter, both in contents and plan, touches pretty closely upon the work of Pastor Majer, of Biberach, already criticised in this periodical; "What hast thou against the Old Testament?" (Stuttgart, 1864); the latter, however, observes a different order in the treatment of individual subjects, so far as it treats of the Old Testament view of God and Divine service in its relation to the New Testament, and then of the saints of the Old Testament in comparison with those of the New Testament.

In this connection it is proper to mention the second edition of Grau's work: "Semites and Indo-Germans, in their Relation to Religion and Science," (Stuttgart, 2d ed. 1867). This work has been greatly improved by interesting extracts from the acute Von Schack's "Poetry and Art of the Arabians in Spain," and from a number of other recent works bearing more or less directly on the subject. These additions, as well as the interesting digression on the analogy between the recent internal ecclesiastical antagonism between Catholicism and the Reformed Church, and between the anti-Christian antagonism between Semitism and Indo-Germanism, may be recommended to the attentive observation of even those readers who are already well-acquainted with the first edition. The author has retained, without any essential change, his fundamental view of the religious and historical importance of the antagonism between the Semites and Indo-Germans, as

maintained in the first edition; and apart from the additions already mentioned, he has made no changes in the elaborate treatment of special points. He justifies himself in this course by the conviction, to which he very properly adheres, that this edition of his book, "notwithstanding its errors, contains much that is useful to the present generation." For even the most important of these "errors," or, as we would rather say, of these "defects,"—the identification of the Semitic spirit with the Israelitish Spirit in the Old Testament,—comprises a profound truth, which, when placed in the light of such Biblical declarations, as Genesis ix. 26, 27; Romans xi. 11–32 sqq., must necessarily exert a very salutary and edifying influence upon the moral and religious consciousness of Christianity in our day.

The department of New Testament apologetics, to which the work last mentioned forms a transition, has been greatly enriched by the German translation, in 1867, of one of the most choice productions of recent English theology. We refer to [Prof. Seeley's] "Ecce Homo, a Survey of the Life and Work of Jesus Christ," (translated from the English edition; Erlangen, Ed. Besold). The author, taking ground on those facts of the Gospel history that are not contested by any opponents, displays remarkable skill in showing the historical necessity of all the principal events in Christ's life, teaching, sufferings, and glorification. He shows the absurdity of supposing this history to possess any mythical or purposely invented character, and develops, with great clearness and effect, the practical purpose of the Saviour and the ethical character of his work as an absolutely new creation. The author's leaving the doctrinal character of the person and labors of our Lord somewhat in the background, does not seem to us, from various indications, to arise so much from any anti-Scriptural and heterodox views as from a design to continue the present work by a special treatment of this portion of the whole department of Christology. Of the representations of the life of Jesus directed against Renan and Strauss, it would be difficult to find one which is comparable to this in soundness and acuteness of theological discernment, in a correct knowledge of what is practically important and truly appropriate to the times, and in attractive diction and an excellent exhibition of the causes and results in Christ's life.*

* [Dr. Zöckler's opinion of *Ecce Homo* might be omitted without disturbing the harmony or completeness of his article. Yet we translate it, though rather as a

An orthodox Scotch theologian has opposed the author's disposition, which occasionally appears, to take too low a view of the doctrinal statements of ecclesiastical christology, by a work not yet translated into German: "Ecce Deus: Essays on the Life and Doctrine of Jesus Christ" (Edinburgh, T. and T. Clark).

To mention another work in this department we may name the learned, Scriptural, and theological treatise of Dr. Schulze (formerly Professor of Theology in Königsberg, and at present, Inspector of the Grammar School of our Lady in Magdeburg), entitled, "Of the Son of Man and of the Logos: a contribution to the Christology of the New Testament." (Gotha, Perthes). This is particularly important, because of its thorough refutation of Beyschlag's heterodox views and assertions. Humbert, of Oppeln, a Counselor of the Government, has published an excellent philosophical, apologetical treatment of the miracles in Scripture, particularly those of the New Testament, bearing the title, "On the Scientific Proof of Miracles," (Oppeln). Although this little work does not treat of the particular miracles of Sacred History, but merely demonstrates the essential possibility or necessity of miracles in general, it is yet one of the most acute and solid publications bearing on this very important point of New Testament apologetics that have been published during the

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matter of interest than of value. His high opinion of the literary excellence of the work accords with the general estimate of English and American readers, but his judgment of its apologetical value, and his classification of it, even, among others of unquestionable evangelical character, will be a matter of surprise to all who, in reading the work, have perceived its defective view of Christ's character, and lamented those concessions,—that are none the less fatal because tacit,—to skeptical opponents, which must really preclude any claim to a place in the department of apologetics, even supposing its author to have such a design. The work has been reviewed at length in a former number of the *Theological Eclectic* (Vol. IV. pp. 334–363), and it is not likely that many of our readers will dissent from the conclusions there drawn. The fatal defect of the work has been stated nowhere in better terms than in a few words in the review to which we allude: "The Jesus of this work is presented to us as man, and nothing more than man. It is not merely that the human aspect of his person and work is alone exhibited; any other and higher nature is passed by and, as it were, studiously rendered needless. The miraculous birth of the eternal Son of God in human nature is nowhere hinted at; it is not, indeed, denied in word, but the theory of the book is constructed on a foundation with which the mystery of the Incarnation is incompatible. . . . For ourselves, we have no doubt that its charm will be gone when the song is sung out, and that it will sink into the depths of that spent literature, which figures conspicuously for a season, excites an expectation which it disappoints, and sooner or later, gives place to the teaching that gives a more certain sound." J. F. H.]

last few years, and occupies a worthy place beside the monographs of Hirzel, Köstlin, Beyschlag, Steinmeyer, etc., relating to the same subject. William Krüger, pastor at Linz on the Rhine, in his little work, entitled "The Resurrection of Jesus exhibited in its significance for the Christian Faith," (Bremen), gives rather a popular than scientific examination of the chief miracle in the history of the New Testament, and the seal and cap-stone of the whole Divine Revelation in the New Testament. The following works relate to single books of the New Testament: A. Klostermann (Tutor in Göttingen, and author of the article *Vindiciæ Lucanæ*, etc., mentioned in the January number, 1867, of the *Beweis des Glaubens*), "The Gospel of Mark in its value as a source for the Gospel History" (Göttingen); J. J. Van Oosterzee, "Four Lectures on the Gospel of John," (Gütersloh); C. J. Riggenbach, "The Testimony of the Gospel of John, investigated anew," (Basle); and P. Hake (Roman Catholic Religious Teacher in the Gymnasium at Arnsberg), "Pragmatic and Systematic Exhibition of the Acts of the Apostles, in its chief contents," (Paderborn). Of these four, the last named work, notwithstanding its pretentious title, is far inferior to the more temperate inquiries of the three Protestant theologians, both in scientific acuteness and in the extent of its intrinsic apologetical worth. Of the remaining three authors, Klostermann, who adopts a strictly scientific method, and pays thorough respect to the latest critical works on the Gospels, has proved the vast importance of the Second Gospel as a source of New Testament history, and as a common foundation of the two other synoptical Gospels. Van Oosterzee, by the aid of a profound study of, and a devout sinking into, the grand depths of the Fourth Gospel, has discussed rather thetically than polemically, but with great acuteness of judgment, the authenticity and credibility of John's Gospel, and its relation to the synoptical Gospels. He discusses its credibility with special regard to its accounts of Christ's miracles and its representation of the Person of Christ. The authenticity of this Gospel, as attested by the highest ecclesiastical authorities of antiquity, constitutes the subject of Riggenbach's investigations, which he conducts with his usual precision and acute apologetical tact.*

* We intend to examine, on another occasion, the little work of Hofstede de Groot, entitled *Basilides als erster Zeuge für Alter und Autorität Neutestamentlicher Schriften, insbesondere des Johannesevangeliums* (German trans.; Leipzig, Hinrichs).

The department of Apologetics has received a very important addition from the standpoint of church history in Dr. Philip Schaff's "History of the Ancient Church from the birth of Christ to the end of the sixth century," (Leipsic and Philadelphia, 1867), a work prepared with great industry and skill. This book, written in the spirit of Neander, but with greater harmony of representation, and superior in elegance to Neander's Church History, undoubtedly occupies one of the principal places among our Histories of the Early Church. Indeed, it is superior in many respects to all other accounts that we have of the same period, and particularly in its careful attention to the most recent monographical literature, and to the judgment of individual characters and facts based upon it. The section on the Emperor Julian the Apostate, and his fruitless opposition to Christianity, published in the *Beweis des Glaubens* (Oct. No., 1866) before the whole work came from the press, furnishes a good proof of the author's method. We may mention in the present connection the recently published Second Part of H. Kritzler's "Humanity and Christianity," a work previously reviewed by us. The author treats Christianity as an ecclesiastically organizing principle, that is, in its historical development from the foundation of the Church to the completion of the Reformation in the sixteenth century; and he follows single sections of this development of ecclesiastical history down to the present time. The second volume, like the first, abounds in brilliant flashes of thought and beautiful descriptions; yet the author's uncertain method of representation, which vacillates between strictly historical and philosophical speculation and a plain narration of historical events, tends to impair the general impression produced by the whole work. He promises to devote his third volume to the elucidation of the social importance of Christianity for the political and domestic life of mankind. We must also mention another historical work, Licentiate A. Mücke's "Doctrinal Theology of the 19th Century," (Gotha), because it elucidates, from the positive Christian standpoint, the most recent development of ecclesiastical and doctrinal history; and triumphantly refutes many of the views and opinions which J. Nippold has attempted to propagate in his "Handbook of the latest Church History," a work written in the spirit of the new theology of Heidelberg and the Protestant Diet. Mücke's work appears, in many respects, to be a congenial supplement to Dorner's "History of the Protestant The-

ology;" but we cannot enter upon a criticism of either of them here, as the apologetical point of view in both of them is less prominent than the purely historical.

III. DOCTRINAL AND PRACTICAL APOLOGETIC LITERATURE.

Düsterdieck, a Counsellor of the Consistory, discusses the principal points of doctrinal theology in the second number of his *Apologetische Beiträge;* he examines chiefly the theological and anthropological doctrines of God, the creation, man, and human sin. He reserves for a third and concluding number his christological and soteriological propositions on the God-man, salvation, and the Church. It is these saving doctrines in the stricter sense, on the other hand, which Luthardt discusses in his "Apologetic Lectures on the Saving Truths of Christianity." (Leipsic, 1847). In this continuation of his apologetical work, the author treats of sin and grace, the God-man and his work, the Trinity, the Church, the Holy Scriptures, the means of grace, and eschatology, in the same pleasing and quickening manner employed by him in the First Part of his "Fundamental Truths of Christianity." The whole work [English translation, Edinburgh, 1869] forms a pretty complete popular system of doctrine, in which the traditional matter of teaching held by the Lutheran Church, which is compressed into the smallest possible space in the same author's "Doctrinal Compendium," is here elaborated in a manner as acute as it is truly ecclesiastical.

Baron B. von Hodenberg, the former Hanoverian Minister of Public Worship, treats apologetically a number of the most important doctrines of faith in "Six Letters upon the questions of the Age." (Erlangen). This little work, which was first directed against Prussian politics and its unifying theology, appeared in four small numbers bearing the following titles: 1. Humanity grows Old; 2. Liberalism and the Politics of Conscience; 3. Prussia's Calling and Truthfulness; 4. Christianity, Union, and Anti-Christianity. The proposition elaborated particularly in the first and second sections, is of apologetical importance,—namely, that all earthly development is necessarily effected according to the laws of decay, and that the whole historical development of mankind from the creation to its completion takes a course analogous to the individual man's development into old age. It is from this fundamental thought the author opposes, in particular, the materialistic notion of the semi-bestial barbarousness of the original condition of our race; and describes it rather

as a state of youthful freshness and vigorous simplicity; avails himself of mythological, archæological and linguistic research to oppose the assumption of the originality of the polytheistic worship of nature, and of the rise of nations from many ancestors, or indigenous original nations; and afterwards gives many very good hints on the original laws of the further moral development of mankind, on Exodus xx. 5, 6, as a necessary standpoint for all contemplation of history, and on Christianity as the center of the history of the world. The author's partiality and occasional passionateness in his view of the political and ecclesiastical relations of the present time, which he derives from these fundamental propositions and views, do not by any means impair the real apologetical value of his work.

Two other writings in which the polemical tendency predominates, lead us from the department of apologetical doctrinal theology to practical apologetics. The first is entitled "Drunken Science, a contribution towards a judgment upon the more recent Theology," by Dr. Carl Scheele, Professor, (Berlin), and consists of twenty-four letters previously published in Hengstenberg's *Evangelische Kirchen-Zeitung*. It is a series of counsels and instructions by an older theologian to a young student, bearing on the true character of the theology of the Evangelical Church, and the many weak points, imperfections, and errors of the new theological schools, against which the young clergyman must be on his guard. The author indulges in a very sharp criticism on the most prominent of the recent and present theologians and tendencies. The "mediating" theology is unmercifully charged with apostacy from the positive faith of the Church, and the labors of its principal adherents are declared to be really destructive, and not constructive. But in spite of the author's coarsely exaggerated and eccentric mode of treating many points, his polemical tone, which sometimes becomes rough and vulgar, and his unwise collisions with many of his natural allies, even Hoffman of Erlangen and his school among the number, the book, nevertheless, contains a goodly number of wholesome truths well worthy of consideration. And these truths are not merely negative, as the opinions, often excellent, which he pronounces on the principal new schools of philosophy and their relation to Christianity, and his criticisms on Beck of Tübingen, Rothe, Schleier, Macher, etc., but his positive statements are of great value; they are the warm witnesses of faith, and beautifully and strikingly

expressed postulates of what the Church and theology most need for their immediate future. We cannot refrain from selecting from the great number of the pithy and important parts of this remarkable little book, which in many respects reminds us of Vilmar's "Theology of Facts," at least one passage, which has a special bearing on the object of this periodical, and may have been written with reference to its title. Dr. Scheele speaks as follows on the vocation of Christian Apologetics as a science: "Apologetics as a science cannot demonstrate faith or Christianity. It can only lead to the only demonstration, which lies beyond its power. The living God makes this demonstration in those who allow themselves to be drawn by Him to Christ. Apologetics can only convince those who are morally and religiously disposed, that is, those who believe in God as the Final Cause of all things, and who inquire after the true God, that all attempts at solution are fruitless if they ignore Revelation. It can only be the guide to the strait gate, for it discovers the surreptitious character of all attacks on Christianity, and of all the arguments that are presented for its irreconcilableness with reason; it reduces to an absurdity, and utterly destroys, those principles or presuppositions on which those attacks are based. Thus it passes over, as satisfactory to reason, only the incomprehensible, fundamental miracle of God's self-revelation in the Saviour of sinners, that is, the necessity of "striving to enter in at the strait gate." We should observe, that Baron von Hodenberg, in his work above mentioned, defines and limits the vocation of Apologetics in a perfectly similar way, so far as he, too, asssigns to it principally the work of a "refutation of scientific errors," committed by the opponents of the Divine Word.

Pastor O. Andreae, who is editorially connected with the *Beweis des Glaubens*, corrects and refutes the errors of a certain class of opponents, in his work, entitled "The Protestant Union tried by its Foundation and Tendency," (Gütersloh, pp. 162). The defence of true evangelical Christianity, in opposition to the worldly anti-ecclesiastical doctrines of men belonging to the Protestant Diet, is specially promoted by the author's polemical exposition of statements, directed against Dr. Schwarz of Gotha and Dr. Rothe of Heidelberg. In this respect the supplements of kindred character added to the principal work, are well worthy of attention; namely: 1. The letter of an unknown Clergyman in Baden on the most recent Ecclesiastical Controversies in Baden;

2. The Essay of T. H. Koopmann, Professor of Painting at Heidelberg, entitled, "Conscious and Unconcious Christianity;" 3. The instructive treatise of Pastor Genzken, of Schwarzenbeck, in Lauenburg, entitled, "How far are Reason, Conscience, the Church, and the Holy Scriptures, a decisive authority for the Religious Education of an Individual?"

Of the works of a practical and edifying character, with at the same time an indirect apologetical purpose, we may mention the beautiful collection of sermons on the Old Testament, which G. C. Deichert, (Pastor of Grüningen, well known as a superior homiletical author) has published under the title of "The Star of Jacob," (Stuttgard); the homiletical works of F. W. Krummacher: "David, the King of Israel," (Berlin), and of Joseph Schlier, "King Saul," (Nördlingen). The following works of similar character relate to the New Testament: H. W. J. Thierch, "The Parables of Christ considered in their moral and prophetical import," (Frankfort); the same author's "Christ's Sermon on the Mount, and its significance for the present time," (Basle); the excellent sermons on the Gospels, by G. Knack, (Berlin); Luthardt's smaller collection of sermons," "The Grace of God in Christ Jesus;" W. Baur's "Easter Blessings, Four Sermons," (Hamburg); and finally the beautiful collection of edifying observations, of a miscellaneous character, which the anonymous French author of *Christianity and Positivism*, a little work previously recommended by us, has published under the following title: "The Christian Housefriend." (From the French; Hamburg). In conclusion, we may also mention the excellent criticism from the Christian standpoint, of quite a celebrated production of our recent light literature, Auerbach's romance, "On the Heights," which Pastor H. Dalton, of St. Petersburg, the author of "National," has published in a lecture, entitled, "Auerbach's Romance, On the Hights," etc. (St. Petersburg.)

As a matter of course, it is not our object to give a complete enumeration of all the works that are more remotely or intimately related to the science of Apologetics. We have only designed to mention some of the most noticeable recent contributions to this department.

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* The same author has just published *Der ewige Jude und der ewige Johannes*, which lecture, as well as his recent little work, *Zur Frage nach dem religiösen Glauben in unserer Zeit*, by a Theologian, are worthy of special regard as apologetical contributions.

IX.—DR. JAMES HAMILTON AS A THEOLOGIAN.*

We gladly embrace the opportunity presented by the appearance of the first volume of the collected works of the late Dr. James Hamilton, of offering to our readers some remarks upon an important aspect of his ministry and authorship, in which it has not hitherto been usual to exhibit them, but which we are confident will come ere long to be generally recognized, when the whole of his writings, in a collected form, and the memoir of his short but fruitful life, have been laid before the world.

This lamented minister of Christ, whose death sent such a thrill of loving sorrow through the whole evangelical church of the three kingdoms, was not only one of the most popular religious writers of the day, and master of one of the most fascinating styles in which Christian truth and feeling were ever clothed; he was also, in our judgment, no ordinary theologian, in the proper scientific sense of that term. He was a distinguished *teacher* as well as stylist, and his books, though never taking the form and bulk of treatises or disquisitions, appear to us to be quite as remarkable for their theological wisdom and depth, as for their wealth of fancy, and exquisite beauty of diction.

Theology being a science, no man can be entitled to the name of a theologian, whose mind is not gifted with a scientific genius or faculty, and enriched besides with a competent share of all the varied knowledge and learning which is indispensable to the independent use of all the sources of the science, and to the solution of all its many difficult questions and problems, in so far as a solution is attainable. Now Dr. Hamilton was endowed in a high degree with a scientific mind, and he was master besides of a stock of knowledge and accomplishments, all available, in various ways, for theological uses, such as comparatively few students are able to accumulate. His scientific gift displayed itself very early in the enthusiasm and success with which he applied himself at college to botany and chemistry, insomuch that at the time it appeared likely that he would devote himself for life to one or other of these sciences; and as one of his fellow-students observes, in a sketch of his early career, which appeared

* From the *British and Foreign Evangelical Review*, Jan. 1869.

many years ago in the *Christian Times*, "much of that charm of novelty and exhaustless variety of illustration, for which his works are so distinguished, is to be traced back to those early and enthusiastic studies." *

His mind, indeed, was not of the logical and dialectical type. It was an intentional mind of rapid and direct insight, reaching by the shortest road, the inmost core of a subject, and looking directly down in to its perpendicular depths. A mind of quick, accurate, and almost second-sighted sagacity; at once clear-seeing, deep-seeing, and far-seeing. He never seemed to arrive at principles by long processes of reasoning, and he seldom or never sought to commend principles to others by the method of dialectics. He always seemed to see great truths in their own self-evidencing light, and he usually took for granted that the best way to commend them to the acceptance of others, was to hold them up in the same aspect and colors in which they had commended themselves to his own. He does not ratiocinate like Paul, he rather exhibits and sets forth a subject in its own intrinsic character like St. John. But he was none the less a true and deep-thoughted theologian on this account. St. John was no dialectician, and yet he was St. John "the divine."

His apparatus of learning and general knowledge was very extensive. Indeed, in some branches of natural knowledge and Christian literature, he has seldom been equalled among professed divines. We have already referred to his early proficiency in the physical sciences. The fellow-student who bears testimony to this, informs us that he was also an admirable classical scholar,—a claim which is amply verified by the facility and appropriateness of classical allusion which occasionally distinguishes almost all his writings, and by the power which he puts forth at times of reproducing, in the most vivid and graphic manner, the state of pagan culture and society in the palmiest days of the ancient civilization. †

His knowledge of books was extraordinary even in his student days, and he continued an assiduous reader, not only of religious

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* We believe the author of this sketch was the Rev. Dr. Andrew Thomson, of Edinburgh.

† For example, in his "Lessons from the Great Biography," at the commencement of his chapter on "The Advent:" "Augustus was Emperor;" "From the Atlantic to the Euphrates," &c.

and theological, but also of general and miscellaneous literature, down to the end of life. And, as serving to show how early his book-erudition took a decidedly theological direction, we may here quote an interesting passage from the same paper, in which we are told of the expectations that were formed of him by his fellow-students at the close of his college-life:—"That he would rise to distinction we could easily foresee, but we should not have pictured him to our mind as the popular tract-writer, sparkling in every page with happy thoughts and beautiful and thick coming fancies. We should more readily have imagined him as the learned editor, who had dipped into an amazing number of authors, whom the common class of readers seldom disturb in their dusty slumbers and who loved to adorn his pages with a multitude of learned references and recondite authorities. We know, indeed, of that vigorous pulse of intellectual life which was beating within him, and we had not been observant of those original fancies and warm affections. But still we should have expected his public course, in the first instance at least, to shape itself in the way we have described. His earliest literary efforts did indeed, take this form, as was seen in his edition of Barrow's Works, and Hall's Contemplations, which, in the biographical sketches appended to them, display, especially when his youth is considered, an uncommon acquaintance with the theological literature of the brilliant age in which those two divines flourished, and which they did so much to adorn. But the sphere in which Providence soon placed him, decided the direction in which his gifts should manifest themselves, and called him to be the popular writer for the million, rather than the learned caterer for the few." But even at the height of his activity and popularity as a writer for the million, his thoughts often went back to his old theological favorites; and it was partly with the view of indulging his first-love, and adding to his early book-lore, that he prepared and published the interesting series entitled "Our Christian Classics; or, Readings from the best Divines;" from the prefaces to which we learn that his love for the old English divines had been as early almost as his childhood, and that the very first use he had made of his reading power, was to apply himself with what he calls "a precocious pedantry" to these old-fashioned worthies.

"In the following pages," says he, in his happiest style, "the

compiler must plead guilty to a certain amount of self-indulgence. It was his lot to be born in the midst of old books. Before he could read them they had become a kind of companions; and, in their coats of brown calf and white vellum, great was his admiration for tomes as tall as himself. By and by, when he was allowed to open the leather portals and look in on the solemn authors, in peaked beards and woolen ruffs, his reverence deepened for the mighty days of the great departed; and with some vague prepossessions, his first use of the art of reading was to mimic an older example (alluding to his father) and sit poring for hours over Manton and Hopkins, Reynolds and Horton. Indeed, so intense did this old-fashioned affection grow, that he can very well remember, when compelled to shut the volume and retire to rest, how, night after night, he carried to his cot some bulky folio, and only fell asleep to dream of a paradise where there was no end of books, and nothing to interrupt the reader. And although it is impossible to recall without a smile such precocious pedantry, the writer is grateful for tastes then formed, and for impressions then acquired. Busier years have made those early haunts forbidden, but not altogether forgotten ground; and now that, yielding to an irrepressible longing, he pays them a hasty visit, he will feel himself less of the mere idler should the intelligent reader lend him his company."

Scientific genius and erudition are indispensable to eminence in all science, but in theology there is a third requisite even more indispensable. Neander's favorite motto had reference to this peculiar element—"Pectus est quod facit Theologum." It is the heart which makes the theologian—the heart more than the head, i. e., a Christian state of the heart, a mind in spiritual and religious sympathy with the mind of Christ himself. And need we say how pre-eminently this sympathy was a characteristic of our departed divine? There have been few disciples in any age of the church who have seen more eye to eye with the Great Master, and have felt more heart to heart than the beloved disciple whom we have recently lost. "He had more of Christ in Him," Mr. Peter Bayne observes, "than any man we ever knew." "He was a living epistle of Christ, written in characters so clear and beautiful that it was impossible not to read it." If "the things of the Spirit of God can only be spiritually discerned," it is easy to see what an immense advantage such a man had for discern-

ing them in their true character and complexion—"he that is spiritual judgeth all things." When the theologian has such an unction from the Holy One, he knoweth all things, he is thoroughly furnished unto every good word and work. How beautifully does Dr. Hamilton express this in the following sentences of his paper, entitled, "The Mind of the Master," in *Evangelical Christendom* for October, 1864:—

"It is of little use to read the letter of the discourses of Jesus, except in sympathy with himself. A critic of our own has said,

> "A perfect judge will read each work of wit,
> With the same spirit that the author writ;

And whether they be the sermons which his own lips uttered, or the preceding and following Scriptures, which the Eternal Wisdom prompted and inspired, in order to be a good interpreter or a good divine, in order to appreciate fully a given passage, or to build up from the whole a system symmetrical and secure, the indispensable requisite is to be made one spirit with the speaker. More especially the immediate words of the Lord Jesus, which are the surest key to all besides, it is only to a kindred spirit that they give out their total meaning; and sayings which to cold logic or dry philology are dark enough, become diaphonous when suffused with love's excellent oil. The vocables which to the unlearned seemed poor and hard, grow rich and melodious when accented and rightly read by the skillful Masorite, and the letter which killeth captiousness or self-conceit, is life and peace when spiritually discerned."

Dr. Hamilton never wrote anything as a professed theologian. His works never assumed the method and style of what are usually understood by theological works; and perhaps, with his characteristic modesty, he would have disowned the scientific claim which we are now making in his behalf. Perhaps he would himself have wished to be thought of by the Church of Christ, as no more in authorship than a practical religious writer, who had labored to serve the cause of his beloved Lord by tiny tracts, and handy little books, and a few biographies of good men and women and one or two periodical compilations and miscellanies of which he took editorial charge. But none the less do we put forward this scientific claim on his behalf, and insist upon a dis-

tinction which ought to be made in his favor between the mere practical writer or preacher, and the practical theologian or divine. A man may easily be the one without any pretensions to be the other. Many men write excellent practical sermons or tracts, or other popular productions, which are very useful and interesting in their way, but no one would ever think of dignifying the authors with the name of theologians. They write scripturally and sensibly on Christian subjects; they unite, it may be, profitably, pleasantly, and in an attractive style; but they may be utterly lacking in philosophic depth and breadth; they may want all originality of thought and freshness of view; they may manifest no shrewd and true "understanding of the times," for lack of tact, of observation, and sagacity of discernment; and never leaving the old ruts of thought in anything of importance, they make no real contribution to the church's stock of wisdom, nor leave any permanent footmarks to show the way where they passed. But the very opposite of all this was the case with the authorship of our departed worthy. Popular and practical as it ever was, it never wanted depth or breadth, originality or freshness, shrewdness or sagacity; and while seldom merely driving in the old ruts of mere traditional conventionalisms of thought and speech, he knew so well how to keep in the road, while avoiding the ruts, that he has made all the evangelical churches his lasting debtors by showing them "this most excellent way." We claim for him, therefore, that he was a true scientific theologian, though always a practical writer and preacher. His scientific department, in other words, was that of practical theology, or the theology of Christian life and practice. And herein we demand for him the honor of being a master of high genius and the truest insight.

Of all the branches of theology, that for which he had least aptitude and liking, was the dogmatic branch. It is remarkable how little use he made of it in any of his sermons or books. To the last, indeed, he remained true and faithful to the doctrinal system of the Westminster Confession and Catechisms, and to the last he continued to cherish a loving veneration for the old Puritan worthies who had been the objects of his first love. While always in a high degree receptive of fresh thought, if it was as sound as it was fresh, he remained firmly to the end, at his early theological moorings. But he seldom made any use of the de-

monstrations of the dogmatic systems, and very rarely availed himself even of their definitions and distinctions. The reason no doubt was, that he never preached or wrote without aiming chiefly at practice, and nothing seemed relevant to him save what was directly applicable to that end. He was impatient, besides, of all dogmatic attempts to give a roundness and completeness to the system of Christian doctrine, for which the divine word has not supplied adequate materials. And still more, perhaps, he disliked the dogmatic habit of viewing Christian truth abstractedly and in dissociation from the person of the living Christ. What he loved and warmly delighted in, was "the truth *as it is in Jesus.*"

"To us," he says, in the paper before quoted, 'The Mind of the Master,' "it is plain and obvious that gospel sayings will fail to give out their full significance, and will fail to exert their legitimate, their strengthening and sanctifying influence, when dissociated from the adorable speaker. They are not the utterance of an automaton on the one hand, nor a mere voice from the excellent glory on the other; they are 'lively oracles,' the counsels of eternal wisdom animating a human heart, and speaking through human lips. They are not statutes on stone, nor tables of brass, that we read; nor is it a trump angelic to which we listen from the overarching heaven, but the grace and truth which came together, and came out in Jesus Christ,—faithful sayings set to something better than the music of the spheres. Truth fitted to our feeble frame, truth spoken in our own vernacular, yet spoken by our God; immortal truth, married to immortal love, and which, now that they are joined together, let no man put asunder."

"Rich in theology, because the only articulate revelation of God; rich in doctrine, because so instructive, so practical, and furnishing for every good work so fully, there is not much in Scripture of what is commonly called dogmatic divinity. But for the scientific arrangement of truth, some minds have such an invincible propensity that to them the Bible is mainly a book of dogmas, mainly a collection of texts or proof passages, and they at once set to work and rear up from those texts a whole temple of truth, a great system of universal theology. It hardly occurs to them that there are many secret things on which the Bible throws no light, and instead of clearing up the whole mystery of

the universe, it only undertakes to guide our fallen race from sin to holiness, and from earth to heaven. In other words, instead of forcing triangular texts into circular cavities, or rearing up square lintels in lieu of round columns, it would be far wiser to admit that there are questions which Scripture does not answer, and thoughts of God which it does not reveal. There are bricks which our box does not contain. It is not that they are lost, for they never were there; when our box was made up they were not put in. And intsead of trying to model in its vast and symmetrical proportions the house not made with hands—God's mighty scheme of the universe—let us be content with our beautiful fragment, with that vestibule or ante-chapel, which athwart the smoke of the great sacrifice, gives a glimpse of the Holy of Holies, and where, surmounting the din of the noisy exterior, are caught bursts of the chorus, 'Blessing and honor, and glory and power, to Him that sitteth on the throne, and to the Lamb for ever.'"

If he could have commanded the necessary leisure, Dr. Hamilton would have taken congenially to exegetic theology, though we do not think that the chief bent of his mind could even have been engaged in that direction, or that, in the absence of this condition, he could ever have attained to a first-rate reputation on this minutely laborious field. But his early attainments in classical philology had given him no faint sympathy with the work of the grammarian and the critic; and in several parts of his writings, he reveals not only his high value for the biblical labors of others, but also the yearnings which he felt to bear a hand in such labors himself, if that had been possible to him, which it never was. After a lively sketch of the lives and labors of the great biblical scholars of the seventeeth century, in "Our Christian Classics," he has a characteristic passage, which utters his whole heart upon this point, and shows what an ardent biblicist he would have become, if a minister's life in London had ever allowed him the opportunity:

"The generation which produced these collossal commentators must have been mighty in the Scriptures; and the ministers who had time to study the 'Critici Sacri,' and Walton's Polyglott, must have possessed an enviable amount of learned leisure. They had not a dozen committees to attend a week, and some thousands of letters to answer in a year. Their mornings were

not devoted to the miscellaneous affairs which now-a-days engross care and divide the energies of the parochial and congregational factotum, nor were their evenings bespoken for *conversations* and lectures, soirees and public dinners. And, although it would be a silly peevishness to complain of a state of matters which is mainly the result of the evangelistic and philanthropic zeal evolved in the present century, we sometimes wish that religious activity left more time for sacred scholarship. Except during the few weeks of his annual holidays, there is many a clergyman who never knows the luxury of a day's unbroken retirement; and for the quiet study of the Bible, city merchants are often more favorably circumstanced than city ministers. No doubt, a sensible man will conform to existing exigencies, and will do his best to produce, from Sabbath to Sabbath, discourses, fresh, practical and impressive; but extemporized as these usually are, in hasty moments, at the end of a laborious week, he often sighs to perceive that there are broad tracts of revelation on which he dare not adventure, and important truths in the 'counsel of God,' which he must 'shun to declare,' lest Christianity itself be compromised by crude expositions or unguarded statements. And that which aggravates the evil is the early age at which the student now enters on the active ministry—spending, in his first charge, the six or eight years which the aspirant two hundred years ago devoted, in his quiet chambers at Oxford or Cambridge, to the investigation of the original Scriptures, and the mastery of systematic divinity. Happily the church is now so rich in active and accomplished laymen, and in men of business who are withal men of piety, that we believe the interests of Christianity would be subserved by pastors being allowed to give themselves more entirely 'to prayer and to the ministry of the word.' "

How much he esteemed and honored the labors of exegetic theology upon the sacred originals comes out in the following admirable passage of his paper on "Finality and Progress," (*Evangelical Christendom*, July 1868):—

"To the Bible we cannot add a new text, any more than we can add to the globe a new ounce of matter; but just as it is said to the mineralogist, Search the soil, search the surface, and search the rocks beneath, so it is said to the student, Search the Scriptures, search the original, so as to get the very sense. And in

this way, it is wonderful how much has of late been done; and just as the galvanic pile gave Davy a new instrument of analysis —just as the prismatic spectrum put a new power for the same purpose, into the hand of Bunsen—so the doctrine of the Greek article and other generalizations, have given the grammarian a new security in rendering the New Testament, and for subsequent versions promise a symmetry and precision, which will place the Englishman almost abreast of the Hellenistic inhabitant of Palestine. And every sentence restored to its right significance, every obscurity cleared up, every controverted meaning vindicated and henceforward placed above discussion, is so much pure gain. It is not a new text, but it answers the same purpose; it is not a new text any more than rubidium is a new metal, for people had been treading on it, and handling it, and even swallowing it, all unconscious, till the other day, when the chemist put his finger upon it and held it up to view."

On the wide and splendidly diversified field of Historical Theology or Church History, our lamented author would have been still more at home. History had powerful attractions for him. He had read all the great historians of our literature; and he has given us, in "Excelsior," three papers on the Story of Great Histories—Sir Walter Raleigh's "History of the World," Gibbon's "Decline and Fall," D. Hume's "History of England" —written with great vivacity and gusto, which show, not only how exquisitely he enjoyed this department of literature, but how admirably he was qualified to apply, even to the greatest of its productions, a criticism not unworthy of their greatness.

But of all history, the history of the Christian life in our world had a fascination and a charm for him, such as, perhaps, very few men—not entirely occupied with this subject, and in their whole life surrendered to it—have ever felt. We distinguish, in speaking of his case, between the history of Christian life, and the history of the Christian Church. He could never have felt in his element either in reading or in writing the history of church heresies or church corruptions of any kind; and a vast deal of what is contained in a church history like Mosheim's, must have been to him highly distasteful and even repulsive. But next to the life and history of Christ himself, there was no kind of history so dear to him as the history of Christian life, especially

in the form of biography—the history of sanctified individual life. Individuality had special charms for him. He was addicted to biography all his days; and he was himself a Christian biographer before he was anything else in authorship. His first works were lives of his own father, and of Bishop Hall and Dr. Barrow; and it was a pleasing coincidence, that his latest literary work was of the same class as his earliest, viz., a sketch of the life of the late lamented Mr. Burns of Hampstead. If he could have had leisure for the work he might have written a delightful history of the church, in the form of a series of biographies of all her best and greatest men of every country and age. All he could ever accomplish of this kind was a Gallery of biographical sketches of the Christian classics of our own country—a work which was evidently a labor of much love, and which no one can peruse without equal admiration for the vivid picturesqueness of his descriptions, and the solidity and felicity of his critical decisions, and the all-embracing Christian-catholicity of his spirit.

But, as we have already said, it was as a practical theologian—as a theologian mainly occupied with the theory and practice of the Christian character, experience and life—that he attained his chief and most splendid distinction; and we must now proceed to state what were the subjects of Practical Theology in which he made his most valuable and memorable contributions to the common stock of evangelical truth, and on which he left the deepest marks of his sanctified genius.

1. Beginning in our enumeration with the Holy Scriptures, viewed practically as the Book of Life, he devoted much thought and pains both to the defense of their divine origin and authority, and to the exhibition of the infinite wisdom, skill, and condescension displayed in their structure and adaptation.

To this grand subject he consecrates the whole of one of his most charming works, originally entitled "The Lamp and the Lantern; or, The Bible a light to the Tent and the Traveler," but afterward reissued with some alteration under the new title of "The Light to the Path; what the Bible has been to others, and what it can do for ourselves." In two of its chapters, entitled "Lessons on the Christian evidence," he writes in the character of a Christian apologist. But, true to his earnestly practical genius, it is as a practical rather than a theoretic apologist that he writes. Adapting himself to the unlearned many, rather than

to the learned few, he avoids all arguments of an erudite kind; he fastens at once upon the internal evidences, and seeks to show that the Word of God is intrinsically credible, or endowed with a self-evidencing light and power.

"There are many ways," he thus begins, "in which intelligent readers have come to the conclusion that the books of Scripture are genuine, that their narrative is authentic, and that the message which they convey to mankind is indeed the Word of the living God. Some of these proofs require a certain amount of erudition in order to feel their force, a considerable power of attention in order to follow the argument, but others are so obvious, that he who runs may read. Nor should it ever be forgotten, that to the sound mind Christ is his own witness, and Christianity carries its own commendation. There is also a class of proofs intrinsic to the Bible itself, which to the most of minds are very conclusive when rightly brought out, and which are all the more valuable because they need no cumbrous apparatus of external evidence. Of these we shall try to give an example in this and the following chapters."

The two chapters are felicitously entitled "The Check and the Counterfoil," "The Mould and the Medallion." They are chiefly taken up in pointing out the striking coincidences between the books of the New Testament when compared with one another, and between the Old Testament dispensation and the New—the one the mould or matrix, and the other the medallion which was struck from it. "The more delicate these coincidences are, the surer is the inference from them. If you were comparing a check with the check book from which it was said to be taken, and found not only the cut portion to correspond with the counterfoil, but if on microscopic examination the torn corner finely coincided—if you found its rough and ragged edge and each riven portion to match exactly the surface from which it was said to be sundered, you could no longer doubt that the piece of paper in your hand had been taken from that book. And these delicate agreements of one evangelist with another show that their story is an extract from the book of truth, a leaf from the volume of actual occurrence, a derivation from a counterpart original!" What a sensible appeal to men of sense! The argument, as drawn out by him at greater length than we can quote here, is by no means a new one; but never was it

more freshly or effectively put. Without being original in substance, it has all the effect of originality from its novelty of form and illustration; and without the least parade of learning or formal argumentation, the whole leaves upon the reader a deep impression of solid sense, and sage insight, and intellectual vigor. And this is, in truth, the special and very valuable service which, as an occasional writer on Christian evidences, he has rendered to apologetics. He has made the argument practical, as it needs above all things to be made to this practical age,—an age which has no leisure for erudite treatises, and which has a horror of all pedantries, whether of ancient learning or of formal ratiocinations. Without adding anything to the argument in bulk, he has added not a little to it in point and real effectiveness. He puts it in a form which a man of sense and candor will hardly be able to resist. He makes his reader feel that really, after all, plain common sense and good mother wit are on the side of the Christian history, marvellous as it is, and great as the mystery of Godliness may be. And if he calls in the aid of his ever helpful fancy even into this field, where most other men find room only for severer faculties, all must bear him witness that he does so not to put figures of speech in the room of arguments, but only to illuminate his reasoning with a brighter light, and by the help of a brilliant association, to fasten it on the memory. Take the following illustration as an example, than which even he never, we think, produced one finer or more memorable:—

"We have often visited the ruins of a famous castle, with which, no doubt, many of our readers are well acquainted (the allusion is to the castle of Heidelberg). Long ago it was captured, and that it might never be a strong-hold to the patriots of Germany again, the enemy burnt it, and blew up the walls. But in the weedy fose is still shown a huge fragment of a tower, which, when exploded, alighted there; and in the goodly joining of its stones, and the hardening of its ancient mortar, such a rocky mass had it become, that when lifted from its base, instead of descending in a shower of rubbish, it came down superbly, a tower still. And like that massy keep, the books we have been considering are so knit together in their exquisite accuracy, the histories are so riveted to one another, and the epistles so mortised into the histories, and the very substance of epistles and

histories alike is so penetrated by that cement of all-pervasive reality, that the whole now forms an indissoluble concrete. And though all coeval literature had perished, though all the external confirmations were destroyed, though all the monuments of antiquity were annihilated, strong in its intrinsic truthfulness, the New Testament would still hold its lofty place—a tower of self-sustaining integrity. And though the efforts of enmity were to succeed as they have signally failed, though learned hostility were to undermine its documentary foundations, and blow up that evidence of manuscripts and early versions on which it securely reposes, so finely do its facts fit into one another, so strongly are its separate portions clamped together, and, in the penetration and interfusion through all its parts of its ultimate inspiring authorship, into such a homogeneous structure has it consolidated, that it would come down on its own basis, shifted, but nowise shattered. Such a book has God made the Bible, that, whatever theories wax popular, or whatever systems explode, 'the Scripture cannot be broken.'"

On the structure and organization of the Bible, he has a chapter brimfull of thought and beauty, entitled "The Literary Attractions of the Bible." And one of the chief of the attractions, in his view, is its marvellous diversity, combined with its profound unity, and its admirable fusion into one codex of instruction, of both the human element and the divine. Time was, not so long ago, when good men and evangelical divines were much more alive to the divine side of Scripture than to the human; and when, to their half open eye, all the human diversities and idiosyncrasies of the book were merged in the all-comprehending and all subduing unity of its divine inspiration. But that time is now retreating into the past,—that one-sidedness of a former generation is now rapidly giving way to larger and truer views. The writings of our author have not a little contributed, during the last quarter of a century, to bring about this improved state of things. And we may well accept his statement of the case, as a final statement of it, to which nothing need be added, and from which nothing need be taken away.

"Speaking to men, the divine Spirit used the words of men. When on the two tables, God wrote the ten commandments, he did not write them in the speech unutterable of the third heavens,

he wrote them in Hebrew letters, Hebrew words, and Hebrew idiom; and had it so pleased him, he might have given all the Scriptures in the self-same way. Employing no mortal pen whatever, from the top of Sinai he might have handed down the one Testament, and from the top of Olivet the other,—the whole, from Genesis to Revelation, completed without human intervention, and on amaranthine leaves engraven in Heaven's own holograph. And in such a case there would have been no dispute as to the extent of inspiration; there would have been no need that like the electrometers of the meteorologist, theologians should insert tests of its intensity, nicely graduated from the zero of Superintendence up to the fullness of Suggestion. But infinite wisdom preferred another way. Inspiration he made the counterpart of the *incarnation*. And as in the incarnate mystery we have, without mutual encroachment and without confusion, very God and very man, so in theopneustic Scripture we have a book, every sentence of which is truly human, and yet the whole of which is truly divine. Holy men spake it, but holy men spake and wrote it as they were moved to do by the Holy Ghost. And just as when God sent His Son into the world, he sent him not in the fashion of an angel, nor even in the fashion of a glorified and celestial man, but in all points like his brethren; so, when he sent into the world his written Word, it came not ready written with an angel's plume, but with reeds from the Jordan it was consigned to paper from the Nile. Every word of it Hellenistic or Hebrew, and yet every word not the less heavenly. And though the unlettered disciple, who in the identity of the ultimate Author forgets the diversity of the intermediate scribes—though he loses less than the dry critic who only recognizes the mortal penmen—that student alone will get the full good of his Bible, who recognizes the parallel facts—its perfect and all-pervasive divinity, its perfect and all-investing humanity."

In all this, and much more, admirable writing upon the same theme, there is nothing, we admit, which is absolutely new in point of substance of thought. The writer's originality was not the originality of thinking, in the special sense in which we speak of a *thinker;* yet who can deny him the merit of deep thoughtfulness, if not of new thinking? And how true an interpreter is he of the thoughts of other minds upon divine things, thoughts lying only half formed in men's consciousness, and

which they are unable to develop and bring to the birth. Do not our souls leap up on hearing him, to embrace his thoughts, and to recognize them as better and happier forms of thoughts of our own, which may have long struggled to utter themselves, but could not. "An original thinker," says Mr. Bayne, very justly, "we cannot say he was, but when his powerful imagination, his exquisite fancy, and his wide and delicate sympathy acted upon an old thought, they covered it with a golden plating so bright and beautiful, that it gleamed in our eyes as if it were new. This, if not the deepest originality, is at least a true originality, and we have no hesitation in affirming that every production of Dr. Hamilton was marked in this sense by original genius.

2. The Christian life itself was the one grand subject of his whole ministry and authorship. We do not mean that it was so in any exclusively subjective sense, or that he did not love to dwell and expatiate upon its objective sources, and standards, and strengths, as well as its inner experiences, and powers, and springs. Very far otherwise as we shall see immediately. What we mean to say is, that the thought of the Christian life seemed to be always uppermost with him, and whatever other Christian topics he preached or wrote upon, he always seemed to handle them with this practical reference mainly in view. He was never what is understood by a doctrinal preacher or writer. He never seemed to love doctrine purely for its own sake, as a subject of mere contemplation, but always chiefly for its bearing upon and application to "the use of edifying." Is Christ to be divided? he would have said. Does not Christ say, I am the way, and the life; and when we set him forth as the way and the truth, must it not be always with the view that sinful men may find in him the life—their truest, highest, ever-living life? There was no subject of thought and speech in which he was so thoroughly at home and in his element as this. He gave to it during the whole extent of his ministry the full force of his powers; he elaborated it, and analyzed it, and illustrated it with all the concentrated force of his intellectual and spiritual powers; and he lavished upon it, as a labor of love, all the shining wealth of his ever active fancy, and his ever-loving and sympathetic heart.

On many parts of the subject of course, his thoughts and expositions could not be different in substance from those of other earnest and faithful ministers of Christ; however like himself he

could not fail to be, even when he was likest other men, for in one way or another, he always left the mark of his own individuality upon everything he said and wrote; if not on the thing itself said, at least on his way of saying it. But, as before indicated, there were a good many conditions and aspects of the Christian life on which his teaching was so strongly marked, and so intensely individualistic, as to have imparted to his authorship a special importance and interest, and to have stamped it with a character of such enduring value, that the evangelical church has already embraced it as a possession for ever.

The chief of these salient characteristics of his teaching was the view he took of the vital relations subsisting between the living Christ and the living Christian—to the effect that the Lord Jesus himself is the only true and living root of all Christian life, and no less its only true center, and supreme object and end; that the Christian life begins, continues and ends in living communion with "the Living One" who was dead—with "the Living Lamb of God in the midst of the throne," the same who took away on the cross, the sins of the world, "a Lamb as it had been slain;" that to be a Christian in the true evangelical sense is to be found in Him; and to be a growing Christian, is to grow up in all things into Him, who is the living Head; and that to walk as a Christian is to walk with Christ Himself in the fellowship of His love, and in the doing of His will, and in the steady, strenuous, and growing imitation of His example.

There was nothing new or peculiar, of course, in this view of the fundamental conditions of the Christian life. It was the view set forth by the Master himself, and by all the apostles. "To me to live is Christ," was an utterance of St. Paul, which would have been accepted by all his colleagues, and by all their genuine converts as well as his own. Such teaching, therefore, was merely a return to the earliest of all Christian teaching,—a return which has been rapidly going on in the evangelical churches for the last generation. The difference between Dr. Hamilton and most other approved teachers, in this respect, was rather a difference of degree than of kind. There have been few evangelical preachers and writers in our time, who have made this return to apostolic practice with so intense a conviction and so ardent a sympathy, and few or none who have carried it out so completely in all that it includes, or who

have set an example in this respect which will be so widely influential in leading other Christians and Christian teachers to do the same.

The point in which he went, perhaps, beyond all his contemporaries was this,—that with him the preaching of Jesus Christ, as the vital root and center of all true Christian life, meant not merely the full preaching of His cross but the full preaching of Himself, the crucified One; not merely of His redemption work, but of Himself, the crucified One; not merely of his redemption work, but of Himself, the blessed, and gracious, and loving Worker, that is to say, the full preaching of His character, His spirit, His heart, and His example. "Preaching the Lord Jesus," which is the term used by St. Luke to describe the first preaching of Christianity in Antioch (Acts xi. 20), seemed to Him to include a plenary and minute setting forth of what the Lord was and is personally, as well as of all that He did and is doing, officially and relatively. It included vastly more than the preaching of the true doctrine about him and his mediatorial office—as that doctrine is laid down in creeds and catechisms. It included the vivid and graphic presentation of the Lord Jesus Himself in his whole personality as Son of God and Son of Man, and in his whole rich and many-sided individuality of character and example. Our Lord's own words on one occasion were, "And I, if I be lifted up, will draw all men unto *me*." The universal attraction was to be the attraction of his own self, chiefly indeed as self-manifested on the cross, but also as manifested in all other ways, both by word and deed and endurance. The Lord Jesus himself was the magnet that was to draw all hearts. Must not this magnet, then, be continually made use of to attract the souls of men into union with Christ, and to draw closer and closer the bonds of holy and loving fellowship with their living Lord? Must not his ministers in all ages and lands determine, like St. Paul, to know nothing in their ministry save Jesus Christ and Him crucified,—understanding by that formula not only all that concerns his redemption work, but also all that concerns the character and life of the blessed Worker? Such, as we may gather from the practice of our author, was his interpretation of that New Testament summary of the preaching of the Apostles,—"preaching the Lord Jesus." The blessed Master Himself was his constant and delightful theme, in all that he was

on earth and is now in Heaven, as well as in all that He did and suffered, and is still doing, as the one Mediator and Reconciler, and few preachers have ever approached him, none have ever excelled him, either in his power to appreciate and love, or in his power to picture and express, the grace and glories of the Saviour's character and example. This adorable Saviour himself he ever set forth as the Alpha and Omega of the Christian life and work. It is in Him personally as well as officially known and understood, that all Christian life must root itself and must grow. It is in Him, as a personal living Lord, once crucified for us, that it must ever center itself in trust and in love. It is to Him it must ever turn the eye of wistful and adoring admiration, following the eye wheresoever he goeth, and pressing ardently after him in the footsteps of His perfect example. "Abide in *me*, and I in you;" "I am the vine, ye are the branches."

The older evangelism trusted almost exclusively to the attraction of the cross. It took a somewhat narrow view of what was meant by the preaching of Christ crucified: and in seeking to win souls to the Savior, it knew scarcely any other magnet than his *dying* love, his atoning and redeeming passion and death. The evangelism of our own day, as represented by Dr. Hamilton, thoroughly sympathizes with all that the older evangelism taught and said upon the glory of the cross of Christ, and is thoroughly at one with it in the conviction that, in a pre-eminent sense and degree, Christ crucified is the power of God and the wisdom of God unto salvation. But it has a broader and more inclusive mode of thought and speech than that. It retains all that the evangelism of the last generation thought and said; but it adds to it the great and fruitful thought, that the person of Jesus is a potent attraction as well as his cross—his character and life, as well as the atonement and reconciliation consummated once for all in his death. The living Christ is in its eyes a mighty factor of the Christian life, as well as the dying Christ; and it reckons upon the powerful attraction which the personal Saviour has for every soul of higher type which has any yearnings for the true, the beautiful, and the good. In a former day, the appeal of the evangelical pulpit was almost exclusively to the sense of guilt which rankles in every human soul, and to the fears of coming judgment which such a guilty conscience engenders, and to the sense of duty arising from such a state of lost souls to flee for

refuge to the hope set before them in the one only atonement. Dr. Hamilton thoroughly sympathized with all this, as far as it went, and often sought to commend Christ to sinners in this very way—which must always to the end of time continue to be the chief and most effective way. But he would have demurred to the assertion that this was the *only* way. Calling to mind what manifold attraction went forth from the person of the Saviour wherever he manifested himself by word or deed, during his living ministry; remembering the numerous proofs which the gospels afford of the power of his words and deeds to touch the hardest hearts, and to reclaim the most heinous sinners, even the publicans and the harlots,—his ministry was framed on the principle of combining the preaching of Jesus the Saviour with the preaching of the cross as the way of salvation; and of trusting to the exhibition of the perfection of beauty in his character and life, to enlighten and inform the consciences of men, and draw to the Holy One their wistful attention and regard, as well as to the still more affecting exhibition of holy love and loving holiness held forth in his death for sin and sinners on the accursed tree. He was evidently of opinion that the Lord Jesus was in every way and in all respects, the wisdom of God and the power of God unto salvation; and that he addresses himself as such to all the elements of human consciousness which have affinity whatever with Christian truth and life, and that he makes his approaches as such to the human soul by all the avenues by which it is any way accessible to his influence and claims. If you had asked him to sum up all the elements of Christ's attraction and power over human souls, he would probably have replied that the fullness of Christ Himself was the fullness of his attraction. He would probably have said, that unless we hold forth Christ in the plenitude both of what He is and what He does, we are not holding Him forth in all the plenitude of this power to draw to Himself, and to bind to Himself forever, in trust and in love, the immortal souls of men. Hence the occurrence in his writings of such passages as the following, which we find in one of his latest and ripest pieces, entitled, "Christ's Walk" (*Evangelical Christendom*, December, 1866):—

"To walk one hour as Christ walked is more than has yet been given to the most ardent and affectionate discipleship; but to

the mere existence of such a pattern, it is unspeakable how much we owe. In conjunction with those other influences of which he is the Alpha and Omega, the example of Jesus is making him, every day, men's Saviour. Read in the gospels, repeated in sermons, faintly reflected in Christians, that matchless life is every day humanizing, stimulating, rebuking, consoling thousands; impelling to deeds of generous self-sacrifice and difficult self-conquest, which he was himself the first to exhibit, and inspiring with hope those lovers of their race who would otherwise despair of mankind. And even although we may not be able to build tabernacles and abide on the mountain, it is grand to dwell near it; it is grand to lift up an eye towards it; it is grand to be sometimes tempted upward; and with souls habitually cleaving to the dust, it does us good, it quickens and ennobles, to attempt, however feebly, to climb; although we must stop far short of the summit, the horizon is widened, the powers are enhanced, and life is redeemed from its tameness by the shortest ascent. . . . .

"Very wonderful is the *balance* of excellence in the Saviour's character. In His sole instance do we perceive each single virtue in its full development. Yet no one virtue in excess, but the whole in harmonious and mutually relieving brightness, so as to form the perfection of beauty, a full-orbed Sun of Righteousness.

"There He stands and will ever stand, history's great miracle and the world's great hope, a sign that is still spoken against, but a name which is continually making progress, and daily working miracles. His enemies themselves being witness, he has left in our dark dwelling a light, which had never hitherto been seen on sea or shore, a light which is as distinct from the tapers of philosophy as it is brighter than the orbs of heaven; a light which, revealing God, enhances all other joyful sunshine, and which fearing neither solstice nor eclipse is destined to hold on its way till it lightens every land. And ever since over Bethany he spread forth his hands and blessed the men of Galilee, a balm has lingered in earth's atmosphere, which was not there before; and we all feel that earth will never again be so bleak since Jesus has been here, nor the grave again so dark since Jesus has been there; just as we feel that goodness has new charms since He showed us what it is, and that Heaven has most nearness since he said, 'I go to my Father,' and 'Lo, I am with you alway.'"

In his last publication, "The Parable of the Prodigal Son," we find the following passage, which brings out the breadth of his views, in conscious contrast with the older habit of thought, in the distinctest manner. It occurs at the beginning of the chapter entitled, "A Happy Meeting."

"To the mediation of the Lord Jesus we owe all our hopes and all our happiness. Including, as it does, satisfaction for sin, a matchless exhibition of divine compassion, and the introduction into our fallen world of that celestial energy which raises to a new and noble life those who were dead in trespasses, it has not only removed every barrier in the way of the transgressor's return, but has made the path of life so open and attractive, that the most simple have found it, the wayward have been induced to enter, the feeblest have been carried through.

"In that mediation so preëminent is the work of atonement, that in the eye of many a reverent beholder it has left small space for other objects, even as it has left no need for further manifestations; and with the impatience of gratitude, with the intolerance of an absorbing affection, they denounce, as beside the purpose, all teaching which has not for its theme, express and exclusive, 'Christ crucified.'

"But right and true as is that sense which nothing can relieve except the blood of sprinkling, and glorious as shines the cross in forefront of the gospel, it is no honor to the Lord Jesus, and it is an injury to ourselves, to forget the great lessons of His life, or ignore those other Scriptures, without whose light a darkness deeper than was over all the land from the sixth hour even unto the ninth, would still encircle Calvary.

"As Mediator, the Lord Jesus was the manifestation of God. The Divine Son, dwelling in the bosom of Deity, He plainly showed the Father. Not only did he bring the Father's message, but on the great axiom, 'I and the Father are one,' here in the midst of men he lived out the Father's life, the Father's truth and tenderness and love. In Moses the law, the sanctity had come already, but the graciousness of God came in Jesus Christ; and in all things like-minded, the very feelings and dispositions of the Father shone in his countenance and breathed in his accents, surrounding his person with a sacred attraction, and with a winsome authority inspiring his words; so that, when to

the heavy laden he said, 'Come unto me,' we know that with like grace and truth the Father invites us; so that, when on the cross he exclaimed, 'Father, forgive,' we know that the prayer was addressed, not to a Deity distant, inexorable, hostile, but to that God who so loved the world that He gave His Son, and who, in order to answer the prayer in a righteous forgiveness, had surrendered the Best Beloved to this sorrow."

Still, with all this glorious breadth of view, never for a moment did he allow it to be imagined, that he had any sympathy with the distinctive spirit and view of what is called the Broad Church party. It is true that party brings much into the foreground, as he did, the living Christ, but they do so in the way of throwing into the background the dead and crucified Christ. They magnify much his living love; but they throw a haze of obscuration over the atonement made for sin in His own body on the tree. They have much value, they tell us, for the life-element of the gospel; but they lay little stress upon the truth element, upon distinct definite gospel doctrine. In all these characteristics our author differed from this school *toto cœlo*. Christ crucified was always in his foreground, as well as Christ risen; the atonement of the dying Christ, as well as the gracious work and presence of the living Christ. He did the very opposite of disparaging the importance of Christian doctrine, with the view of exalting the importance of Christian communion. He saw clearly that the more he magnified communion with Christ as the highest and ultimate thing in the Christian life, the more he must value distinct and definite doctrine touching the person and work and relations to the Church of the Lord Jesus Christ himself; for how can we commence with one whom we do not know? and how can we know Him distinctly without a distinct doctrine concerning Him? In truth, we regard such teaching as Dr. Hamilton's as the true and only adequate antithesis to the teaching of the Broad Church. It is only by such teaching as his that we can effectively repel and keep in check that interesting, it is true, but still extremely defective and one-sided view of the Christian system and life. It is not by a one-sided doctrine of our own that we can successfully cope with the one-sided doctrine of others, but only by a doctrine all-sided, comprehending and complete. It was a weakness of the older evangelism that it did less than justice to the living Christ, and living communion with Him, and it was partly this weakness which was the occasion of

the reaction represented by the Broad Church movement. To avoid this weakness, as our author avoided it, and at the same time hold fast to the doctrine of reconciliation to God by the blood of the cross, is the only sure way to overcome the reaction and carry the gospel triumphantly through it.

Having dwelt so long upon these points, we shall be compelled to touch very briefly upon others which remain to be mentioned. One of these was the prevailing type under which he loved to exhibit the Christian life. This we would describe as the family or domestic type. Objectively, the gospel of Christ was to him supremely the revelation of God as a Father reconciled in His Son and reconciling; the revelation of the Son as the Elder Brother of the whole family of God in earth and heaven, and of heaven as the Father's house, the Elder Brother's home, and as such the true home and hearth of all the redeemed family forever. And, subjectively, the Christian spirit of life to him, was the spirit and freedom of *Sonship*, crying, "Abba, Father;" the spirit and love of brotherhood, first towards the Divine Son supremely, and next towards the whole household of faith and the whole family of man for the divine Father's and the divine Brother's sake. This delightful view of Christianity, whether regarded as a revelation or a life, pervaded his whole ministry and authorship. It is the idea which impregnates the whole of his latest work on the "Parable of the Prodigal Son," and no Christian writer has ever excelled him in the use that may be made of family images, and domestic affections and experiences, in order to illustrate and expound the relations and loves, and the mingled sorrows and consolations, of the consecrated life of God's children. But in thus employing the family life as a type or image of the Christian life, he had a distinct consciousness that it was no mere fanciful analogy which he was thus turning to account. He agreed with and quotes a remarkable passage from Mr. J. Baldwin Brown's work on "The Home Life, in the Light of its Divine Idea," to the effect that "God has not borrowed these images—father, children, home. It is heaven that lends to earth, not earth to heaven. Heaven but reclaims its own when it takes these images and applies them again to heavenly use. For God made the first man after a divine original, and after a divine orignal, too, he made the first home. The things that are upon earth, the things which have root in humanity, as God made it, and which are not the devil's work, are first in heaven."

Another very favorite theme with him, was the unity and diversity of the Christian life. In this feature he bears a strong resemblance to Neander, who loved to write of the one and the manifold of that life. The diversity he saw in it was almost endless, and had reference to its whole history from first to last, in individual souls, and in communities and churches. He took as much delight in the variety of the kingdom of grace, as in that of the kingdom of nature. He looked at the variations of the church landscape with the nature of a poet's eye, and he described and painted them with all the the gusto, as well as the picturesque skill, of a first-rate artist. Much of the delight he took in Christian biography was owing to this cause, for he could never find two Christian lives in all respects the same; and if he loved all Christian lives chiefly for their unity of faith, and love, and hope in the one blessed Lord, he loved them all also all the better for their differences, and even for their oppositions of temperament and complexion. He has two admirable papers in *Excelsior* (August and September, 1854), expressly devoted to this subject. They are entitled "Living Epistles," the one treating of the diversities among Christians, the other of their fundamental agreements.

Now, familiar as we have long been with this mode of thought, it was not the habit of thought of the older evangelism—the evangelism represented by such writers as Philip Doddridge and John Newton. The view it took of the "Rise and Progress of the Christian life," was a great deal narrower and less genial. Doddridge's celebrated book bearing that title, leaves the impression upon the reader, that unless he travel into into the Christian life, and through it, in the exact road laid down there, as in a map or road survey, he has grave reason to doubt whether he is in the road of life at all; and, fortunately, we are in possession of the opinion of Dr. Hamilton of this very book, and with reference to this very point. It occurs in a paper in *Excelsior* for February, 1856, on "Devotional Writers."

"If it were asked who has most contributed to the devotional thoughts and feelings of Britain, we think the answer would generally be, Leighton. Yet with many, if not the most, Doddridge has had the initiative. Most inquirers begin with the 'Rise and Progress' before they nourish their minds with the 'Commentary upon St. Peter.' And the first teaching will be apt to retain an enduring influence upon the mind. The 'Rise and

Progress' of Doddridge was commenced and concluded with much prayer, and these prayers have received an abundant answer. The serious inquirer there finds a seriousness congenial to the state of his own mind. But he will by no means meet them with the simplicity of the gospel. Having used it as a guide book ourselves, we speak from experience when we say that it has a gaeat tendency to perplex the way of salvation. . . . 'If the 'Rise and Progress,' be taken as a map of the plan of Salvation, it points out a very circuitous path to the Cross. . . . . It would be very desirable that a gospel preface should be prefixed to it, declaring a free, full, and present salvation."

Another subject of practical theology on which our author wrote largely, and with memorable influence and effect, was the differences of the Christian life, or its heaven-like pervasiveness. On this poiut there was much need for expansion or broadening in the older evangelism, as we remember it in the Edinburgh pulpit of one of our youth and student days. It was for long a puzzling problem with us, which the pulpit of the day gave us no help in solving, how it was possible to do heartily the every-day work of life and the world, without being hindered by it in the spiritual life, without even contracting deep sin, and falling into gross incousistency with the Christian profession, by reason of this very heartiness? It was not till after a long struggle with the established conventionalism of the religious world, that we were able to get a firm hold of the reconciling principle,—"*Whatsoever* ye do in word and deed, do it unto the Lord; and whatsoever ye do, do it *heartily*." Could any principle be broader, and yet stricter?—*everything heartily*, because *everything to the Lord*. The emancipation of mind and conscience and life, which such a discovery brought, was glorious, and filled the heart with strong joy, and a boundless elasticity of spirit. When Dr. Hamilton came to London, twenty-seven years ago, we soon found that he was in full possession of the discovery, and that the enunciation aud application of it constituted, in fact, one of the most salient characters of his ministry. It was this very principle in its fullest development and reach, which animated, like a fervent soul, his first book,—"Life in Earnest;" and that book, which it would be superfluous to quote because everybody has read it, has done vastly more than any other work of our time to make the principle popular in the religious world, and to obtain for it everywhere a unanimous recognition. The principle is now a

realized possession forever, and never will the church suffer the little book to die which has domesticated the principle in every Christian home. The old narrowness is exploded, and in that universally popular little tract we behold the small, compact, and well-aimed explosive that mainly did the work.

We mention only one subject more,—the *progressiveness* of Christian knowledge and life, both in the individual and in the church. A man of narrow views has no hope of theological progress for the Church; he is content with things as they are; or, if not content with them, he has no expectation that they will ever be much mended; and this because, for want of depth and breadth of insight, he has no perception that Christianity has yet any undeveloped powers or inexhausted resources. He measures the gospel of Christ by his own knowledge of it. He cannot surmise that it can be any bigger than his own notion of it, or have any powers available for the world's good or the Church's progress, more than those which he has gauged himself.

Very different from such a man was our lamented author. For his large and comprehensive thoughts on the progressiveness of the Christian religion and life, we refer to his paper entitled "Finality and Progress," in *Evangelical Christendom*, for July, 1864, where he treats expressly of this very topic:

"The volume of the book is finished, and we expect no addition to its sayings. But, though revelation is complete, we trust that religion will advance. In other words, as the years move on, under the guidance of God's providence, and the teaching of the Spirit, we trust that the Bible will be better and still better understood; and that practical piety will become a presence in our world, more lovely, more majestic, and more potential, than it ever yet has been. And if, as Sismondi says, religion be the repository of all the most precious things which the human race possesses; and if there be no element in human progress which ought not there to find a place, we may hope that a Christianity shall yet evolve, so lovely and so stately, so upright and so genial, in such sweet fellowship with heaven, and so frank and friendly towards brother men, that, in view of its manifold acquirements and vigorous maturity, the former days shall not be mentioned, nor come into mind; or if mentioned at all, shall be leniently mentioned, and with a fond sort

of forgiveness, as the days when we spake as a child when we thought as a child."

The services rendered by the teaching of Dr. Hamilton, on all these subjects of practical theology, are so weighty and important in themselves and in their yet undeveloped consequences, and they were made possible for him to render by so rare and extraordinary a combination and conciliation of natural and spiritual gifts, that we cannot doubt for a moment that he had a mission from the Great Master to render to His Gospel and Church these very services. We are fully persuaded,—in view both of the great things he did in the course of a brief life, and of the great faculties of nature and grace which enabled him to do them, and which needed to be blended and reconciled in an almost unexampled manner, to confer upon him this ability—that he was a chosen instrument of God raised up and equipped for this very work—a work which may be fairly described as the work of developing the old and narrow evangelism into an evangelism broader and more genial, wider in its sympathies, larger in its views, and more thoroughly humane and brotherly in its spirit. This was not indeed his work in any exclusive sense. We do not forget what is due to many other eminent teachers and preachers, both dead and living. But his share in the work was still a large one; and for popular effectiveness and wide-spread actual effect, was perhaps the most important share of all. And we are further well assured, that this work which he did will never die. It has already spread its influence widely, but we shall see it spread its influence much more widely still. When his unpublished writings are added by the press to those already before the world, and when his life and letters have been subjoined, as the complement of his authorship, we have no doubt that his fame and usefulness will be largely expended throughout the Christian world; that, long after his death, he will continue to speak, and to be listened to with admiration and love; and that posterity will count us, his contemporaries, to have been happy in having enjoyed the living presence and ministry of so Christ-like a disciple,—of a modern apostle so much in the image of the apostle whom Jesus loved, and of that other apostolic man, whom his colleagues loved to call Barnabas, rather than Joses, because he was a son of consolation.

X.—THE FRENCH PREACHER, LACORDAIRE.*

Thirty years ago, Sir James Stephen, in his kindly way, anticipated the bitter and contemptuous complaints which have been recently urged against the dullness and ineffectiveness of English preaching:—

"Every seventh day a great company of preachers raise their voices in the land to detect our sins, to explain our duty, to admonish, to alarm, and to console. Compare the prodigious extent of this apparatus with its perceptible results, and, inestimable as they are, who will deny that they disappoint the hopes which, antecedently to experience, the least sanguine would have indulged? The preacher has, indeed, no novelties to communicate. His path has been trodden hard and dry by constant use; yet he speaks as an ambassador from heaven, and his hearers are frail, sorrowing, perplexed, and dying men. The highest interests of both are at stake. The preacher's eye rests on his manuscript; the hearer's turns to the clock; the half-hour glass runs out its sand; and the portals close on well-dressed groups of critics, looking for all the world as if just dismissed from a lecture on the tertiary strata."

Had the brilliant essayist crossed the Channel he would have discovered that the eloquence of the pulpit was not extinct, and that France had a living preacher who knew how to fascinate the intellect, kindle the imagination, and touch the heart of the most cultivated and of the most illiterate. Whenever Lacordaire was announced to preach in Notre Dame, the cathedral was surrounded, long before the doors were open, by an immense and heterogeneous crowd. Before he appeared in the pulpit, the vast nave, the aisles, and the side-chapels were thronged with statesmen and journalists, members of the academy and tradesmen, working-men and high-born women, sceptics, socialists, devout Catholics, and resolute Protestants, who were all compelled to surrender themselves for the time to the irresistible torrent of his eloquence. The Archbishop of Paris, who seems to have been a

* From the *Contemporary Review*, May, 1868, abridged.

timid and cautious man, and who, in 1834, had interdicted Lacordaire from continuing his Conferences in the Collége Stanislas, and who hesitated very much about offering him the pulpit at Notre Dame, was swept away at last by the universal enthusiasm, and at the close of the Conferences of 1835-36, rising from his archepiscopal throne, he hailed the preacher before all Paris as "the new prophet."

What was the secret of this remarkable success? Can the Frenchman teach us English preachers how to change the weary indifference of our audiences into earnest and sustained attention? To preach as he preached may be possible only to men of rare and exceptional genius in rare and exceptional circumstances; but can we learn from him how to redeem our sermons from the common reproach of being altogether uninteresting and unimpressive? I think he can teach us some things which many of us have never discovered for ourselves.

Mr. Edmond Scherer, indeed, maintains that the discourses of Lacordaire are "unreadable."* He thinks that all their charm vanished as soon as they were printed. There is, no doubt, some truth in what Charles James Fox said of parliamentary eloquence, that no good speech ever reads well; and it is equally true that very often sermons which were effective when delivered to a great congregation become intolerably dull when collected into a volume and read quietly by the fire-side. But Lacordaire's Conferences, though they owed a great deal to the living presence of the orator, to whom may be appied the words which Sir James Stephen applies to George Whitefield, "Vividus vultus, vividi oculi, vividæ manus, denique omnia vivida," will reward patient and thoughtful study. It was not his habit to write his sermons fully. They were taken down from his lips by reporters, and are printed with only very slight changes.

But they must be accepted for what they are. To read them for any other purpose than to discover how, among an irreligious and sceptical people, a great preacher compelled thousands of men to listen to him with respect, and sometimes kindled them into passionate excitement, would be to waste time and strength. Lacordaire was a great preacher—nothing more. But to be *that* was something.

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* Littérature Contemporaine, p. 166.

His learning was neither extensive nor profound. In the discussion of the theories of modern unbelief, he was plainly as M. Scherer phrases it, "dépaysé." His philosophy had neither depth nor acuteness. His logic was often feeble and incoherent. Even his rhetoric was sometimes vitiated by a glaring want of taste. But still he was a magnificent preacher; and it is as a preacher and a preacher only, that I propose to consider him.

The story of his life is very pleasantly told by Dora Greenwell in the little volume recently reviewed in these pages. "The Interior Life of Lacordaire," by Chocarne, which has been translated into English, reveals the intensity of his devotion, and contains curious and pathetic illustrations of the severity of his asceticism. M. Montalembert's sketch is a glowing panegyric. "Lacordaire's Correspondence with Madame Swetchine" is really an interesting autobiography, covering several of the most important years of his life. It is understood that an authoritative memoir is being prepared by M. de Falloux.

Lacordaire's first sermon was delivered while he was still in the seminary. He preached it in the refectory while a hundred and thirty men were dining. His voice had to make itself heard above the rattle of plates and spoons.

"I do not believe," he says, "that there can be any position more unfavorable to an orator than to have to speak to men who are eating. Cicero could not have delivered his orations against Catiline at a dinner of senators, unless, indeed, he had compelled them to throw down their forks at his first sentence. How would it have been if he had had to speak to them on the mystery of the Incarnation?"

Certainly the subject does not seem to have been very felicitously chosen, and it is not wonderful that when the young preacher looked at his audience, who appeared to be devoting all their attention to their dinner and none to himself, he felt very much disposed to throw his square cap at their heads. He left the pulpit with the full conviction that he had preached very badly. He dined hurriedly, and went into the garden mortified and humiliated; however, he soon learned that he had done better than he thought, and that his congregation had been strongly impressed by his discourse.

In the spring of 1833 he preached for the first time in public. It was in the great church of St. Roch.

"I was there," writes M. Montalembert, "with MM. de Corcelles, Ampère, and some others, who must remember it as I do. He failed completely, and coming out, every one said, 'This is a man of talent, but he never will be a preacher.' Lacordaire himself thought the same. "It is evident to me that I have neither sufficient physical energy, nor sufficient intellectual flexibility, nor sufficient knowledge of the world in which I always lived, and always shall live, alone,—nor, in short, sufficient of anything that a man ought to have in order to be a preacher in the full sense of the word."

A year later he delivered his famous Conferences in the Collége Stanislas, and within two years of his failure at St. Roch he was at Notre Dame, surrounded by an audience such as I suppose no French preacher had addressed for more than a hundred and twenty years.

He had, no doubt the oratorical temperament. It was difficult for him to speak in private. There was a coldness and reserve in his manner which surprised those who had seen his frankness and fire in the pulpit.* He was conscious of the inspiration which every true speaker derives from the sight of his audience; he was surprised, himself, that his imagination, and all his intellectual powers should be so stimulated when he came face to face with the people. He was acutely sensitive to the merely accidental circumstances in which he had to speak. He would have liked to have carried off the beautiful pulpit which he saw in the cathedral at Sienna and have had it placed in Notre Dame. Standing in such a pulpit he thought he could preach better. "These things," he says, "are not indifferent to eloquence; far from it." He liked a great crowd before him,—"I have met with

* "What difficulty I have in speaking! . . . . Yesterday I made great efforts to entertain a young ecclesiastic who is rather seriously ill at our house, and who begged me to tell him something that would amuse him; *it was impossible for me to speak alone.*" He goes on to say that he cannot but admire the faculty that ladies have; "they are able to talk as much as they please, and how they please; their heart is a spring that flows naturally. The heart of man, mine especially, is like those volcanoes, the lava of which flows only at intervals, after a shock."—*Correspondance du R. P. Lacordaire et de Madame Swetchine*, p. 75.

a saying of Cicero's which has greatly pleased me:—'Non est magnus orator sine multitudine audiente.'" He was ardent; was easily excited to passion; his mind had a natural tendency to what the French call *les mouvements oratoires;* there was great boldness, enthusiasm and vehemence about him. These things are not to be acquired by any culture. If they do not come to a man at birth they can never be his.

But though these high endowments cannot be acquired they may be *suppressed;* and I think it very possible that if Lacordaire had been a clergyman of the English Church or an English Nonconformist minister, the chances against the development of his characteristic genius would have been overwhelming. How is it that while our political orators are unsurpassed, we rarely have a preacher who even approaches the highest order of eloquence? No doubt the rank and file of English preachers speak very much more effectively than the rank and file of English members of Parliament. If the unfortunate man who made his sufferings in church known to the nation over the signature "Habitans in sicco" had been obliged to sit in the gallery of the House of Commons a night every week for five or six years, his wailings would have been much more heart-rending. But what names can be found during the present century, either among the clergy of the Church of England or among the ministers of the Nonconformist churches, that can be set over against the names of Plunket, Canning, O'Connell, Derby, Lyndhurst, Gladstone and Bright? Political orators of the second rank we might match: Chalmers might be set against Lord Brougham, Melvill against Shiel, the Bishop of Oxford against Lord Carlisle, Spurgeon against Cobbett; John Henry Newman, Edward Irving, Dr. Manning, Mr. Liddon, Mr. Binney, Dr. Macleod, Dr. Guthrie, Mr. Angell James, would outweigh a crowd of Home Secretaries, Chancellors of the Exchequer, and Solicitors-General, to whose speeches the House of Commons has listened with admiration; but so far as I know there has not been a man since Robert Hall who could be compared with the great parliamentary orators; and the absence of pulpit eloquence of the very highest order deprives ordinary preachers of the stimulus and guidance they require.

It is incredible that of the vast number of men who have entered the Christian ministry in England, Scotland, and Ireland,

during the last fifty years there have not been a dozen, or a score, at least, who, if they had entered the House of Commons, would have rivalled the most illustrious political speakers. And although the eloquence of the politician is stimulated, developed and disciplined by influences of which the preacher is deprived, it cannot be the preacher's duty to accept mediocrity as his inevitable doom; he is bound to try to overcome the disadvantages of his position. With whatever force and eloquence he might have been able to speak in discussing budgets, treaties of commerce and reform bills, he ought to speak, at least, as forcibly and eloquently in asserting the authority of the Divine law, illustrating the depth and intensity of the Divine love, rebuking the sins of men, consoling their sorrows, appealing to their fear of a future judgment, and to their hopes of a glorious immortality.

But if he is to do this, he must not imitate with superstitious reverence the sermons even of the most successful preachers of past generations. If Jeremy Taylor, Robert South, Richard Baxter, Isaac Barrow, George Whitefield, and Jonathan Edwards were living now, their sermons would assume a form very different from that which was found to be most effective a century or two centuries ago. They would treat topics they never touched; they would treat the same topics differently. The method and arrangements of their sermons would be altogether new. Lacordaire did not attempt to copy Bossuet, Bourdaloue, or Massillon. He had his own conception of what a sermon must be in order to interest, impress and influence modern Frenchmen; and he walked in the light that God gave him. The *form* of his sermons was original. He knew how men at the Bar and in the Chamber won a verdict or carried a vote; he knew how M. Cousin fired a crowd of students with philosophical enthusiasm; and although the special objects of the preacher must always give his eloquence a special character, Lacordaire resolved that he would not refuse any of the legitimate and available resources of the barrister, the statesmen, and the lecturer on philosophy. What had he to do with the classics of the pulpit? "It is not my business," he exclaims, "to observe the rules of rhetoric, but to bring men to the knowledge and love of God; let us have the faith of St. Paul, and let us speak Greek as badly as he did." On this passage M. Sainte Beuve observes acutely enough, that we must take it as the orator meant it; if he disregarded the

common laws of rhetoric, it was only to observe its higher principles; and, to carry out his own comparison, "he does not speak Greek worse than his predecessors, but speaks it differently."

What we want in England is a preacher of equal courage and equal genius, who shall emancipate some of us from the dull tyranny of "three divisions with an application;" and others from the strange delusion that a spoken address should be a written essay—sensible, perhaps, and with a certain scholarly finish—but colorless in style, with no touch of humor, or pathos, or of passion, no grace of fancy or intensity of moral appeal, no worldly shrewdness or spiritual fervor,—an essay without a solitary passage that could by any mischance provoke a smile or a tear, startle, melt, or interest any man, woman, or child in the congregation.

Lacordaire, of course, did not read his sermons. He did not even write them. It was his custom to think them out, dash down a few notes indicating the general course of the thought, and write a passage here and there, which he probably reproduced in the pulpit almost as it stood on paper. Bossuet prepared in very much the same way; like Lacordaire, he trusted very largely to the inspiration of the moment for the precise language in which his thought was to be expressed.* Robert Hall did the same; though occasionally he verbally prepared whole sermons without setting pen to paper.

The objections to extemporaneous preaching are obvious. The most fatal argument against it is, that to very many good preachers it is impossible. And the men who can speak fluently, and who have no occasion to dread any serious catastrophe if they go into the pulpit without their manuscript, may be reasonably afraid of becoming vague and declamatory. An east wind, a rainy morning, a fit of indigestion, may almost ruin an extemporaneous sermon, however carefully the thought may have been prepared. The very best preacher will be likely to degenerate sometimes into weakness if he does not read; his mind will now and then obstinately refuse to work; and, perhaps, for five or ten minutes, he will be compelled to utter truisms or platitudes. Lacordaire's sermons are singularly uneven. There are rhetorical extravagances which it is impossible he could have ever written. His metaphors are often incoherent. The elevation of the style

* Many of Bossuet's sermons, however, were much more fully prepared than has been commonly supposed. See M. Gandar, "Bossuet, Orateur."

is maintained when all elevation of thought has vanished. After passages of conspicuous power there often occur passages as conspicuously feeble. But the advantage of his method of preparation are not less obvious. It involved the necessity of mastering completely the main outlines of his subject. The substance of what he had to say was passed and repassed through his mind until he became familiar with it. The principal thoughts were dwelt upon long enough for his whole nature to glow with their heat. He could see his sermon at one glance from end to end, could judge of the relative importance of its various parts, could readjust its arrangement, could anticipate with considerable accuracy its effect as a *whole*. When he was in the pulpit he had all the stimulus which a true speaker derives from his audience. There was interaction between his mind and the minds of his people. He could tell instinctively when he had made a point clear, and could throw aside at the moment any illustration or argument which he found to be superfluous. He could develop and intensify passages which he saw to be inadequate as he had mentally prepared them. His style lost all stiffness, and was free, bold, and direct. It took fire with the rapidity of its own movement. More than one of his critics has felicitously quoted, as descriptive of his eloquence, his expansion of our Lord's commission to his apostles:—

"*Go and teach all nations.* Fear neither the difficulties of foreign tongues, nor the differences of manners, nor the power of secular governments; consult not the course of rivers nor the direction of mountain ranges; go straight on; go as the thunder goes of Him who sends you—as the creative word went which carried life into chaos—as the eagles go, and the angels."

It was thus that Lacordaire swept on whenever he had a great subject and a large audience.

Even those of us who are conscious that for us to attempt to drive a fiery chariot would end only in humiliation and disgrace, and who know that apart from our "paper," as the Scotch call it, we should fail most ignominiously, may learn something from Lacordaire's success. We may, at least, think out our subject as though we were in the presence of the people, and master our sermon before we write it. The prolonged brooding over our arguments and appeals which this will render necessary, will be

time well spent. Our thoughts will become more vivid. Illustrations, more or less felicitous, of difficult points, will be certain to present themselves. We shall see the worthlessness of some ingenious fancies with which, when they first occurred to us, we were greatly struck. If the whole thought of a sermon is in the mind at once, the sermon will acquire a vital unity which will greatly add to its power.

"When I prepare my sermons," said a preacher, "I start like Abraham, who went out not knowing whither he went." He happens to be a man of some genius, and generally finds his way into the land of promise. Most men who write in this vague and unintelligent manner, fill page after page with aimless, loitering sentences; and if they light upon anything picturesque, beautiful, or noble, it is only by accident. Nor is the danger wholly escaped if a man begins with a blank "plan," which he fills up as he writes. He is almost certain to give the impression that his thinking was done to "order." There will be a pettiness and poverty about his thoughts which will betray the fault of his method. He will write like a man who, as Archishop Whately puts it, "has to say something," instead of like a man "who has something to say." Men who read their sermons, should have their real preparation finished before their first sentence is written.

It is rather difficult to imagine how Lacordaire would have preached Sunday after Sunday had he been the clergyman of an English parish or the minister of an English Nonconformist congregation. His Conferences are all on great themes; an ordinary preacher in this country must discuss and illustrate many topics which hardly admit much boldness and freedom of treatment. Our difficulties arise not merely from the frequency with which we have to preach, but from the fact that we are obliged to preach on truths of secondary importance, and on many very commonplace duties about which it is not possible to kindle in an audience any great enthusiasm. Lacordaire's subjects were nearly all of a kind to excite the keenest intellectual activity of his congregation. Many of them were subjects which, at the very moment he spoke, were stirring the passions of men, and creating political as well as religious antagonism throughout France. In his first series of Conferences he maintained the necessity of a teaching Church, and claimed for the Church that freedom of instruction which many French statesmen still regarded with apprehension: he explained the constitution of the Church; asserted

its infallibility; contended for the Papal supremacy; he discussed the condition of religious instruction in the world before the Christian Church was founded; he developed his theory of the Spiritual and Temporal Powers, and maintained the coercive power which is indispensable to the Church as an organized society. In the third series he illustrated the effects of Catholic doctrine on the Intellect; in the fourth series, its effects on the Soul; in the fifth, its effect on Society. The sixth series is devoted to our Lord Jesus Christ—his inner life, his public power, the establishment of his kingdom, its perpetuity and development, his pre-existence, and the controversies raised by modern unbelief. The seventh series is on God. The eighth is on the Intercourse between Man and God. The ninth is on the Fall and Restoration of Man. The tenth is on the Providential Economy of Redemption. His Conferences at Toulouse are on Life—the life of the passions, the moral life, the supernatural life, and the influence of the supernatural life on the public and private life of man. Besides these Conferences we have three or four funeral orations which he delivered on the death of great statesmen and soldiers.

Every preacher will understand the prodigious advantage which Lacordaire derived from having to preach only on subjects of such magnitude and importance as these. Even great orators produce but a slight effect when they are not speaking on great questions. Mr. Gladstone himself could not have been very eloquent on the bill for facilitating the establishment, improvement, and maintenance of oyster and mussel fisheries in Great Britain, or on the bill for regulating the inspection of cattle-sheds and cow-houses within burghs and populous places in Scotland. It is when the leader of her Majesty's Opposition has to impeach the general policy of the Government, or when the First Minister has to meet a vote of want of confidence, that they reveal the force and splendor of their genius. There are many truths which ought to be explained, many duties which ought to be enforced in sermons, about which there can be no great excitement; if sermons on such matters are clear, sensible and simple, nothing more is necessary.

But do preachers sufficiently appreciate the importance and worth of topics which in themselves are noble and commanding? Mr. Matthew Arnold thinks that modern poets err through

choosing poor and trivial subjects. The following passage occurs in the preface to the second edition of the first series of his poems:—

"It has been said that I wish to limit the poet in his choice of subjects to the period of Greek and Roman antiquity; but it is not so. I only counsel him to choose for his subjects great actions, without regarding to what time they belong. Nor do I deny that the poetic faculty can and does manifest itself in treating the most trifling action, the most hopeless subject. *But it is a pity that power should be wasted; and that the poet should be compelled to impart interest and force to his subject instead of receiving them from it, and thereby doubling his impressiveness.* There is, it has been excellently said, an immortal strength in the stories of great actions. The most gifted poet, then, may well be glad to supplement with it that mortal weakness which, in presence of the vast spectacle of life and the world, he must forever feel to be his individual portion."

The same advice may be given to preachers.

"How often do you preach?" said a distinguished French preacher to an English Nonconformist minister.

"Twice on Sunday," was the reply, "and once during the week."

"But that is altogether impossible," answered the French orator.

"I have no choice."

"Well, take my advice; once in two months preach a great sermon. Think about it; work at it; make it as perfect as you can; give to it all the time you can spare. On ordinary occasions satisfy yourself with a 'Meditation.' It is your duty to consecrate to God and to the preaching of his truth, whatever learning you have, and whatever genius. Do your highest and best as often as you can; but that can be only now and then."

The Englishman smiled and bowed; but thought that the Frenchman's advice was hardly practical.

There was, however, something in it; and by preparing fully at regular intervals a sermon on a lofty subject, a preacher will gradually elevate his ideal of what his sermons ought to be, and his preaching will be far more effective. The people will soon be conscious of the benefit they derive from these exceptional dis-

courses. A sermon "once in two months," in which a great truth is fully and vigorously treated, a great duty earnestly enforced, a great heresy thoroughly discussed and confuted, will leave them at the end of the year with distinct and positive results from the preaching they had listened to. At present the mere fragment of a truth is commonly presented every week in a sermon hastily written; or the obligation to discharge a duty is authoritatively declared, but is not urgently pressed; or a popular heresy is just struck at in passing; and at the end of the year the congregation is neither wiser nor better for all the preacher's pains.

It is possible, I believe, to make even very ordinary sermons on which little time can be spent much more effective, if the principle of Mr. Arnold's advice to poets is uniformly remembered. We cannot always be ascending to the seventh heaven of religious thought; the greatest topics can only be occasionally presented in a manner at all worthy of them; but there are a thousand by-paths of truth which are exquisitely beautiful, and in which weary men find refreshment and peace, and there are a thousand minor virtues which are necessary to a perfect life. These secondary truths do not demand the strain and effort which are necessary when we endeavor to illustrate the fundamental articles of the Christian faith; to speak of these unheroic virtues involves no exhaustion of intellect or of passion. But they have a real human interest, and will always be welcomed by the people, though they may not produce any very great excitement. The real explanation of the dullness of sermons is probably to be found in this, that very often the subjects they treat have no charm to the preacher himself; or, if they interest him at all, it is only because of his technical knowledge and professional habits.

> "What poets feel not, when they make,
> A pleasure in creating,
> The world in its turn will not take
> Pleasure in contemplating." *

Mr. Arnold has wisdom for us in verse as well as in prose.

But these digressions are extending to an undue length. It is not the purpose of this article to discuss the general principles of homiletics, but to illustrate the qualities and the defects of a distinguished preacher.

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* Matthew Arnold's "New Poems," p. 159.

Unlike most English preachers, Lacordaire had the courage to use, in God's service, all the powers that God had given him. With us, the preacher is, in nine cases out of ten, only a fraction of the man. The greater part of his nature appears to be in a condition of suspended animation from the moment he enters the pulpit to the moment he leaves it.

"I once heard a preacher," says Mr. Emerson, "who sorely tempted me to say I would go to church no more. Men go, thought I, where they are wont to go, else had no one entered the temple in the afternoon. A snow storm was falling around us. The snow storm was real, the preacher merely spectral; and the eye felt the sad contrast in looking at him, and then out of the window behind him into the beautiful meteor of the snow. He had lived in vain. He had no one word indicating that he had laughed or wept, was married or in love, had been commended or cheated, or chagrined. If he had ever lived and acted we were none the wiser for it. The capital secret of his profession—namely to convert life into truth—he had not learned. Not one fact in all his experience had he yet imported into his doctrine. This man had plowed and planted, and talked and bought and sold; he had read books; he had eaten and drunken; his head aches; his heart throbs; yet was there not a surmise, a hint, in all the discourse that he had ever lived at all. Not a line did he draw out of real history. The true preacher can always be known by this—that he deals out to the people his life—life passed through the fire of thought. But of the bad preacher, it could not be told from his sermon what age of the world he fell in; whether he had a father or a child; whether he was a freeholder or a pauper; whether he was a citizen, or any other fact in his history."

This is only another way of saying that the sermon is too often insulated from the preacher's real life; it is the artificial product, not of his whole nature, but of a special faculty on which alone the duty and stress of creating it is charged. He may be a wit; but an epigram never flashes its light in the pulpit. He may have a fund of worldly wisdom; but though the Book of Proverbs is in the Bible, he never ventures on a shrewd saying in church. He may be a capital story-teller; but he never gives his people a parable. His moral nature is as little trusted as his intellectual.

He seems to think it a duty to speak as though his pulse never quickened. He can be indignant, pathetic, vehement elsewhere; but there is neither indignation, pathos, nor vehemence, when he warns his congregation against sin, and entreats them to do the will of God. Nearly all his reading is forgotten. He may remember something he has seen in Augustine or Athanasius, in Bull or Hooker, in Calvin or Baxter; but his novels and books of travel, his poets and biographies, his books of natural history, his Addison and Defoe, his Ruskin and Buckle, have all vanished, and there is no trace of them left. Lacordaire, ascetic as he was, did not believe that this "mortification" of intellect and heart was a preacher's duty. He went into the pulpit a living man. Everything he knew, everything he had read, everything he had thought, every resort of his genius, every passion of his soul augmented his power. A touch of humor, a stroke of wit, a personal reminiscence, an outburst of patriotism—why should these be forbidden to the preacher? Lacordaire found a place for them all. To him no human faculty or emotion was "common or unclean." He was not a mere preacher; he was a man who preached.

No doubt there is a certain unique power about the preacher who dwells apart from the agitations of his age, "in the secret place of the Most High, and under the shadow of the Almighty." The supernatural peace of the soul that is surrounded perpetually with the majestic realities of the invisible and eternal world, and is never ruffled for a moment by the storms which shake the thoughts of common men, has an ineffable charm, and exerts over some hearts a mysterious control. It may, however, be fairly questioned whether, on the whole, Lacordaire was not right in speaking to his countrymen "in their own tongue," and making them feel that he was a man "of like passions" with themselves. Prophets and apostles did not isolate themselves from the common interests and thoughts of common men. Isaiah and Jeremiah, Amos and Micah, were keenly alive to all that was passing around them. St. Paul himself never ceased to be a Jew. Even St. John was not a rapt mystic, unaffected by the passions and conflicts of his age. The Incarnation is but the highest example and illustration of a law which the preacher can never forget without diminishing his power. Even after the resurrection, the true humanity of our Lord remained. "Behold my hands and my

feet . . . handle me and see; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as ye see me have." It is not by ceasing to be men, that we exert the mightiest power over the spiritual regions of human nature; God became flesh that he might bring man to himself. And if we are men at all, we may as well belong to our own country and our own times.

But whether Lacordaire was right or wrong in identifying himself so closely with what he felt to be the better and nobler spirit of his age, he appears to me to have assumed the only position which can rightly belong to a Christian preacher in relation to unbelief. He failed indeed to comprehend accurately its most recent phases; but he tried to comprehend them, and satisfied himself that there was nothing in them to render the truth of the faith he preached uncertain. This conviction he frankly avowed. Throughout his life he was a Christian apologist, but he never apologized for Christianity. Very many of our English preachers speak as though, after all, it was not quite certain whether God became incarnate in our Lord Jesus Christ. They seem to think it would be illiberal to be too confident. They always let you know that there is very much to be said on the other side. They discuss the Christian story as though its trustworthiness were an open question. They appear to be seeking the truth with their hearers. They are willing to be convinced that they are wrong, even in the fundamental articles of their creed. This was not Lacordaire's temper. He was a Christian preacher because he believed in Christ, with all his heart and soul and strength. He never hesitates, never falters, never suggests, even for a moment, that there can be any uncertainty about the merits of the controversy between faith and skepticism. He is not trying to find truth; he has it. It is not a discovery he has made for himself; he has received it as a revelation from God. When Peter preached in Jerusalem on the day of Pentecost, he preached with the same full assurance of faith. No doubt there was very much urged against the claims of Jesus to be the Messiah. Had He not been rejected by the scribes, the men who knew most about the prophecies? Did He not seem to contradict the teaching of Moses and the prophets? Was it certain that He was born in Bethlehem? Had He not lived for the greater part of His life in Nazareth? How was it possible for the man who was crucified to be the Christ? Where was the power, where was the splendor,

where was the triumph over all the enemies of the Jewish race, which, according to the hopes of a long succession of calamitous centuries, were to signalize the coming of the true King of Israel? But St. Peter's preaching was not qualified by the difficulties and perplexities of which the most honest Jew might be conscious. The apostle's own mind was made up; and he denounced the crime of the crucifixion with relentless severity, and affirmed, with all the energy of perfect conviction, that Jesus was the Prince and Saviour. The doubts of other men were not permitted to emasculate the expression of his own faith.

That in this confused and troubled time it is almost impossible for a Christian preacher, especially if he be a young man, to feel at all sure that he has found the truth on many grave theological questions, is freely conceded. He may hesitate between conflicting *theories* of the Atonement; may be perplexed about the historical character of some parts of the Old Testament; may have failed to solve to his satisfaction many difficulties which arise from the comparison of the four Gospels. He must never affect a firmness of conviction that he does not really possess. In many provinces of theological thought, no modest man, acquainted with the vicissitudes through which the faith of Christendom has already passed, will either speak or think dogmatically. But until a man has reached a clear and final conclusion on the supernatural origin of Christianity, he has no right to preach at all. The gulf is infinite between the recognition of Jesus Christ as God manifest in the flesh and every theory in which his Divine Personality is denied; a man has no right to become a religious teacher until he has made up his mind forever on which side, in this great controversy, his conscience requires him to stand. Till then he has nothing to teach. Nor is it enough that he should have come to the conclusion that "on the whole, the balance of probability" is in favor of the unique claims of our Lord Jesus. Christ must be to his own higher nature "the Way, the Truth, the Life." The claims of Christ should be verified in his own spiritual consciousness, or he cannot hope to preach them to any good purpose. And if he has actually found God in Christ, and has risen, through Christ's power, into that lofty region of spiritual vision and activity into which Christ came to translate us, it is monstrous that he should speak as though after all he was not quite sure whether or not the Lord

Jesus is the Son of God and Saviour of mankind. If he has known the agony of losing for a time all faith in the highest revelation of the life and thought of God to our race, there will be nothing in his spirit and manner, even when he speaks with the firmest confidence, that can justly offend or wound those who are still feeling after God in the darkness, if haply they may find Him. But for a Christian preacher to speak hesitatingly and with qualifications on the supreme controversy between Christ and those who openly impeach or secretly doubt His authority over the religious faith of our race, is for him to betray the trust he has received from God, and to discourage and destroy the hopes of mankind. Insolence and uncharitableness to men who are endeavoring to solve most urgent and practical of all questions —how the heart and the intellect and the conscience of man are to find rest in God—are unpardonable. But as unbelief is contagious, faith is contagious too; and a preacher's power is more than half ruined if he cannot, or if he does not, give men the impression that after fearless and intelligent inquiry he is irrevocably on the side of Christ.

Let a man preach what he knows. If he believes it to be his vocation to enter the Christian ministry, and yet has "verified" only the central articles of the Christian creed, let him be content to preach these until the secondary doctrines have also become clear and real to him. Let him say nothing at "second-hand." So long as he speaks of what he has "seen and heard" for himself, his words will have power; and he need not be afraid of wearying the people by dwelling incessantly on a few great truths, if only these truths have been divinely "revealed" to him. What the people weary of is the weak and lifeless repetition of a merely traditional faith.

Lacordaire believed not only in the authority of the Christian revelation, he believed also in the power of preaching. He never gave men the impression that he was simply speaking "against time." It was plain to every one that listened to him that he intended to break down the force of adverse prejudices and to remove the misconceptions which rendered faith in Christ impossible. He knew with what contemptuous indifference vast numbers of his countrymen regarded the claims of Christianity, and with what bitter hostility these claims were denied and resisted by others; and he stood there in the heart of Paris to compel

them to acknowledge that the Christian controversy was not closed; and to master, by the sheer force of logic and passion, the scepticism and irreligion of his age. He cared nothing for the admiration which his eloquence might win; he spoke like a man who was resolved to make men Christians. This agonizing earnestness is perhaps most conspicuous in his earlier sermons; in those delivered at Toulouse towards the close of his life there is less of strenuousness and vigor. However difficult it may be to analyze and explain the power of successful orators, there can be no doubt that the success is in some way proportioned to their force of *will*. Their speeches or sermons are not mere intellectual efforts; they have the nature of moral acts.

What were the prominent results of Lacordaire's preaching it is not easy to estimate. But it seems certain that he saved very many young men from drifting into unbelief; that he recalled to the Church many who had already forsaken it; and that he inspired French Catholicism with a new courage, hopefulness and enthusiasm. The objects he strove for he largely secured. It is unfair to contrast the effect of his preaching with the great revival of religious earnestness created by the labors of such men as George Whitefield or John Wesley. It was not Lacordaire's mission to rebuke common sins, to startle the conscience, to proclaim the infinite love of God, and to persuade men to penitence and a devout life. He appeared in France at a time when it seemed almost impossible to persuade cultivated and liberal Frenchmen to give a Christian preacher a fair hearing. Bishop Butler, speaking of his own days says, "It is come, I know not how, to be taken for granted by many persons that Christianity is not so much as a subject of inquiry; but that it is now at length discovered to be fictitious;" and he appears to think that it will be a great matter if he can convince men that "it is not, however, so clear a case *that there is nothing in it*." These words were as true of France when Lacordaire preached his first sermon in Notre Dame as they were of England a hundred years before. It may perhaps be questioned whether he might not have done even more to restore the faith of his countrymen by reasoning with them of righteousness and temperance, and judgment to come," than by assuming the position of a Christian apologist; just as it may be questioned whether the rude sermons of the preachers of the Methodist revival did not do more to

rescue the English people from atheism and irreligion than the philosophy of Butler's "Analogy," and the ponderous arguments of the Boyle Lectures. But we must measure the success of men by what they intend to achieve; and in the great struggle, protracted through so many weary and troubled centuries, with human sin and unbelief, every right-hearted and zealous servant of Christ has had his own work to do, the result of which should be cordially and generously acknowledged.

It may be that even Lacordaire did not possess those special gifts which are necessary for the ordinary work of the Christian ministry. The power to constrain men to forsake sin and to live a constrained and saintly life, to console sorrow, educate the conscience, and develop the higher affections of the spiritual nature, comes from the inspiration of the Holy Ghost. It is not the prerogative of genius. It is not to be acquired by a rhetorical discipline. But the men who have received it should remember that the natural and supernatural gifts of God are alike necessary to the Christian preacher. The greatest of the prophets spake not only "as they were moved by the Holy Ghost," but with all the fire, splendor and energy that belong to a lofty imagination and to vehement passion. The human culture of St. Paul rendered him capable of receiving himself, and conveying to others that form of divine revelation with which he has enriched forever the thought of the Church. The ordinary laws of the intellect and the heart are not suspended or suppresed by the mysterious and supernatural "gift" conferred upon every true minister of Christ; and from the study of a great orator like Lacordaire every preacher may learn how he can best explain, illustrate, and enforce the truth of God.

R. W. Dale.

XI.—RELIGION AN ESSENTIAL WANT OF MAN.*

BY THE DEAN OF CANTERBURY.

Why is not an attempt made to get rid of religion? Men of the world must find it a great plague. It robs them of one day in the week, as far as outward business is concerned. It obliges them to submit to, and bear part in, a great deal of what they must feel to be atrocious humbug. It keeps them in bondage, both in words and acts, to a cumbrous etiquette, borrowed from days whose habits and rules have passed away. And, considered as furnishing a means of investment, its returns are but capricious, and, on an average, pitiably small.

Why, then, is it not got rid of? It would appear as if nothing could be easier. Let a compact society be formed, of men well to do in the world, who shall agree to drop it, as far as by the law they may: to proceed in their words and acts, as if there were no such thing. The trouble saved would be so great, the additional profit and luxury so evident, that they surely would be very soon joined by numbers more, and thence the association would spread into other ranks and strata of society; the world would at length awake to its real interests, superstition and bigotry would disappear, and the conversion of mankind to common sense would be complete.

It is really strange that nothing of the kind is done. And all the more strange because it is continually beginning to be done. Every few years, some man comes forward, and proves to us that all religion is a fiction out of men's own heads. There is a great sensation for a time. Men meet together, and talk about forming the association for getting rid of religion. Sometimes even the preliminary machinery is arranged. An organization is set on foot. A press is established. Convincing and triumphant pamphlets are issued, one after another; and at last religion is announced as altogether demolished. But somehow, the movement never gets any further. Propaganda after propaganda passes away, and the association never fairly sets about its work.

The question then recurs, Why do not men get rid of religion?

* From *Good Words*, Jan. 1869.

And the answer is a very simple one, deduced from the facts of the case: BECAUSE THEY CANNOT DO WITHOUT IT.

The course of things is very much this. Up to a certain time the bold face is worn, the anti-religious movement goes on; the press works triumphantly in the estimation of him who evokes it. And then—a blow falls, and all is at an end, as far as the prime agent is concerned. A face and a voice are missing from his family circle, or a frail integument of life has given away within him, and the end of life looms up before him—and farewell propaganda! Could you look within that curtained window, there he sits with his Bible.

Now, the result of this peep is very much in *his* favor; but it is not at all in favor of the association for getting rid of religion. We seem to see that it will never live to do its great work. Member after member drops away to the enemy. It is like the old story of the man who tried to teach his horse to do without eating. Just as he was beginning to succeed, the horse died.

Mankind, then, cannot do without religion. But again, WHY?

And we may answer this last question directly and indirectly. Directly, by giving the immediate reason which drives the stricken champion of the un-faith to his Bible. Indirectly, by searching out other conditions which must be fulfilled in order for the object, for which he goes to his Bible, to be attained. The former of these will lead to the latter.

What does he want with his Bible? Has he not over and over again proved that Gospel History, which I see him now so anxiously turning, to be a tissue of inconsistent exaggerations? It seems to me that he is examining somewhere about that eleventh chapter of St. John, which I remember was one of his especial objects of aversion. I think he claimed to have demonstrated that the great miracle, if it ever took place at all, was a collusion to impose on the Jews and the disciples. And yet what do I see? He searches for his pencil, and he underlines some particular words, and he turns down the leaf, and lies back in his chair, and folds his hands, thinking. What has he found? He has found comfort. All was dim and dreary before him. In a few weeks the machine must be taken down; and then? Or, the beloved presence was gone from him—and he searched earth and sky, and his own books, and his own thoughts—all were empty, and would give him no news of the missing one. And

upon these blanks of humanity came a voice:—"I am the resurrection and the life." One bright streak laces the mist; what wonder that he loves to look upon it?

And thus much is shown us in the picture we have been contemplating: that one, and in very many cases, the principal reason why mankind cannot do without religion, is, that a time is coming for every one when we shall need comfort, and that of a kind which, from the very nature of the case, nothing about us here can furnish. So that it must be sought elsewhere than here. And that "elsewhere" can only be in things believed to exist, out of the range of our earthly senses. And that is the realm of religion.

But this is plainly a low and inadequate view of the matter. God grant that our friend of the un-faith may really find and keep his comfort! Because it seems to us that he has a good deal to undo, and a good deal to do, before this comes about. In that want of comfort are wrapped up other wants, which perhaps at this present moment he does not feel, but which he will feel, before his comfort is many days old.

Let it be observed, that I am at present on very wide and general ground. I merely notice, that words have come across the misty desert of grief and death, from one who has tidings of resurrection and life. And without pursuing the answer so as to identify Him whom Christians love, I put what surely is a necessary question: Who, what sort of a person speaks? Or, if even this be at present too pointed—whence, from what kind of a place do such words of comfort come?

Must we not say, that he who speaks them is of necessity a Being of Power, and of necessity a Being holding in his hand the destinies of man, and of necessity a Being willing that Man should fulfill his highest destinies? Or if we take the vaguer form of the question, must we not even then say, that the source of such words and hopes, be it where it will, is one from which flow also other streams, besides this one of comfort only?

A streak of light, we said, laces the mist. Where does that light come from? A streak of light in a mist is an evidence of a body of light somewhere; a token that beyond that mist there is clearness. When we see it, we say, "It is clearing."

What is the body of light, and where? A question of immense import. Is it altogether of another world? Is it a light entirely

new, casting a spectrum of unaccustomed colors? Beyond the mist is light. But is not the mist itself, in which we live and move, lighted by the same?

The Being who speaks these words of comfort, the place from whence their sound comes, is of necessity pure, spotless, happy, holy. Do we never hear anything of these qualities down here? Nay, to come to the point, is there not in every man's bosom, a witness to them, a witness that they ought to be the attributes of his own character?

Now what I want to say is this: that this champion of the unfaith,—that any man among the sons of men,—when he is stricken down and needs comfort,—and when he goes to his Bible and sees comfort written there in such words as those we have been quoting,—if he have a brain capable of putting two ideas together, and if he have a heart susceptible of any of the nobler feelings, cannot take to himself the comfort thus brought into his view, without feeling safe about the congruity between himself, his own character and qualities, and the Being who spoke these words, or the place from whence they issued. If he who spoke is the resurrection and the life, then in order for me to call that resurrection and life mine, I must be very clear about my relation to him. If from some pure and holy place such a message has come, then for me to be gathered into that place, I must be pure and holy too. I submit that such thoughts as these are no fiction of mine, but do exist and find a place in every one of us under the circumstances supposed. If a man wants to find comfort in prospect of his own dissolution,—if he wants to find comfort under any manner of affliction, it is utterly impossible for him to keep that search for comfort separate from a consideration of his own moral qualities and position.

And I further say, that such a consideration cannot be carried many steps beyond its beginning, without bringing up at least two more wants—two more reasons why he cannot do without religion.

Let us see. Suppose you and I, my friend, sit down together, looking each into the other's face, and begin to consider this moral state of ours. I don't mean that we could conveniently thus do it; only I like to imagine another looking on, because it helps one to be honest. Let a quarter of an hour be supposed thus to pass. Well, what is the result as yet? Can we pretend to say that it is anything but deep dissatisfaction? First, comes the

verdict, in less than two minutes, if the man be true,—"not what I ought to be." But there lurks within the fallacy, "Yes, but we know that none of us can be what we ought to be." And this may induce a certain calm of satisfaction for a few minutes. But the inquiry goes on, and as it goes on, another verdict begins to sound in the ears,—"not what I might have been." The work is not done yet. "Yes, but circumstances have been against me." And so, compunction is deadened, and a kind of satisfaction again supervenes, for a few minutes more. And as those few minutes more are given to the work, searching acts and words, and unveiling opportunities, and stripping naked one's carefully clothed up motives, what do we hear, ringing clearer and clearer till it becomes the voice of the whole soul,—what but this,—"Guilty, guilty:" guilty, against granted powers, in spite of favorable opportunities; guilty of evil act sprung from evil motive,—guilty of evil words sprung out of evil affections,—guilty, even to the undeniable proofs of a state out of all congruity to any Being who could be the Resurrection and the Life, and to any place from which the light could come which shines through the mist.

Well, then, what are the two wants which result from this discovery? Clearly the first of them is, the want of deliverance from guilt. When I try to claim comfort from religion, I discover that it is not for me. Now I am not writing theology. Some of you may say, "O here's the cloven foot. Now we are going to hear all the old story, about atonement, and so forth." Whether you will hear that or not, depends not on me, but on the course of my argument. If that brings it in, why you must be content to hear the old story, even though it be old.

But we are not come to it at present. We are come to this. Any comfort that religion can give me as to these great matters in question must depend on my moral purity, truth, justice. I am not pure, I am not true, I am not just. I might have been all these to a far greater extent than I am. Instead of comfort, I see discomfort—instead of hope, fear. For if there be such a Being and such a place, then (and I cannot get rid of this thought) not only is He not, and is it not, for me, but something else must be for me. If there is in Him, if there is there, all this light and comfort, is there nothing else? Is there no justice also for man? Even putting this in its lowest and mildest aspect, is there no

fear that the guilt I have incurred here may abide on me there? And then, if I can now, with all these fallacies hanging about me, see so much cause for shame and self-reproach in it, how will this be there, when, the world's influence having fallen off from me, I shall see things even more in their true light? Can I be unclean here and pure there? What is to make the difference? And if, by any chance, that is going to be my final state, to which this one is but introducing me, this present short life on earth must necessarily be a considerable element and component of the final and long life there. This unworthy conduct of mine, this neglect of opportunities for good, how is it to drop off from me and be as it had not been,—if, that is, justice is to rule proceedings there, which my conscience tells me it will?

So then it is obvious that this overpowering sense of guilt must be somewhow got rid of, if our friend whom we detected sitting with his Bible is to derive real comfort from it. We will not, at this moment, say anything about the requisites for accomplishing this; we will only observe that all the principal religions in the world have taken this matter into account, and have provided some way, whatever may by us be thought of the way proposed, whereby the sense of guilt may be got rid of.

But when we have said this, we have also said more. If a man simply wants to get rid of the sense of guilt, without also getting rid of the source of guilt, he is not a religious, but a merely selfish man. If mankind wants thus much of religion, that it supply comfort in prospect of the next world, and that in order to that comfort being ministered, it supply also a means of relieving the guilty conscience, then, unless we are to recognize a very low and degraded estimate of mankind, religion must be called on to supply very much more—even the means of getting rid of guilt through life; in other words the means of living purely, and justly, and holily. That which should supply the means of getting rid of the sense of guilt and fear of its consequences, without also furnishing some means of getting rid of guilt itself, would be no boon, but a curse to men: a mere paralyzer of their noblest faculty, the conscience.

The only possible way, whereby I can roll off from my mind a sense that I am guilty and have no right to the comfort set forth in my Bible, must be some provision whereby I can be made to share the qualities of them who speak that comfort, and to put on the character of that place from whence the tidings of it come.

And if a man be good for anything—be anything more than a selfish and sensual creature, this want also emerges sooner or later in his mind: the want of being better than he is.

Now we have been taking hitherto an extreme case. Our champion of the un-faith might be supposed capable of doing without religion, if ever anybody could. And so we took him, as showing how the case lies with the most unfavorable instance we could produce.

But the generality of men are not champions of un-faith. They are ordinary human creatures, gifted with common sense and the power of detecting falsehood; not very likely, at least in this wide-awake country of ours, to be led by the nose for the profit or pleasure of a few whose interest it is to lead them.

And what is their verdict on the subject? They form the bulk of our community. What says our community about being able to do without religion? The verdict of that community on this matter is very striking. First of all, in ruder days, it was convinced that the nation ought to have a religion, and it exacted that it should have a religion, and that that religion should be one and the same for all who dwelt within its frontiers, and partook of its rights. This was some evidence, but it was of necessity imperfect, because thus the want of religion might be not a real one springing out of the depths of man's heart, but one artificially induced by the will of rulers.

But in the course of time as light and knowledge increased, it became plain that such was not the way for a nation to have a religion; that the way for a nation to have a religion was for the individual men in that nation to have a religion, and then to group themselves into bodies according to their several religious feelings and convictions.

And now came the true evidence, as to what average men of common sense think about the necessity of religion for man. As the chains were taken off Englishmen, one after another timid person trembled: there would be no religion left; the State would become unchristian; immorality and unbelief would swamp us all. What was the result? Why that there was ten times more religion than ever; that the State, which had never done a Christian act in all its history, for the first time in its life became Christian, and proved its faith by its works.

I once heard the late Dr. Conolly (of blessed memory, if ever

man was) relate an incident connected with his establishment of the kindly treatment in the Hanwell Asylum. A pauper patient was brought up to the gate in a straight waistcoat, struggling and kicking "Take that off," said the doctor; "we allow no such thing here." "Bless'e, sir, he'd fly at your throat." "Take it off I say, or take him away." It was taken off, the man gazing in astonishment. He was led into the porter's lodge, and set down to a plentiful meal. The man covered his face with his hands and burst into tears; and from that moment became tractable and kindly.

Now, what was done in this case? Just this; the disease was not removed, but its true treatment was discovered. The depths of the human heart were first sounded; and power over evil was educed, which none had suspected before. Even so has our community, since its emancipation from compulsory conformity, shown what is in the depths of the heart of man with regard to religion. Being set free, the nation did not do without religion. It then first truly discovered that it wanted religion.

And the consequences of the discovery are becoming more momentous every day. The standard of right and wrong in the public mind is slowly, but surely, rising; the reverence for things pure and of good report is steadily on the increase; and there probably would be found, if the search were to be made, in spite of all the ferment of conflicting opinions, a greater consensus in favor of the great foundation doctrines of religion now, than at any former period of our history.

From all which things, private and public, we infer that the association for getting rid of religion is never likely to prosper among men; that the wants of our nature which lead it to have recourse to religion are not artificially created, but inborn and inevitable. The fear of death, the burden of guilt, the aspiration after good,—these are facts, the existence and the effect of which will be manifested whenever the fountains of our nature are stirred, and as long as mankind exists on the earth.

HENRY ALFORD.

XII.—AN ITALIAN DEFENCE OF PASCAL.*

[Vincenzo Gioberti is a distinguished ecclesiastic, an eminent patriot and scholar, who for many years labored at Turin, in behalf of the Unity of Italy, and against the temporal power of the Pope. His great work "*Il Gesuita Moderno*" is probably the most learned and complete exposure of Jesuitism in all its departments of speculation and of labor—criticism, science, missions, casuistry and education—that has ever appeared. It is written as an answer to a defence of Jesuitism, by P. Fransesco Pellico, a brother of the famous Silvio Pellico. C. M. B.]

Turning to the subject of moral laxness in general, we find that your usual argument to exonerate yourselves from this charge is to fix upon Pascal the mark of a falsifier and calumniator. You trust that few or none of your readers will have patience closely to examine in libraries a mass of dusty casuists, to verify a hundred or more citations; and that, seeing you assume an air of frankness, others will be disposed to believe you on your words. But the time is passed in which men were so simple as to repose blind faith in the assertions of Jesuits; and the veracity of Pascal does not need in our day, to be justified against the charges of the Company. When a great author possesses the confidence of the public, to convict him of falsehood requires facts and not mere assertions; and all the Jesuits, and their followers in chorus, may cry out that the author of the Provincial Letters is a falsifier, without making the least impression upon the minds of intelligent men. The mere statement that a genius so stupendous, and a man so loftily and sincerely pious, as Pascal, was a falsifier of quotations, and was willing to expose his own honor and that of religion, to the inevitable ruin of a cause supported by such means, committing a solemn fraud, formally and severely forbidden by the pure and rigid morality which he was at that very moment advocating, and that he should have died with those falsehoods upon his soul without exhibiting the least remorse, or making the least sign of repentance, is a thing so grossly improbable, that the best reasons are required to make it believed. You, without adducing any, attribute to others the

* Translated and abridged from *Il Gesuita Moderno* per Vincenzo Gioberti, by Rev. C. M. Butler, D. D.

customs of your order, and make Pascal to be a Jesuit. That your associates may be deceitful, false, and calumniators, where there is a question of protecting themselves and of ruining their adversaries, is a thing so notorious and certain, that we may almost put it into the creed; and your book alone (pardon me) may suffice in part to illustrate the fact. If you, who belong to the number of saintly Jesuits, falsify and defame in virtue of holy obedience, we can easily imagine what the mere political Jesuits may do in a similar emergency. If, therefore, we judge according to extrinsic probability, no one will be so bold as to believe that the mark of falsification and calumny should be fixed upon Pascal rather than his adversaries. If we pass from probabilities to facts, that which was before highly probable becomes absolutely certain. You amuse me, Father Fransesco, when I wish to have recourse to extrinsic authority to resolve a doubt of this kind; and you give me no high conception of the principles of criticism taught in your schools. Your proceeding might be plausible and good, if the works of the Jesuit casuists, quoted by the author of the Provincial Letterswere lost, or if we had but a few fragments of them, as for instance we have of the casuists of the porch; but they survive,—although (God be praised!) covered with dust,—in the libraries. If, therefore, you wish to produce conviction, and to nullify an authority so formidable as that of Pascal, you should, with the books in your hand, revise his quotations, and show them to be false or garbled; you should produce the genuine text, and mention with accuracy the authors, the editions, the volumes and the pages, and proceed in that severe critical method, which of itself furnishes a high presumption of the honor of the writer, even to those who cannot themselves make such verifications. Such is the obligation imposed upon all who wish to assault and destroy a fame so well founded as that of the illustrious Frenchman. And observe well that his defenders are not, at the present day under the same obligations; for if we felt compelled to reply with long discourses and with an array of citations, to every scribbler who lightly or maliciously calls in question a lofty name, without proving his accusations, we should be simpletons indeed. It belongs to him who assails and calls in question a cause already settled, to adduce good arguments on the other side; and until he shall do so, the partisans of that cause may rightfully enjoy what they possess,

without a further expenditure of their time; inasmuch as it would be an absurdity to respond at length to every ignorant or presumptuous critic who may present himself. The veracity of Pascal was subsequently proved in the most irrefragible manner; and if you wish to be assured of it you have but to read the last Provincial Letters, in which the author justifies the first series; the writings of the curates of Rouen and of Paris, who wished to verify in the original text the passages cited by Pascal, and not only found them to be exact, but collected and published new propositions, not less scandalous and horrid than those already divulged; and the learned and sagacious notes of Nicoll, published under the name of William Wendrock, in which the assertions of Pascal concerning the moral system of the Jesuits is invincibly corroborated, and the exactness of his citations placed beyond all doubt. The Father Onerito Fabry assumed the task of confuting Nicoll in his *Notæ in Notas*, published under the pseudonym of Bernard Stubrock, and accomplished nothing but a laugh at his own expense, at the sight of his own book condemned at Rome, without, in this case, the possibility of having it attributed to the least taint of Jansenism.

To reach the end which you propose with little fatigue, and to unveil to the public "the accumulated falsities of the Provincial Letters," you invite your readers to a recent apology for your order which is occupied with this matter. But you wish that we should confide either in the mere assertions of Crétineau-Joly, or in his proofs. On the first supposition you are excessively modest in demanding that blind confidence should be given to the master historian of your order, and that we should believe Pascal to be a rogue because M. Crétineau is pleased to say so. The authority of M. Crétineau-Joly opposed to that of Pascal! *Ma diavolo! Dove avete il cervello?* Even if your historian was a Tacitus, do you not know that historians the most distinguished are not believed, when they manifestly contradict authors of still higher authority? And who in any respect, whether that of genius, or piety, or learning, or judgment, is greater than Pascal? He was not a member of any religious order. He was in no position which would sway him toward a partisan investigation, or induce him through interest or any other motive to become an enemy to the Company. He was as perfectly free to enlist under your banner, as that of the Jansenists. Why did he not do so? Be-

cause his legal, generous and profoundly Christian soul was indignant at your corruptions. It was not a factious spirit which induced him to oppose the Jesuits; but it was the depravity of the Jesuits which precipitated him into Jansenism.

And now we ask what are the proofs alleged by M. Crétineau-Joly to justify his opinion? He touches the question only incidentally in a note; and in order to show the "accumulated falsities of the Provincial Letters," instead of examining a notable number of citations, he adduces only *four*. Even these he does not venture to charge as *false*, but only as inexact. Even if Pascal, in adducing so long a series of allegations, had fallen into some errors, the authority of his book would not have been thereby lessened. Among the best works which hinge upon the declarations and discussions of extracts, I do not know how many could be found which are perfectly free from the mistakes which are incident to human imperfection. But this does not redound to their prejudice, beause every fair reader will estimate their value as a whole, and not decide upon it from a few exceptional particulars. Now what will you say if I shall prove to you that, in the present instance, the inadvertence, or the inexactness, or the falsification, or whatever you may choose to call it, imputed to Pascal by your historian, belongs to himself; and that his censure therefore is without foundation,—that the falsifier is not Pascal, but he who accuses him of falsification? If those who accuse the distinguished author are reduced to the necessity of sophisticating upon three or four places of little moment, and do not succeed even in this small business, thus meriting the titles which they appropriate to him, ought we not to conclude that their censure is equivalent to an apology and justification? I return you thanks for having shown me how to vindicate, with an unassailable argument the veracity and exactness of Pascal on the whole, without expending upon the subject many pages. No one now can call it in question, if I succeed in proving in reference to these few citations that your recent apologist chose too hastily to attempt to blacken the memory of a great man.*

But the Provincial Letters you say "were, from their first appearance, by the sentence of the church, and also of the civil

* This critical examination consigned by the author to his appendix, is very conclusive, but too long to be here inserted. C. M. B.

authority, stamped with the seal of infamy, which no abuse of eloquence, or labor of partizanship can cancel." Oh, sagacious theologian! are you ignorant to this degree of the principles and the history of ecclesiastical law? But this would not have happened if, instead of defaming the memory of your teacher, Dettori, you had recollected and put in practice his teachings. Do you not know that the Provincial Letters were lauded and translated into many languages by the most learned and religious men? That they were read in the conclave of Pope Alexander VIII, and admired by many cardinals? That they received the approbation of the most respectable curates of Rouen and Paris, who confirmed their statements with apposite writings? That when the Jesuits in 1659 denounced them to the Parliament of Bordeaux, that noble assembly by a formal decree, in the following year decided in opposition to their demand; and that the decision was approved and solemnly confirmed by the theological faculty of the same city? That the contrary act of the Parliament of Aix in 1657 was notoriously extorted by your Fathers to repair the discredit received in reference to the same subject by the Parliament of Paris? That the condemnation pronounced by the civil Lieutenant in 1866, was the result of similar management, and injured much more than it profited your sect, because the mode of execution violated all the accustomed forms, was a manifest usurpation of the rights of the clergy, and was more than outweighed by the two absolute and much more authoritative decrees, which were published at the same time in the capitol of the Gironde?

How then could you venture to adduce "the sentence of the church, and of the civil authority?" How could you dare to speak of the censure and the confutation of contemporaries, when in fact their first opponents were defeated and put to shame by Nicole and by Pascal himself, and the last of them was condemned by Rome? Or how could you affirm that the Provincial Letters were subjected to the same condemnation? But inasmuch as the reply of Fabry was equally proscribed, you cannot but see that the blow inflicted upon the shoulders of Pascal fell upon the head of the Jesuits. And how did you dare to call the simple prohibition of the Index "a seal of infamy impressed by the Church?" Are you not aware that the congregations at Rome, although very respectable and endowed with large au-

thority, cannot without grave error be confounded with the Church and with the Apostolic See? That a book which makes the congregation of the Index, equal to the Holy See and to the Church, can have no other effect than to be itself enrolled in the Index? That this congregation when it prohibits a work does not intend by this design alone to affix a seal of infamy upon the work and its author? That when it is necessary to stamp a book as infamous, Rome is accustomed to resort to other, and more rigorous and solemn means than that of simple prohibition? That a large part of prohibited books are subjected to censure for some single error or partial fault, as well as for their substance? That sometimes the prohibition of a book was not caused by intrinsic defects, but only by those which are extrinsic—as for instance the omission or the change of the author's name, the want of proper authorization from the place of publication; and sometimes also from the use of the vernacular tongue, whereby all classes of readers are admitted to the knowledge of certain delicate matters, which it is not expedient that every one should know? That all these reasons may concur in the prohibition of the Provincial Letters? That these defects do not imply that the *morale* of the book is not irreprehensible, the criticisms just, the citations faithful, and the accusations made against the Jesuits well founded? That it would be in the highest degree injurious to suppose that Rome had been willing to blame the maxims of Pascal and to approve those of the Jesuits, because the former are in harmony, and the latter in conflict, with the doctrines of the Gospel? That Rome, in doing so, would have contradicted herself, inasmuch as many of the propositions referred to by Pascal, have been censured by the Holy See? That therefore the book of Pascal, being incorrupt in substance and only in fault incidentally, it is absurd to say that Rome has wished to stamp it with the seal of infamy? That if all prohibited authors bear this stamp upon their brow, then this infamy belongs no less to Father Fabry than to Pascal? That it would be much greater in the case of the former, because his work is a tissue of errors, insipidities, falsifications, injuries and calumnies so evident that they cause the Jesuits themselves to blush, although they are not in this respect peculiarly delicate? That the father Tellier would also be infamous, who, wishing to vindicate the missionaries of the order, saw his book twice prohibited by Rome? That the

Father de Colonia would be infamous, who with "his Jansenistic Library" stigmatized a number of the best authors as heretics, without any other result than that of securing the condemnation of his own work as calumnious? That the Father Pickon would be infamous who issued a book against that of Anthony Arnauld upon frequent communions, and whose censure was itself censured, while the work of the Jansenist was left untouched? How, that more infamous than all would have been the Father Perot, who wishing to justify the casuists impugned by Pascal sent to the press a wretched production, which was not only distinguished for its shameful vituperation of the French Episcopate and clergy, but which was condemned in a decree of 1659 of Alexander VII? That finally innumerable other writers of the order would also be infamous, whose names are stretched along conspicuously in the catalogue of prohibited authors, for the edification of the faithful and the honor of the company?

And now, what will you answer, my Reverend, Father to these observations? Will you still say that no abuse of eloquence, no labor of partizanship, can ever efface from the brow of Pascal the seal of infamy which is justly stamped upon falsifiers and calumniators? Will you persist in saying that the accusations of this great man are false, and that the morality of the casuists is most pure? What will you say to me if I make one of your own apologists a witness to the contrary? Now read I pray you carefully the eleventh paragraph of the eighth book of the history of Leopold Ranke, and you will find there a picture of Jesuit morality more brief, than that given by the eloquent author of the Provincial Letters. What will you say then? That Ranke is right and Pascal wrong? Does the first deserve to be remembered among the best of historians, because he draws a horrible picture of the depravity of the Jesuits of the 17th century, and is the second worthy, from the same cause, of being inscribed among heretics and calumniators? Is the one your friend because he gives you stabs and blows which bring blood, and the other your enemy because he does not flatter and caress you? Few men have rendered such service to the church, to religion, and to civilization as Blaise Pascal, because more than all other men he wrought for the extermination of a school of impure casuists, and for the vindication of the outraged honor of evangelical morality. France should hold herself in a special manner under obligations

to him; inasmuch in his time the power of the Jesuits was so dominant, that to him alone it was due that the progress of culture, overshadowed by this pestilential tree was not arrésted as in Spain, in Portugal, in Belgium, and in other countries where you reigned without opposition. I know well that you wished to degrade this man's name, because so long as it flourished, you doubted reasonably enough whether you would be able to reinstate the doctrine of probability into a position of honor; but in this effort I am sure yon will not succeed, because no name is so sure of being immortal as that which in history and in the memory of man, is inseparably joined to the vindication of virtue.

XIII.—REVISION OF LUTHER'S VERSION OF THE NEW TESTAMENT.

BY DR. DORNER, PROFESSOR IN BERLIN.

[This article is translated and greatly condensed from a report presented by Dr. Dorner to the German Evangelical Church Conference, and first published in the *Allgemeines Kirchenblatt*, and afterwards in a separate form, Stuttgard, 1868.]

There are now in circulation in Germany eleven different texts of Luther's translation of the New Testament. This divergence has arisen, in some cases, from the different editions published by Luther himself, and in others, from further changes, not merely orthographic and grammatical, but actually affecting the sense. Under the apprehension that these gradual changes would increase, the German Bible Societies, especially the Canstein Institute,* came to the conclusion that it was desirable for the ecclesiastical authorities to make provision for a judicious revision of Luther's translation. On the 25th of December, 1860, the

*This famous institution at Halle was founded by the Marquis of Canstein, a friend of Spener. Up to 1854 it had issued more than four and a half millions of Bibles, and more than half that number of Testaments.

Institute formally presented the matter before the Supreme Consistory in Berlin. This body received the application favorably, but made prominent the idea of securing *uniformity* in the text, rather than a revision. They also directed their delegates to lay the subject before the Evangelical Conference which met at Eisenach in 1861. The result was that two years later, this Conference pronounced decidedly in favor of securing a uniform text on the general basis of the text in the Canstein Bible, compared with the original editions of Luther, and especially the last, but without adopting the verbal forms which are now obsolete. Where the differences in the different editions of Luther have reappeared in modern editions, the best rendering was to be selected, as decided, whenever any doubt could exist, by the original. The comparatively few passages in which some change or correction appeared to be necessary for the proper understanding of the Bible were to be translated literally from the original, and in conformity with the linguistic character of Luther's version.

The Canstein Bible Institute with this encouragement, applied to the Upper Consistory in Berlin for the help of the learned men required for this great and difficult work. The Consistory before replying took measures to ascertain whether the ecclesiastical authorities in the other German States in which Bible societies exist would be willing to coöperate, and especially whether they would designate some of their scholars to participate in the work. Favorable responses were received, and the commission as fully constituted, consisted of Professors Nitzsch, Twesten, Riehm and Beyschlag from Prussia, Drs. Meyer and Niemann from Hanover, Drs. Brückner and Ahlfeld from Saxony, Dr. Fronmüller and Pastor Schröder from Würtemberg. This Commission met in the rooms of the Canstein Institute at Halle on the 2d of October, 1865, and continued in session two weeks.

At the first session, a resolution was adopted that no change from Luther's version should be made except by a majority of two-thirds. Six months later the same Commission, with the addition of Dr. Frommann, met at the same place, Apr. 4–16, when the changes in the text adopted at the first meeting were again considered, and the alterations then proposed by the minority were discussed. The choice between the variants in the current German Bibles was made by a majority, but the rule in respect to a change from Luther's text was rigidly adhered to.

The text as thus revised, together with an index of the alterations from the Canstein text, was printed in 1867 by the Canstein Institute and offered for sale at a low rate in order to give to all the fullest opportunity for forming a judgment in regard to its merits. Copies were sent to the other Bible Societies in Germany, and also to the various church authorities standing in connection with the Eisenach Conference, with the request for their opinion as to the advisableness of adopting this text for general circulation. About forty papers were received in reply, from Bible Societies, church authorities, voluntary unions and single individuals, most of which spoke warmly in favor of the manner in which the work was executed. Not a few, however, expressed a desire for a larger number of changes, or, on the other hand, for fewer alterations, or, if regarded as necessary, in a different way.

It was therefore decided that the Commission should meet once more for the purpose of making a final revision, with all these suggestions before them. This meeting was held on the 20th of April, 1868, and continued till the 25th of the same month. The entire results of the conferences of the committee in 1865, 1866 and 1868, were then printed by the Canstein Institute and sent to the different Bible societies and the church authorities.

What now is the amount of the changes actually made? There are in all 287 alterations of the present Canstein text, but a portion of these are a return to an earlier Canstein edition, or to Luther's edition of 1545, or some earlier one. Some of these alterations also, are reckoned two, three, or four times, especially in parallel passages. Some dozen changes are merely grammatical; others consist in the insertion or omission of brackets, a comma, a plural form instead of the singular, the definite article, in all cases after the original; or in the choice of an intelligible word in place of an obsolete one. None of the changes affect any doctrinal point.

But may it not be said, on the other side, that the proposed alterations are too unimportant; that more numerous changes should have been made, if the work was to be undertaken at all? I believe that on this point the prelate Stock has given the correct view. We must, he says, give as far as *possible* to the church what corresponds to the original text. Many stumbling blocks,

many occasions of misunderstanding are removed by the changes proposed, while the correct understanding is often facilitated by a slight turn of expression. Most of the alterations are of a kind to free the German translation from more or less considerable difficulties.

The emendations of special value in this respect occur in Matt. xv. 5, xxviii. 1, Luke xi. 36, Acts ii. 3, Rom. iv. 12, v. 7, viii. 3, xi. 15, xiii. 5, 1 Cor. ix. 9, 2 Cor. v. 6, vi. 12, Gal. iii. 1, iv. 25, Eph. i. 9, Phil. i. 18, Tit. iii. 3, 2 Pet. ii. 11, Heb. ii. 7, iii. 16, James ii. 4, Rev. ii. 17.

We have no right to withhold from the Church the boon which they may thus enjoy, or to compel those who preach the gospel either to declare as apostolic what the apostles have not said, or to say to the church that this and that passage is incorrectly translated and should be rendered thus and so, the result of which, when often repeated, is to impair the confidence of the community in the correctness of Luther's version, and in any case to make them unduly dependent upon the subjectivity of the minister. I deny, however, that the probable result of accepting the revised version would ultimately be a radical revision. Such a revision is much more likely to be threatened by the contrary course. This text, as amended, removes the most important errors, while what is passed by as not ripe for discussion will in consequence be less likely to excite agitation.

I have only in conclusion to express my own sense of the value of this work. It represents a moderate and cautious progress, will be sure to be helpful in the understanding of the scriptures, and will give, it is to be hoped, satisfaction to those who desired some change to be made in our German version. It now remains for the Conference to decide in respect to the whole matter. There are persons, it is true, who object to the work; but not on doctrinal grounds, for these do not exist; nor would it be right to charge them with the desire to give to Luther's version a kind of dogmatic authority, as the Roman Catholic Church does to the Vulgate, for inaccuracies in Luther's version are on all sides freely admitted, and the only normative authority in the German Evangelical Church is that of the text in the original; nor does the objection spring from simple reverence toward Luther, for this reverence would rather lead to the wish that his mistakes should not continually be brought into view.

The principal objection springs, I believe, from the apprehension that this revision will only introduce one text more, and open the door for radical changes, the result of which will be that we shall lose the common bond which unites the evangelical church in Germany. But what is this alleged unity in the editions of Luther's Bible? There are at least from four to five hundred variations in the eleven editions in common use. Is it a small thing to bring out of all this confusion one uniform text, which in the course of a few years shall become the one in ordinary circulation? Even if this text were not at once to be received in all parts of Germany, there would be a gain wherever it was current, and a check would be put to the increasing variations in the different editions. In respect to the emendations of Luther's text, they scarcely amount to one word in a thousand, or in three pages of the new edition of the New Testament. How, then, can it be said that we have no longer Luther's translation in this edition? If a skillful philologist publishes a new edition of an author and introduces a number of emendations, either from manuscripts or from conjecture, who fears that the author is gone? But in our case the great advantage exists of not depending upon conjecture at all, but upon the irrevocable authority of the original text. Besides, I am convinced that the excellence of Luther's translation, especially after it is purified from undeniable mistakes, is so great as by its own intrinsic merits to set at defiance improper changes.

But is there not reason to fear that the new editions will become a stumbling block to the weak, and cause them to lose confidence in Luther's version, and so fall into error? The weak are not those best acquainted with the Scriptures. It is a remarkable fact that the most urgent expressions in favor of a revision have come from the localities where the Bible is most read, while the fear of change appears to be greatest in the places where only a general and indefinite respect is paid to the Scriptures. Now it may lead this latter class to real inquiry and a lively interest in the Scriptures, as they learn of this or that alteration, and come to understand that the Evangelical Church desires much more than an indefinite reverence for the Bible, and would help them to gain a more thorough understanding of every part, and to receive more perfectly into their hearts the sense and power of the original. We must also remember the needs of the

strong as well as the weak, and provide for those who desire spiritual growth.

To shrink now from consummating the work which has been so happily begun would be injurious to the Evangelical Church, both externally and internally. It would be a confession of weakness,—a confession that, with all her vaunted freedom, she is more firmly bound by the errors transmitted from the past than even the Roman Catholic Church, for the latter undertook in the 16th century a much more comprehensive revision of the old Latin translation of Jerome, which itself was an improvement upon the Itala, the translation in use before his time. The Romish church would find in our impotence a new confirmation of its darling and oft repeated assertion, that the churches, or as it loves to call them, the sects, which have separated from her, have either fallen out among themselves, or have come to a stagnant and mechanical state, like the Monosophytes, Monothelites, etc., who possess only an apparent life. I firmly believe that the Church of the Reformation has by inheritance the power of uniting life and progress with stability, evangelical freedom with evangelical loyalty to the truth, and that in this sense the principle of the Reformation still lives. And here is the opportunity to show it.

No less injurious would the failure of this undertaking be to the best interests of the evangelical theology. What a calamity would it be if the surest results of exegetical theology, recognized and received by all who are capable of judging, were to be forever excluded from the Bible used by the church, and the church were doomed, while conscious of the errors in its translation, to vindicate them against every assault. For these reasons we need, not an entirely new translation, but simply an improvement in a comparatively small number of passages. I cannot but cherish the lively hope that Luther's translation of the New Testament, in this revised form, will be universally introduced into the churches and schools, and recommend to the Conference to give their full sanction and encouragement to its general circulation.

BRIEF NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

Professor Masson's translation of Winer's Grammar of the New Testament was exceedingly incorrect, and could not safely be put into the hands of those who would be likely to depend upon its decisions. Professor Thayer, of Andover, has therefore undertaken a much needed service in proposing to give such a revision of this translation as could be relied on. The whole appearance of the work as it now stands,* indicates a careful and thorough scholarship. A critical comparison of several pages with the original confirms the impression made by a general examination of the book. In its present form, this translation may now be recommended as worthy of a place in the library of every minister who desires to study the New Testament with the aid of the best critical helps. The indexes are very full and satisfactory.

—The late Dr. Lillie's *Lectures on the Epistles of Peter* † are a successful endeavor to present the results of a thorough exegetical study of these epistles in a popular form, and will be recognized as truly valuable by all who, on this basis, seek to become trustworthy expounders of the Scriptures. Expository preaching, it is certain, can never reach its highest excellence, if it is allowed to be a merely loose running commentary upon the text with discursive remarks. This error is here avoided, but the question might arise whether a still higher result for homiletic purposes might not be attained by making prominent the *central thought* of a passage and grouping the other parts around it. In this way the unity necessary for all effective discourse is secured, while the means of personal application to the hearers are given. Dr. Lillie's work is thorough, instructive, serious and evangelical, but the same materials in the hands of a Chrysostom would have been worked up with more light and shade.

—In his own solid style of thought and expression, the President of Williams College in his recent work, *The Law of Love and Love as a Law*, ‡ has given an ethical exposition of these two expressions, the first referring to theoretical morals, the other to practical. The substance of it was delivered in a course of lectures before the Lowell Institute, and those who are interested,

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* *A Grammar of the Idiom of the New Testament, prepared as a solid basis for the interpretation of the New Testament*, by Dr. George Benedict Winer. Seventh edition, enlarged and improved by Dr. Gottlieb Lunemann. Andover: W. F. Draper. 1869. 8vo. pp. 728. $5.

† *Lectures on the First and Second Epistles of Peter.* By the Rev. John Lillie, D. D., late Pastor of the Presbyterian Church at Kingston, N. Y. With an introduction by Philip Schaff, D. D. New York: Charles Scribner & Co., 1869. 8vo. pp. 531.

‡ *The Law of Love and Love as a Law; or Moral Science, Theoretical and Practical.* By Mark Hopkins, D. D., LL. D., President of Williams College. New York: Charles Scribner & Co., 1869. 12mo. pp. 342.

as all ministers of the gospel are supposed of course to be, in the fundamental questions of morals, will find in these discussions a stimulating and strengthening power. The author's recognition of the importance of the sensibilities in a comprehensive system of moral science and his frank recognition of the value of President Finney's elaboration of this subject in his "Systematic Theology" are especially hopeful. On the other hand, his definition of conscience, while exhibiting progress in making the central idea that of moral consciousness, appears to us defective in not including the idea of sensibility to pleasure or pain. The chapters on Government, the right of suffrage and the duties of citizens are full of thought and exceedingly timely. Dr. Hopkins takes the ground distinctly that the state may not legislate directly for the promotion of intelligence and morality for their own sake.

—Whoever wishes to gain a comprehensive view of the growth of our English literature can hardly make a better beginning than to take up Professor Henry N. Day's *Introduction to the Study of English Literature.** With much skill he has selected the best specimens of prose and poetry at certain marked stages of the history of the language, and accompanied them with an admirable series of etymological, grammatical, historical and aesthetical notes. The selections and notes are followed by a systematic view of the elements of our language and literature.

—The exceedingly severe strictures of Rev. George B. Jewitt, on the denominational version of the New Testament prepared by Prof. Conant and others under the direction of the American Bible Union, have been reprinted from the "Congregational Review" in a separate form.†

—The tribute to the memory of the late Rev. Thos. H. Stockton, by his friend, Rev. Alexander Clark,‡ is appreciative and hearty, and will be welcomed by the friends of the eminent pulpit orator.

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* *An Introduction to the Study of English Literature.* By Henry N. Day, Author of "Logic," "Art of Composition," etc. New York: 1869. Chas. Scribner & Co. 12mo.

† *A Review of the New Testament of the Immersionists,* 2d ed. Salem, 1868. 8vo. pp. 38. *A letter to the American Bible Union, in answer to a recent pamphlet entitled "Essex South Association, and the Revised Testament."* Salem: 1869. 8vo. pp. 54.

‡ *Memory's Tribute to the Life, Character and Work of the* Rev. Thos. H. Stockton. By Alexander Clark, Pastor. New York: 1869. 18mo. pp. 55.

RECENT THEOLOGICAL PUBLICATIONS.

United States.—*Pressensé*, Religion and the Reign of Terror, or the Church during the French Revolution, $1.75.—*Shepard*'s Sermons with a Memoir, $2.25—The New Testament, translated from the Greek text of Tischendorf, $1.50.—*Dodge*, Evidences of Christianity, $1.50.—*Hopkins*, (late Bishop of Vermont) Candid examination whether the Pope of Rome is the great Antichrist of Scripture, $1.25.—*Abbott*, Jesus of Nazareth; His Life and Teachings, $3.50.—*Laurie*, Glimpses of Christ in Holy Scripture, $1.

Great Britain:—*Barnes*, Notes, Critical, Explanatory, and Practical, on the Book of Psalms. Author's edition. Vols. 2 & 3, each 4s.—*Wordsworth*, The Holy Bible, in the Authorized Version, with Notes and Introduction by Christopher Wordsworth. Vol. I. Part I. The Book of the Prophet Isaiah. Imp. 8vo, pp. xxii. 126, 12s 6d.—*Fairbairn*, Revelation of Law in Scripture; considered with respect both to its own Nature and to its relative place in successive Dispensations. The Third Series of the "Cunningham Lectures." pp. 484. 10s 6d.—*Rigg*, (*James H.*), Relations of John Wesley and of Wesleyan Methodism to the Established Church of England, Investigated and Determined. 2s.—*Alford*, How to study the New Testament; the Epistles (second section), and the Revelation, 3s 6d.—*Beard*, Manual of Christian Evidence, containing, as an Antidote to current Materialistic Tendencies, particularly as found in the writings of Ernest Renan, an outline of the Manifestation of God in the Bible, in Providence, in History, in the Universe, and in the Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, 10s 6d.—*Clissold*, Transition; or, the Passing Away of Ages or Dispensations, &c., 6s.—*Delitzsch*, Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews. Translated from the German by Thomas L. Kingsbury, M. A. Vol 1. 10s 6d.—*Harless*, System of Christain Ethics. Translated from the German of the 6th Enlarged Edition by the late Rev. A. A. Morrison, and revised by the Rev. William Findley, M. A. 10s 6d.

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pp. 24Sgr.—Studien en bijdragen op 't gebied der historische theologie, verzameld door *W., Moll* en *J., G., de Hoop Scheffer.* 1e deel. 1e stuk. 168 pp, 1 Rthlr, 7½Sgr.—*Brischar*, Die katholiken Kanzelredner Deutschlands seit den 3 letzten Jahrhunderten. Die deutschen Kanzelredner aus dem Jesuitenorden. 2 Bd. 1003 pp, 3Rthlr 15Sgr.—Corpus reformatorum, Vol. XXXV. Inhalt: J. Calvini opera quae supersunt omnia. Ediderunt W. Baum, Ed. Cunitz, Ed. Reuss, Vol. VII. 4Rthlr.—*Gerlach*, Die Klagelieder Jeremia erklärt, 151 pp, 24Sgr.—*Tischendorf*, Conlatio critica codicis Sinaitici cum textu Elzeviriano, Vaticani quoque codicis ratione habito, 109 pp, 15Sgr.—*Weiss, Bh.*, Lehrbuch der biblischen Theologie des Neuen Testaments, 756 pp 3Rthlr. 20Sgr.—*Caspari*, Chronologisch-geographische Einleitung in das Leben Jesu Christi. Nebst 4 Karten und Plänen. *Agentur d. Rauhen Hauses*, 263 pp, 1Rthlr 24Sgr.—*Das Buch Daniel.* Uebersetzt und erklärt von *T. Kliefoth*, 518 pp, 2Rthlr. 20Sgr.—*Diestel*, Geschichte des Alten Testaments in der christlichen Kirche, 817 pp. 4Rthlr 20Sgr.—*Ernesti*, Die Ethik der Apostels Paulus in ihren Grundzügen dargestellt, 157 pp. 1 Rthlr.—*Friedlieb*, Prolegomena zur biblischen Hermeneutik. 1 Heft. Nebst einem Anhang, enthaltend Abhandlungen grösstentheils aus dem Gebiete der biblischen Exegese, 229 pp, 1Rthlr.—*Hengstenberg*, Die Weissagungen des Propheten Ezechiel für solche die in der Schrift forschen, erlautert. II. Theil ,344 pp, 1Rthlr 15Sgr.—*Janssen*, De kerkhervorming in Vlaanderen, historisch geschetst meest naar onuitgegeven bescheiden. 2e deel, 336 pp. 5Rthlr.—*Jongeneel*, Neue Entdeckungen auf dem Gebiete der biblischen Textkritik. Proben und Hypothesen. Mit 4 Taf. *Leiden*, 1868, 60 pp, 20Sgr.—*Ueberweg, F.*, System der Logik und Geschichte der logischen Lehren, 427 pp. 1Rthlr 20Sgr.—*Villari*, Geschichte Girolamo Savonarola's und seiner Zeit. Nach neuen Quellen dargestellt. Unter Mitwirkung des Verfassers aus dem Italienischen von *Mr. Berduschek.* 2 Bde. 4Rthlr.—*Beyschlag*, die paulinische Theodicee Romer IX—XI. Ein Beitrag zur biblischen Theologie. 12½Sgr.—*Meyboom, L. S. P.*, De godsdienst der oude Noormannen 2e stuk. 5Rthlr.—*Naumann, M. E, A.*, Die Naturwissenschaften und der Materialismus, 322 pp. 1Rthlr 24Sgr.—*Preuss, Ed.*, Die Rechtfertigung des Sünders vor Gott. Aus der heiligen Schrift dargelegt. 205 pp. 1Rthlr.

XIV—DAVIDSON'S INTRODUCTION TO THE NEW TESTAMENT.*

We desire to preface our review of this work by an unfeigned expression of respect for the learning of its author, and of gratitude for the services which in former days he rendered to the cause of sacred criticism. His erudition in every department of Biblical study is great, and in mere bibliographical knowledge he is perhaps unrivalled. Scarcely anything seems to have escaped him that has any bearing upon theological literature. It is truly astonishing to contemplate the number of authorities referred to in these volumes. Dr. Davidson may, in this respect, be compared with the late Mr. Buckle. The list of books prefixed to the "History of Civilization" was itself a literary marvel; but Dr. Davidson seems quite capable of equaling it, if he had any such ambition. We must add, however, that though both the writers named display an extraordinary acquaintance with the literature of their respective subjects, both manifest a similar weakness in regard to it. It surprised many to find that while Mr. Buckle had mastered numerous recondite works with which few had any acquaintance, other books familiar to almost every reader seemed to have entirely escaped his notice. Dr. Davidson in like manner constantly names obscure foreign writers, of whom scarcely any one has ever heard, while distinguished home scholars, whose writings have secured a standard place in our Biblical literature, are left unnoticed. Nor can the plea of honest ignorance, which might have been advanced in favor of Mr. Buckle, be urged in defence of Dr. Davidson. To ignore in discussions such as those embraced in these volumes the names and writings of eminent native scholars like Westcott, Alford, and Tregelles, is, in our judgment, simply to be guilty of the most offensive and ridiculous affectation.

We have alluded to the services which Dr. Davidson formerly rendered to sacred criticism; and these were undoubtedly of great importance. To him as much perhaps as to any man is to be

* From the *British Quarterly Review*, Jan. 1869: A Review of Dr. Samuel Davidson's "Introduction to the Study of the New Testament," 2 vols. London; 1868. The few pages in respect to the Epistles are omitted.

traced the origination of that taste for paleographic and critical researches which now prevails to so considerable an extent in our country. We have ourselves a vivid remembrance of the delight with which his treatise on Biblical criticism inspired us. That work opened up to us a region hitherto untraversed, and by the interesting style in which it treated subjects usually deemed dry and unattractive, drew us eagerly onwards in their investigation. However much we may now differ from him, and however deeply we may deplore the position he sees fit now to occupy, we must be ever grateful to him for the stimulus in sacred studies which his early works imparted, and for the amount of instruction which they so pleasantly conveyed.

Dr. Davidson's history as a critic has been not a little remarkable. The mental revolutions through which he has passed, though of a different nature, may be regarded as almost parallel to those of which Dr. Newman gives such a striking account in his "Apologia." Beginning his career as a strongly conservative critic, he has gradually developed into one of the keenest and most uncompromising assailants of Scripture that have yet appeared in our country. Strange and mournful it is to trace his course from the publication of his first "Introduction" in 1848, to his editing and supplementing of Horne's second volume in 1856, and then to the publication of his "Introduction to the Old Testament" in 1862, until we discover his latest phase in his second "Introduction to the New Testament" now before us. It is a descent throughout. With ever increasing velocity does he rush down the steep slope of rationalism, till at length he plunges into the gulf of semi-Straussian infidelity which he has now reached; and if, as we would gladly infer from some passages in this work, he still clings to some essential verities of the Christian faith, there are other passages in it which seem to indicate that he has abandoned, or is prepared to abandon, all that gives preciousnesss or power to the Gospel.

Of course we are far from making it matter of reproach to Dr. Davidson that he has simply changed his opinions. If he has had good grounds for doing so, the fact is rather to his honor. Few inquiring and candid minds fail, in the course of years, to modify views which they once strongly entertained. What is sometimes lauded as consistency, is really nothing more than a blind, unyielding obstinacy, impervious to all argument. We

fully share in Bacon's as well as Whately's admiration for "minds that have not suffered themselves to fix, but have kept themselves open and prepared to receive continual amendment, which is exceedingly rare." But the word "amendment" is an important one in this passage. It is unfortunately quite as easy to change for the worse as for the better; and the question therefore arises —Has Dr. Davidson any convincing reasons to offer in proof that the startling revolution of opinion through which he has passed in reference to the New Testament, has been one from the side of error to that of truth? The volumes before us furnish us with materials for answering that question; and we have now with all earnestness to consider the conclusion regarding it to which they lead.

First, however, let us endeavor to collect from this work the author's present critical and theological position. As to criticism he now holds—1, that not one of the four gospels was written by the person whose name it bears; 2, That the book of the Acts is a forgery of the second century; 3, That of the Pauline Epistles, the Pastoral Epistles, and that to the Ephesians, probably did not proceed from the Apostle; 4, That of the Catholic Epistles, those bearing the names of Peter and James, are non-authentic, while the three Epistles of John are to be ascribed to another than the Apostle; and 5, That the Epistle to the Hebrews cannot, in any sense, be attributed to Paul, but was in all probability written by Apollos. The only parts, therefore, of the New Testament which he holds to be certainly or probably authentic are—1, the Epistles of Paul to the Thessalonians, Corinthians, Galatians, Romans, Colossians, Philippians, and Philemon; 2, the Epistle of Jude, and 3, the book of Revelation. Such are the critical results which he has now reached; and while it will be seen that they do not carry him to the extreme length which has been reached by Baur and others of the Tübingen school, they are sufficiently grave to demand the most earnest consideration.

It is not so easy to define Dr. Davidson's present theological position. Great cloudiness hangs over those statements in this work, which serve to indicate the view which its author now takes of Christianity. As might be expected, he is often severe on those who attach much importance to doctrine. So far as we can gather, he thinks the example of Christ far more precious than any work which He performed, or any truths which He

taught. In some passages Dr. Davidson seems even to indicate that he regards belief in the resurrection of our Lord as unimportant. This is so startling a statement, that we feel bound at once to justify it by a quotation. Referring to the last chapter of Luke's Gospel, Dr. Davidson writes as follows:—

"Ordinary principles of interpretation applied to this chapter fail to bring out any definite knowledge of its contents; and the highest criticism itself must be content with an idealizing process. Conservative critics will attach importance to the letter of the evangelic record, to the empty sepulcher, to the difficulty of supposing mere visions in the mind of the disciples the second day after Jesus died, to the numerous witnesses of the bodily resurrection, and to the probability of miracle here if at all. They will hesitate to forsake the old faith of the church—a step involving the serious assumption that the Apostles were deceived in the form of their belief at least, if not in its existence. Others more speculative, but not less honest, will resolve the fact into a spiritual resurrection, having the souls of the disciples for its theater; finding an explanation of that state of mind in the natural reaction necessarily following the first impression of the death of Jesus psychologically possible. They will attribute visions of the risen Jesus, narrated in the Gospels, to popular imagination, conceiving that the memoirs could not but depict him in a form more or less corporeal. Feeling the force of objections to the reanimation of a body, of the contradictory statements of the evangelists, the different points of view taken in Paul's Epistles, and the existence of a predisposition to visions in the first Christian believers, they will hesitate to accept the literal. But not the less will they maintain that Christianity does not fall with the denial of the resurrection, especially as the fact is reported in a manner so contradictory and susceptible of different interpretations. A thing surrounded with historical and other difficulties will not be made a corner-stone in the edifice. And they are right, if the superior dignity of Jesus rests upon His stainless conscience, His life of love and purity, His words of truth, His embodiment of the Father to mankind; if the glorious manifestation of Divine love in a human person be the essence of His biography; if He be 'the express image' of the Almighty."—(ii. 40, 41.)

In accordance with the views set forth in this passage, the resurrection of Lazarus is regarded as having been no literal fact, but as forming part of that "idealism" which the author traces throughout all the miracles peculiar to the fourth gospel. He hesitates indeed as to the fact that *any* miracles have ever been wrought. This, too, seems to him quite a question of indifference. Either conclusion may be held regarding it. There can, however, he thinks, be no doubt as to the mythical character of many of the miraculous accounts contained in Scripture. The "higher criticism" cannot accept them; they make too great a demand on faith. And "such extravagances of the miraculous may lead a reader to reject it, not only on the occasions mentioned, but on others."—(ii. 243).

Yet he apparently believes in the sublimest of all doctrines—the Incarnation of the Son of God in the person of Jesus of Nazareth. He refuses to accept the Christology of Baur derived from the confessedly authentic epistles of Paul. The Pauline Christ, according to Baur, is no more than human, though He is the realization of ideal humanity. But Dr. Davidson holds that the view to be derived from these four epistles as to the person of Christ is not that of Baur, but is on the contrary this:—"That the principle of divinity which is seen in the man Christ existed already in the person of the Son of God, but assumed human nature in the man Christ, by which means it could be manifested to men."—(i. 397).

The miracle, then, of the incarnation, is admitted; and this is a concession which seems to bear in its bosom some important considerations. First of all, it grants the question of the miraculous. The supernatural is allowed to have been inaugurated by this stupendous event, so that, in whatever form it may hereafter appear, it cannot be objected to on mere *a priori* grounds. And then, secondly, if the Son of God really became incarnate, it is exceedingly difficult to believe that no absolutely trustworthy record of the design of His manifestation in the flesh has been preserved to us. Grant with Baur and others that Jesus of Nazareth was merely a wonderful specimen of humanity developed according to natural processes, and no shock is felt on hearing that the accounts which have reached us of this extraordinary man, are in many respects, erroneous. But hold with Dr. Davidson, as we understand him, that he who is known to us

as Christ was really the Son of God in human form, and the mind is instantly revolted on being told that, the grandest of all possible events having taken place in our world, its end has to a great extent been defeated by the fact that no certainly reliable information has been conveyed to us respecting the life and work of this Divine-human person. To our mind the doctrine of the Incarnation naturally and almost necessarily suggests the doctrine of subsequent inspiration. If the great act took place, there is extreme difficulty in believing that no care was afterwards taken to let men know with accuracy and fullness *why* that was done, and *how* He, in whose person the act was consummated, lived and died. The merely humanitarian school may consistently regard the Gospels as a commingled mass of truth and error. But to start with declaring that Jesus Christ was the Son of God, and then to maintain that we know little that is certain regarding His earthly history, is to come into violent collision with all the conceptions we can form of the wisdom and goodness of Divine Providence. We hope we do not misunderstand Dr. Davidson when we ascribe to him a belief in the true divinity of Jesus Christ; but if not, we would respectfully ask him to look at his own weighty words previously quoted, and then to consider if he is likely to be right in saying of the person who was the "express image of the Almighty" that "a mythic haze encompasses the person, life, and discourses of Jesus, which may be often penetrated, often not."

The truth is that the work before us indicates that the writer is still in a state of painful indecision. Great and rapid as has been his downward progress, he has yet farther to go before he can find a logical resting place. He must sever the last threads that still bind him to the evangelical faith. His final position must be alongside of Renan, Baur, and others, who do not believe in the New Testament as being, in any sense, a supernatural revelation from heaven. At present, he is in the position of one who believes, and yet does not believe; who recognizes in the Gospels the dim portraiture of a divine man, and yet has no certain knowledge of the work which He came to earth to accomplish, or of the words which really proceeded out of his mouth.

The ruin of our author, thus far, has been what is preposterously styled "higher criticism." This is the goddess who has pre-

sided over the creation of these volumes; and never was fairy more capricious; never was Pythoness more ambiguous in the responses given to her votaries. It is amusing to note how often illustrations are furnished in this work of the contrariety displayed by those who possess, in common, the same inspiration. Such adepts in the higher criticism as Baur, Schwegler, Hilgenfeld, and Dr. Davidson himself, are often found at deadly variance with one another. Let us give a few examples. Hilgenfeld thinks that the second Epistle to the Thessalonians "has un-Pauline expressions," and therefore denies its authenticity. Davidson maintains (i. 9) that "little weight can be attached to a few expressions affecting mere composition," and ascribes the epistle to Paul. "While we agree," says our author (i. 140) "with Baur in rejecting the 16th chapter (of the Epistle to the Romans) the 15th cannot be put in the same catagory. There is an intimate union between the 14th and 15th which forbids their separation; and the contents of the latter are truly Pauline." Strongly under the influence of "true criticism," Baur declares that "the Epistle to the Colossians stands between the Pauline writings and fourth gospel, forming a bridge for the passing of certain ideas about Christ's person from a lower to a higher elevation. Its Christology is the echo of Gnostic ideas. The Logos doctrine is introduced into Paulism. The writer confronts the Ebionitism current throughout Asia Minor with a conciliatory tendency, or, as Schwegler puts it more definitely, the epistle originated in the midst of the efforts which the church of Asia Minor was making toward unity, after primitive Ebionitism was overpowered by the help of incipient Gnosticism." This is a delicious morsel of "genuine criticism." It is beautifully illustrative of the procedure of that school to which Dr. Davidson has now attached himself. But alas! the pupil is still somewhat refractory, and will not yield to the above conclusive reasoning of his masters, but presumptuously replies in language which we, in our benighted condition, might have been left to use:—"Some allowance should be made for diversity of time and circumstances. If the author has respect to different persons and influences, or if he intends to combat other errors, he will necessarily vary his arguments."—(i. 177). Thus does "the higher criticism" disport itself throughout these volumes. It is quite a different faculty in one mind from what it is in another, and from one who is

anxious to get firm hold of this transcendent power, and be guided by it to sure and satisfactory conclusions, it may well draw forth the exclamation, "Quo teneam vultus mutantem protea nodo?"

We come now to look somewhat more closely at Dr. Davidson's reasoning with respect to particular parts of the New Testament, and we shall begin by examining his views as to the Gospels. This is not, indeed, to follow the order which he has himself adopted. He professes to treat the several books in their chronological sequence, and the reader may be surprised to find, on opening the first volume, that he is confronted at once with the *second* Epistle to the Thessalonians. That epistle is deemed by Dr. Davidson the first portion of the New Testament which was written; and it is, on this principle of chronology, that he deals successively with the rest of the canonical books. But we have not found his arguments as to their respective dates very clear or conclusive; and for this, among other reasons, we shall depart from the course which he has followed, and look first at the opinions he has formed and expressed regarding the Gospels.

The following are his views as to the probable period at which these were written. Of the first, he says (i. 481), that "there is no real evidence to connect it with Matthew," and adds, "the baptismal formula, with such passages as xvi. 19, xviii. 17, xxiv. 14, prevent the critic from putting the canonical Gospel before A. D. 100." Of the Gospel of Mark, regarding which we are told (ii. 84), "the author is unknown," he says, "probably we shall not be far wrong in dating it about A. D. 120." The third Gospel, again, the author of which, it is said, (ii. 25), "could not have been Luke because of the time when it was written, as shown by internal evidence," is declared not to have been "composed before the beginning of the second century, perhaps about A. D. 115." Lastly, the fourth Gospel is attributed to some "great unknown" (ii. 449), and is assigned to A. D. 150.

Let us then briefly examine these alleged facts. None of the Gospels, it is maintained, can be dated earlier than the beginning of the second century, and all of them are the productions of men different from those whose names they bear,—men totally unknown at the present day, and men whose authorship, nay, whose very existence, was never heard of in the primitive church.

Dr. Davidson's mind is probably too matter-of-fact to be much

affected by any æsthetical considerations. Still we would just ask him in a sentence to consider if "la plus belle chose du monde," as Renan, with, at least, admirable taste, styles the Synoptical Gospels, could have arisen at the time, or in the haphazard fashion which he imagines. We shall scarcely be suspected of partiality when we affirm that there is as great a difference between the tone and character of our canonical Gospels, and any of the acknowledged writings of the second century, as there is between the verdant oasis, with its fruits and flowers, and the sandy desert which spreads around it. Let any one make himself familiar with the writings of the apostolic fathers, all of which may be reckoned as just within the period named by Dr. Davidson for the first appearance of the four gospels, and we shall be surprised if he does not feel, in passing from the one class of writings to the other, that they could not possibly have been produced under the same influence. There is a dreary, vapid tone about the one; there is a dewy freshness, and, so to speak, a Divine aroma about the other.

Again, all the writings of the New Testament, and pre-eminently the Gospels, seem to be completely severed by the *style* in which they are written from the genuine remains of the second century. The nearest resemblance to their diction is found, as might have been expected, in the earliest Christian uncanonical writing, the Epistle of Clement to the Corinthians. There is a wide gulf between them and all subsequent compositions. They constitute, as Thiersch has well remarked, quite a "literary genus," complete in itself, and to which no other history or epistle, known to exist, can naturally be added. They all protest, therefore, by the very coloring which they exhibit, against being relegated to the second century, and set side by side with writings of such a totally different impress and character.

But our critic demands *evidence*, and by this he means express quotations from these books as authoritative, or positive testimonies that they were written by the men whose names they bear. Be it so: we look around and we behold several most competent witnesses quite prepared to speak on the subject. Of these we select at present Irenæus who succeeded Pothinus as Bishop of Lyons, probably about A. D. 177. His great work, "Against Heresies," was written, we certainly know, between A. D. 182 and A. D. 188, for we are expressly told that it was composed

during the Roman episcopate of Eleutherus, and that bishop was succeeded by Victor in A. D. 189. Now, every one acquainted with the writings of Irenæus knows how constantly he refers to the four Gospels as of Divine authority, and how plainly he ascribes them to their respective authors. There is a well-known passage (*Adv. Hær.* iii. 2, 8) too trite for quotation, in which he argues that there were four divinely inspired gospels, and could not possibly have been more or fewer. Neither he, nor apparently any writer in his day, had the slightest doubt as to either the authorship or the authority of our canonical Gospels. These were accepted points both within and without the church, so that the writings referred to might be, and were, appealed to as possessed of a binding power and a decisive voice in regard to every question connected with Christianity.

Now, let us candidly weigh these undisputed facts. Irenæus speaks, in a sense, as both the representative of the Church and of the world, in the latter part of the second century; while he tells us, by implication, that a universal consent had then been reached as to the authenticity of these Gospels, still in our hands. And this according to Dr. Davidson had been effected, with respect to the fourth Gospel in the course of between thirty and forty years! That writing had been issued about the year A. D. 150—falsely claiming to have been written by the Apostle John, —and so eager were all parties to be deceived, that in the course of a single generation, the imposture had everywhere been accepted, and was treated with all the deference due to inspired Scripture! For, let it be well understood, it is not one section of the church, nor even the church as distinguished from the numerous heretical sects, that was, before the end of the second century, perfectly agreed with regard to the authenticity of the gospels. Irenæus expressly declares (*Adv. Hær.* iv. 11, 7) respecting those outside the church: "So firm is the ground on which these Gospels rest, that the very heretics themselves bear witness to them, and starting from these (documents), each one of them endeavors to establish his own peculiar doctrine." No language could be more conclusive as to the unquestioned authority then ascribed to these writings; and no one, we imagine, whose judgment has not been warped by a peculiar system of criticism, will believe that such a *consensus* could have been reached, if the Gospels sprang up in the way, and at the dates supposed by Dr. Davidson.

Moreover, the character of Irenæus and the peculiar advantages for obtaining accurate information which he possessed, are well worthy of being taken into consideration, when we seek to assign their proper value to his statements. Whatever intellectual or literary defects may be discovered in his extant writings, there can be no question that his moral tone was of the highest order, and that he shrunk, with a deep-seated horror, from every species of falsehood. The very first line of his work contains these impressive words, "*the truth*," and every subsequent page proves how earnestly he sought to uphold and defend it. This, then, was not a man likely to be led away by spurious gospels; he was, on the contrary, the very man to make sure that the sources to which he looked for a knowledge of Christ were of the most trustworthy character; and he had enjoyed the amplest opportunities of doing this. In a very interesting fragment of one of his lost works, happily preserved by Eusebius (*Hist. Eccl.* v. 20) he thus addresses Florinus, a former friend of his own, who had lapsed into Valentinianism:—

"These opinions, those presbyters who preceded us, and who were conversant with the apostles, did not hand down to thee. For, while I was yet a boy, I saw thee in Lower Asia with Polycarp, distinguishing thyself in the royal court, and endeavoring to gain his approbation. For I have a more vivid recollection of what occurred at that time, than of recent events, (inasmuch as the experiences of childhood, keping pace with the growth of the soul, become incorporated with it); so that I can even describe the place where the blessed Polycarp used to sit and discourse—his going out, too, and his coming in—his general mode of life and personal appearance, together with the discourses which he delivered to the people; also how he would speak of his familiar intercourse with John, and with the rest of those who had seen the Lord; and how he would call their words to remembrance. Whatsoever things he had heard from them respecting the Lord, both with regard to His miracles and His teaching, Polycarp having thus received (information) from the eye-witnesses of the Word of Life, would recount them all in harmony with the Scriptures."

This passage will probably, of itself, be sufficient to convince our readers of the utter untenableness, we may even say absurd-

ity, of the views of Dr. Davidson, respecting the date and authorship of the Gospels. Here is a man who was removed by only one link from the Apostles, and who could vividly recollect the accounts which he had received from a friend of John as to the words and works of Christ,—one who declares that he had often heard Polycarp discourse of these in a manner *harmonious with the Scriptures;* and this man, as we have seen, constantly, and without a shadow of hesitation, ascribes the four Gospels to the authors whose names they have always borne. In presence of this indubitable fact, will Dr. Davidson's assertions regarding the origin of these writings bear a moment's serious consideration? Must we believe that one situated like Irenæus was so completely befooled as to accept, as authentic and apostolic, works which had no existence in his own early youth, and of which he had never heard from his revered predecessors and teachers? Still more, must our faith stretch itself so far as to suppose that all his contemporaries were victims of the same illusion,—that, by a kind of glamour, as wonderful as was ever ascribed to any magician, their eyes had, in some way or other, been so bewitched that they unanimously concurred in accepting forgeries for authentic documents, and, notwithstanding all their other disagreements, joined with one voice in attributing these spurious writings to the *same* authors? Further still: must we hold that in an age so utterly incapable of discriminating truth from falsehood, there nevertheless flourished men possessed of the genius and constructive ability requisite to concoct our four canonical Gospels, and that while inculcating the purest morality, they were themselves the authors of a deliberate fraud in palming their writings under fictitious names upon the world? And finally: to strain our credulity to the utmost, must we conclude that there arose authors of such sublime self-abnegation that after producing works which immediately drove all similar writings out of the field—which seized as by an irresistible charm upon the hearts of men, and which have been prized ever since as earth's choicest treasures—they voluntarily plunged into obscurity, were never heard of by the men of their generation, and succeeded, with the most marvellous ease, in completely hiding themselves under the veil which they had assumed? Such are some of the "acts of faith" to which the theory of our author would drive us; and whether, in these circumstances, it is not more probable that

Irenæus after all was right, and that Dr. Davidson is wrong, we may safely leave without further comment to the judgment of our readers.

Thus much on the general question of the Gospels. Did space permit we might adduce the weighty evidence of Tertullian (*Adv. Marc.* iv. 5, &c.), and show how that learned, acute, and independent writer continnally accepts the traditional authorship of these writings as an indisputable fact. We might also trace references to them much higher than the time of Irenæus, but to show how little our cause needs any doubtful support, we have been content as yet to rest it entirely upon the authority of that writer. We shall now, however, ascend somewhat higher in our citations, while we canvass more particularly the statements of Dr. Davidson in reference to each of the four Gospels viewed by itself.

Our author's treatment of the first Gospel is, in several respects, arbitrary, and in one at least, we are sorry to say, glaringly uncandid and unfair. He takes for granted as a self-evident fact, that Matthew wrote in Hebrew only, though he knows well that many critics, whom he would probably admit to be possessed of as great acumen and ability as himself, hold a very different opinion. In view of the respect he so often professes for Bleek, he might have deemed the arguments which that admirable scholar suggests in favor of the originality of the Greek, and the dependence upon that of the Hebrew version (*Einl. in das N. T.*, 103--110), worthy of some consideration. We cannot here enter on the important and much vexed question as to the original language of the first Gospel. Dr. Davidson has, we think, in no way strengthened the argument for the view which he adopts. He only succeeds in here illustrating very clearly the dogmatism by which, above most critics, he is distinguished. The opinions he presents as to the little prevalence of Greek in Palestine during the lifetime of our Lord and His apostles, belong to a school which may now be said to be out of date, and are directly opposed to the results reached by Bleek and Dr. Roberts. Nor does it prove anything but his power of assertion, when we find him affirming of our first Gospel, (i. 480), "It is certainly not an original; but it approaches the nature of one by the forms through which it passed, from the time of its incipient derivation from the Aramæan." We need not tell our readers that the statement of

Papias, preserved by Eusebius (Hist. Eccl. iii. 39), is the corner-stone on which Dr. Davidson and others rest their argument for the Hebrew original of Matthew, to the disparagement of our existing Greek Gospel. The isolated and obscure, if not in some degree absurd, account of Matthew's Gospel, given by the ancient and doubtless excellent, but confessedly weak, Bishop of Hierapolis, has of late been much canvassed; and the more it is subjected to criticism, the less capable does it appear of bearing the superstructure which has been raised upon it. Without entering at present on a discussion which our limits forbid, it may be enough to guard our readers against attaching undue importance to the positive assertions of Dr. Davidson on the point in question, if we quote these words of Tischendorf, from his recent work on the Gospels:—"We are fully satisfied in the matter, being convinced that the acceptance by Papias of a primitive Hebrew text of Matthew (a view which may not have been limited to him, and may have been repeated by others), rested entirely upon a misunderstanding."

But whatever opinion be adopted with respect to the original language of the first Gospel, it cannot be denied that the *Greek* text of Matthew is quoted from the earliest times as possessed of canonical authority. In proof of this, we need refer only to the so-called "Epistle of Barnabas," which Dr. Davidson himself assigns to about A. D. 110. In that epistle we read (chap. iv. *ad. fin.*) as follows:—"Let us beware lest we be found, as it is written, 'many are called but few chosen;'" while again, (chap. v.), we are told that when Christ chose His own apostles who were to preach the Gospel (He did so from among those) who were sinners above all sin, that he might show He came "not to call the righteous, but sinners to repentance;" and once more (chap. xix.), we find these words, "Give to every one that asketh thee, and thou shalt know who is the good Recompenser of the reward." Dr. Davidson admits, on the evidence of these passages, that "the epistle of Barnabas clearly recognizes the Gospel's existence," but he is very far from dealing fairly with the first and most important of the citations. Our readers will observe that there is a striking peculiarity connected with it. Not only does it contain words which are an exact quotation from Matt. xx. 16, or xxii. 14, but it adduces these along with the authoritative formula, "*It is written*," the well-known mark of

acknowledged canonicity. Until recently, this fact could not be, or at least, was not, very strongly pressed by the defenders of the authority of the first Gospel. As is well-known, it was not till the discovery of the "Codex Sinaiticus," that the first four and a half chapters of the "Epistle of Barnabas" were possessed in the original Greek. They existed only in an ancient Latin version, and though that contained the words "sicut scriptum est," yet rationalistic writers were ready with the affirmation that these had doubtless been foisted in by the translator, and there opponents had no means of disproving the allegation. But the Greek has now been happily recovered, and the question is settled. With "as it is written" before their eyes, the boldest critics can no longer breathe a doubt against the genuineness of the passage, or refuse to concede that the author of the Barnabas epistle does, in the quotation referred to, cite words from some writing which was then possessed of acknowledged canonicity.

But *what* writing? One should imagine there would be no difficulty in answering that question, seeing the words are found *ad literam* in our Greek Gospel of Matthew, and nowhere else. But let the reader mark how Dr. Davidson deals with them, and then form his own opinion as to the honesty and impartiality of that writer. "The saying," he tells us, "many are called, but few are chosen," is evidently taken from Matthew in its present form, but it is also found in substance in the fourth book of Esdras, which was considered canonical because of its prophetical character. The writer of the Barnabas epistle may have believed that the sentence was found in the Old Testament canon, even in the form it had in Matthew's Gospel, and so prefaced it with "it is written." Such transference of a passage in the New Testament to the Old is not without example in Justin and Polycarp. In the present instance the mistake was slight, because the saying quoted is found in the fourth of Esdras, which, though not a part of the Old Testament canon, was assumed to be so.—(ii. 509).

We confess that the reading of this passage roused our deepest indignation. The one thing which at all reconciles us to the rationalistic writings, and prompts us patiently to follow their reasonings, is a belief in the thorough honesty of the authors who deem it their duty to present such compositions to the world. The constant profession of these writers is that they have devoted

themselves to the simple pursuit of truth. No one is louder in raising this cry than the author of the work before us. He is forever exhibiting himself as an unbiased critic, in contrast to the defenders of the accepted canon of Scripture. But we venture to say that nothing more flagrantly uncandid can be cited from any orthodox writer than is the argumentation pursued in the passage quoted above. The bias is so manifest, that we are amazed at the effrontery of the writer; for in the first place, the words cited are *not* found in the fourth book of Esdras. What we find there is, (chap. iii. 3), "Many indeed have been created, but few shall be saved;" a totally different statement from that quoted by the writer of the epistle, and contained in the Gospel of Matthew. In the second place, it is quite a gratuitous assumption that the fourth book of Esdras was ever esteemed canonical; an assumption made simply to meet the exigencies of the present case, and contradicted by the critic himself, when he admits that that book did not form part of the Old Testament canon. And, in the third place, it is doubtful whether the date of the fourth book of Esdras does not approach so near to that of the "Epistle of Barnabas," as to render it impossible that the one writing should bear testimony to the canonical authority of the other. Altogether, the above reasoning of Dr. Davidson constitutes one of the most painful efforts to *miss the truth* which it was ever our misfortune to encounter; and in the case of such a pretentious friend of "genuine criticism," may justly call forth the strongest reprobation.

There can be no doubt, then, that in the very beginning of the second century the Greek Gospel of Matthew was regarded with the same reverence as the Old Testament Scriptures. To it, as to them, was the deference due to inspiration accorded. It lay before the writer of the Barnabas epistle as a work to which he bowed with unquestioning submission, and which he quoted as possessed of sovereign authority. How ridiculous, then, is the assertion of our author, that certain passages which happen to displease him, "prevent the critic from putting the canonical Gospel before A. D. 100," that is, some ten or twelve years before it is without the slightest hesitation cited, as of Divine authority? We beg to be excused from such an act of credulity as this; and we prefer to believe that when the writer of the "Epistle of Barnabas" quoted our first Gospel as canonical, he

did so on the understanding that it was accepted by his readers, no less than by himself, as the authentic and inspired production of Matthew.

We shall not have to dwell at so great length on the Gospel of Mark. It pleases our author to put it in the third place among the Gospels, and to describe it as for the most part compiled out of the previously existing Gospels of Matthew and Luke. We pass over these opinions without remark, as they have often been discussed, and it is perhaps impossible to reach anything like certainty regarding them. But when Dr. Davidson affirms that our existing "canonical Gospel cannot have been the production which Mark wrote from reminiscences of Peter's oral teachings and narratives," and that "its author is unknown," while the date of the Gospel is placed so late as about A. D. 120, his statements are of a kind which demand the most serious consideration.

Dr. Davidson endeavors to support his views respecting the second Gospel by both internal and external arguments. "That Mark," he says, "was not the writer of the present Gospel may be inferred from the fact, that it is not copious nor remarkable in particulars relative to Peter." He refers to well-known omissions by Mark of incidents recorded by the other evangelists, tending to the honor of that Apostle, and will not allow any weight to the reason usually adduced that the modesty of Peter had something to do with those omissions. But, to our mind, nothing could be more beautiful or satisfactory than the explanation suggested for this special feature of Mark's Gospel if, as has been believed from the earliest times, the Evangelist composed it from the instructions that he derived from Peter. He whom grace had so changed that he urged upon others the precept, "Be clothed with humility," would naturally leave out those passages which tended to exalt himself as one who had enjoyed the special friendship of Christ.

The external argument is worthy of more attention. Critics have very generally felt the language in which Papias (or John the Presbyter as reported by him) refers to Mark's Gospel, not a little embarrassing. The following is the account as given by Eusebius:—

"This also the Presbyter used to say; Mark, being the inter

preter of Peter, wrote accurately all that he related, not however (narrating) in order the things which were either done or said by Christ; for he neither heard the Lord nor followed him; but subsequently, as I said, (joined himself to) Peter, who used to frame his teachings according to the wants (of his hearers), and not as making a full narrative of the Lord's discourses," &c.

Here it is stated that Mark did not write *in order;* whereas our author justly remarks, "The matter of the Gospel is as well digested as that of Matthew or Luke." He adds:—

"The difficulty of reconciling the testimony of the Presbyter with the condition of the present Gospel is palpable; and the witness is important from being the oldest. No solid reason can be given for deposing him, except the perplexity in which he involves those who believe him to speak of the present Gospel. If he speak of a prior document written by Mark, his testimony is natural and intelligible, and the conclusion it leads to is, that a later writer composed the present Gospel of Mark."

Dr. Davidson, however, with a fairness which does him honor, admits, as Baur has done, that the early fathers refer to only one work as having proceeded from Mark. And he asks, "If the document of which Papias speaks was not our present Gospel of Mark, how could this older writing have passed at once into oblivion, and the present Gospel, originating suddenly in its stead, be reckoned the work of Mark?" while he candidly adds, "It is difficult to answer these questions." To us it seems not merely difficult, but impossible. Eusebius, in reporting the words of Papias, manifestly applied them to our existing Gospel, and no whisper of any other work as having been composed by Mark reaches us from all antiquity. A better solution of the difficulty must therefore be sought. And we would humbly suggest the following. The word τάξει is not here to be understood as denoting "in order," but should be explained in the light of the term σύνταξιν which follows, and with which it is evidently related. The Presbyter states that is was not the object of Peter in his discourses to give a *complete history* (σύνταξιν) of our Lord's discourses; and in like manner Mark did not aim in his Gospel at presenting in full (τάξει, in consecutive order from beginning to end), an account of what was either done

or spoken by Christ. This exactly fits Mark's Gospel as the shortest and least complete of all the evangelical histories, and saves us from all necessity of ascribing the words of Papias to any other writing than that which has always been known and accepted by the Church.

We have next to consider our author's views as to the Gospel of Luke. Referring to the acts of the Apostles as connected with this Gospel, he affirms (ii. 25), "Both proceeded from the same person, who could not have been Luke, because of the time when the third Gospel was written, as shown by internal evidence." We afterwards read (p. 53):—

"The work itself exhibits evidence of its appearing after the destruction of Jerusalem. The *immediate* coming of the Son of Man is not held forth; the Evangelist contenting himself with fewer and more indefinite signs than those of the first Gospel. . . . The destruction of Jerusalem was already past; xxi. 24, implies that Jerusalem had been trodden down by the Gentiles *till the times should be fulfilled.* Experience had shown that no alteration or improvement in the existing state of things could be expected soon after the Jewish state was dissolved; but that the Roman yoke must be endured for a while. When this Evangelist wrote, the Christians had undergone much persecution; and there are accordingly many exhortations to steady watchfulness and fidelity (xii. 4; xxii. 12, &c.) These considerations, along with the Gospel's posteriority to that of Matthew, lead to the conclusion that it was not written before the beginning of the second century, perhaps about A. D. 115."

Thus, then, according to Dr. Davidson, we have another spurious Gospel in the one which bears the name of Luke, and it is to be regarded as having been composed in the first quarter of the second century. Passing over other objections to this theory, there is one argument which occurs to us that we do not remember to have seen noticed, but which appears conclusive against such opinion. It is implied in the question as to the *sources* whence the Evangelist derived his materials for his work. Dr. Davidson devotes a page or two to the consideration of this point, but concludes by saying, that "the subject does not admit of a satisfactory explanation." Most true on the hypothesis which he has adopted; for let it be remembered how much mat-

ter we find in Luke which is not contained in any other of the Evangelists. Our author states it as follows:—

"He has the parable of the two debtors (vii.); of the good Samaritan (x.); of the friend going to another at night to borrow bread (xi.); the rich man who built large barns (xii.); of the barren fig tree (xiii.); the lost piece of silver (xv.); the prodigal son (xv.); the unjust steward (xvi.) the rich man and Lazarus (xvi.); the unjust judge (xviii.); and the Pharisee and the Publican (xviii.) He records the miraculous draught of fishes (v.); the raising of the widow of Nain's son (vii.); the cure of a woman having a spirit of infirmity (xiii.); of a dropsical man (xiv.); of ten lepers (xvii.); the conversion of Zaccheus (xix.); the healing of Malchus's ear (xxii.); and the journey of the two diciples to Emmaus (xxiv.). The first two chapters are also peculiar to him; and beside these larger portions, many small incidents and traits are given by him alone."

Now, our argument is this. If an author, writing so late as about A. D. 115, could collect so much *new* material respecting Christ, how does it happen that we find next to nothing that is new in the works of other contemporary writers? Only a few miserable scraps, as is well known, can be collected from the early Fathers, adding anything to our knowledge of either the words or the works of Christ, beyond what we learn from the four Gospels. Yet, according to Dr. Davidson, it was possible, so late as the second decade of the second century, to obtain that vast amount of additional information respecting our Lord's life on earth, which is comprised in the third Gospel. Strange, in that case, that neither Clement of Rome, nor any other writer of the age, should have laid hold of these evangelical narratives which were, it seems, floating so richly about. Why was the writer of Luke's Gospel the only man to appropriate the precious treasure? And how did it come to pass that he acquired such a monopoly of the available sources of information? "It may," says Dr. Davidson in his distress, "be inferred from a minute survey of its contents, that Luke employed the Gospel according to the Hebrews in one of its earliest forms, and the so-called Gospel of Peter." But supposing these two works to have then existed, how comes it that *other* writers took no advantage of them in referring to

Christ, but limited themselves (with the most insignificant exceptions) to those accounts which are contained in our canonical Gospels? The idea of their acting thus is ridiculous, if they could have done otherwise; and the manifest conclusion is, that the author of the third Gospel, instead of living alongside of the early Apostolic Fathers, who add nothing to our knowledge of Christ, must have composed his work a long time previously, while as yet the Evangelic traditions were fresh and abundant, and when, as he himself says, it was possible "accurately to trace out all things from the beginning."*

We come now to deal with the fourth Gospel, to which our author devotes a larger amount of space than to any other part of the New Testament. His conclusion is decidedly hostile to its Apostolic origin. But he scarcely gets beyond negation in dealing with this question. Unfortunately for him, and for all others taking a similar view, the Gospel *exists*, and must have had an author; but where to look for him, when the eye does not rest on John, is a puzzle which Dr. Davidson cannot solve. "The subject," he says, (ii. 445), "presents a variety of embarrassing circumstances, so that it is difficult to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion. Though the balance of evidence is clearly against the Gospel's authenticity, it is not easy to account for the early belief of its Johannine origin otherwise than by assuming that it arose in the circle of John's disciples about Ephesus, under influences posterior to that Apostle." Is it *then* easy? Making the supposition that the Gospel came into being at the date assigned it by our author (A. D. 150), and that it sprang from among John's disciples at Ephesus, can we then easily account for its early and universal ascription to John, as the words of Dr. Davidson import? Let us see.

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* We should have liked, had space permitted, to set before our readers some account of the theories which have been broached as to the relation between the Gospel of Marcion and that of Luke. Nothing could be more illustrative of the freaks and follies of "criticism." Many writers of the Tübingen school, such as Baur, Schwegler, and Ritschl, argued strenuously that Marcion's Gospel was the prior one, and that Luke used it in the composition of his work. The old opinion, however, that the Marcionite document was simply a modified and corrupted form of the third Gospel, is now accepted by all scholars. See for a masterly view of this controversy, Bleek's *Einl. in das N. T.*, 121–138.

First of all, we have to get over the *fact* of forgery. That the Gospel claims to have been written by John (chap. xxi. 24, 25),* and was issued under his name, admits of no doubt. Is it likely that any one of John's disciples would have dared thus to abuse his name, and, while conscious of deliberate fraud, would have had the hardihood to pen these solemn words (chap. iii. 20, 21):— "Every one that doeth evil hateth the light, neither cometh to the light, lest his deeds should be reproved; But he that doeth truth cometh to the light, that his deeds may be made manifest that they are wrought in God?" Is this the language of a forger and a cheat? Very strong evidence must be produced before we will believe that such is the case; for if ever the voice of sincerity, abhorring all thought of secret guile, fell upon the ears of our world, it surely did so in the utterance which has been quoted.

Next, we have to account for the *success* of the imposture. Half a century after the death of the Apostle, this writing (*ex hypothesi*) came forth under his name. Is it not enough merely to state this, in order to see that the theory is inadmissible? The deception must have been at once apparent. "How is it," men would have asked, "that we have never heard of this work until now?" and, with one voice, they must have rejected such a barefaced attempt at deceiving them. Yet, according to our author, it was quite otherwise. All men concurred in accepting this work as that of the Apostle. Immediately on its appearance, it was received as John's, for Theophilus of Antioch (A. D. 168), expressly names John as its author, implying that all had, for some considerable time, been agreed as to that point. No one, in short, dreams of forgery; no one ever hints at a doubt as to the apostolic origin of the Gospel; and this unanimity could, we believe, never have been reached, had the work been a forgery, but can be accounted for only by the fact that it was an authentic production of its reputed author.

But again; will the theory of Dr. Davidson fit in either with the internal characteristics of the Gospel, or with the use made of it by early writers? Looking at its contents, are we to believe that its graphic narratives, so suggestive of an eye-witness

* Credner and others think it probable that these verses were added by the contemporaries of the Apostle, in express testimony that this Gospel was written by the beloved disciple; we prefer, however, to regard them as having proceeded from the pen of John himself.

(chaps. iv., ix., xi.)—its sublime discourses, breathing the very poetry of heaven (chaps. xiv., xv., xvi.)—its solemn prayers, rising to the loftiest pitch of adoration (chap. xvii.)—its touching descriptions, melting every heart (chaps. xix., xx.)—its marvelous insight into the wants of man, and its satisfying discoveries of what God has done to meet his necessities (chap. iii.)—its spirituality and depth of ethical teaching, so unparalleled in human compositions (chaps. iv. 24; viii. 34)—its God-like tenderness, combined with God-like purity (chap. viii. 11)—its blendid grandeur, softness and severity (chaps. xviii. 6; vi. 20; ix. 41)—are all the works of an impostor, so dead to the simplest elements of morality that he could contrive an elaborate falsehood, and interweave evidences of his imposture with the very passages that indicate such transcendent elevation and power? It is vain to tell us, as some explanation of this difficulty, that not a few works were published under false names in the early Church. Such a procedure may be in keeping with rubbish like the "Ignatian Letters," or the "Clementine Homilies," but is simply revolting and incredible when thought of in connection with the fourth Gospel. That marvellous work bears in its own bosom the evidence of its authenticity, else our faith in the good and the true is destroyed forever.

But, let us now glance at the use made of this Gospel by early writers, and see if that will comport with the theory that it was given to the world by some unknown author about A. D. 150. We shall not plunge into the controversy as to whether or not Justin Martyr was acquainted with the fourth Gospel, though we have little doubt of the fact, and believe that Dr. Davidson's lengthened and laborious effort to maintain the contrary completely fails. Nor shall we search for evidence as to the employment of this Gospel by the various heretical sects of the second century. Much obscurity hangs over that region of inquiry, and no very certain results can be reached either on the one side or the other. But we look to a quarter illuminated by the broad light of day. In the concluding chapter of the great work of Irenæus (*Adv. Hær.* v. 36) we find these words:—

"And, as the Presbyters say, those who shall then have been found worthy of life in heaven shall go thither, and others shall enjoy the delights of paradise, while others shall possess the

brightness of the city; for everywhere shall the Saviour be seen according as they who see him shall be worthy. (They say) that this difference of abode belongs repectively to those who brought forth an hundred-fold, and those who brought forth sixty-fold, and those who brought forth thirty-fold; of whom some shall be taken up into heaven, some shall live in paradise, and some shall inhabit the city, and that it was for this reason the Lord declared, 'In my Father's house are many mansions.'"

It is clear that these concluding words are a quotation from John xiv. 2, and that this quotation is represented as having been made by certain predecessors of Irenæus, to whom he refers under the name of "Presbyters," or "Elders." It is impossible to say with certainty who are thus denoted. But one thing is obvious,—that those whom Irenæus, writing about A. D. 180, could describe as "Elders" must have lived very soon after the Apostolic age. Many critics suppose with great probability, that the above passage is a quotation from the lost "Expositions" of Papias, as it harmonizes exactly with what is known as his style of interpretation. Dr. Davidson, indeed, attempts somewhat feebly to deny this, and remarks, "The word *elders* is sometimes defined by 'disciples of the Apostles,' sometimes by those 'who saw John the disciple of the Lord.' Is it not evident that Irenæus employed it loosely, without an exact idea of the persons he meant?" But to this we reply: Not so—it is rather evident that, in quoting from the elders as he does, he must have known the exact authorities to whom he referred; and we cannot but conclude that these lived at a very early period in the history of the Church. Nothing is so probable as that the citation is here from the work of Papias, and if so, he must have been acquainted with the fourth Gospel; but whether that be granted or not, it is obvious that, as Irenæus himself was born certainly not later than A. D. 140, those styled "elders" by him must have lived very early in the second century. The existence and use of the fourth Gospel are thus traced far higher than A. D. 150, even to the very borders of the period when the Apostle John is believed to have given it to the Church.

Altogether, we marvel not that scholars like Credner and Ewald, notwithstanding those strong rationalistic tendencies which they often exhibit, should have found themselves con-

strained to maintain the Johannine authorship of the fourth Gospel. They felt that the proofs of that position were so numerous and powerful, that no stand could be made against them; and they saw that the difficulties springing from a denial of it were so overwhelming that they shrank from facing them, and virtually proclaimed every attempt to grapple with them absolutely in vain.

Are there any difficulties on the other side? We care not to deny that there are, while we have no hesitation in saying that these amount to not a tithe of such as embarrass our opponents. Dr. Davidson dwells especially, and at great length, upon the Quartodeciman controversy; and there can be no question that hitherto the apparent discrepancy between the accounts of the Synoptists, on the one hand, and of the fourth Gospel on the other, as to the day on which Christ suffered, has not received any perfectly satisfactory explanation. But critics have by no means abandoned the subject in despair. On the contrary, they are laboring at it with good hope of ultimately clearing away all the perplexities which have gathered round this point, as well as around the obscure details of the Paschal controversies in the early Church. Meanwhile, it is too much the habit of writers like our author to pronounce those difficulties which may still exist insuperable, and to regard the expectation of yet receiving more light as hopeless. Hence the hasty conclusion that the fourth Gospel must be considered non-Apostolic—a conclusion, as we have seen, opposed to the strongest evidence, and which many rationalists themselves have declared to be untenable.

* * * * * Our irksome task is now done, and there is just one thought which, in conclusion, we would press upon the attention of writers like Dr. Davidson. It is the vast responsibility which they incur in publishing views such as those set forth in this work, unless they are able to substantiate them by what must, to all reasonable minds, amount almost to demonstration. As long as there is a possibility that such a writing, for instance, as the fourth Gospel actually proceeded from an Apostle of Christ, it should surely be the care of every considerate man not to disturb the belief to that effect which prevails in the Churches. The injury which may be thus inflicted on both the hope and the holiness of multitudes is incalculable. It may be said indeed that the critic is not responsible for the effects pro-

duced upon his readers; these have simply to judge for themselves on the *data* with which he furnishes them. But he *is* responsible. It is owing to him that they abandon their faith, if under such hypotheses they *do* abandon it. And on the supposition that he *may be wrong*, not surely, in this case, an extravagant one, when it is considered how different is the conclusion which has been reached by such men as Credner, and Bleek, and Ewald—there then applies to him that solemn declaration: "It must needs be that offences come; but woe unto that man by whom the offence cometh." Our best wish, therefore ,with respect to the learned, but, as we think, grievously mistaken writer from whom we now part, is that he may not make a single convert to his opinions. If there be no hope of winning himself back to the better faith of former days, then we fervently trust, for his own sake, that though led astray himself, he may not be the means of misleading others. Still let that wonderful Gospel which he has impunged retain its place of authority in the Church, teaching men to confide in their Father's grace and their Saviour's power, by its sublime announcement—"God so loved the world that He gave His only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him should not perish, but have everlasting life"—showing them how to live by the bright and blessed exemplar that it sets before them—"I am the light of the world; he that followeth me shall not walk in darkness, but shall have the light of life"—and preparing them willingly to die by these grand and God-like words which it breathes so lovingly over them: "I am the resurrection and the life; he that believeth in me, though he were dead, yet shall he live;" "In my Father's house are many mansions; if it were not so, I would have told you; I go to prepare a place for you; and if I go and prepare a place for you, I will come again and receive you to myself, that where I am, there ye may be also."

XV.—AGE AND AUTHORSHIP OF THE PENTATEUCH.*

BY W. LINDSAY ALEXANDER, D. D.

The Pentateuch has come down to us with the reputation of being the writing of Moses. The tradition to this effect among the Jews is uniform and steady. Such a tradition can neither be summarily rejected nor implicitly received; for while, on the one hand, the tradition of a nation respecting the authorship of a well-known portion of its own literature, is entitled to great respect, as carrying with it a *prima facie* credibility, yet on the other hand, as tradition is sometimes at fault even on such matters, it cannot be allowed definitively to settle this question. We must, therefore, look for other evidence of the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch, if such is to be found; and, at any rate, the question must be left open for free discussion, and the decision made to rest on the balance of probability on the one side or the other.

It has been sometimes assumed that our Lord has decided this question by the reference made by Him, in his recorded teaching, to the law as given by Moses, and to what Moses says in the law.† But it is to be observed that no utterance of our Lord, relating to this subject, amounts to anything like a declaration that Moses wrote the Pentateuch. All that can be fairly inferred from such expressions is, that certain institutions in use among the Jews were appointed by Moses, and certain sayings found in the Pentateuch were uttered by him. But this would no more prove that Moses *wrote* the Pentateuch, than the fact that sayings and institutions of Christ are recorded in the Gospels, would prove that these were written by Him. More decisive is his using the expression "the book of Moses" (Mark xii. 26) in

* From the *Sunday Magazine*, Oct. 1868.

† Comp. Matt. xix. 7, 8. John v. 45; vii. 19, 22, 25, &c.

reference to the Pentateuch. But even this is not finally conclusive, because the Jews were in the habit of calling a book by the name of the party of whom it principally treats, who might or might not be its author. Whilst, therefore, we would receive with implicit submission whatever is said by our Lord, we do not think what he has said in such passages as those above cited, renders unnecessary an inquiry into the authorship of the Pentateuch.

It is impossible here to discuss this question in all its details; not only because of the extent of these, but because to go into them fully would involve investigations of a philological and linguistic kind, not suited to the purposes of this journal. It is possible, however, I think, to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion without entering upon the minute inquiries with which the question has been clogged.

There are two points to which consideration must be directed: —1. Have these writings any claim to the antiquity which tradition has assigned to them? 2. Assuming them to be of sufficient antiquity, is there any probability that they were written by Moses? In the discussion of this latter question, the historical credibility of the books comes into prominent consideration; but this it will be more convenient to attend to when we come to notice the contents of the separate books.

There seems no reason to doubt that the Pentateuch, in the form in which we now have it, existed before the deportation of the Jews to Babylon. That they had it on their return from their exile is certain from the notices of the reading and expounding of the law to the people, given in the Book of Nehemiah;* and that they recognized it as containing a code imperatively binding on them, is evident from the submission they yielded to its injunctions in matters affecting their interests, affections, and habits.† No one will suppose that the Pentateuch could be composed during the exile; or if it had, that it would have been possible to impose it on the Jews as the ancient code of their nation, or to exact from them submission to its requirements and restrictions.

In connection with this must be taken the important fact of the reception of the Pentateuch in its present form by the Samar-

* Comp. chapters viii. ix.

† Comp. Ezra ix. x. Neh. xiii. 1–3.

itans. Whether these were a heathen people originally, or, as seems more probable, a mixed people, partly heathen, partly Israelitish—the heathen element greatly preponderating—is a question that has no important bearing, so far as I can see, on our present inquiry. The point of importance is, that they not only had no connection with the Jews, but were, from the beginning, their bitter enemies. The hostility of the two was so deep and settled that it became proverbial. Though necessity or self-interest might induce them sometimes to have commercial dealings with each other, they had none that implied either friendly intercourse or charitable aid. We may hold it as certain therefore that it was not directly, or by friendly communication from the Jews, that the Samaritans received the Pentateuch. Whence, then, did it reach them so as to be received by them as authoritative? Some have supposed that it was brought to them by the Israelitish priest sent by the King of Assyria to teach the colonists whom he had settled in Samaria "the manner of the God of the land."* Of this, however, there is no notice in the record; on the contrary, the whole tenor of the narrative leads to the conclusion that the priest taught the people to whom he was sent very little of the truth concerning Jehovah, that he did not establish the worship of Jehovah on any solid basis among them, and that he conveyed to them no authoritative code of religious service. Hence the people remained in a state not much better than they were before. That they did not at this time receive the Mosaic code, seems further certain from the fact that when they came to treat with the Jews to be permitted to unite with them in the rebuilding of the temple, they grounded their appeal, not on their having adopted the Mosaic ritual and law, but simply on their seeking the God of Israel, and sacrificing to Him, "since the days of Esarhaddon, king of Assur," a notice which remits us to the narrative in 2 Kings xvii, from which we learn how unmosaic, and positively heathenish, their observance of the worship of Jehovah was. It seems evident that at this time they had neither a regular priesthood nor an organized service of their own, and that they sought refuge from the unsettled state in which they were, under the well-ordered system followed by the Jews. We must therefore relinquish, as untenable, this supposed communication of the Pentateuch to the Samaritans by

* 2 Kings xvii. 24 ff.

the Israelitish priest, and along with that the argument which has been founded on it for the existence of the Pentateuch in its present form among the Israelites previous to their dispersion. The probable channel through which the Samaritans received the Pentateuch is suggested by a notice in Nehemiah xiii. 28. There we are told that Nehemiah "chased from him," *i. e.*, banished from Jerusalem a priest who had married a daughter of Sanballat the Horonite, a chief of distinction in alliance with the Samaritans. The priest thus driven out would naturally betake himself to his father-in-law, his connection with whom had been the cause of his having incurred the penalty of exile. Now, Josephus narrates how a priest of the name of Manasses, who had married a daughter of Sanballat, was expelled from Jerusalem and went to Samaria, where a temple was built for him on Mount Gerizim, and where he was consecrated high priest. It is true that Josephus * places this event more than a century later than the time of Nehemiah; but it is probable that he has done so from confounding Darius Codomannus, in whose time he places it, with Darius Nothus, who was reigning at the time of Nehemiah. It is generally believed that the two events are the same; and that as the Sanballat of Nehemiah possessed influence with Darius Nothus, he obtained from him permission to build the temple on Gerizim, and that it was his son-in-law who was the first high priest of Samaria, and the organizer of the Samaritan ritual. Assuming this, it will not be thought improbable that he carried with him from Jerusalem a copy of the Pentateuch, and introduced it among the Samaritans. Why he took the Pentateuch only, and not others of the sacred books, receives its reasons, probably, in the fact that it was the book to which, as a priest, he attached the greatest value, and that which was to be of most service to him in his new sphere. Taking this as, on the whole, the most probable account of the communication of the Pentateuch to the Samaritans, it seems to corroborate the conclusion that that book, in its pristine form, was possessed by the Jews on their return from Babylon, and was recognized by them as authoritative.

That the Pentateuch was well known to the Jews in the time of Zedekiah, is evident from the many quotations from it, and allusions to it, in the writings of Jeremiah; as well as from the

* Antiq. Bk. xi. c. 8.

account given in Jer. xxxiv. 8–22, of the proposal to enforce a law recorded in the Pentateuch (Exod. xxi. 2 ff. Deut. xv. 11 ff.), and the judgments threatened by the prophet because of the violation of it. So decisive is this evidence, that the only way in which the opponents of the antiquity of the Pentateuch try to get over it, is by supposing that Jeremiah *forged* the law, that he induced the king, by telling him a deliberate lie, to proclaim its observance, and that it was because the king discovered how he had been imposed on that he recalled the proclamation.* A supposition so utterly groundless and outrageous, shows the desperate case of those who are compelled to resort to it.

In 2 Kings xxii. 8 ff, we have an account of the finding in the temple of "the Book of the Law," which is also called "the Book of the Covenant" (xxiii. 2,) and of the reading of it to the king Josiah, and of the effect this produced. This book may have been the temple copy of the law, which, during the reign of the idolatrous prince who preceded Josiah, had been hid or fallen aside, or it may have been the sacred autograph of the author religiously preserved in the ark. Whether the book contained the entire Thorah or only the book of Deuteronomy, is matter of uncertainty. What is clear is that the part which produced the greatest impression on the king and his people is to be found in Deuteronomy. (Comp. Deut. v. 30–33; xiii. 6–11; xvi. 6–8; xxviii. 37, with 2 Kings xxii. 19; xxiii. 3, 20, 23, and 2 Chron. xxxiv. 24, 31). At least, then, the book of Deuteronomy was, on this occasion, read before king Josiah, and as it had been long enough in existence to allow of its being lost and forgotten, we must presume it was in existence as far back, at least, as the reign of Josiah's grandfather, Hezekiah. But as this is the last book of the Pentateuch, and as is manifest, and by all acknowledged, the last written, the entire Pentateuch must have been extant in the reign of Hezekiah.

The existence of the Pentateuch before the time of Hezekiah is further shown by the use made of it by the prophets Isaiah, Joel, and Micah. Beside frequent allusions to the historical events recorded in the Pentateuch (on which, however, much stress cannot be laid, as these might be known by popular tradition or by detached records), Isaiah repeatedly cites passages from the Pentateuch almost verbatim; compare—

* Colenso *on the Pentateuch.*

Isaiah	iii. 9	with Gen.	xix. 5.
"	vi. 5	" Ex.	xxxiii. 20.
"	xi. 15, 16	" "	xiv.
"	xii. 2	" "	xv. 2.
"	xii. 5	" "	xv. 1.*
"	xxiv. 18	" Gen.	vii. 11.
"	xxx. 9	" Deut.	xxxii. 20.
"	xxx. 17	" Lev.	xxvi. 8; Deut. xxxii. 30.
"	xliv. 2	" Deut.	xxxii. 15; xxxiii. 5, 26.

In ch. xxx. 9, Isaiah makes mention of "the Law of the Lord," by which phrase it is more than probable that he intends the Pentateuch, from his alluding in connection with it to a passage occurring in Deut. xxxii. 20. It is evident, also, from the whole tenor of Isaiah's writings, that the Levitical institute, as described in the Pentateuch, was in full operation in his day.

In Joel we find frequent references to the priesthood and their services in such terms as show familiarity with such a religious institute as that which the Pentateuch prescribes. For allusions to the Pentateuch in his writings compare—

Joel	i. 2–4	with	Deut. xxviii. 38; xxxii. 1, 7.
"	i. 10	"	" xxviii. 51.
"	ii. 2	"	Ex. x. 14.
"	ii. 3	"	Gen. xiii. 10.
"	ii. 13	"	Ex. xxxiv. 6; xxxii. 14.
"	ii. 23	"	Deut. xi. 13, 14.
"	ii. 30	"	" vi. 32.

In Micah the allusions to the Pentateuch are also frequent and manifest. Take the following:—

Micah	i. 7	comp. with	Deut. xxiii. 19.
"	v. 6	"	Gen. x. 10.
"	v. 7	"	Deut. xxxii. 2.
"	vi. 4	"	Ex. xx. 2.
"	vi. 5	"	Num. xxii. 5; xxiii. 7; xxv. 1.
"	vi. 6, 7	"	Lev. ii. 1, 15; ix. 2, 3.
"	vi. 14, 15	"	Lev. xxvi. 26. Deut. xxviii. 38 ff.

Of these allusions many are so close that they are undeniably citations almost word for word. The deniers of the antiquity of

* This is especially apparent in the original of the two passages. Isaiah uses the unusual word *gey-ooth*, "ornament, excellency," English version, "excellent things," in evident allusion to the *gaoh gaah*, of Ex. xv. 1.

the Pentateuch cannot but admit this; but some of them have sought to escape the conclusion fairly deducible from this by the ridiculous supposition that the compiler of the Pentateuch has borrowed from the prophets.

But it is not among the prophets of Judah only that traces of acquaintance with the Pentateuch are to be found; we find the same in the writings of those who prophesied in the kingdom of Israel. Hosea is full of them; and so is Amos. Nahum also borrows from the Pentateuch. Compare—

Hosea	i. 2	comp. with	Deut. xxxi. 16.
"	i. 10	"	Gen. xxxii. 12.
"	iv. 4	"	Deut. xvii. 12.
"	v. 10	"	" xix. 14.
"	vi. 1	"	" xxxii. 39.
"	vi. 7*	"	Gen. iii. 1 ff.
"	viii. 1	"	Deut. xxviii. 40.
"	viii. 12	"	" iv. 6, 8.
"	viii. 14	"	" xxxii. 18.
"	ix. 4	"	" xxvi. 14. Lev. xvii. 1.
"	ix. 12	"	" xxviii. 41.
"	ix. 17	"	" xxviii. 64, 65.
"	xi. 8	"	" xxix. 23.
"	xi. 8, 9	"	" xxix. 28.
"	xii. 3, 4	"	Gen. xxv. 26; xxxii. 24; xxviii. 12, 19.
"	xii. 5	"	Ex. iii. 15.
"	xiii. 5	"	Deut. ii. 7; xii. 10.
"	xiii. 6	"	" ix. 12, 14.
Amos	ii. 8	"	Ex. xxii. 26.
"	ii. 9	"	Num. xiii. 32, 33.
"	ii. 11	"	" vi. 2–21.
"	iv. 4	"	Deut xiv. 28.
"	iv. 5	"	Lev. vii. 13. Deut. xii. 6.
"	iv. 9, 10	"	Deut. xxviii. 22, 27, 60.
"	iv. 11	"	Gen. xix. 24, 25.
"	v. 11	"	Deut. xxviii. 30, 38, 39.
"	v. 21	"	Lev. xxvi. 31.
"	vi. 14	"	Num. xxxiv. 8.
"	viii. 14	"	Deut. ix. 21.
"	ix. 13	"	Lev. xxvi. 5.
Nah.	i. 2	"	Ex. xx. 5; Deut. xxxii. 35.
"	i. 3	"	" xxxiv. 7. Num. xiv. 18.

* The rendering in the margin of the English version of this verse is: "But they, like Adam," &c., and this is preferred by many eminent scholars, among the rest by Rosenmüller and Hitzig, the latter of whom is avowedly rationalistic.

The references of Hosea and Amos also to the Levitical ceremonial, show familiarity with it as an existing institute.

These allusions to the Pentateuch by the prophets are the more important for our present object, inasmuch as they not only indicate familiarity with that book on the part of the prophets themselves, but presuppose acquaintance with it on the part of the community. The prophets were the popular teachers of their day, and their oracles were uttered for the instruction of the people at large. Many of their allusions to the Pentateuch also have reference to threatenings or promises therein contained, the fulfillment of which the prophet announces. In such a case, it was essential to the object the prophet had in view that his allusions should be readily apprehended by the people; and this they could be only as the source whence they were drawn was familiarly known by the general community. It has been objected by a strenuous opponent of the antiquity of the Pentateuch that "the prophets, these trustworthy witnesses of their age and its character, partly because of the historical certainty of their age ....especially because of that freedom from prejudice and restraint, and that candor by which they were characterized (for they stand forth isolated from all parties, and as simple witnesses for the truth), never mention the Mosaic book of the law, recommend it, or use it as a voucher for their own teachings."* Here the great value of the testimony of the prophets is admitted, and of this admission we are entitled to avail ourselves as attesting the worth of the evidence above adduced. As to the objection that the prophets do not formally refer to the Law as sanctioning or confirming their declarations, it may suffice to say that, as Prophets of the Lord, what they uttered needed no extrinsic sanction, but was, as a direct message from the Almighty, in itself of supreme authority. That they should have referred to the law (as the writer I have quoted admits they "continually" do) without expressly stating that what they refer to is in the *Book* of the Law, is a circumstance on which no stress can be laid; or if it proves anything, it proves rather that they deemed it unnecessary to specify the source of their allusions, because the people were already too familiar with this to require it to be pointed out to them.

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* De Wette, *Beiträge zur Einleitung in das A. T.* i. 184.

That the Pentateuch was known and possessed by the ten tribes is further evident from 2 Kings xviii. 12, where it is stated that Israel was carried away into Assyria "because they obeyed not the voice of the Lord their God, but transgressed His covenant and all that Moses, the servant of the Lord, commanded." As men cannot obey a law, or be justly punished for transgressing it, if they have it not, it is plain from this that the people of the ten tribes possessed the Mosaic law. Should it be suggested that perhaps they had it only orally by tradition, the suggestion is set aside by ch. xvii. 37, where we are told they had it in a written form.

The fact that the Pentateuch was known to the people of the Israelitish kingdom points to the conclusion that the book had reached its place of recognition and authority previous to the separation of that kingdom from the kingdom of Judah; for, as the hostility between the two kingdoms was great, it is not likely that the one would accept a *new* book of religious laws and institutes from the other. This consideration is strengthened when it is remembered that the whole tone and tenor of the Pentateuch legislation is opposed to such a separation of the people as the secession of the ten tribes from Judah and Benjamin had effected; so that, had it not been already recognized beyond the possibility of being set aside, the kings of Israel would not have suffered it to be found in their dominions. It is a noticeable fact also that though setting up a rival system of worship, the kings of Israel, like the leaders of the Samaritans at a later period, distinctly recognized the system followed in Judah as presenting the normal pattern for such an institute.* There seems no way of accounting for this but by assuming that the system followed in Judah was that which had been common to the nation before its separation, and therefore continued venerable in the eyes of the separated tribes after their secession. But this implies the organization of the Levitical system as enjoined in the Pentateuch previous to the separation; and, consequently the existence of that book in its present form antecedent to this.

Keeping in mind that in the later period of the kingdom of Judah there was a book known as the Book of the Law, which we have seen to be identical with the Pentateuch, we have now

* See 1 Kings xii. 25–33.

to notice that in the poetical and older historical books of the old Testament there are constant references to the statutes of the Lord, and to the law as a definite and well-known code given to the people by God, which they were bound to obey, and which served as a test by which the good and genuine Israelite who followed it, and delighted in it, was discriminated from the wicked and hypocrite by whom it was transgressed or neglected.* These references carry us up even to the time of Joshua, and to the period immediately succeeding the death of Moses (Josh. xxii. 5; viii. 32–34; i. 7). We must believe, then, that from their settlement in the promised land, the Israelites were possessed of a book known to them as the Law; and if this was not from the first the Pentateuch, it falls to those who call this in question to show when, and how, the name came to be transferred to that book, so as to be exclusively appropriated to it; and also how it came to pass that that law, if not the law contained in the Pentateuch, is in every part of it cited identical with passages now extant in the Pentateuch.

"Whether observed or unobserved, it is clear," says a careful and candid writer, "that there was, throughout the whole period of the Hebrew monarchy, a written law, which law had been given, not to the people then living, but to their fathers, which was commonly known as the law of Moses, and which was manifestly the very same with that now existing in the Pentateuch. Further, that this law was regarded as of supreme authority, as 'better than gold,' and 'sweeter than honey;' whose observance would surely bring down blessings on the people, whose disobedience, curses; most observed by those who draw the closest to Jehovah; in a word, the appointed revelation of his will."†

Let us now advance to the Pentateuch itself, and see whether it bears any indications of an antiquity such as tradition assigns to it, and such as we have seen it is, to say the least, not improbable that it may justly claim. Here it is to the four later books that we must chiefly appeal; for as the Book of Genesis must, on any supposition, have been written after the events it

* Comp. for instance Psalm i. 2; xix. 7–11; lxxviii. 5, 10; cxix. 1. 2 Kings xiv. 5, 6. 1 Kings xiv. 8; xi. 33, 38; ix. 6; viii. 51, 53, 58; iii. 14; ii. 3; 2 Sam. xxii. 23.

† *"The Mosaic Origin of the Pentateuch Considered,"* by a Layman of the Church of England, p. 320.

records, we cannot expect to find in it such traces of contemporary authorship as in the other books, which, if genuine, were written at or very near to the time when what they recorded took place.

Now, it seems to be admitted, on all hands, that a very considerable portion of the legislation contained in Exodus, Leviticus, and Numbers, is as ancient as the time of Moses. The constant allusions to "the camp," to "tents," and to "the wilderness," in these laws bespeak their origin at a time anterior to the settlement of the people in Canaan, and whilst they still dwelt in tents and in the wilderness.* "The law," says Dean Milman, "breathes the air of the desert; enactments, intended for a people with settled habitations, and dwelling in walled cities, are mingled with temporary regulations only suited to the Bedouin encampment of a nomad tribe."† The same may be said of the laws which make reference to "the tabernacle," as in the midst of the host, as a place before which offerings were to be brought, and before which alone, apparently, any animal could be slaughtered;‡ an ordinance utterly incapable of being observed when Israel was spread over the whole land of Canaan. The absence of allusions to the temple and its services is strikingly conclusive as to the composition of these laws anterior to the time of Solomon; the omission of any prescription relating to the king, among those regulating what was to be done in the case of sins of ignorance committed by different classes in the community, and where specific mention is made of priests, the whole congregation, individuals of the common people and rulers (chiefs of the tribes), indicates a time when, as yet, there was no king in Israel; whilst the constant references to Aaron and his sons, or especially to Eleazar, as the parties by whom certain prescriptions were to be attended to, bear indubitable evidence of the origin of those enactments during the period preceding the occupation of Canaan by the Israelites.§ It is important, also, to

* See Lev. vii. 37 (which has reference to the entire group of laws in the preceding part of the book); iv. 11, 12, 21; xiv. 3–8; xvi. 10, 21–28. Num. xix. 3, &c.

† *History of the Jews*, i. 131.

‡ Lev. xv. 31; xvii. 1–7.

§ Ex. xxvii. 21; xxviii. 12,40–43; xxix. 4, 5; xxx.7, &c. Lev. i. 5, 7,11; ii. 2, 10; iii. 2, 5, 13; vi. 2, 7, 9, 11, 13, 18; vii. 10, 31, 33, 34; xvi. 2, 3, 6, 8, 9, 11, 21, 23. Num. iii. 32; iv. 16; xxvii. 21, &c.

observe that not a few of the laws are represented as having been suggested or rendered necessary by events which occurred in the wilderness;* so that they must have been instituted at the time when these happened. That, in addition to these, the Decalogue, with its history and appendices, is to be referred to the period to which the writer of the Pentateuch ascribes it, is admitted by all.

Taking these, then, as unquestionable specimens of a legislation contemporary in its origin with the desert life of the Israelites, we have in them the means of ascertaining the general character and spirit of that legislation. If, as is the case, in language, style, spirit and general character, the rest of the legislation in the Pentateuch corresponds with this, we are entitled, provided there be no evidence to the contrary, to assume that the rest of the laws incorporated with these is of the same date, and had the same origin.

Besides what may properly be called laws, these books contain many ordinances and arrangements which possess a character of undoubted antiquity. Such, for instance, is the ordinance concerning the two silver trumpets (Num. x. 1 ff.), which could only have originated amongst a people situated as the Israelites were before they settled in Canaan; and such also, are the arrangements concerning the position of the tribes, in their tents and on their march; the functions of the Levites, in reference to the tabernacle, &c. (Num. i. 4). Nothing could be more idle than for a writer at a later age to have invented these, and inserted them as parts of the national law. The same may be said of the ordinances concerning the tabernacle in Ex. xxv. and xxvi.

To these evidences of the archaic character of certain portions of the Pentateuch may be added two which belong to the whole five books; the one is the occurrence of phraseology which had become obsolete in the language, at a date not much later than the time of the occupation of Canaan by the Israelites; the other is the occurrence of Egyptian words, allusions to Egyptian usages, and the Egyptian or anti-Egyptian character of some of the enactments, "which," to use the words of Dean Milman, "certainly would not have been introduced at a later period, when the captivity in Egypt was but a remote re-

* Lev. xiv. comp. x. 1 ff Ex. xxv. 31.

miniscence."* To these I must content myself here with simply alluding.

To the admittedly antique portions of the Pentateuch are to be added the fragments of poetry found in Num. xxi. Three such are preserved in this chapter: the chant from the Book of the Wars of the Lord, ver. 14, 15; the song of the well, ver. 17, 18; and the song of triumph over the Amorites, ver. 27–30. These are of undoubted antiquity. The song of Moses in Deuteronomy xxxii, is also unquestionably a contemporary document.

The Pentateuch, then, bears undoubted evidences of antiquity as high as that which tradition ascribes to it. Are there any parts of it which bear traces of a later origin, so as to forbid our ascribing such antiquity to the book as we now have it? To this we must attend, for the affirmative has been confidently asserted by many eminent writers. But it may be convenient, in the first instance, to take up the question of the *authorship* of the Pentateuch. This is virtually the question of its Mosaic origin.

As preliminary to this inquiry, it is important that attention should be called to the *unity* of the Pentateuch. Whether it originally formed one book or not, there is no denying that a unity of design, character, spirit, and style pervades the entire series. The earlier books prepare for the later, and the later presuppose and carry forward the earlier. This is admitted on all hands. "The real heart of the Pentateuch," says Kurz, "is unquestionably the giving of the law. The narratives which precede and accompany it are subservient to this, and furnish its historical basis and boundaries;"† and Knobel, one of the most decided and able opponents of its Mosaic authorship, calls it a "compact whole," and adds—"The book of Genesis is the preparation for the following books, or we may say the porch to the temple of the Theocracy, the erection of which is set forth in the following books."‡ Now, whilst it is admitted that this does not *necessarily* imply the agency of only one author in the composition of the work, it must be held to afford a presumption in favor of that

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* *History of the Jews*, Fourth Edition. Vol. i, pp. 131, note.

† *History of the Old Covenant*, vol. iii, p. 502.

‡ *Die Genesis erklärt*, p. 1.

supposition—that is, it renders it more probable that only one mind was engaged on the preparation of the whole book than that several were. It renders also highly improbable the supposition that additions were incorporated with the original work by different writers and at times widely separated from each other. To do this, and yet preserve the unity of the book, such as we find it in the Pentateuch, would be to achieve what is without a parallel in the history of any nation.

The presumption, then, is that the Pentateuch was written by one hand. Was that hand the hand of Moses?

Tradition, steady uniform tradition, reaching up to within a few centuries of the death of Moses, tells us it was, and tradition never has named any other. Now this is a fact of great weight. Testimony of this sort is the proper evidence on which ancient documents are received as genuine; and as the alternative supposition is that these documents, if not genuine, are forgeries and impostures, the difficulty, the almost impossibility of making a nation receive and hand down such forged documents as genuine gives this evidence very great weight. Suppose Doomsday Book or Magna Charta had been the forgery of a later age, would it ever have been possible to persuade the English nation that the former had been prepared by order of William the Conqueror, and the latter wrested from King John by the barons at Runnymede? Or suppose the Koran had been composed under one of the later caliphs, would any power or influence have been adequate to induce the whole Arabian tribes to accept it as the production of Mohammed? Every one must feel that the improbability in such cases is so great as to amount almost to an utter impossibility. As a matter of fact, consequently, all documents thus attested are accepted as genuine, unless strong internal evidence to the contrary can be produced. On this ground, then, a very strong presumptive proof of the Mosaic authorship of these books is reared.

In further support of this conclusion it is to be observed:—

1. That there is no preliminary improbability that Moses may have composed these books. That writing was in use in his day, and amongst the people with whom his education had been conducted, is now recognized by all scholars as beyond question. That Moses, "learned in the wisdom of the Egyptians," was master of the art of writing, it would be preposterous to doubt.

That he had ability enough to write these books no one will venture to deny. And that he had abundant leisure for the writing of them, if not while the people were on the march, yet at intervals during their journey, and especially during their long and quiet residence on the uplands of Paran, is too obvious to be questioned. Had Moses, then, purposed to write these books, there was nothing to hinder his doing so.

2. There was much to excite such a purpose in his mind. It was every way desirable and important that such a record of events and such a body of institutions should be put in a permanent form; and Moses, the leader of the people, the only living witness of all that had happened to them, the author of their polity, the man who had left his mark on their entire organization, and whose spirit was infused into their entire religious and political system—Moses was of all others the person to do this. It was a work befitting his hand, and his peculiarity. Was Moses likely to be unaware of this, or insensible to the call thus addressed to him? Is it probable that such a man would fail to appreciate the importance of the occasion, or shrink from the duty thus lying before him? Or is it in the nature of things credible that, after all he had done to guide, form, and regulate his nation, he should leave everything he had done and ordained to the uncertain keeping of tradition, when he had within his power the obvious means of giving what he had accomplished a permanent stability by committing it to writing?

3. It may be asked who but Moses could have obtained for the Pentateuch the authority in Israel which it unquestionably possessed? Who but he could have subjected the nation to laws so severe and institutions so opposed to their natural inclinations and tendencies? There is no period, besides, in the history of the nation when we can conceive it possible that such a body of laws would have been devised, or when, coming before the people as something new, they would have accepted them. "To what other period," [than that of Moses], asks Dean Milman, "can the Hebrew constitution be assigned? To that of the Judges? a time of anarchy, warfare, or servitude! To that of the Kings? when the republic had undergone a total change! To any time after Jerusalem became the metropolis? When the holy city, the pride and glory of the nation, is not even alluded to in the whole law! After the building of the Temple? when

it is equally silent as to any settled or durable edifice! After the separation of the kingdoms? when the close bond of brotherhood had given place to implacable hostility! Under Hilkiah? under Ezra? when a great number of statutes had become a dead letter! The law depended on a strict and equitable partition of the land. At a later period it could not have been put into practice without the forcible resumption of every individual property by the state; the difficulty, or rather the impossibility, of such a measure may be estimated by any reader who is not entirely unacquainted with the history of the ancient republics."* These considerations present in a strong light the improbability of the Pentateuch having been composed by any other than Moses himself.

4. The fact, admitted by all, that Moses is the author of certain portions of the Pentateuch, renders it highly probable that he is the author of the whole. This fact has a twofold bearing on the question now before us. On the one hand it sets aside an objection to the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch founded on the general identity of the language of the Pentateuch with that of the later books; for though it may seem strange that a language should not greatly alter in the space of nearly a thousand years, yet the fact that the portions of the Pentateuch admitted to be from the pen of Moses do not differ materially in respect of language from the other books of the Old Testament, indubitably shows that, whether we can account for it or not, the written language of the Hebrews did remain substantially unchanged from the time of Moses to that of Malachi.† On the other hand, the fact before us renders it highly probable that the entire body

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* *History of the Jews*, vol. i, p. 130.

† We have an analogous instance in a sister dialect of the Hebrew, the Syriac As that language appears in the Peshito version of the New Testament, executed in the second century, so does it appear in the writings of Abulpharagius and of Bar Hebræus in the thirteenth. Probably the Pentateuch and the Peshito, from their very authority as sacred books, *fixed* the languages respectively in which they are written, just as Luther's version of the Scriptures and our Authorized Version have so materially contributed to fix the languages in which they were written. In fact, these versions present a close analogy in their linguistic character to the Pentateuch as compared with the later books. In all three, there are certain archaic or obsolete words and forms, but in all, the language is substantially that which the later literature of the country exhibits.

of legislation in the Pentateuch was given and recorded by Moses; for it is not usual with nations to *incorporate* with the code of a famous early legislator the enactments of a later age; it rather remains, sacredly kept by itself, a venerated treasure, neither to be lost or tampered with, but preserved in its original integrity from generation to generation. Besides, had other laws than those of Moses been incorporated with his, these laws must have been given either as human enactments or as divine injunctions. But what Israelite would have dared or been allowed to incorporate a mere thought of his own mind or dictate of his own wisdom with that sacred code, which was given to their nation by God Himself, and part of which was written by the divine hand? On the other hand, had any of the prophets uttered these (supposed) later enactments, why should he have set them forth under the name of Moses, seeing his own authority as a prophet was sufficient of itself to give his law authority, and seeing he was running the risk of destroying that authority entirely by resorting to a deception which might be readily detected and exposed? Surely the balance of probability here lies on the side of the assumption of the genuineness of the entire Pentateuch.

5. Whilst not a hint is given in the Pentateuch that any other than Moses had a share in its composition, there are large portions of it for which a distinct claim to Mosaic authorship is made in the book itself. Thus not only have we such general announcements as in the closing verses of Lev. (xxvii. 34), and Numbers (xxxvi. 14), that "these are the commandments which the Lord commanded Moses," and such statements scattered through the book as that "the Lord spoke to Moses," "the Lord said unto Moses," "as the Lord commanded Moses," and such like; but whole sections are formally ascribed to Moses, as, for instance, the section Exod. xvii. 8--13, comp. ver. 14; the section Exod. xx.--xxiii., comp. xxiv. 7; the section Exod. xxxiv. 1--26, comp. ver. 27; the section Num. xxxiii. 1--49, comp. ver. 2; while the entire book of Deuteronomy professes to have been written by him (Deut. i. 1; xxxi. 9, 10, 24--26). Now, when all the passages in the Pentateuch thus directly ascribed to Moses are examined, they will be found to embrace so large a portion of the whole legislation of the Pentateuch as to render it hardly worth while to contend for a different authorship for the rest. But it may

be asked, "Are we to accept the assertion of any book as to its own authorship as decisive?" I reply, certainly not. But this is a species of evidence which no intelligent inquirer will lightly esteem; because the alternative hypothesis here is that of a *deliberate forgery*, and this is a conclusion not to be accepted but on the very strongest evidence. It is a conclusion from which, as applied to the case before us, every consideration both of propriety and probability constrains us to recoil. Even those who have ventured to adopt it have tried to soften its repulsiveness by suggesting that such a forgery is only an "innocent fiction." But this is foolish. An innocent fiction! What is an innocent fiction? A parable is an innocent fiction; a good moral tale is an innocent fiction; an amusing story that violates no moral principle may be allowed to claim this character; but to write a book in another man's name, in which he is made to say what he never said, and to prescribe what he never prescribed, for the purpose of imposing on a nation certain laws materially affecting their interests, and to which, but for the sanction of his name, they would never have submitted—this is an act to which no soft name can be applied, and to call which an "innocent fiction" is simply an attempt to hide an atrocious crime under an inoffensive guise. Let us not be seduced by such paltry expedients. If the book of Deuteronomy is a fiction, it is one of the most audacious pieces of literary forgery ever perpetrated, and its universal acceptance by the Hebrew people as genuine, a more marvellous instance of successful fraud than any on record.

6. There are evident traces in the Pentateuch of *a Book* in which each successive portion of the law and history recorded by Moses was inserted. Thus we read (Exod. xvii. 14) that "the Lord said unto Moses, write this for a memorial in the Book" (not *a* book, as in our version), "and rehearse it in the ears of Joshua," &c. A little farther on we find it mentioned that "Moses wrote all the words of the Lord," and then, "took the Book of the Covenant and read in the audience of the people," &c. (Exod. xxiv. 4, 7, 8). So also where injunctions are prospectively given concerning the duty of a king; among other things, he is commanded to "write a copy of this law in a book out of that which is before [*i. e.* in the the custody of] the priests, the Levites," (Deut. xvii. 18, comp. xxxi. 9, 10). Moses, also, in summoning the people to obedience, enforces his summons by an

appeal to blessings promised and curses threatened, which "are written in this Book of the Law," (Deut. xxviii. 58, 61; xxix. 20, 21). There was, then, a book, an authorized copy of which was to be in the custody of the priests in all coming time subsequent to that of Moses, from which copies might be taken, by the recorded contents of which the conduct of king and people were to be permanently regulated, and which was formed by the addition to the previously existing portions of it of such records as God commanded Moses to write. That this was that "Book of the Law," or "of the Covenant," which was known under these appellations from the time of Moses onwards, and which has come down to us as it was received by the Jews, it would seem unreasonable to doubt.

7. When God told Moses that He would make him the medium by which He should convey his laws to Israel, He enjoined upon him to put into the ark the testimony that God should give him, and He added:—"There I will meet with thee, and commune with thee from above the mercy seat, from between the two cherubim which are on the ark of the testimony, of all things which I will give thee in command unto the children of Israel," (Exod. xxv. 16, 21, 22). Here we have provision made for the safe keeping of all the commandments which God should enjoin on Israel through Moses; they were (in a written form, of course) to be put into the ark. When this is compared with such statements as we find at the close of Numbers and Leviticus, with the frequently recurring statement, "The Lord said unto Moses," prefixed to groups of laws in Exodus, Numbers, and Leviticus, and especially with the statement that "Moses wrote this law, and delivered it unto the priests, the sons of Levi, which bare the ark of the covenant of the Lord, and unto all the sons of Israel," and the statement that "when Moses had made an end of writing the words of this law in a book until they were finished," Moses commanded the Levites which bare the ark of the covenant of the Lord, saying, "Take this book of the law, and put it in the side of the ark of the covenant of the Lord your God, that it may be there for a witness against thee," (Deut. xxxi. 9, 24–26), we cannot refuse to admit that a very large portion, if not the whole (for the phrase in Deuteronomy, "this law," most probably includes the entire Thorah, or Book of Laws, recorded in the preceding books), was delivered by Moses to the custody of the custodians of the ark

of the covenant, the most sacred treasure of the Israelites. When it is remembered with what reverence such deposits were regarded, and with what care they were watched among all ancient nations, we may rest assured that what Moses thus committed to the care of the Levites, would neither be lost or lightly tampered with, so long as the nation retained its integrity. This renders it highly probable that the Book of the Law found by Hilkiah in the temple was the autograph of Moses sacredly preserved through the generations which had intervened. When we know that what Moses wrote and completed as the law which God had enjoined on the Israelites through him, was deposited in the side of the ark—that the ark was preserved with religious care, and placed in the temple after it was built—and that the book found in the temple by Hilkiah is described as "the book of the law of the Lord by Moses," (2 Chron. xxxiv. 14)—it seems an unreasonable degree of scepticism to doubt that what Hilkiah found was really what Moses gave to the Levites to keep.

I have now laid before the reader a summary of the positive evidence in favor of the antiquity and Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch as we now have it. It may be proper, however, to remark that in asserting this position, we do not necessarily exclude the possibility of interpolations having here and there crept into the text of the copies in use among the Jews, or even the supposition of a formal revision of the text by some competent authority at a later period, by which the language may have been somewhat modified, and slight alterations or additions here and there made. I do not say here that such has actually been the case; but should it be proved to have been so, the fact may be admitted without prejudice to the Mosaic claims of the writing.

It may be further observed that the position that Moses wrote the Pentateuch does not necessarily exclude the hypothesis that the author has introduced certain traditionary narratives, whether committed previously to writing or not, into these books, especially the first of them. A question of authorship is not immediately a scrutiny of sources. What concerns us in this inquiry is not, Whence did the writer draw his materials? but, Who was the writer? If it should be proved that there are traces of different traditions, or different documents, in the Pentateuch, this would not of itself invalidate the claim of these books to have been composed by Moses. For these separate materials must have been

put together by some one, and if by some one, why not by Moses? If a writer sees meet to incorporate with his narrative suitable materials made ready to his hand, does that destroy his claim to have produced the book in which these are found?

It will be remembered, however, that the conclusion at which we arrive is, as yet, only conditional. We hold Moses to be the author of the Pentateuch as it now stands, *provided* there be no parts of it which can be clearly shown to belong to a later age. If this can be made out, the conclusion we have labored to reach must be seriously modified. For no evidence of a general nature can avail against specific proof of this sort. Had the recently discovered poem ascribed to Milton, and about which there has been so much controversy, contained undoubted allusion to the Revolution, or had it contained words which could be shown to have been introduced into the language in the time of Pope, no one would hesitate to say it was not Milton's, even though his name in full had been signed to it.

There therefore yet lies before us an important part of our inquiry. This I reserve for the following paper.

XVI—TISCHENDORF'S INTRODUCTION TO THE AUTHORIZED VERSION OF THE NEW TESTAMENT.*

A magnificent display of human intellect in the literature of England and America was that which the noble originator of this collection aspired to accomplish for the benefit of the educated world beyond the native countries of the authors represented. As the *thousandth volume* he introduces the Word of God which we have received at the hands of the Apostles of the Lord; and it is without a doubt the most worthy crown of this edifice erected by human genius.

Not to mention earlier English versions, in the reign of Elizabeth, in the year 1568, or precisely three centuries ago, the English nation received at the hands of the Bishops with Parker at their head, an authorized translation of the Bible. Fifty years later King James I. ordered a revision to be undertaken by a select body of learned divines, and in this amended form, it has continued until now in the hands of everybody as The Authorized Version. The New Testament of this translation is contained, so far as the text is concerned, in the thousandth volume of the Tauchnitz collection. Formed from the original Greek text as it was in use among Protestant theologians in the days of Elizabeth and James the First, and executed with scholarship, conscientiousness, and love, this translation of the New Testament has not only become an object of great reverence, but has deserved to be such. The English Church possesses in it a national treasure. Only the German Church inherits one equal to it, in its

* The following essay by Dr. Tischendorf, of Leipsic, is prefixed as an Introduction to the Tauchnitz edition of the New Testament, being the one thousandth volume of the "Collection of British authors," Leipsic, 1869. The volume contains the Authorized English Version, and translations of various readings from the three most celebrated manuscripts of the original Greek text, and will be, to those unacquainted with the original, a striking exhibition of the general agreement of the Received Text with the most ancient manuscripts, and of the unimportant nature of a large part of the variations. It is a 16mo. of 414 pages, and is sold, bound, at $1.35.—Ed.

New Testament by the hand of Luther. But the Greek text of the Apostolic writings, has, since its origin in the first century, experienced sundry vicissitudes in the hands of faithful men who have studied and made use of it; copies continually departed more and more from the first, and in this way numerous variations obtained currency. The English Authorized Version, equally with the Lutheran translation, is based upon the editions of the Greek text which Erasmus in 1516, and Robert Stephens in 1550, had founded upon manuscripts written after the tenth century. Whether those Greek copies out of which Erasmus and Stephens prepared their editions, were altogether reliable, that is, whether they exhibited as far as possible the Apostolic text, has long been matter of earnest discussion with the learned. Since the sixteenth century, Greek manuscripts have become known far older than those of Erasmus and Robert Stephens, and besides the Greek, also Syriac, Egyptian, Latin, and Gothic, into which languages the original text was translated in the second, third, and fourth centuries; moreover, in the works of the Christian fathers who wrote in the second and following centuries, many citations from texts of the New Testament have been found and compared. What was the result? The learned saw, on the one hand, that the text of Erasmus and Stephens, had been for the most part in use in the Byzantine national Church long before the tenth century; but on the other hand, they had learned the existence of thousands of readings which had not been edited by Erasmus and Stephens. Now the problem came to be, what reading in each instance most correctly represented that which the apostles had written. This problem is by no means an easy one; for variations in the documents are very ancient; Jerome already notices them. Even in the fourth century there were diversities in very many places of the New Testament text. The learned have been and are very much divided in opinion as to which readings represent the word of God most exactly; but one thing has been admitted by most who understand the matter, and it is that the oldest documents must come nearer to the original text than those that are later.

Providence has ordered it so that the New Testament can appeal to a far larger number of all kinds of original sources than the whole of the rest of ancient Greek literature. Before all others which it possesses, Christian scholars have for a long time

highly valued two manuscripts, which to great antiquity add the distinction that they contain, not merely more or fewer portions of the sacred text, but the greater part of the entire New Testament as well as the Old. One of these manuscripts is deposited in the Vatican at Rome, and the other in the British Museum. To these, within these ten years a third has been added, brought from Mount Sinai and now at St. Petersburg. These three hold undoubtedly the first place among the many copies of the New Testament of a thousand years old; and by their authority will have to be judged and rectified both the earlier Greek editions of the New Testament, and all existing modern translations of it. Indeed it is to be hoped that out of them a Greek text will be prepared for the good of theological science in general; and that it will be taken as the basis of new translations for the use of Christian churches everywhere. Before this comes to pass, it is for all Christians, who highly value and esteem the Holy Scriptures, of great interest to learn to know the relation wherein the current European and American translations stand to the oldest copies of the original text of so great authority. And therefore it appeared to Baron Tauchnitz and to myself, as at once a work of piety and learning, on the occasion of the thousandth volume of this collection, to present to English readers of the Bible an edition of the New Testament, in which they would find, along with their authorized text, the readings which vary from it in the three most ancient and important manuscripts.

This comparison of the current English text with the most ancient authorities is fitted to draw attention to the degree in which these last confirm it, as well as to the frequency with which they deviate from it. It should not be forgotten, however, that the three manuscripts of which we speak, differ among themselves both in age and importance, and that not one of them stands so high as to exclude all gainsaying of its bare authority. But it would be either unwarrantable arrogance or blameworthy indolence, to treat these primeval documents with neglect; it would be a misunderstanding of the dispensations of Providence which have preserved these documents for fourteen or fifteen centuries, amid all the vicissitudes of time and given them into our hands, if we were not ready most thankfully to give heed to them as instruments worthy of the highest respect for the recovery of the truth.

Is our undertaking by any possibility adverse to religion? May that which by long use for several centuries in churches and schools and houses has won respect and affection, be called in question as uncertain, and distrusted as inexact? He who should recognize irreligion in our testing and even calling into doubt that text of the Bible, respect for which simply results from common use, would greatly err. It seems to us much rather the greatest act of piety, to regard confidently as the word of God, nothing which is not accredited and established as such by the most ancient and also most trustworthy evidences which the Lord has placed in our hands. From this point of view and with this conviction, the writer of this Introduction has for thirty years past explored the libraries of Europe as well as the recesses of monasteries in the Asiatic and African East, in search of the most ancient copies of Holy Scripture; and he has devoted his whole energy to collect all the most weighty documents of the kind, to labor upon them, to publish them for the benefit of posterity, and to restore on the basis of scientific research the very original text of the Apostles. With the same conviction he has undertaken this popular task, this work upon the English New Testament. No nation has distinguished his labors and their happy results by so extensive a reception as the English, ever since he visited London, Oxford, and Cambridge for the first time, a quarter of a century ago; he may hope then, that the same nation will receive with genuine interest the book which we now place in its hands.

But before we proceed to speak of our indication of the various readings, it is but fitting that we should give a few more specific details about the three famous manuscripts which have been employed for the undertaking.

The *Codex Vaticanus* came first into the possession of learned Europe. From what place it came into the Vatican library is not known, but it is entered in the very first catalogue of the collection, dating from 1475. It contains the Old and New Testaments. Of the New it at present contains the four Gospels, the Acts, the seven General Epistles, nine of St. Paul's Epistles, and that to the Hebrews as far as Chap. ix. 14; but all that followed this place is lost, namely, the last chapters of the Hebrews, the two Epistles to Timothy, the Epistles to Titus and Philemon, and the Revelation. The text is written in three columns to a page. The peculiarity of the handwriting, the arrangement of the manu-

script, and the character of the text itself, more especially certain remarkable readings, induce the opinion that the codex is to be referred to the fourth century, and probably to about the middle of that century. During a long period the Roman Court very seldom granted access to the manuscript for any critical use of it; but in the year 1828, by the command of Leo the XIIth, the late Cardinal Angelo Mai undertook an edition of it. His edition first appeared in 1857, three years after his death, and was found to be full of mistakes. The writer of the present Introduction corrected Mai's New Testament in several hundreds of passages in his *Novum Testamentum Vaticanum*, published in 1867. Still further corrections are supplied in the fac-simile edition of 1868 by Vercellone and Cozza; inserted also in the *Appendix Novi Testamenti Vaticani*, 1869.

The *Codex Alexandrinus* was, in 1628, sent as a present to King Charles I. of England, from Cyril Lucar, Patriarch of Constantinople. Cyril Lucar, who had formerly been Patriarch of Alexandria, brought it with him to Constantinople; and this explains why it is called the Alexandrian Codex. It is written in two columns to a page, and contains the Old and New Testaments. It is imperfect in the New Testament, having lost Matt. 1. i. to xxv. 6; John vi. 50 to viii. 52, and 2 Cor. iv. 13 to xii. 6. It contains, however, the two epistles by Clement of Rome, which in it alone have descended to posterity; also an epistle of Athanasius, and a production by Eusebius on the Psalter. On palæographic and other grounds it is believed to have been written in the middle of the fifth century. The New Testament was edited in 1786 by C. G. Woide, and republished with corrections by B. Harris Cowper in an octavo edition issued in 1860.

The *Codex Sinaiticus* I was so happy as to discover in 1844 and 1859 in the monastery of St. Kætharine on Mount Sinai. In the year last named I was traveling in the East under the patronage of the Emperor Alexander the Second of Russia, and to him it was my good fortune to transfer the manuscript. It contains the Old and New Testaments, and is written with four columns to a page. The New Testament is perfect, not having been deprived of a single leaf. To the twenty-seven books of the New Testament are appended the Epistle of Barnabas complete, and part of the Shepherd of Hermas, which books, even at the be-

ginning of the fourth century were reckoned for Holy Scripture by a good many. We are led, by all the data upon which we calculate the antiquity of manuscripts, to assign the Codex Sinaiticus to the middle of the fourth century. The evidence in favor of so great an age is more certain in the case of the Sinaitic Codex, than in that of the Vatican manuscript. It is even not impossible that the Sinaitic Codex,—we cannot say as much of the Vatican MS.,—formed one of the fifty copies of the Bible which in the year 331 the Emperor Constantine ordered to be executed for Constantinople under the direction of Eusebius, the bishop of Cæsarea, best known as a church historian. In this case it must be understood that the Emperor Justinian, the founder of the Sinaitic monastery, sent it as a present from Constantinople to the monks at Sinai. The manuscript was edited by the discoverer in 1862 at the cost of the Russian Emperor Alexander II., in a form as literally exact as it was splendid; the New Testament of the same was reproduced for ordinary use in a cheaper form in 1863 and 1865.

From all that has been said it follows, that the first place for antiquity and extent, among the three chief manuscripts, belongs to the Sinaitic Codex, the second place belongs to the Vatican, and the third to the Alexandrian. This arrangement is altogether confirmed by the condition of the text of the manuscripts. That text is not only, in accordance with the writing of manuscripts in the fourth and fifth centuries, the same which was read in the East in precisely those centuries; but rather, for the most part it truly represents the text which was then copied from much earlier documents by Alexandrian scribes who knew very little of Greek, and, therefore, did not intentionally make the least alteration;—that is to say, the very text which, in the third and second centuries was spread over a great part of Christendom. In further confirmation of this idea we may refer to the agreement of our three ancient copies with the oldest translations,—the Latin, made in the second century in proconsular Africa; the Syriac version of the Gospels made at the same time, and recently brought from the Nitrian desert in Egypt to the British museum; and the Coptic or Egyptian versions of the third century. The same opinion is also further confirmed by the agreements of the text of the three great MSS., with Irenæus, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, and others of the older fathers of the Church. What

we have been saying applies most of all to the Codex Sinaiticus, which, for example, is unapproachable in its close relation to the Latin version of the second century; it applies in a lesser degree to the Vatican MS., and still less to the Alexandrian, which, however, is far preferable in the Acts, Epistles and Revelation, to what it is in the Gospels.

There are two remarkable readings which are very instructive towards determining the age of the manuscripts and their authority, and these we shall forthwith take the liberty to lay before the reader.

1. The ordinary conclusion of the Gospel of St. Mark (chap. xvi., 9--21), is to be found in more than five hundred Greek manuscripts, in all Syriac and Coptic manuscripts, in almost all the Latin, and in the Gothic version. But Eusebius and Jerome say expressly that in nearly all correct copies of their time, St. Mark's Gospel ended with the 8th verse of the last chapter, and was without verses 9--21. With these famous accurate manuscripts of Eusebius (who died A. D. 340), there agree,—among all extant Greek MSS.,—only the Sinaitic and the Vatican.

2. In the beginning of the Epistle to the Ephesians we read, "to the saints which are at Ephesus;" but Marcion (A. D. 130--140), did not find the words "at Ephesus" in his copy. The same is true of Origen (A. D. 185--254); and Basil the Great (who died A. D. 379), affirmed that those words were wanting in *old* copies. And this omission accords very well with the encyclical or general character of the epistle. At the present day, our ancient Greek MSS., and all ancient versions, contain the words "at Ephesus;" yea, even Jerome knew no copy with a different reading. Now, only the Sinaitic and the Vatican correspond with the *old* copies of Basil, and those of Origen and Marcion.

To these examples others might be added: thus Origen says on John i. 4, that in some copies it was written, "in Him *is* life," for "in Him *was* life." This is a reading which we find in sundry quotations before the time of Origen; but now, among all known Greek MSS. it is only in the Sinaitic, and the famous old Codex Beza, a copy of the Gospels at Cambridge; yet it is also found in most of the early Latin versions, in the most ancient Syriac, and in the oldest Coptic. Again, in Matt. xiii. 35, Jerome observes that in the third century Porphyry, the antagonist of Christianity, had found fault with the Evangelist Mat-

thew for having said, "which was spoken by the prophet Esaias." A writing of the second century had already witnessed to the same reading; but Jerome adds further that well-informed men had long ago removed the name of Esaias. Among all our MSS. of a thousand years old and upwards, there is not a solitary example containing the name of Esaias in the text referred to,—except the Sinaitic, to which a few less than a thousand years old may be added. Once more, Origen quotes John xiii. 10, six times; but only the Sinaitic and several ancient Latin MSS. read it the same as Origen: "He that is washed needeth not to wash, but is clean every whit." In John vi. 51, also, where the reading is very difficult to settle, the Sinaitic is alone among all Greek copies indubitably correct, and Tertullian, at the end of the second century, confirms the Sinaitic reading: "If any man eat of my bread he shall live for ever. The bread that I will give for the life of the world is my flesh." We omit to indicate further illustrations of this kind, although there are many others like them.

In a plate engraved on steel we have exhibited to the eyes of our readers the peculiar writing of our three important MSS. Initial letters, such as are displayed by the Alexandrian Codex, are altogether wanting in the Sinaitic and in the Vatican, which, in this respect, correspond with the documents of the first century found at Herculaneum.

While the text of the English Authorized Version is faithfully represented in this edition, such readings as differ from it in the three great authorities are indicated in the notes. The letter S means the Sinaitic MS., V the Vatican, and A the Alexandrian. S*, V*, A*, point out any reading of S, V, or A, which has been altered by some later hand; though we give the original and not the altered reading in such cases. When we give an altered reading, it is marked S^2, V^2, or A^2; but as a rule, only original readings are noted, and reference is made but seldom to changes introduced by ancient correctors. The abbreviation "*om.*" signifies the omission of the word or words to which it refers; "*adds*" or "*add*," point to the omission of a word or words in one or more of our MSS. If two or more notes belong to the same words of the Text, they are divided by a comma, and not by a semi-colon. If words of the text itself

are quoted, they have after them the sign : , and then follow the readings of the Codices. Sundry manifest slips of the pen which occur in the MSS., especially in those of the Alexandrian scribes, have been passed over in silence. Yet there are some which have been noted which are to be regarded as erroneous, even if not pointed out by the words "*an error*," or "*a mere error*." I have no doubt that in the very earliest ages after our Holy Scriptures were written, and before the authority of the Church protected them, willful alterations, and especially additions, were made in them. Many various readings consist only in the forms of words and their arrangement, and are of small import. Many others did not at all require to be noticed here, because they merely relate to the Greek idiom. In some cases I have allowed myself to indicate an inaccurate or unsuitable rendering of the Greek, prefixing "*translate*," or "*all MSS.*" Distinguished scholars, such as Trench, Scrivener, and Alford, whom I have usually followed in these cases, know how to supply still more of these rectifications; but a larger introduction of them was not in accordance with the plan of this work.

In conclusion I have to record that my learned friend Mr. B. Harris Cowper has lent a helping hand in this undertaking.

For no single book of classic Greek antiquity is it possible to summon three primitive witnesses comparable to the Sinaitic, the Vatican, and the Alexandrian codices, for the confirmation and rectification of its text. That we can manifestly do this in the case of the most holy and influential book which the world possesses, calls for our profoundest gratitude to the Lord our God.

CONSTANTINE TISCHENDORF.

Leipsig, Christmas, 1868.

XVII.—RAMMOHUN ROY AND THE BRAMO SOMAJ OF INDIA.*

During the last few years, several Bengali gentlemen have appeared in London, and have met with a warm reception in those circles of society which are interested in the progress of India. They have come, not, like some others, to press very doubtful claims upon an unwilling government, but to prosecute their studies in literature, law, and medicine, with a view to practice at the Indian bar, or to secure the direct appointments to the medical and civil services which the competition system has opened to their grasp. Their gentlemanly manners, their broad education, and their large acquaintance with English literature, have excited no little surprise in their friendly entertainers; and thoughtful men have recognized in them an illustration of the results of English rule in India, and have formed conceptions of the good influence of that rule, which had never been produced in them before. Those gentlemen who specially care for the religious progress of the Indian empire, have entered with peculiar interest into their religious views, have listened to their discussions, have heard the story of the growth and development of their convictions, and have marked the strong and the weak sides of the position they maintain. They have shown beyond all question that in minds like theirs, the ancient idolatry of India has lost its hold, and that an active spirit is at work, which must, in the end, revolutionize Hindu society.

The same phenomena have been observed in a far greater degree in India itself, especially in Bengal. In recent years, native gentlemen have appeared far more prominently than before in general society, and in positions of public influence. They are seen in the senates of universities, among the municipal authorities, in important posts in the public offices, and even on the judges' bench. The officials with whom they have had to deal have been comparatively free from the stiff, exclusive etiquette of former days. The providence of God has thrown

* From the *British Quarterly Review*, April, 1869.

into the front rank of official and mercantile life men of large sympathies, ready to guide wisely that transition stage in Indian social life which has advanced during this period with rapid strides; and from them the leaders of native opinion have received a courteous welcome into their new sphere of influence.

On their side, the educated natives themselves, now growing very numerous, have also made advances. Some of the tall barriers which fenced them round have been broken down; they have held closer intercourse with Europeans than in former times; their houses have been open, not for heathen dances, as they used to be thirty years ago, but to receive the visits of ladies, and to welcome those who have wished to bring education and literature among the gentler members of the household. This course has again reacted to their advantage; their interest in public affairs has been recognized, their books and papers have been read, and their opinion on important questions has been sought. Their progress in religious opinion has been observed with peculiar interest, and on many occasions English residents, not missionaries, have attended their gatherings for worship. Distinguished visitors to India, like Dr. Macleod, have sought them out; and Englishmen generally have been struck by manifestations of solid progress in native society, which were scarcely expected, but which none can now fail to observe.

There can be no doubt that the progress is real, and that it has been secured by large numbers in the principal native families, especially in the chief cities and their immediate neighborhood. The educated gentlemen of Bengal in particular have a strong sympathy with the Government, and are prepared to coöperate with Englishmen and with each other to secure important reforms. Several cherished institutions of Hinduism are being attacked with great vigor: infant marriages, polygamy, and caste, have again and again been assaulted in their periodicals and at their public meetings; and few things have been more striking in the social life of Bengal in recent days than the memorial against Kulin polygamy presented three years ago to the lieutenant-governor, and signed by twenty-two thousand names. While the empire has been growing in material wealth—while a compactness and unity have been given to its numerous provinces which they never before enjoyed—while the wages of labor have increased, and all kinds of produce are in full demand—the mind

of the people is waking up to activity and to thought. The millions of the ignorant are learning through the eye, and from the talk of their neighbors; while the myriads of the educated, with their larger knowledge, find broad convictions rapidly ripening, and thus the way is being prepared for those extensive national changes which will bring new life, and freedom, and happiness to the great empire which we have been called to rule. In the religious elements of this progress, missionaries see on a great scale the fruit of those labors of theirs of which superficial observers have taken little account. While many influences, in addition to their own, have combined to bring about this advance, it is to their direct Christian instruction that the religious progress is due. Their constant preaching in the native tongue, their wide circulation of the Scriptures and of the simple Christian literature which explains them, and their system of thorough Christian education, have contributed greatly to crystallize into definite form the convictions widely felt respecting the folly of idolatry, the burden of caste, the real unity of men as one family, the duty of casting away the old deities, and worshiping one living and true God. It is especially in their Christian schools that thousands of young scholars have been trained, who, grown to manhood and holding chief places in Hindu households, are now standing out as leaders of native opinion, and are advocating moral and social changes, which, as innovations on the customs of ages, must be felt to be of a marvelous kind. Some few have been won to the Gospel through hard trials, and have subsequently become distinguished as faithful converts and as native ministers of tried character and great boldness. But thousands more are convinced of the truth of Christianity, without courage to profess it, or to bear the penalties which the profession so often involves. Beyond these, many thousands more, still maintaining the caste customs which they profess to despise, are content with declaring their want of faith in the gods of their fathers, and their desire to be worshipers of the one God of heaven and earth.

Much has been said in detached papers respecting this advance of religious opinion in India; but few efforts have been made in England to gather up the elements of the story into a connected whole. We propose, therefore, to describe at some length the course which this progress has taken, and especially to show the

views and the position of that Theistic school in India, which, next to the Christian converts of the same rank, seems to be the most promising nucleus of moral and social improvement, and which exhibits the great weaknesses of the movement as well as its elements of truth and power.

The actual manifestation of this progress has been rapid; but the causes which have produced it have been at work for a long period, and have been both numerous and powerful. These native gentlemen, with their new views, have seemed to spring up suddenly, like the rich verdure of the rainy season. It is only within a few years that even in India much has been heard about them. But many have been laboring long to secure this result. The causes of these results have been in operation fifty years; during the last thirty years they have been employed in greater number, with greater force, and over a wider surface. Many of the formidable barriers which resisted them have given way; individuals who fanatically opposed them have died out; and the energy with which plans have been set in motion, and the time during which they have been working, adequately account for the result.

The course and the causes of this wonderful advance in society may be observed most fully and on the largest scale among masses of men. But they have been singularly illustrated in the character and career of a distinguished man, who heartily sympathized with the end which they have secured, and greatly contributed to promote it. This native gentleman was the Rajah Rammohun Roy. Little is now known of him in England, except in the select circles of Unitarian society in which he moved; and the opprobrium poured on him in India was so great as to induce his relatives and admirers to keep his name and opinions in the background, and thus cause him to be forgotten even there. Two years ago, Miss Carpenter, of Bristol, who personally knew him, and whose father, Dr. Carpenter, was one of his valued friends, published the outline of his history which is contained in the volume at the head of our article,* and gathered up those scattered notes respecting his last illness and death which still existed among his friends. Taking advantage of this little memoir, it will be useful to describe with some detail the events of his life and the distinguishing features of his character. When

* *The Last Days in England of the Rajah Rammohun Roy,* Edited by Mary Carpenter. London: 1866.

these are well understood, it will be more easy to appreciate the great Theistic school, of one portion of which he was at the same time the actual founder and the most illustrious example.

Rammohun Roy was the son of Rám Ránth Roy, a Rarhee Brahmin, residing in the district of Burdwan, and was born about the year 1774. Taught Persian and Bengali under his father's roof, he was soon sent to Patna to learn Arabic, and to the holy city of Benares to acquire the sacred Sanskrit. He evidently had a genius for languages. His knowledge of Arabic was so full and correct as to secure him the title of Moulvee, very rarely given to a Hindu. Sanskrit he read fluently; and in later years, he wrote and spoke English with wonderful correctness. Very early also did he manifest his spirit of inquiry and his eagerness to promote reforms. When only sixteen years of age, he wrote his first paper against Hindu idolatry. His father and family were so alarmed and displeased at this tendency to free-thinking that he was sent away from home; and amongst other places to which he traveled, he spent a considerable time in Tibet, discussing Buddhism with the lamas. Returning to Burdwan at the age of twenty, he began to study English, and with the help of one of the English magistrates, who took a great liking to him, made rapid and satisfactory progress. But he could not leave the Brahmins alone, and soon began a strong controversy with them on the subject of Suttee, a practice which was then immolating eight hundred widows a year in the province of Bengal alone.

In 1804 his father died, and at the age of thirty he found himself a wealthy man, and free. Removing for a time to Moorshedabad, where his grandfather had resided, he published his first tract in the language then employed throughout India, in the courts and in literature—the Persian—with the formidable title, "Against the Idolatry of all Religions." Of course his enemies became more numerous than before. "Rashness and self-conceit" were charged against him; he was counted a terrible "infidel;" and in 1814 he found it most for his comfort to leave the country and take up his abode in Calcutta. Intent upon "one thing," the destruction of that corrupt Hindu idolatry which greatly vexed his soul, he now published an abridgment of the Vedant, with a preface, in which he sought to show that the early authorities of Hinduism teach Theism, and that idolatry had supplanted a faith

which was once pure. This was a home-thrust of great importance, because it was turning the weapons of the Brahmins against themselves; and the effect upon his followers lasted long.

The Vedas, which are the oldest and most revered writings of the Hindus, consist, to a very large extent, of hymns, which magnify and extol the great powers of nature. The earliest forms and ritual of worship were extremely simple, and the hymns contain, within a very narrow range of thought and subject, a few passages of great beauty. As time went on, the philosophizers among the priestly tribes shaped out a pantheistic system, at first loose and unsettled; in a later age, compact, consistent and complete. To this they gave the name of Vedant, that is, "the end" or "essence" of the Vedas. Reading the theories of this book in the light of his own strong views, Rammohun Roy persuaded himself that the Vedic system was one of simple Theism, and that it was the duty of wise and good men to bring back the Hindu race to the point from which their fathers had started centuries ago. Herein he took up, in relation to modern Hinduism, the position which Luther had taken in reference to the Romanism of the middle ages. "Give up later corruptions, fall back on the original book, and you get pure Christianity." "Give up later corruptions, fall back on the Vedas, and you get pūre Theism." With this design, in 1816, he published one and another of the original Vedic tracts called Upanishads, from which the Vedantic system had been drawn, stating in a preface his view of the contents and the purpose for which he put them in circulation. They were published at his own expense, and were freely distributed among his friends and in society at large. He also delivered lectures and addresses to his countrymen on the unity of God, and exposed prevailing errors with great boldness. In regard to idolatry, he held very strong views. Englishmen have been found who were anxious to palliate it and explain it away. But Rammohun Roy, who saw it with his own eyes, and knew what his countrymen and fellow-Hindus meant by it, showed the system no mercy; while at the same time, he looked upon the people around him with feelings of deep compassion, as deluded and degraded through the false teachings of others.

"Hindus of the present age," he says, "with a very few exceptions, are downright and gross idolaters. . . . . By the ceremony of *pran pratishtha*, the Hindu believes that the nature of

the image is changed from that of the materials of which it is formed, and that it acquires not only life but supernatural powers. . . . . In attention to their supposed wants as living beings, he is seen feeding, or pretending to feed them, every morning and evening; and as in the hot season he is careful to fan them, so in the cold he is equally regardful of their comfort, covering them by day and night with warm clothing, and placing them at night in a snug bed."

But he was early taught the penalties which all reformers are called upon to pay. The whole Hindu community was greatly embittered against him; the Brahmins and orthodox families were indignant in the extreme. During ten or fifteen years his life was repeatedly threatened. When he settled in Calcutta, scarcely one member of his family joined him. For a time, at least, his wife remained on the estate at Burdwan. His mother was alienated and even cursed him. Eventually, she went on a pilgrimage to Jugannath, and only as she drew near to death did maternal love begin to appreciate the son she had cast away. Yet he had strong friends. A few were found among his countrymen whose views corresponded with his own, and there was a little group of Scotchmen, merchants in the city, who were charmed by his earnestness, his gentlemanly manners, and his large heart, and at whose house he was always a welcome visitor. He paid one or two visits also to the Serampore missionaries, who at first were much interested in his doings. On one occasion, he attended family worship, with which he was quite delighted, and he received from Eustace Carey a copy of Watts's "Hymns" and "Songs for Children," which he kept and read with pleasure till his death.

So anxious was he both to get and to give forth all the light he could on the fundamental questions of religion, and so assured that he should find his favorite doctrine of the unity of God everywhere, that, after having examined the Koran, and edited the Vedic tracts, he began in 1817 to study Hebrew and Greek, that he might read the Christian Scriptures in their original tongues. Charmed also with the life and teachings of our Saviour, he compiled, in 1820, especially from the "Sermon on the Mount," a little collection of His sayings, and published them in English and Bengali, under the title, "The Precepts of Jesus, the Guide to Peace and Happiness."

"This simple code of religion and morality," he says at the close of the preface, "is so admirably calculated to elevate men's ideas to high and liberal notions of our God, who has equally subjected all living creatures, without distinction of caste, rank or wealth, to change, disappointment, pain and death, that I cannot but hope the best effects from its promulgation in the present form." "They contain not only the essence of all that is necessary to instruct mankind in their civil duties, but also the best and only means of obtaining the forgiveness of our sins, the favor of God, and strength to overcome our passions and to keep His commandments."

This book had an unexpected ending. In 1821, the Rev. W. Adam, a Baptist missionary, who had been his instructor in Greek and Hebrew, professed himself a Unitarian, and the fact gave rise to the report that while Mr. Adam had been trying to convert Rammohun Roy, Rammohun Roy had actually converted him. Those, however who were acquainted with the earlier tendencies of Mr. Adam's mind, justly explained the matter otherwise. But the fact and the book brought on Rammohun Roy a controversy with Serampore, which assumed rather a harsh tone, and in which he was spoken of as "a heathen," and "an injurer of the cause of truth." The argument was led away from the peculiar position in which Rammohun Roy had first placed it, and was made a Trinitarian one, respecting the reality of the atonement and the proper deity of Christ. That tender sympathy which was eminently due from Christian men to one who had flung away such a vast amount of ancestral error, and who was actuated by such a philanthropic spirit, was rather lost sight of in the thought that Trinitarian doctrine must be upheld. In reply, Rammohun Roy published an "Appeal to the Friends of Truth," and afterwards, in reply to further criticisms, a "Second Appeal." When at length he had prepared his "Final Appeal," he was refused permission to publish it at the Mission Press, which had in 1820, printed the original work, and all that had since followed it. One cannot but fear that, instead of leading him on to higher and more complete views of Christ and of His work, this treatment rather confirmed his previous convictions, and steeled him against further inquiry. His views, however, are not a little remarkable, considering the way in which they had been acquired; and he has stated them with honesty and boldness in more than one passage of his writings.

Respecting "Jesus of Nazareth," he speaks as the "Christ of God." He places "implicit confidence" in His "veracity, candor, and perfection;" he represents Him as a "Being in whom dwelt all truth, and who was sent with a divine law to guide mankind by his preaching and example." He held Him "superior even to the angels in heaven, living from the beginning of the world to eternity;" and reckoned that the "unity existing between the Father and himself" is "a subsisting concord of will and design, such as existed among His apostles, and not identity of being."

In regard to the usual work of evangelical Christianity, of which, in the province of Bengal, Serampore was in his day the center, he says:

"I admire the zeal of the missionaries sent to this country, but disapprove of the means they have adopted. In the performance of their duty they always begin with such obscure doctrines as are calculated to excite ridicule, instead of respect, towards the religion which they wish to promulgate."

"It is, however, a great satisfaction to my conscience to find that the doctrines inculcated by Jesus and His apostles are quite different from those human inventions which the missionaries are persuaded to profess, and entirely consisted with reason and the revelation delivered by Moses and the prophets."

"To these men (the Hindus generally) the idea of a triune-God, a man-God, and also the idea of the appearance of God in the bodily shape of a dove, or that of the blood of God shed for the payment of a debt, seem entirely heathenish and absurd; and, consequently, their sincere conversion to (Trinitarian) Christianity must be morally impossible. But they would not scruple to embrace, or at least encourage, the Unitarian system of Christianity, were it inculcated on them in an intelligible manner."

When pressed respecting his views of the way of salvation, he answered, as his Theistic followers have repeatedly answered since his days —

"Numerous passages of the Old and New Testaments distinctly promise us that the forgiveness of God and the favor of His Divine Majesty may be obtained by sincere repentance, as required of sinners by the Redeemer."

Of the beautiful and earnest spirit in which he commenced and carried on his own work, amid the obloquy and opposition

to which he was exposed, we have the following illustrations in his own words :—

"If the short duration of human life be contrasted with the great age of the universe, and the limited extent of bodily strength with the many objects to which there is a necessity of applying it, we must necessarily be disposed to entertain but a very humble opinion of our own nature.

"On the other hand, sorrow and remorse can scarcely fail, sooner or later, to be the portion of him who is conscious of having neglected opportunities of rendering benefit to his fellow-creatures.

"Being thoroughly convinced of the lamentable errors of my countrymen, I have been stimulated to employ every means in my power to improve their minds, and lead them to the knowledge of a purer system of morality.

"My reflections upon these solemn truths have been most painful for many years. I have never ceased to contemplate, with the strongest feelings of regret, the obstinate adherence of my countrymen to their fatal system of idolatry, inducing, for the sake of propitiating their supposed deities, the violation of every humane and social feeling."

During the next ten years, he gathered other native friends around him, and maintained close intercourse with the English, who had learned to esteem him. At this time, one of his friends, Brojomohun, published a small pamphlet against the prevalent idolatry. The work is full of the most pungent satire; the strictures on the system are exceedingly severe; and the arguments are penned with great skill and vigor. The writer gave promise of good service to his countrymen; but died shortly after, at the early age of thirty-seven. But the opinions of Rammohun Roy made little way, and the number of those who truly shared them was but small. The opposition with which he met, amongst other things, took the formidable shape of a law-suit against him by his own nephews for the possession of the family property. It was instituted under the plea that, by his opinions, he had lost caste, and therefore his possessions ought to be forfeited. Had Rammohun Roy really professed himself a Christian, and thus in truth lost his caste, under the existing law—a law not altered in Bengal till 1832, and throughout India generally till 1850—there is little doubt that his property would have

been lost. But, as he had always sought to remain a Hindu, he defended the suit, and, after many years of litigation, on a final appeal, it was decided in his favor. His religious discussions seem to have come to an end; but he was earnest in promoting practical reforms. In 1821 he wrote, "I consider the cause of the Neapolitans my own." The efforts made in England to abolish slavery in the West Indian colonies had his warm sympathies; and he took a deep interest in the question of Parliamentary Reform, which was then approaching a practical issue. But he was chiefly devoted to a local evil, in the abolition of which his knowledge, his humanity, his pen and his personal influence, rendered important service. This was the practice of Suttee, or burning widows alive, which was abolished by Lord William Bentinck in 1829. The measure was adopted and promulgated with little previous discussion, and none knew it was coming till it appeared in the official "Gazette." The orthodox were greatly scandalized by "the interference of the Government with the native religion;" and an address was presented, bearing eight hundred signatures, asking for its repeal. Rammohun Roy, at a meeting of his friends, moved a vote of thanks to the Governor-General for his humanity; and an address was presented by him, signed by three hundred native gentlemen, in which they offered their grateful acknowledgments for the abolition of the cruel rite. His active mind was not satisfied even with such things. At this period, he carried on an extensive correspondence with the most celebrated Unitarian ministers in England and America. They had heard of his history and of his controversies; had read and republished his chief writings, and took a deep interest in his concerns. He was ready to set anything right that was wrong; and he gives an amusing instance of his eagerness for reforms in the following suggestion, that the exclusiveness of the Church of England should be broken down by that paragon of religion and morality, King George IV., of whom he had a very high opinion, and to whom he devotes one of the longest sentences he ever wrote:—

"But what disappoints, or rather grieves me much, is that our sovereign, whom all parties, either Whigs or Tories, enthusiastic Radicals, or political time-servers, are compelled by the force of truth to acknowledge as the most accomplished person of his time. of most enlightened acquirements, and most liberal sentiments,

should not use his royal influence to remove from the members of his national Church the fetter of a solemn oath, imposed by the thirty-nine articles, naturally liable to doubt, and disputed as these have been, from the beginning of Christianity; and that he has not caused to be discontinued the repetition of that general denunciation found in the concluding part of the Athanasian Creed, to wit: 'This is the Catholic faith, which, except a man believe faithfully, he cannot be saved.' The only consolation that I can offer to myself is that, as his Majesty is the best judge of suitable opportunities for the introduction of improvement in the National Church, it is probable that in due time more enlarged principles may receive the royal sanction."

It is not difficult now to estimate the work which Rammohun Roy had done, and the position which he occupied. At the period to which we refer (1830), his work was in a great measure accomplished, and his band of followers had almost ceased to increase. His religious and theological discussions had given place to efforts for various practical reforms. The religious reformation he had planned advanced, only up to a certain point. It was mainly determined by considerations relating to human need and suffering; and had been urged on merely human ground. It had unconsciously fallen within the same range of thought and motive as that generally adopted by earnest Unitarians, and it wrought the same kind of beneficial results. It stopped short where evangelical efforts only begin, and could not penetrate to the depth which those efforts soon reach. Rammohun Roy had said that for ordinary Hindus to comprehend the abstruse doctrines of the system generally taught by missionaries was impossible; and that if that taught by Unitarians were fairly presented, they would embrace it by hundreds. He taught it himself; others have taught it after him; and the results have not corresponded with his prediction. Unitarian Christianity, as such, has made less than a dozen converts in India. Evangelical truth has made its myriads among the poor; its hundreds among the educated.

One very important fact runs through the entire history. The system on which he acted had an inherent weakness, which was the ruin of its usefulness while he lived; which has been its bane ever since; and was never more injurious than now. It has always permitted compromise with vital truth, and has

accommodated itself to the personal interests of its followers. Apart from the ignorance and bigotry of the times in which he lived; apart from the strength of the orthodox party, and their bitterness against his views; apart from certain self-confidence and hastiness of judgment on his own character, Rammohun Roy was seeking to reform an evil system while upholding one of its most cherished institutions. He wished to destroy the degrading idolatry of India, but he preserved that caste which is its strongest bulwark. He accused the Brahmin priests of misleading their countrymen for private ends; he insisted on continuing to be one of those priests. He wished to be a philanthropist, to link himself with other nations, to speak and act and love as a man; while he persisted in remaining a Hindu, and preserving the rights which only as a Hindu he could legally enjoy. To the last, he in fashion kept his caste; and his brahminical thread was round his shoulder when he died. Even from his own point of view, as a believer in one God and in the brotherhood of the human race, his position was untenable. His Unitarian friends believed him to be in the right. "Maintaining his caste (says Dr. Carpenter), he was able, as a Brahmin to address his countrymen authoritatively in relation to their religion." But where was the use of upholding his Brahminhood when the first doctrine that he had to teach was, that because all men have one Father, Brahminism was a fiction, and they were not Hindus merely, but men? Morally, he compromised himself, and his orthodox countrymen regarded him as a traitor and an infidel.

So far, he was committing an old error, and was seeking at the same time "to serve God and Mammon." Miss Carpenter herself says his followers are doing so; and the accusation fairly applies to himself. Rammohun Roy was not sordid, but he cannot have forgotten that the retention of his father's estates depended on the preservation of his caste. Dr. Carpenter indeed allows that "the Rajah, in various ways, manifested solicitude to preserve his caste, with a view both to his usefulness and *to the security of his property*." So to live and act was the deliberate choice of himself and his friends. We read that amongst his followers, though no man was admitted to society unless he renounced idolatry, yet "one of the society keeps in his house a number of gods, as well as two large pagodas; and the society has granted him a dispensation on this head, because he pos-

sesses a certain quantity of land from the king of Delhi for this purpose, and *if he were to destroy his idols he would lose his land!*"

Such compromises of principle in view of self interest, however explained or defended, invariably ruin a man's usefulness; while nothing wields so much power as an enlightened conscience, doing and suffering all things because they are right in the sight of God. Self-sacrifice is a test of sincerity; and the truth of Christ has won its way slowly but surely in India, because the men who have embraced it with a whole heart have given up caste, and "suffered the loss of all things" for Christ's sake. God's blessing has rested in marked measure on those who have thus accepted "the offence of the Cross;" who have heard the Master say, "He that loveth father and mother more than me, is not worthy of me," and "He that taketh not up the Cross and forsaketh all that he hath, cannot be my disciple." Apart from special blessings, the decision itself has given firmness and strength to those who had received grace to make it. No men have been so strong in character, or so distinguished for usefulness, as the men who have thrown off caste most completely; and no men have been morally so weak as those who have sought to retain its restrictions. From the day of Ziegenbalg downwards, during the hundred and sixty years in which Christianity has been taught in India, resistance to caste has ever brought blessings; compromises with their selfish and unloving restrictions have always done harm. The reforms really wrought in Indian society have come from the men who worked outside the system; and the men who have remained inside it have been able to yield only a partial assent to the views of their brethren, and to follow them when the road had already been prepared. Viewed in this light, an English Christian will understand why in India so much importance is attached to the ordinance of baptism in the case of adults, both by Christians and Hindus. By the act of baptism, caste is destroyed, and, as a rule, can never be restored. In all lands, on the passage from heathenism to Christianity, that public decision, that open profession of the changes which are involved in baptism, has exercised immense moral influence. In India, it has been like burning the boats after landing on an enemy's coast. Henceforth, retreat was impossible.

In November, 1830, Rammohun Roy left Calcutta, to pay that visit to England which he had long planned. The inquiries and discussions necessary before the renewal of the East India Company's charter were soon coming on. The petition of the orthodox Hindus against the abolition of Suttee had already been forwarded to the Privy Council, and he was most anxious to oppose it. The Reform Bill was making a great stir, and he was deeply interested in the measure, as one likely to emancipate the masses. He was anxious also to see a land which he admired so greatly, and in which he already counted many of his personal friends. On the eve of his departure, the King of Delhi besought his aid in pressing certain claims on the East India Company, and, having appointed him his agent, conferred on him the title of Rajah, which has since been attached to his name. Little need be said about this visit, as it bears but in small degree on the work of his life. He landed at Liverpool on the 8th of April, 1831. He received a warm welcome, especially from the more prominent members of the Unitarian body, both lay and clerical, and soon gathered round him many friends, including not a few who had met him in Calcutta. For a while he was quite a lion in London. He was presented at Court, and received much personal attention from the East India Directors, though they ignored the Delhi claims. He visited the galleries of the House of Commons, dined with Robert Owen and Miss Lucy Akin; went over to Paris and dined with Louis Philippe. But he was no idler. He took so strong a view of the Reform question, that he threatened to renounce his connection with the country if the bill were not carried, and to retire to America. He gave evidence before the East India Committee in the Commons, and contributed several valuable papers to their report respecting the land tenures, the rights of the peasantry, taxation, and the like. He was present with Lord Wellesley, Charles Grant, and Earl Russell, when the decision of the Privy Council upheld Lord William Bentinck's great measure for the abolition of Suttee. He visited schools and hospitals; appeared as a visitor on the platform of Exeter Hall; and the Unitarian party, who have so frequently questioned the usefulness of evangelical missions, received him at their own annual meeting with unusual honor, and made much of their illustrious "convert."

So two years passed pleasantly away. His courtesy and gentleness, his winning manners, his purity of life, his great respect for women, his high moral tone, and his interest in all good schemes for benefitting his fellow-men, justly made him a favorite in society, and increased the number of his personal friends. At length, in September, 1833, he travelled to Bristol, to pay a long promised visit to his friend, Dr. Carpenter; but he had only been there twenty days when he was suddenly cut off, and died from inflammation of the brain. The story of the visit, with its pleasant intercourse, and with all its sickness, suffering and pain, is touchingly told by Miss Carpenter, who remembers it as one of the most striking incidents of her younger days. The diaries and notes, the descriptions of his character, the funeral sermons and panegyrics, the sonnets and laments, are repeated again and again, until they greatly lose their force. The book which contains them is far too large. Nevertheless, the effort to embalm his memory is a worthy one, and the events themselves are very touching. On two occasions during this brief visit, John Foster dined with him, and much enjoyed the evenings passed in his company. During one of them, at Dr. Jerrard's request, Rammohun Roy entered fully into his religious views, and made very clear and definite statements of the extent to which he accepted Scripture truth. Mr. Foster says: "I had entertained a strong prepossession against him, and had no wish to see him. My prejudice could not hold out half-an-hour after being in his company. He was a very pleasing and interesting man, intelligent, largely informed, unaffected, and in the best sense of the word, polite." Respecting their conversation, Dr. Jarrard adds:

"1. That Rajah Rammohun Roy expressed his belief in the Divine authority of Jesus Christ as an inspired teacher of righteousness and an accredited messenger from God.

"2. He explicitly declared that he believed in the miracles of Christ generally, and particularly in his resurrection, which, he said, was the foundation of the Christian faith, and the great fact on which he rested his own hopes of a resurrection."

During all his later days, he read the Scriptures daily in Hebrew and Greek. "Miss Hare often read them to him also; this was never omitted at night. He was also in a constant habit of prayer, and was not interrupted in either by her presence; whether sitting or riding, he was frequently in prayer." During

his brief illness he conversed but little with any one; but was observed to be frequently engaged in prayer. "He passed away without one message to his countrymen, without one last testimony to the truths which he labored to establish." Amid the silent sorrow of a few attached friends, he was buried under a group of elms in the shrubbery of Stapleton Grove, but his remains were subsequently removed to the new cemetery at Arno Vale, where his friend, Dwarkanath Tagore, erected a monument to his memory. Several funeral sermons were addressed to Unitarian congregations respecting his history, character, and work. A fine full length portrait of him, painted in London, having been exhibited in Bristol, was purchased by his young hostess, Miss Castle, and was presented to the Bristol Institution, where it still hangs over the staircase. In describing his recollections of Rammohun Roy, the Rev. W. Jay, of Bath, expresses it as his view that he grew both in faith and character in his later years, and was an evangelical Christian, or very near it, when he died. It is difficult to determine the point; perhaps Rammohun Roy himself did not care to lay down his exact position, or settle how far he was consistent in maintaining his caste while studying the Scriptures and delighting in all efforts of Christian usefulness. He was undoubtedly an extraordinary man, of a deeply devout spirit, who had cast off all the grosser elements of the faith of his fathers, and longed truly that all his countrymen should do the same. Though his creed was incomplete, and he injured and diminished his usefulness by what he retained of the old system, he effected much towards the great changes which that system must undergo. Only God can justly weigh a spirit and a course like his; and it is well to hope that after a stormy life, in which he suffered much for the truth which he had found, he rested at last in the bosom of the Saviour, whose words and whose character he had so much admired.

Before Rammohun Roy quitted Calcutta for England, he and his followers had formally established the Brahmo Somaj, *i. e.*, meeting of the worshipers of the Supreme God. In earlier days, some English friends had joined them, and they were termed the Unitarian Church of Calcutta. But as they increased in number, and obloquy fell upon them, it was thought best for English and natives to keep apart; and eventually, in January 1830, the latter enrolled themselves in Brahmo Somaj. It was

planned that the meeting for worship should be held weekly; that portions of the Upanishads should be read, and devotional hymns be sung. The anniversary of the day has long been observed by the disciples of the school, and was never kept more openly or with greater ceremony than in the present year. Many of the hymns used in the services were composed by Rammohun Roy himself. On his departure for England, the meetings were discontinued, and the society dissolved. A few of the followers, however, held together around his distinguished teacher and friend, the Pundit Ramchundra Shurma; and, after an interval of ten years, in October, 1840, they revived the society, and began actively to advocate their views, and to draw converts to their faith.

The time was singularly opportune for their purpose. English education, carried on for twenty years in Government and Mission schools, had led hundreds of young men to the position from which the Brahmo creed commences, viz., that Hindu idolatry is unworthy of belief. During the first half of this period, and while Rammohun Roy was still in Bengal, the earliest classes of English students had boldly adopted Atheistic opinions; and the chief Government college, then called the Hindu College, had gained the credit of producing and fostering them. But after his arrival in Calcutta, in 1830, Dr. Duff met these young men with an earnestness and a soundness of argument which none could resist, and won among them distinguished victories. The Atheistic school was completely swept away; and since that period, with very rare exceptions, the educated classes among the natives in all the Presidencies of India have been numbered among Theists, either more or less advanced. In point of fact, that superior culture which had led onward Rammohun Roy has far more than forty years been producing masses of men possessed of like convictions. The class has not been made by Rammohun Roy and his followers. But the same causes which made him have made them; and acting with infinitely greater number and greater force, over a wider surface, have naturally produced men with those convictions in far greater numbers than before. Missionary institutions, Government colleges and schools, and even well-taught native English schools contribute thousands to the class every year; and wherever they are well maintained, in country towns as well as in the chief cities, the same important

results naturally follow. Young men feel compelled to cast off faith in idols and the institutions which Hindu idolatry sustains. Some men advance far beyond this: and notably the Christian converts, who fight their way up-hill to far higher stages of conviction, character, and resolves. But this rejection in faith in idols is the point from which thousands start in the religious life.

Commencing their efforts at this juncture, and on this promising soil, the members of the Bramo Somaj did good service in seeking to give a distinctly religious form to the new views springing up around them. They wished their young countrymen, not merely to cast off the old faith, but definitely to adopt another in its stead; and that, as they did recognize the existence of the one true God and their dependence upon him, they should give him constant and sincere worship. Here, again, they were greatly favored in their leader. The revived movement was headed by a man of high and earnest character, Babu Debendranath Tagore, the eldest son of Rammohun Roy's closest friend, the well-known native merchant and landholder, Dwarkanath Tagore. Relinquishing excellent prospects in business, Debendranath Tagore gave himself with singular devotion to what he believed to be a great cause; and in many ways gave promise of that lofty character and life in which he followed Rammohun Roy's example, and for which he has during many years been greatly esteemed. He presented the Society with a printing press and fonts of type; repaired, and eventually purchased the house containing their hall for worship; gathered a library of the sacred books; and dispatched four students to Benares, that they might be trained to understand them. He edited their periodical; took a prominent part in their publishing schemes; and was a constant preacher and speaker at their meetings of worship. His personal efforts, unflagging interest, and generous gifts, powerfully contributed to sustain and extend the Society in those early days, and to him its subsequent progress and success to a large extent are due.

One great mistake was made by the Somaj at this period, which it cost them both time and trouble to remedy. Without entering at any length into the doctrines of the Society, which may more conveniently be reserved to a later page, it may be stated here, that in shaping out their creed, the president and members followed far too closely on the steps of Rammohun Roy.

We have seen how he persuaded himself that the Vedic tracts contained a pure Theistic doctrine; how he had committed himself to them, had republished them, had translated them, and with his mind full of Hindu terms, had insensibly given to his translations shades of meaning which he had derived from his English studies, but which the original passages really did not bear. Debendranath Tagore and his companions followed the same course. They, too, adopted the Vedantic books and treatises; republishing those of Rammohun Roy, and adding many others, in Sanskrit, Bengali, and English, selected or prepared by themselves. Wishing to retain their native position, to retain their caste, and therefore to keep their system native and free from foreign associations, they gave a thoroughly Hindu aspect to everything around them—to their literature, their worship, and the technical terms by which their school should be described. Their worship was full of Sanskrit; during the service extracts were read from the Upanishads of the Vedas, and the sacred, talismanic verse, the Gayatri, was recited by all. Their monthly periodical, published chiefly in Bengali, contained improved editions, and frequently Vedantic authorities. Thus the Society fairly committed itself to the Vedant system, believing that it was really a system of Monotheism. "The Vedas alone are the sole foundation of all our belief. Our humble object is merely to revive and propagate an existing system of truth. . . . Vedantism is our creed, and the Upanishads are our book of religion." At this time they frequently called themselves Vedantists.

When therefore it became clear from the controversies which sprang up, from the works of scholars like Colebrook, and from the teachings of their own pundits, that the Vedant was a system of Pantheism, and that the Upanishads distinctly taught Pantheism, and could be truly understood in no other sense, they found themselves in trouble. They were, in fact, plainly beaten on their own ground. But as they never meant to be Pantheists, and merely wished to rest their Theistic views on native ground, they found no difficulty in giving up the position they could not maintain. "The old fort was speedily deserted, and the retiring squadrons, with a damaged reputation, themselves blew it into the air." After 1850, the Vedic system found no friends among the men who had mistakenly defended it.

Their progress was at first slow; and the fact would be difficult to explain, were not their retention of caste, and other compromises with Hinduism, known greatly to diminish the confidence with which they have been regarded in general society. In 1841, they had about one hundred members; in 1846, there were five hundred. For several years their number did not increase; and the membership very rapidly changed. Evidently, the repetitions in the public service, the singing of the same hymns, the reciting of the same ritual extracts, the delivery of the same addresses on the works of creation, wearied the disciples, and led them to leave a system which gave them so little satisfaction. The existence of the same class of educated men in various country towns, soon led to the establishment of branch societies. At first they were three in number, and were confined to Bengal. But within a few years the branches rapidly increased to forty, and were found in the North-West Provinces, the Punjab, and even in Central India; the last established was a small Somaj at Hydrabad, in the dominions of the Nizam. They are now, according to the *Indian Mirror*, sixty in number, and have an income of about £1,000 a-year. The branches, however, are not strictly such; they are not formed of the natives of the towns and cities where they may be found. They are composed chiefly of Bengali members, whom employment in public offices is carrying to all parts of Upper India. No distinct statements have recently been made as to the number of these members; a careful calculation three years ago showed the names of nearly two thousand on the books of the parent society and its then forty branches. Their number is probably about the same at the present time.

Great interest has been manifested in them by Englishmen, especially by Christian men, and many a visitor has been taken to their weekly service, held in Calcutta on Wednesday evenings. Men have found a peculiar pleasure in witnessing a service so simple and natural. Their long hall in the Chitpore-road, the floor of which slopes downwards from the two ends towards the center, is neatly fitted with open pews, and is well lighted with chandeliers and wall-lamps, protected from the wind by glass shades so common in India. In the middle of the hall, on a carpeted platform of marble, sit the two pundits or teachers who conduct the worship; and in a recess immediately opposite, are the musicians, with their instruments. The service com-

mences with the reading of various texts and passages from the Vedas in the original tongue. The Gayatri, a sacred verse supposed to exercise a powerful charm, is recited by all in measured musical tones, and is then silently meditated. A hymn from one the Upanishads is then chanted by all present.

An exposition of a text from the Vedas, a discourse on some topic of natural theology, or of moral duty, is afterwards given; and is usually followed by an extempore address by the president or one of the members, or it may be by some special lecture. The service closes with the singing of hymns by the musicians, who accompany the melody, a purely native one, with their instruments, and the whole service generally occupies about an hour. Special meetings have often been held on other days, especially on the Sundays, for consultation, in times of controversy, or to receive some special address or lecture from one of their leaders; and in recent years such meetings had been frequently necessitated by the important questions which have sprung up among themselves, and which have given them the most serious concern. Before we describe their recent history, and show the position in which the Brahmos and the Theistic school generally are now found, it will be useful to exhibit as definitely as may be the doctrines which they profess to hold.[1]

The doctrines of the Somaj have not always been the same, nor have they rested upon the same basis. Their first authorities, as we have seen, were the Vedas; and in submitting themselves to their teaching, without having sufficiently examined what that teaching was, they committed a mistake of the gravest kind, which did them considerable injury.

Laying their old national book aside, they turned to the works of nature, and for a few years, books like Paley's "Natural Theology" were largely used, and formed a basis for many addresses in their public meetings, and for articles in their periodicals. Next, corresponding with Theodore Parker, Emerson, and Francis Newman, whose works were sold in Calcutta in large numbers, they began to move onward, and to find that the theology of outward nature was but part of God's teaching. "Revelation in these outward works is needless; the true teaching is within. Man's own mind contains intuitions which are a sufficient guide to truth and duty. No book is needed; the human mind contains the whole." This adoption of the doctrine of intuition was an

important change in the views of the Society, and wrought a manifest change in their literature and lectures. Their attitude towards Christianity has till recently been that of a watchful enemy. Twenty years ago, aroused by the marked success of the Gospel, they took for awhile the position of open antagonism to missionaries. They interrupted their preaching, and tried to excite the people against them. They have ever felt a strong sympathy for the opponents of Christianity, and have read with avidity the works of Parker, Colenso, Darwin, and any other writer of mark who has made, or has been thought to make a formidable assault on the Bible. Till recently, they were, as a body, remarkably ignorant of the Bible; they were evidently afraid to read it, as well as strongly prejudiced against its contents. As a rule, throughout their history, missionaries have dealt courteously and forbearingly with them; they have treated them as learners who might be advised and instructed, as men in whom "some good thing" was found toward God and toward men. At times, their boasting and their pretence have received, as they deserved, rebuke and strong argument. But for the most part, our missionaries have endeavored to secure them greater enlightenment; have prepared for them special papers, tracts, and books, or have delivered special courses of lectures; which they, on their side, have not been unwilling to attend.

A few extracts from their writings will reveal their views with greater clearness. These might be multiplied to a great extent; but the Theistic position, in its essentials, has no great range of expression and dogma; it is needless to encumber our pages with the repetition found in their authorities.

The Bramos have not adopted or compiled any definite system of doctrine. They are firm in rejecting all special revelation; such a revelation they declare to be "impossible." For all religious truth, they therefore fall back on the works of nature and the intuitions of man's own mind. In this simple system, they teach that God is a loving Father, and men are his children. To secure happiness, men must fulfill all duty and forsake all sin. For the wrong which they do, they must suffer punishment; but the process will be remedial, and will purify the soul from all its errors. Meditation and prayer conduce to the same end. Very soon after the Somaj was established, a little book of moral precepts was compiled, called the "Brahmo Dharma, or Religion

of the Brahmos." It is divided into two parts, which treat of the attributes of the Supreme and of human duties. It is preceded by a statement of principles and a brief liturgy. The following is

THE BRAHMIST'S COVENANT.

"Having full faith in this religion, I adopt the religion of the worshipers of Brahma.

"1. I will live devoted to the worship of that one supreme Brahma, who is the creator, preserver, and destroyer (of the universe), the giver of present and eternal good; all-wise, all-pervading, full of joy, the good, and without form. I will worship him with love, and by doing things that will give him pleasure.

"2. I will worship no created thing as the supreme God.

"3. Unless disabled by sickness or calamity, I will every way, in faith and love, fix my thoughts in contemplation on the Supreme.

"4. I will live earnest in the practice of good deeds.

"5. I will endeavor to live free from evil deeds.

"6. If, overcome by temptation, I perchance do anything evil, I will surely desire to be freed from it and be careful (for the future).

"7. Every year, and in all my worldly prosperity, I will offer gifts to the Bramo Somaj.

"O, God! grant me strength, that I may entirely observe this excellent religion."

They constantly boast in their writings of the grandeur of their system, and affirm not only that it will pervade all India from the Himalayas to the sea, but that it will become the religion of the world.

"Here then, is the object of our search. Here then is the religion that has come down to us direct from God, and exists from the beginning of the world in numerous forms, given according to the whims of men. This form, divested of all peculiar tenets, requires a name to distinguish it from others, and we have happily a very judicious name given—Brahmism. The sum and substance, the pith and marrow of Brahmism is a collection of all those principles and precepts which every religion is found to possess. Hence it is that Brahmism is a universal religion; its tenets are followed by all indiscriminately—by the

Mohammedans, the Christians, the Hindus of our time, as well as by the Jews, the Egyptians, the Chinese, the Romans, or any other nation of antiquity. Hence it is that the religion which we call Brahmism is intended by our Heavenly Father to be the religion of the world. Hence it is that Brahmism is from the beginning of the world, is universal, and is sufficient. Hence it is that Brahmism is the vital part of every religion under the sun. Christianity, Mohammedanism, Hinduism, or any religion whatever, can be proved to be Brahmism alloyed with some particular opinions and tenets, the chief source of religious disagreement. No religionist can safely attack Brahmism; it is wounding one's own legs. Hence it is that we hardly hear of any sound and judicious argument against Brahmism from men whom we know to be wise and sincere."

The following is their view of repentance. The extract is taken from a recent number of their periodical, the *Indian Mirror*:—

"The Theist deals with realities, not with fancies; he neither dwells in imaginary heaven nor in imaginary hell. He sees there is actual sin in his heart, and he feels sorrow and repentance for it. Nay, repentance comes to him naturally, as uneasiness follows bodily distemper. He cannot ignore it. He cannot will it away, much less rejoice in sin. But such penitence is proportionate to the acuteness of the spiritual malady which induces it. In the natural state of the mind, it can neither be too little nor too much. The fact is, that the mortifying feelings of self-condemnation consequent on the visitation of God's law are, like other emotions, not dependent upon our will; they do not rise or disappear, increase or decrease in poignancy at our fiat. We feel them in their due measure, because compelled to do so under the law of nature. Thus the soul in a normal condition is prevented from bringing down its sin through imagination to the zero point, or magnifying it into horrid proportions. Thus, while the sinner seems depressed, he does not sink into absolute and hopeless depression, under a conviction that he is absolutely a sinner. Such a conviction is prevented by the other fact which he cannot but be conscious of, namely, the fair side of his life. If he feels there is evil in him, he cannot but feel, on the other hand, there is something good in him; and if sorrow is,

as a consequence, inevitable, joy too is inevitable. Neither purity nor impurity is absolute in humanity. However wicked man may be, there must yet be some goodness within him. If there is in our biography much to deplore and repent for, there is also some matter for self-gratulation and thanksgiving to God."

The following extract shows their view of a future state, and the source whence the knowledge of it is derived:—

"Our reverend friends lay great stress on the point that it was the Bible that brought life and immortality to light. If that be the case, why is the belief in a future existence, and the distribution of future rewards and punishments, so prevalent among all non-Christian nations? Why are there such beautiful descriptions of the destination of the human soul found in their religious Scriptures? This leads us to believe that the immortality of the human soul is as much an intuitive belief as our convictions of the distinctness of the principle within us which we call "I," from the body, and of its immeasurable superiority to the latter. This belief in future existence afterwards gains ample corroboration from the moral attributes of God, which require a just distribution of rewards and punishments not witnessed in this life. Now, believing in an intuitive truth is one thing, and giving a demonstration of it to others, another. People may often fail in the latter, though they cannot ignore the belief, as was the case with the Grecian philosopher, Plato.

"Logical demonstrations of the immortality of the soul given in modern times are more satisfactory than those given in ancient times, because the science of theology improves with time, just as other sciences, while the primary institutions upon which the science of theology is based, are the same in all ages and countries."

Other quotations could without difficulty be selected from their numerous tracts, lectures and periodicals, to illustrate their views of human life and duty, their hope and comfort in sorrow, and their idea of the relation of man to God. These topics are at times discussed with great earnestness, and with some beauty of thought and language; but everywhere the reader misses the overpowering motive which should stimulate and guide the soul in its struggles against evil. No topic has been more frequently pressed upon them by missionaries than the way of salvation. Holding at one time the usual views respecting pardon as fol-

lowing at once on repentance, they were urged to show how the mercy of God is on that theory to be reconciled with justice in his public government. At length their teachers come to the conclusion that, in that government, *justice must take its course;* and mercy is shown because the punishment administered purifies the soul from guilt, and eventually sets it free. In the whole range of theology, there is no theory of atonement so dreary and devoid of hope as this:

"Repentance will save the sinner, says Brahmism. Save him from what? Not from the punishment due to sins already committed, for Divine justice is immutable and its decrees irreversible; but save him from sin. You may fabricate a convenient theory of atonement, and do what you like; bathe in the Hoogly, offer sacrifices, go through baptismal ceremonies, visit a hundred holy cities; nothing will save you from the punishment you deserve. The moment you have sinned, justice will rise up and say, 'Sinner, thou hast sinned, and must be adequately punished.' Overburdened with iniquity, his conscience upbraiding him, such a sinner repents sincerely for ages, if need be, till he is liberated from the bondage of sin. Here you see justice and mercy acting in unison. The Lord is Father and Judge both. When the Judge has passed the sentence of punishment, the merciful Father appears before the sinner, and says: 'Suffer the pangs of remorse to the utmost measure for the sin thou hast committed—repent earnestly—repent day and night, and thou shalt be delivered from sin.' This is the sum total of the true theory of atonement. A Brahmo is thus taught to believe that the judge who punishes him for his sins is also his Father, and he drinks the cup of retribution, though bitter, knowing that it cometh from the Father, and containeth not poison, but the medicine that healeth. In God's moral government, justice makes punishment necessarily and inevitably follow the commission of sin; mercy makes that punishment remedial, and inflicts it on the sinner for the sake of amendment."

The professedly religious Theists who hold these views, who have organized themselves into societies, who observe regular seasons of worship, and who earnestly endeavor to propagate their views, occupy, of course, the front rank among the Theistic classes, and hold the same kind of relation to Christianity which

many Unitarians do in England and America. But the Theistic school in general extends on every side far beyond the Brahmos. Behind them there are myriads of men, comparatively young, in whom a broad education has produced the same complete unbelief in Hindu idolatry; and who accept that position the more readily because every educated man who is their senior has already reached it. These men abound in Bengal. They have been produced (as we have seen) by the Government colleges, the missionary institutions, and good native schools, which may now be found in every large native town; and, of course, the city of Calcutta, the heart of the province, is filled with them. Of their numbers it is difficult to speak, but they are very great. Thirty thousand lads are receiving an English education every year in Bengal alone; and of these, fifteen hundred come up to the matriculation or entrance examination of the Calcutta University. This process has been going on for a long period. The number of men now living in Bengal who have received an English education must considerably exceed a quarter of a million; and it would not be difficult to find a hundred thousand who can read and write English with great ease. The other Presidencies and provinces of India are not so forward in general education as Bengal Public opinion in them has grown more slowly. At the present time, their English scholars are almost equal to those of Bengal, and the universities have begun to run the same useful career. They have probably contributed to the educated classes of the Indian Empire some ten hundred thousand persons during the last twenty years. He cannot be far wrong, therefore, in estimating the number of men in all India, who have received their education in the English as well as the vernacular languages, at half a million. Another ten years will probably raise their number to a million and a half! All lads of respectability and enterprise enter English schools, if they possibly can. They believe that an English education will give them an honorable livelihood—will fit them to share in the business of the state—will secure them employment in commerce, in medicine, and in law, and will enable them to enjoy some of the highest blessings and pleasures of civilization. The expansion of mind and the enlarged knowledge thus attained, exert a direct influence on their position as Hindus. They tend to weaken and thus destroy national and family prejudices, to expose the selfishness and

tyranny of caste, to put down the pretensions of the Brahmin priesthood, to destroy the authority of the Shastres, and thoroughly to undermine the popular idolatry. They thus sweep away an enormous mass of public error, and prepare the mind for influences of a higher and better kind. The Hindus, as a people, have very strong religious tendencies, and feel but little sympathy with Atheism. The prime doctrines of Theism—the existence of one God, creator of all men, the unity of the human race, and the general obligations of morality and religion—are acknowledged without difficulty. Thus, in a general way, the entire educated class, taught the English language and studying English literature, naturally reach the Theistic position, and, as a matter of conviction, ordinarily occupy it. Were practice and conviction inseparably linked in the Hindu mind, we should hope the best from this state of things. But while caste, and idolatry, and national customs are not believed in, they are maintained as habits. In the case of Christian converts, "perfect love casteth out fear;" and they break away from these evils in obedience to the Saviour. The rest, not having those all-powerful convictions, stop short; they "halt between two opinions," or rather, for fear of social penalties, which men like themselves, as well as the orthodox party, will feel bound to inflict, they refuse to break with these evils, and suffer them still to be maintained as social observances in the families to which they belong.

The great mass of educated native gentlemen hold this position; but there is one section of them, who, in considerable numbers, have been led to a higher faith, if not to a higher practice. The missionary schools of Bengal contain eight thousand scholars, of whom more than a thousand annually leave with a considerable knowledge of Christian truth. These schools have been at work for forty years, and have been training this number for about twenty years; and thus they have exercised a very powerful influence in elevating the educated classes. They have indoctrinated with Christian truth the minds of not less than twenty thousand scholars among the respectable families of the country, who would not otherwise have been accessible to missionary effort; they have given them an accurate knowledge of the way of salvation, have brought them into contact with lofty motives and principles of life, have made deep impressions upon their hearts before they were hardened by the world, have conciliated affection, confidence, and good-will, and have created a respect

for Christianity and for Christian men throughout the community at large. In connection with them, missionaries have also secured opportunities of instructing, by lectures, books, and pamphlets, thousands of men who were not their immediate scholars. They have to a great degree guided the educational movement, and determined its generally healthy character; and by their efforts and their controversies have done much to diffuse, to invigorate, and to maintain a religious spirit amongst the educated classes, not excepting the Brahmos themselves. The young men who have been trained in mission schools have manifested in many ways the fruits of their Christian education. Though not converted men, and ready to contend bravely with the evils of idolatry, many have lived a superior moral life, have been distinguished for truthfulness, gentleness, uprightness, and diligence in business, and have exhibited an anxiety to benefit others. Thousands of them have attained a faith far higher than the simple Theistic formulas, and have been convinced that if any religion on earth be true, it is Christianity. Yet, like myriads similarly taught, they remain in name Hindus, quietly observing so much of the current idolatries, ceremonies, and customs of their families as the public opinion around them compels them to follow, and in many cases waiting for the good time when the universal change, from which no one is to suffer, shall set them free!

It has frequently been asked why, with these myriads of prepared minds about them, the Brahmo societies can reckon up only two thousand disciples. The answer is a simple one. The universal opinion has been, "These men, with all their professions, are no better than ourselves." The want of a teacher authorized to say, "This is Divine truth;" the dreary creed, the sameness of the instruction, the lack of a discipline among the professed disciples, the compromises with caste and idolatry (the most damaging defect of all), have led thousands, when pressed to join the society, to reply, *cui bono?* Many reasons exist why such an objection may be raised by the Theists at large. These reasons are specially valid and numerous in the case of the men who have obtained an acquaintance with Christianity, who feel its influence, and who respect its book as of Divine authority. So far as their views are definite and clear to themselves, these men have gone beyond the Brahmos, and think very little of them or of their creed. From no class have the latter drawn so few mem-

bers to their Society as from the Christianized scholars of mission schools.

Such has been the general growth of the Theistic school, and such is the position it at present occupies. Important changes have recently taken place among the Brahmos; strong efforts have been made to advance in usefulness, numbers, and influence; and the whole Theistic body are at this moment in a restless state of transition, which may well be watched with interest, and call forth special efforts on their behalf.

Five years ago, the Brahmos began to display unwonted activity. New blood had come into the Society. They had secured the services of a new preacher, and he had rapidly made for himself an influential position. This was Babu Keshub Chunder Sen. The president of the Somaj was still Babu Debendranath Tagore, who held the office for twenty-five years. Mr. Sen was one of the acharyas, or appointed teachers. He proved to be a fluent speaker, especially in English, and was found to possess a power of public exposition which rendered great service to the community. His English lectures became celebrated, and large audiences gathered to hear them. At times, he was forced into controversy; notably on one occasion, with a native missionary, who had been very severe on the system; and his happy hits, in reply to his antagonist, were received with vociferous cheers. With English missionaries he has usually been on good terms, though their criticisms, while full of kindness, have never lacked fidelity; and the kind and courteous tone of his discussions with them have been deserving of all praise. From the first, Mr. Sen earnestly pressed on the Somaj the importance of new efforts to diffuse its tenets. His own pen and the pens of others contributed several additions to their literature. New missionaries were appointed, and he himself paid numerous visits to the country towns of Bengal, lecturing to large audiences in the branch Somajes that had been established in those places. Branches were also commenced in the Northwest Provinces. In 1864, he was deputed to visit the cities of Madras and Bombay, to confer with the educated classes they contain on the importance of establishing religious societies like that of Bengal. He found the society of Madras narrow and backward, opposed to innovations, thoroughly afraid of caste rules, and in complete bondage to Hinduism! When therefore he "discoursed in English for two hours, fluently and forcibly, upon education, woman's mission,

and social tyranny, sounding out a prose Excelsior in the ears of his people," the native mind of Madras was stirred to its depths, and found itself face to face with a breadth of knowledge, a freedom of thought, and a fearlessness of speech, to which it was a total stranger. A few gentlemen, however, gathered around him, and formed a Society called the *Veda* Somaj, on principles similar to those of the Brahmo Somaj. He found the society of Bombay full of educated men, but very deficient in moral principle, and submitting to the galling yoke of caste almost without remonstrance. His description of the Parsees is very striking:—

"We, in Calcutta, have a great deal of show and glitter, and tawdry outside, pompous nonsense and big talk; but I find the Bombay people have a great deal more. The Parsees, though they do not recognize caste, are no less conservative than the Hindoos, and adhere to the policy of compromise. In spite of their enlightened notions, they still wear the *kusti*, or *poita* (the sacred thread); use cows' urine for the purification of the heart; stick to the revolting and barbarous custom of exposing dead bodies to be rent in pieces by vultures and wild beasts, instead of burying or burning them, lest by so doing they defile the earth or fire, both of which are held in the Zend as gods; and observe several other domestic and social ceremonies which they know to be absurd and pernicious. Whom do they fear, if not their Dustoors, or high priests? The fear of God casteth out the fear of man. May the Parsees, who otherwise justly command our respect, and who have nobly proved to the world what self-reliance and perseverance can achieve, even amid most discouraging circumstances, abjure these prejudices ere long! Worldliness or mammon-worship prevails to a fearful extent in Bombay, and hence a sad want of earnest thought, and serious reflection on God and immortality, among the educated classes. Wholly devoted to the cares and pursuits of worldly life, they seldom exalt their thoughts and aspirations to the realities of the spiritual world."

The result of these efforts was expansion and growth. These were shown, not in questions of doctrine, but in relation to the great social evils which have corrupted Hindu society. Many of the Brahmos began to feel themselves compromised by caste observances, and by the idol worship in their houses, which met them every day of their life. They felt stirred also to advocate

publicly, and to promote in their own circles, female education; to oppose the customary marriage of children, or the numerous marriages of Kulin Brahmins, and to promote the marriage of widows, especially of those who had become so while still young girls. Conviction increased that on these great questions the time was come for them to act—the day for mere talk was gone by. Hinduism is not merely idol worship: it is a strict system of social rules—faith in the gods, caste, rules, social penalties, all mutually involving each other. The social and domestic customs of the Hindoos are interwoven with their ancestral system of belief and worship. The Brahmos felt that they must now separate them. Necessarily, a struggle took place in the community. The older members stood aghast at the proposal. Men who had been Brahmos for twenty years, and had connived at the worship of Durga all the time, saw no reason for change. But others felt it to be incumbent on every true and sincere Brahmo to discountenance such customs, even at "the risk of being excommunicated, and otherwise persecuted." A division at length took place, towards the close of 1865. The majority—weak, conservative, and timid to the last—"kept aloof from this bold undertaking," and remained where they were. A small band of reformers, headed by Mr. Keshub Chunder Sen, broke off from the old Somaj, and, having enlarged their basis of principle so as to "incorporate in their theology the truths of all Scriptures, and admit to membership the Theists of all nations," in November, 1866, organized themselves into a society, under the name of *The Brahmo Somaj of India.*

It was specially with the view of making the acquaintance of the Brahmo school that Miss Carpenter, at the close of 1867, paid her visit to Calcutta. Known as a personal friend of Rammohum Roy, she had unusual claims upon their attention, as she was particularly anxious to learn their views, and show her sympathy with all earnest efforts at reform. Miss Carpenter, however, was greatly disappointed with them; their weakness and their compromises with caste met her at every turn; some even distinctly avoided all intercourse with her, apparently ashamed of their position, and expecting reproach at her hands. One of the saddest pieces in her journal gives utterance to her impressions, which refer specially to the older school:—

"Various indications which had recently reached us in the West had excited a hope that the period was now come when

the spirit of the Hindu reformer was leading on his countrymen to a purer religion and a higher civilization. My present visit to the scene of his labors, however, did not enable me to realize these hopes. One place of worship only, that which he had himself founded and dedicated to the worship of one true God, was pointed out to me, as the house where the Brahmos assembled for worship once a week, on Wednesday evenings. This had been recently renovated by Debendranath Tagore, the leader of the sect, the son of his personal friend. There I joined in true Bengali worship, in memory of him whom I so highly venerated; but I did not see the leader of the sect, nor even had I a personal interview with him, as he left the city shortly after my arrival. No interest appeared to exist in learning anything respecting a man who had conferred such honor on his country. I could not even learn where stood his house in the Circular-road, formerly the resort of enlightened Hindus and friendly Europeans, nor where was the site of that printing-press which he had established in Dhurumtollah to defend himself to the public against the attacks of his opponents.

"The absence of any cenotaph record on marble tablet of his very existence, or statue, as an enduring memento of his grand and noble presence, was rendered more remarkable by the fact that a finely executed bust of his friend Dwarkanath stands in the Public Library to testify to the respect of his fellow-citizens.

"Nor did I discover any trace of his spirit among his followers. Instead of that earnest and candid search after truth which was so characteristic of Rammohun Roy—that devoted study of the Christian Scriptures, because he perceived that they were 'a universal guide to truth and happiness.' I found among the Brahmos an extreme prejudice against Christianity, combined with ignorance of the contents of the New Testament, which they were unwilling to study, having satisfied their minds, by a perusal of Deistical works, of the antecedent impossibility of revelation or miracles. Even the 'Precepts of Jesus,' with its various translations, is out of print, and its very existence appears generally unknown. In social progress they were in many respects beyond what are called 'orthodox Hindus,' or those who most tenaciously adhere to their religious rites and ancient idolatrous social customs; but, at the same time, further progress is discountenanced by them; and it was on this ground particularly that Kes-

hub Chauder Sen and the advanced party had separated from them.

"Yet, with all these discouraging facts before me, I gradually discovered that the character of the great reformer had produced a deep impression on many hearts, and one which is slowly but surely preparing for future improvement." (Vol. I, pp. 176, 177).

Since the division, the new school has set earnestly to work. It has endeavored to establish closer intercourse among all the Somajes in India, and to propagate their faith more extensively and systematically throughout the country. Upwards of sixty such Somajes, or "Churches," as they are called, exist in the different provinces of India, in which the members assemble weekly, and in which "hymns, sermons, prayers, and the reading of Theistic texts from the Hindu, and sometimes from other scriptures, compose the service." About a dozen missionaries, who have given up worldly pursuits, and depend on the voluntary contributions of the Brahmo community for the bare necessaries of life, go about the country visiting the Somajes, "and preaching to the natives generally, even to the lower orders of the people." For the first time, the women of their families have been invited to share in their worship; in the meetings in private houses, on many occasions, Brahmika ladies have been present; and their leader calls aloud for rules of etiquette under which this new thing in India, the public meeting of the sexes, shall be conducted. In more than one place, an *utsab*, or festival, has been held, in which religious services have been kept up at intervals for a whole day. Many marriages have been performed among them without any idolatrous ceremony, marriages in which both parties were adults; and as there is doubt about the legality of a ceremony so conducted, the Legislative Council have been considering a bill to clear the doubts, and render such marriages legal. It will be made to cover the case of all similar reformers of the native systems, and after some further inquiry, will, in all probability, speedily become law. The new hall, erected for this advanced school, was opened with great ceremony in January last, on the anniversary of the founding of the Somaj; and the day's proceedings were closed by a meeting in the Town Hall of Calcutta, and a lecture by Mr. Sen, at which many Englishmen were present.

But the tree is known by its fruits. "Do men gather grapes of thorns or figs of thistles?" Where one least wishes it, there

the Brahmo system is always revealing its internal weakness. Like a patient whose constitution is tried by a hard climate, who suffers first from one sickness, then from another, and never enjoys real health, so this system, subjected to many trials, is always breaking down. The great interest shown by Englishmen in India in the recent developments of the Theistic school, and the kind attention paid to its most prominent leader, have led to grave mistakes in himself and his followers, which have not only injured their own spirit, but have done the system permanent harm. Two years ago, Mr. Sen delivered, to a large native audience in Calcutta, a striking lecture, entitled, "Jesus Christ: Europe and Asia." It was an eloquent and glowing description of the character of Christ, and of his great followers both in the apostolic age and in later times. It dwelt strongly on the spirit of self-sacrifice which Christianity inculcates, which has effected such great good in the world, and by which true Christians in India have sought to benefit the empire. And the lecture ended by saying: "The better to stimulate you to a life of self-denial, I hold up to you the Cross on which Jesus died. May His example influence you, that you may be prepared to offer even your blood, if need be, for the regeneration of your country." The lecture produced a great sensation; there seemed to be a genuine enthusiasm in the speaker, which aroused corresponding feelings in his audience; and throughout the address the cheers were hearty and long-continued. But the impression soon passed away; the enthusiasm cooled down. Calm reflection showed the audience that in following their teacher so heartily they had reached the very Rubicon of Christianity; if sincere, a little more earnestness and decision would carry them across the boundary. They drew back in consternation. Their leader found himself all but deserted. Then the pendulum swung back the other way. Twelve months after, he determined on a public retraction, practical, if not expressed in words. He delivered another lecture on "Great Men." It was a complete contrast to its predecessor; and the audience, resolved not to be taken in, listened to it in profound silence. Such men, said the lecturer, are born great; they are superhuman, yet there is nothing miraculous about them; they appear when needed; they are representative of their age and of special ideas; they are unselfish; they are heroes. Luther, Knox, and Mahomet, were such men; and on a level

with them he placed the Bengali's favorite, Chaitonyo, who lived three hundred years ago, and founded the Vaishnava system! The name of Jesus was not uttered once during the address, and the example so extolled twelve months before was totally lost sight of. The last lecture which has been published was delivered in January of the present year. It is on "The Future Church;" and asserts, among other things, "No prevalent religious system is wholly false." It greatly disappointed all who heard it.

A more unhappy model for a reformer could scarcely be chosen than that of Chaitonyo. He contended, indeed, against idolatry, and taught that the true way of salvation was to be found in Faith. But his followers formed a secret society: it was in secret their caste was broken, and there was no manly resistance to ancient customs and evils in the light of open day. Naturally, therefore, the system came to a miserable end, and led to vicious practices worse than any which it professed to reform. Like Chaitonyo and his followers, the Brahmos have begun to gather to their festivals with processions and gaudy flags, and triumphal hymns. And like Chaitonyo, and other great teachers of Hinduism, Keshub Chauder Sen permits the more degraded of his followers to prostrate themselves before him and worship him! Of course, several of his better disciples have, in consequence of these things, quitted the system.

This is not the way to lead on the Theist school to truth and life. The Church of the future in India will not be a Church of Vaishnavas. It will not be a Church of men, compromising and timid, caring for numbers, and swayed by the opinions of the passing hour. It must rest on the rock of principle; its followers must have the fidelity of martyrs; its model can be no other than He who laid down His life for men. In form and system, that Church may be purely native, organized by its own native members, instructed by its own native ministers; its sections differing on minor points of worship and outward order. It may be cut free from all English ties and English models; and may stand before the world as a true Indian Church. But it will be true to the Bible, true to the Saviour, and consecrated to the best interests of man, because its meat is to do the will of God.

XVIII.—THE CENTRAL IDEA OF THE BIBLE—A GUIDE TO ITS INTERPRETATION.*

BY REV. RHYS GWESYN JONES, UTICA, N. Y.

Man is constitutionally religious. Even his intellect cannot long be satisfied without something spiritual. All the pleasure derived from phenomena are almost immediately exhausted, and æsthetics very soon becomes too gross for the mind. It wants something still more refined. Having for a short time contemplated beauty in the phenomenal, it begins to inquire for the noumenal. Here it comes in contact with the spiritual; for every thing else it abstracts, as not fitted for the resting place of beauty, and, though the spiritual comes not within the domain of the mere intellect, yet the intellect yearns after the spiritual as its only resting place and without which it cannot be satisfied, but is forever doomed to ask, what was previous to this or what will follow.

But when we remember that man is possessed of reason,—an ethical or moral nature,—then we feel ourselves at once raised above the natural to deal with the supernatural. There is nothing in nature for the spirit. It lives entirely on the supernatural, and when allowed fair play it will clearly indicate to man his position and want of communion with his Creator. It likewise feels its inability to effect a reunion with its spiritual progenitor. It is only by subjecting the ethical to the merely intellectual that man can ever think of effecting by his own merits a reunion with his Creator. His moral nature, or reason, if allowed to speak, will distinctly teach him that if the desirable reconciliation is to be effected, it must be effected by God himself and by a peculiar plan of his, in which will be manifest his justice, mercy, holiness and love. And this plan of reconciliation is evidently the basis upon which a revelation can be given worthy of the character of God and beneficial to man. Had revelation not the

* Translated by the author from the *Diwygiwr*, (Llanelli, Wales).

idea of reconciliation for its stand point, it would on the one hand prove God unwise in giving it, while on the other it would have proved useless to man.

To show that it would have been unwise in God to give a revelation of himself which had not reconciliation for its leading or central idea, we may remark that the whole of nature shows that God pays strict regard to the law of parsimony, never using more means than are absolutely necessary to accomplish the desired end. Had God not intended reconciliation between himself and man, the only possible end for which a revelation could have been given would have been for the purpose of confirming man in his enmity, and aggravating his guilt. Now that this was unnecessary appears from the fact that sin tended to drive man as far as possible from God, and this very departure aggravated his guilt to the utmost extent. On the other hand, revelation, without reconciliation for its ground work, would have been more than useless to man. It is the very nature of sin, as already remarked, to make man an enemy to God. It originated a consciousness of guilt in the soul, and this guilt when unaccompanied with the hope of reconciliation produced constantly accumlating fear and hatred. A revelation of God's character to man under such circumstances would only have made more apparent to him the infinite distance and the awful contrast between his character and God's, and consequently the utter hopelessness of ever being reunited to Him.

That it is impossible for such an idea as the hope of reconciliation to originate in the mind of man (even could he be convinced of its desirableness) is very evident. For the very essence of repugnancy towards all wickedness is bound up in the idea of God. The thought of God produces an untractable, spontaneous aversion in the sinful soul, and every new manifestation of God's character would directly and immediately tend to rouse up its native, indwelling and inevitable hatred into activity. The sinful soul experiences in itself a recoil against God, and springs back with a strange and unconquerable force from the presentation of the true idea of God. It is impossible that his natural attributes should be known and their opposition to sin clearly seen, without being regarded by the sinner with emotions of hostility and dread. That part of God's character most worthy of being revealed, his infinite holiness, which constitutes His

eternal glory and loveliness in the sight of all good beings, is the very attribute against which the guilty soul feels itself arrayed, and it likewise finds that attribute entirely and eternally opposed to himself as a sinner.

That the above remarks are not unnecessary towards attaining a distinct and right idea of the groundwork or grand condition of revelation will be apparent from the following remarks, based upon, though not an exact translation of portions of Ullmann's *Essence of Christianity:*

"Several attempts have been made to find out the central or essential idea of revelation. Storr, being captivated by the supernatural element which pervades Christianity, took that to be the essential idea of revelation. Herder considers its universal sympathy with mankind as its distinguishing trait, while Chateaubriand regarded the sublime beauty by which it was pervaded as its characteristic. In the first ages of the church, having to deal with literary opponents and Pagans, Christianity was looked upon as essentially a doctrine. Whereas in the hands of the Romans, a race as much distinguished for practice as the Greeks were for theory, and having to deal with rude barbarians, Christianity was made essentially a law, and it presented the same aspect in the theories of English deists in the seventeenth century as well as in the speculations of the Kantian school. Still, in the theories as well as practice of many Germans, Christianity assumed the idea of redemption. But of late it has been presented in another aspect, namely, the reconciliation or union of man with God, which view claims for itself, as sole dispenser of this privilege, the title of the absolute and essentially perfect religion."

"We find traces of this conception in the remote periods of Christian antiquity. It is still more apparent in the mysticism of the middle ages, especially among the Germans, but it has now become for the first time the predominating influence in the speculations of modern times. The three first definitions contain some, but not the whole truth of Christianity. As doctrine, Christianity lays the chief stress on correct views of the divine nature. Then as law, in the hands of Laud, Christianity and the moral law appear as one and the same. Again, the definition of religion as a habit of mind or state of feeling corresponds with the views of those who regard Christianity as redemption; for

the word thus used implies in its object a complete inward change. These are in themselves imperfect until all are comprehended and reconciled under the highest and last conception which regards Christianity as the instrument of an entire union with God. This idea is the natural result of considering religion as that influence which brings the whole spiritual existence of man into relation with the Deity; always providing that the expression, union of God with men, be employed not in a Pantheistic sense but as denoting a mental and spiritual process. This then is the only fully satisfactory view, inasmuch as it not only embraces all the others but results immediately from the original innate character of Christianity, which is essentially life, action, history, not a mere code of moral, metaphysical and logical axioms."

In order that we may interpret the Bible, it is necessary that we should have some method, and in order that we may become possessed of such a method it is requisite that we grasp its leading idea and the method which the author would naturally follow in composing such a work. We have already found out that the central idea of Christianity is reconciliation between God and man, and the Bible, therefore, since it is evidently a book that treats of Christianity may be said to be a book in which is explained and developed the idea of reconciliation; in which is historically illustrated the plan by which God reconciles the world to himself without reckoning their trespasses unto them. Having found out the leading idea to be illustrated, it then becomes necessary to find out what method of procedure an author would choose in writing upon such an idea.

We may commence by saying that no wise author whose aim it was to convey information on the subject in hand in the shortest manner possible, would write on collateral subjects any more than was absolutely necessary to throw light on the subject in hand, while on the other hand he would leave nothing untold which was necessary to place his own subject in the clearest light. Thus much we may venture to say of human authors, and certainly we need expect no less from that Divine and all-wise author, by the guidance of whose Spirit the sacred penman wrote the scriptures. Therefore in reading the Bible we must not expect that it will exhaust any subject except this one of reconcilia-

tion. As an illustration let us conceive of a book written on farming. It must needs treat of many collateral branches, such as geology, chemistry, climatology, botany, anatomy, physiology, farriery, carpentry, smithery, masonry, &c. But any one who should attempt to learn either of those sciences or trades from such a book would be greatly disappointed, for he would find in it only allusions to them for the sake of illustration, rather than a complete treatise. Would a person so disappointed be justified in blaming the book or its author for so disappointing him? No, the blame would rest with himself rather, for mistaking the aim of the writer. I think this is a case in point as regards the Bible. In it will be found something of philosophy, geography, geology, astronomy, chronology, history, ethics, etc. But any one expecting to find in it complete information on either of the above sciences would be disappointed; for the aim of the writer in introducing them into the work, was to illustrate the subject in hand rather than to write an exhaustive treatise on them. Therefore it is quite unreasonable for the infidel to blame the Bible because its astronomy is not satisfactory, or because it does not say everything that modern discoveries have told us of geography; or because it has suffered the greatest portion of the history of the human race to pass unnoticed; or because he cannot find in it a complete system of moral philosophy scientifically developed. The only answer we can give him is, you have mistaken the aim of the Bible. Neither do we think that those writers who undertake to prove that Moses was a first rate astronomer or that the Bible contains a complete code of morality in all its details, confer much honor upon the book or its author, nor do they somehow give us a very high idea of their own judgment. We do not feel that we could love the Bible one whit more than we do at present had it been a more complete encyclopedia than any one yet written, since the reason why we value the Bible is not for the general information it conveys about everything, but because it teaches us what is God's method of reconciliation. When we are convinced that the Bible does that, then we feel that it has accomplished its mission, and whatsoever it would do more than this would make it of no greater value.

We must now therefore try to find out what would be necessary for a writer to say in order to make the idea of reconciliation intelligible to the reader, and then we must see whether the Bible

contains that. In order that we may understand this reconciliation, the laws of thought demand (and that we are to interpret the Bible according to the laws of thought, no one I presume will deny in the present day, or if there be such an one, I have only to say that my mission is not to him) that we should fully understand the nature and ground of the quarrel, and in order that we may understand the quarrel it is requisite that we should be made acquainted with the relations of the parties and the position which they virtually occupied before the quarrel broke out. Once more it is requisite that we should become acquainted with each of the parties individually, his character, station, and relation to other beings around him; for it is evident that relations greatly modify things, persons and affairs. A word that would be quite harmless if spoken against a private individual, may prove to be high treason when spoken against some person on the throne of a kingdom.

Having thus found out the things which the book would treat of, it becomes us in the next place to inquire how it should be written as to method and style. Here, again, we should expect it to be written in the style most intelligible to the persons interested. The author would write in accordance with his readers' mode of thinking and not according to his own, if he wished to be understood, as far as that can be done without conveying erroneous ideas to the minds of the readers. The language must be the language of the readers, and the illustrations those drawn from things familiar to the readers and used agreeable to their conception of them without disturbing their minds by giving new turns to familiar thoughts or new meanings to familiar terms, or if such be the case he must duly apprise the reader of such a change.

Again, we should expect allusion to be made only to things within the possible compass of the reader's acquaintance. For instance, a writer in the present age may illustrate his subject by an allusion to geographical, astronomical, and many other scientific subjects, which if brought forward as an illustration two hundred years ago would have made darkness darker, instead of throwing light on the subject to be illustrated, because the readers were totally unacquainted with the existence of the places, laws and facts which are now quite familiar to us. Therefore it is natural for us to expect that an all-wise author, writing for the benefit of men in general, would likewise confine his allusions to

countries and draw his illustrations from laws and facts in the neighborhood, and well known to the recipients of revelation. While at the same time, designing his book for all ages, he would write so as not to contradict the experience of more enlightened periods. For instance, the first readers of the book were acquainted with a small portion of Asia and Africa only. Hence it were worse than useless for the author to allude to Europe, America and Australia without at the same time giving some information concerning them. Again, if the readers thought the earth to be the center of the universe it was quite unnecessary for the author to attempt to correct such an opinion, since his sole intention would be to show that God alone was the creator and governor of the universe. If the readers conceived of the earth as flat, it made no difference to the author since his work was to show that the earth was the Lord's and the fullness thereof, that all its inhabitants had become corrupt, and that God was ready to be reconciled to them.

Having thus shown what the laws of thought demand in the construction of a book which had in view to illustrate this central idea of reconciliation between God and man, and finding that the Bible professes to be such a book, it remains for us now to inquire whether the Bible in its construction actually answers to our subjective conception of what it should be. Perhaps some one may say that this is begging the question—a merely looking into the Bible what it should be, because we actually know what it is. It is very true that the things revealed in the Bible could never have been found out by the human mind. But still we think it must be allowed to the mind, that having the idea of reconciliation given, it is capable of evolving the question to be considered or to state the conditions to be fulfilled in order to afford the necessary ground for understanding such an idea. For here we have to do, not with bringing about the plan of salvation, but with the comprehension of it by the human mind. And we maintain that we can become so acquainted with the human mind as to be able to say what does and what does not agree with the laws of thought. Hence, whether before being acquainted with the contents of the sacred volume we could have deduced the above conditions or not is immaterial. It is sufficient for us that we are capable of perceiving that they are agreeable to the laws of our thinking, and if we find that the actual compo-

sition of the Bible is in accordance with the above conceptions, then by fair reasoning we can say the Bible agrees exactly with the laws of our mind as manifested in human compositions, and therefore is the more worthy of our attention, as it gives us the firmer hope of understanding it.

Paul declares that the central idea of the Bible is that God is in Christ reconciling the world unto himself, without reckoning their trespasses unto them. Agreeably then to our subjective conception of what a book illustrating this central idea should be we find the Bible beginning by giving us a view of one of the parties in the quarrel which is to be made up by reconciliation, setting him forth as the creator and governor of all, absolutely holy, the source of all goodness and nothing but goodness. On the other hand, man is represented to us as created by this holy being in his own image free, from every tendency to sin, and set in the midst of all the goodness of nature, and all things made subservient to him. All the demands made upon him were just and equitable, and in perfect accordance with his nature and position. Then we have presented to us the change which took place in man through the temptation of the devil, while God still remains the same in the holiness of His character as well as the extent of his demands on man as his creature and dependent. Here then originates the necessity for the method of reconciliation; for on the one hand man has transgressed the commands of God and deserves punishment, while on the other hand we have presented to us God who has created man for the purpose of making him happy for ever and still entertains the same desire. But he is now apparently frustrated in his designs both by the perfection of his own character, the constitution of his government and the influence of sin upon man. The plan of reconciliation must therefore include in itself satisfaction to the divine nature and government as well as a provision for counteracting the influence of sin upon the human mind. These now are found in the doctrine of the atonement and the influence of the Holy Spirit. And we find that, wherever their misconceptions were no hindrance to the Israelites in the way of understanding the main point, their general mode of thinking has been left quite undisturbed; whereas the greatest care was taken to correct it, whenever their previous conceptions might give them wrong views of the subject to which their attention was directed. For instance they were left quietly to enjoy their notion that the

earth stood and the sun traveled, and that the earth was flat and had ends somewhere. But whenever they thought of worshiping idols as other Gods, then was a voice to them immediately saying, "Hearken O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord." They were not for a moment left in doubt as to whether there were more Gods than one.

Agreeably to another position already laid down we venture likewise to assert that the Bible says nothing of countries of which the recipients of revelation were ignorant. This we think is very worthy of the attention of modern expositors of prophecy who bring forward Russia, France and England as being particularly alluded to in Scripture. We are ready to believe them if they can prove that the Jews in the time of Ezekiel and Daniel or the seven churches of Asia knew anything of the above countries. If they did not know anything of them, which seems to us more than probable, if we except those portions which were under Roman sway, then we venture to say that expositors are far from being justified in speaking as they do of those and other countries. For there is nothing more evident than that the books of Scripture were destined by their various writers to be the means of comfort and enlightenment to their contemporaries, which would be far from being the case if they illustrated their subjects by allusions to matters or things with which their readers were utterly unacquainted. We think that expositors have failed to explain the Bible much more from trying to learn from it scores of things which it was not destined to teach, than from any real difficulty connected with the sacred volume, and we have little doubt that men will find the Bible the easiest of books as soon as they will learn to read it as learners and not as teachers. We may notice likewise that according to our view of the aim of Scripture it is quite unnecessary to extend the notices of creation and the deluge beyond the immediate residence of man, or to speak of them only so far as they pertained especially to him.

This view will likewise teach us the meaning of sacrifice. On the one hand it manifested the need and possibility of reconciliation, while on the other hand it showed the insufficiency of all things earthly to effect this reconciliation. In the life of Jesus Christ we have an illustration of the difficulty of effecting the plan of reconciliation as well as a pattern of the blessed effect.

For in Him we see one thoroughly in union with God, who felt no pleasure in anything but doing the will of God, and in whom the prince of this world could find nothing irrelevant or redundant, while on the other hand He contains everything we could wish as calculated to throw light on the divine plan which he had come to carry out in the world. In this way the Bible seems altogether either preparing us to understand and receive the plan when it should be manifest, or else illustrating and urging us to receive it after it is accomplished. There are many subjects alluded to in the foregoing remarks which demand a separate and extended treatment, and to which we may return at some future period. Convinced as we are of the soundness of the principles laid down, we are free to confess that we admit it to be very difficult to carry them out, and find it easier to describe our subjective conception of what the Bible should be than to point out its objective facts as being exactly what the laws of thought seem to demand. But we feel that this is an interesting field, and wish to commend it to the attention of Christian theologians.

BRIEF NOTICES OF NEW PUBLICATIONS.

We have been favored with the opportunity of examining the sheets of Professor Hoppin's forthcoming work on *The Office and Work of the Christian Ministry*,* and are confident it will be welcomed as a valuable addition to the literature of Homiletics and Pastoral Theology. The first paragraph of the book is the key note of the whole. "The Apostle to the Gentiles, who was not accustomed to glory, except in the Lord, gloried in his ministry. In the ministry of Christ, he found his divine vocation; his whole being rejoiced in it; he had for it a holy enthusiasm; he gave his life freely to it, and he would have given a thousand lives." After a spirited introduction on the greatness of the work of the ministry, the author enters upon the subject of Preaching, which occupies the first part of the book (pp. 23–340), and in presenting which he treats of the history of preaching, of the analysis of a sermon, and of rhetoric applied to preaching. The second part of the work (pp. 341–609), treats of the pastoral office and the care of souls. On all these subjects, which are discussed in a comprehensive, earnest and thoughtful spirit, and with much good taste and judgment, we everywhere meet with stimulating and suggestive thoughts, which cannot fail to be helpful to those who are preparing for the ministry, as well as to those already engaged in the work.

— The results of learned investigation on topics preliminary to the systematic study of the Bible are judiciously brought out in a condensed form by Prof. Barrows, late of Andover Theological Seminary, in his *Companion to the Bible.*† The work is divided into four parts. The first treats of the genuineness, credibility and inspiration of the Scriptures; the second and third, of the history of the Canon, and the several books of the Bible; the fourth, the principles of Biblical interpretation. The author observes with much truth that "most of the popular objections to the Old Testament have their foundation in an isolated and fragmentary way of viewing its facts and doctrines, and they can be fairly met only by showing the relations which these hold to the entire plan of redemption," and that it is only when we contemplate revelation "as a glorious whole, having beginning, progress and consummation, that we can truly understand it." The materials for such a view are furnished in this work. As a manual for Bible-class teachers, intelligent laymen, and even preachers of the gospel who desire a good introductory treatise to a wider range of study on these subjects, it will prove to be a valuable aid.

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* *The Office and Work of the Christian Ministry*, by Rev. James M. Hoppin, M.A., Professor of Homiletics and the Pastoral Charge in Yale College. New York, 1869. 8vo. pp. 609.

† *Companion to the Bible.* By Rev. E. P. Barrows, D. D., Professor of Biblical Literature. New York: Am. Tract Soc., 1869. 8vo. pp. 639.

— Dr. Coleman's *Apostolical and Primitive Church*,* originally published some twenty-five years since, was originally written to demonstrate that the ecclesiastical constitution of the primitive church was essentially popular. He maintains that the great controversy of the present day is not with true Protestant Episcopacy, but with High Church Episcopacy, Papacy, Formalism and Ritualism, the latter of which he regards as "the aggressive heresy of our churches." In this new edition, much has been compressed and much added, with the view of making the work more distinctly adapted to this conflict. As a manual of study on these topics, we know of no superior to it in English, and should be glad to learn that it had found a place in every minister's library.

— Conybeare and Howson's *Life and Epistles of St. Paul*,† is now well known as a standard work in theological literature. The two volumes of the American edition issued a number of years since by Messrs. Charles Scribner & Co., are now bound together in one volume, and sold at the low price of three dollars. For ministers and others able to read the critical notes, this edition is to be preferred to the popular editions in circulation.

— The vigorous essay of Rev. D. W. C. Huntington, a prominent minister in the Methodist church, on *Sanctification*, is a protest against a theory which "while it claims to be distinctively and exclusively Wesleyan," the author maintains "flatly contradicts some of the main positions of John Wesley on the subject." The theory is, that after regeneration, a second work of the Spirit is required, which is characterized by "a conviction of sin peculiar to itself, received by an act of faith specifically adapted to its object, often known by the mind experiencing it and attested by a divine witness," as distinct from any other work or state of grace. The author maintains with much force that no such two-fold division of Christian holiness as this theory necessarily implies, is taught in the Scriptures, and that it gives a dangerous prominence to mere emotional experience.

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* *The Apostolical and Primitive Church, popular in its government, informal in its worship. A Manual on Prelacy and Ritualism, carefully revised and adapted to these discussions.* By Lyman Coleman, D. D. Philadelphia, 1869. 12mo., pp.

† *The Life and Epistles of St. Paul*, by Rev W. J. Conybeare and Rev. J. S. Howson. The only complete and unabridged edition. New York: Chas. Scribner & Co., 1869.

‡ *What is it to be Holy*, or *The Theory of Entire Sanctification*, by Rev. D. W. C Huntington, Pastor of the Asbury Methodist Episcopal church, Rochester, N. Y. 1869. 18mo. pp. 71.

XIX.—CHILLINGWORTH'S RELIGION OF PROTESTANTS.*

BY PRINCIPAL TULLOCH.

"The Religion of Protestants" is Chillingworth's great work, by which alone he can be said to be remembered. It sums up all his thought, and has taken its place in English literature as a monument of Christian genius. His other writings are comparatively unimportant, as they are comparatively unknown. A few sermons—nine in all; a series of tracts under the name of "Additional Discourses"—most of them mere sketches or studies for his great work; and a brief fragment, more significant than the rest, entitled, "The Apostolical Institution of Episcopacy Demonstrated"—comprise the whole. The sermons are marked by the vigor both of thought and language which is always characteristic of him, but are not in any special manner interesting or valuable. They contain nothing which would have preserved his name from oblivion; they contain even little to remind us of the bold thought of "The Religion of Protestants." In a still less degree than the few sermons of Hooker attract notice beside "The Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity," do Chillingworth's sermons serve to draw attention away from the work with which his name has become identified.

The tract on Episcopacy possesses a distinct value, as showing the liberal direction of the author's mind on a subject in which his feelings, education, and the eventful turn of his life, strongly interested him. He had not only been trained an Episcopalian in the school of Laud, but all his natural love of order and ardent affection to the Royal cause had enlisted his sympathies on behalf of the existing government of the Church. But no degree of personal prepossession is able to obscure in him the light of rational thought on this any more than on the general subject of religion. Episcopacy is to him in its essentials "no more but

* From the *Contemporary Review*, March, 1868.

this"—"an appointment of one man of eminent sanctity and sufficiency to have the care of all the churches within a certain precinct or diocese, and furnishing him with authority (not absolute or arbitrary, but regulated and bounded by laws, and moderated by joining to him a convenient number of assistants), to the extent that all the Churches under him may be provided of good and able pastors, and that both of pastors and people conformity to laws and performance of their duties may be required." Such a form of government he maintains "is *not repugnant* to the government settled in and for the Church by the Epistles," nor is it incompatible "with the reformation of any evil, either in Church or State, or the introduction of any good" which it may be desirable to introduce. The brief argument of the tract is confined to the "demonstration" of the first of these propositions, and is throughout of the most moderate and reasonable character. He quotes the evidence of "two great defenders of Presbytery," Molinæus (Dumoulin) and Beza, in favor of Episcopacy being the recognized order of Church government "presently after the Apostles' times," and draws the usual inference from this admitted antiquity on behalf of its being the institution of the Apostles themselves. With the validity of such an inference we need not now concern ourselves. It appeared to Chillingworth's mind, in every respect, a fair and dispassionate one, in the light of which the anti-Episcopal dogmatism of the Puritan Presbyterian party seemed utterly unreasonable. To vindicate the institution of Episcopacy from their abuse, and show its claims to a rational historic standing, is the sole aim of his argument, in which aim he is completely successful. Any further claim for it as a positive *jus divinum* is inconsistent alike with his object in the tract and with the whole tone of his thought and reasoning.

It now remains for us to consider his chief work, "The Religion of Protestants a Safe Way to Salvation." This work presents itself to our examination in two points of view:—first, in its general intellectual and literary character: and, secondly, in its substantive argument and meaning, or, in other words, in reference to the great principles which it sets forth. It might be further considered in its controversial details, some of which are aside from the main purpose of the work, and well deserving of attention as illustrative of its logical method and force. But as our purpose in these sketches is not to revive controversy or to

adjust rivalries long since forgotten, but only to fix the significant ideas which have influenced the course of religious thought and permanently enriched it, it is unnecessary as it would be useless, for us to go over the particular points in the polemic between our author and his Jesuit opponent, further than it may be important to do so for our general purpose.

I. "The Religion of Protestants" claims first to be considered by us as one of the most notable productions of English literature. What are its claims to occupy such a position? What are the distinguishing characteristics of its thought and style? In judging it from our modern standard in such matters, we are struck at first by a certain imperfection and clumsiness of form arising out of its controversial purpose. The reader is naturally anxious to get into the heart of the subject and see what a writer of such name has to say about it—what are the strong points of his argument—and how he lays them down and expounds them in relation to one another. In a modern book on the subject, of any remarkable ability, the reader would probably find himself thus carried to the center of interest at once, and made to recognize the great lines of thought characteristic of the opposing sides, and the claims that the one rather than the other has to his following. The modern mind, whatever it may have lost, has certainly gained in organizing power—in the capacity of surveying a subject in its whole outline, and disposing of it in proportion to the relative importance of its details. In controversial literature particularly this has been a great gain. It has tended to fix attention upon the real differences of thought out of which all minor differences spring, and to deliver the reader from mazes of detailed argumentation, which, however ably conducted, have often little or no bearing upon the main points at issue.

In Chillingworth's time controversy, and especially theological controversy, was still a conflict of details. It is one of his excellences that he is superior in this respect to many of his contemporaries. Yet, with all his advance, "The Religion of Protestants" suffers greatly from being in form a detached reply to a forgotten book. The reader has to wade through, in successive chapters, the arguments of the author of "Charity Maintained,"* and in many cases also the statements of Dr. Potter, to which the Jesuit's work was a reply. The real pith of the subject is only

* His Jesuit opponent, Knott.

reached sometimes after all these repeated processes of statement and reply, when the author is at liberty to follow the unembarrassed course of his own thought.

The work opens with a preface addressed to the author of "Charity Maintained," mainly in answer to a pamphlet entitled by him, "A Direction to N. N." This preface, as we formerly remarked, is full of interest for the light which it throws on the formation of Chillingworth's opinions, and is marked by great dignity and elevation of tone. Then follows the preface of the author of "Charity Maintained," and Chillingworth's reply to this, anticipatory of many points upon which he afterwards dwells more fully. Then in succession, through seven chapters, the argument of his Jesuit opponent is given first, and his answer in detail follows. Every point is carefully met, and amidst so many minute particulars of argument there is necessarily a good deal of recurrence of thought. The reader gets impatient of interruptions and of the multitude of steps by which he advances to the close of the controversy.

It is obvious that only rare attributes of thought and style could have arisen above these disadvantages of form, and given unity and life to such an accumulated mass of controversy. But we have scarcely opened the book when we see evidence of these. We find ourselves in contact with an intellect of singular strength and brightness, with a clearly penetrative and powerful thoughtfulness, which grasps the whole subject, and moves unconfused amidst its details. Strength and earnestness,—genuine grasp of mind, and large intelligence,—are Chillingworth's highest characteristics. Some minds have shown more extent of scope, and certainly far more richness and glow of speculative comprehension in conducting a great argument. In these respects Hooker is incomparably superior, and Jeremy Taylor, in his "Liberty of Prophesying," moves with a freer and more sustained air. But neither Hooker nor Taylor equal our author in mere mass and energy of mind, and the masculine robustness and downright honesty generally associated with such simple strength. The very height at which more imaginative writers sometimes soar, gives a certain indistinctness to their thought; it gains in coloring and impressiveness at the expense of plain outline and meaning; but the meaning of Chillingworth is always plain, and always strong. He evades no difficulties, and never flinches for fear of consequences;

he grapples hardily with every statement of his opponent; meets it with the pure force of reason; and brings it to the ground without any hesitation. He is ready for battle at every point, and has never any doubt of the keenness of his weapons nor the force of his blows.

Next to the strength and straightforwardness of his intellect, the most remarkable characteristic is his fairness. No fairer controversialist we believe ever entered the lists. He never takes an undue advantage of his opponent. He is tender to him personally, while unsparing to his arguments. He had himself been caught in the toils amongst which the Jesuit was struggling, and while he pursues and unwinds the entanglements one by one, he never does so in a contemptuous spirit. His magnanimity is beautiful, considering the character of the attacks to which he was subjected by Romanists and Puritans alike. He grows warm and indignant at times, and he uses firm language, especially when he resents "the imputation of Atheism and irreligion;"* but he never smites as they sought to smite him. We know of no personality that ever escaped his pen. A half-tender, half-compassionate, "God forbid I should think the like of you," or "For God's sake free yourself from the blind zeal for a little space,"† is the utmost to which he yields. Of all theologians of the seventeenth century, of any century perhaps, Chillingworth is one of the most thoroughly fair, candid, and open-minded. Temporarily a convert to Romanism, and actually for a while the inmate of a Jesuit seminary, the transparency of his manly and earnest spirit is never for a moment dimmed. The same love of the truth, and the same keenness in its search, animated him from first to last. The idea of upholding a system merely because he had embraced it, or an institution because he happened to belong to it, would have been unintelligible to him. His mind could rest in nothing short of clear and definitely reasoned convictions. He must see the truth for himself, and be able to give some reason for it—why he held to it and why he rejected the contrary. It was this that made his enemies accuse him of inconstancy in religion, and allege that, according to his principles, "a man could be *constant in no religion.*"‡ As he could not un-

* Vol. i, p. 8, Oxford Ed. (All the references are to this Edition.)

† Letter to Mr. Lewgar, Maizeaux's Life, p. 32.

‡ Maizeaux's Life, p. 18.

derstand a mere blind adherence to any system merely because he had once accepted of it, so they could not understand his continual inquisitiveness and determination to see the truth more clearly. "Why constantly be asking what is the sense of Scripture? What religion is best? What church purest? Come, do not wrangle, but believe." This, which is virtually what his Puritan opponent said to him, represents the alternative state of mind. According to a commonplace of almost all religious parties, a man is supposed to be unsettled in religion if he is constantly asking questions, if his mind is restlessly moving towards what seems to him a higher light; while the religious inquirer, on the other hand, has no idea of religion which does not involve constant inquest and movement. It is to him of the very nature of religious thought to be always moving,—to be always rising, and so changing its relation to human systems. Certainly Chillingworth's mind was of this order. Truth was to him one, but its very simplicity made it all the more difficult to seize; and while he kept his eye steadily fixed on it, he was constantly re-adapting his attitude towards it, and trying to get a clearer sight of it.*

* He thus describes his own changes in religion, very much in the spirit we have described them:—"I know of a man that of a moderate Protestant turned a Papist, and the day that he did so (as all things that are done are perfected some day or other) was convicted in conscience that his yesterdays's opinion was an error; and yet, methinks, he was no schismatic for doing so, and desires to be informed by you whether or no he was mistaken. The same man afterwards, upon better consideration, became a doubting Papist, and of a doubting Papist a confirmed Protestant. Even yet this man thinks himself no more to blame for all these changes than a traveller, who, using all diligence to find the right way to some remote city, where he had never been (as this party I speak of had never been in heaven), did yet mistake it, and after find his error and amend it. Nay he stands upon his justification so far as to maintain that his alterations were the most satisfactory actions to himself that ever he did, and the greatest victory that ever he obtained over himself and his affections to those things which in this world are most precious; as whereas for God's sake, and (as he was really persuaded) out of love to the truth, he went upon a certain expectation of these inconveniences, which to ungenerous natures are of all the most terrible; so that although there was much weakness in some of these alterations, yet certainly there was no wickedness. Neither does he yield his weakness altogether without apology, seeing his *deductions are rational* and out of some principles commonly received by Protestants as well as Papists,—and which by his education had got possession of his understanding." —Vol. ii, chap. v. p. 259.

It is this earnest high-mindedness, this spirit of healthy rationality, which gives such elevation, purity, and dignity to Chillingworth's thought. He is superior to all commonplace of his church or school—all mere professionalism. And nothing perhaps more marks the great writer in any department than this superiority. A writer who is unable to rise above the level of his profession may be acute, learned, and able; he may be a great authority on his own subject, but he will never take a place in the world of thought and literature. In order to do this, he must show himself at least capable of rising above traditional or official limits, and of perceiving the truth in its own light, and vindicating it on the highest grounds of reason. In all special departments of intellectual work, and particularly in theology, the highest minds have been of this order. They have been minds thoroughly competent in their own department, but also of a healthy openness of thought in other directions. They have always recognized something higher than professional canons of opinion, and carried the breath of nature, so to speak, and of universal reason, into their work. It is this which makes the distinction between such a writer as Hooker and Andrews, for example; the latter—a man apparently of far more special ability than Hooker (he is said to have been master of fifteen languages), but infinitely inferior in breadth and capacity of thought—forgotten, except by a few theological students who turn occasionally to his sermons; while Hooker continues, and will ever continue, one of the great classics of English literature. It is this which distinguishes our author and sets him far above most of his theological contemporaries, either Anglican or Puritan; Hammond or Sanderson, on the one side, and Owen, to take the very highest example, on the other. In contrast to such writers, Chillingworth is a man of rational and not merely of special theological culture. He shows himself capable not merely of handling particular doctrinal points after the best manner of his school, and of bringing logical skill and erudition to bear upon their support and illustration, but moreover of dealing with questions in their most generalized intellectual shape, and of bringing them to the test of the higher reason of all men. And so it is that "The Religion of Protestants," like "The Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity," has an unfading interest to the common educated intellect, and not merely to the theological student. It remains, although in a less degree than

the great work of Hooker, a living force in general literature—a permanent monument of thought marking the advance of the human mind in the loftiest of all directions.

It is especially this higher thoughtfulness, this touch of light from the altitudes of a divine philosophy, which gives any life to theological polemics. However able, ingenious, or successful for the time an argumentative work may be, if it have nothing of this—if it never soar beyond the confines of its special subject, nor start any principles of general application—it will be found to lose hold of the succeeding generations, and gradually to pass from the ranks of literature. It may be sought after and highly prized by certain minds, but the progressive intelligence finds no meaning in it. It may have served a cause, silenced an enemy, and even gained a distinguished victory; but it has done nothing to advance the course of thought; it has opened no tracks which have been further cleared and expanded; and so it passes out of sight, and deserves to do so, great as may have been its temporary reputation. It is a distinct gain to literature that an oblivion—frequently rapid, always sure—should thus overtake the great mass of controversial writings, which contain so little that is fitted to elevate or enrich human thought. To be forgotten is their happiest fate. But let a fair, generous, and noble reason—like Hooker's or Chillingworth's—irradiate a controversy, and it acquires permanent life and interest. It becomes a mirror of higher truth, and men return to it in after-generations to study the principles which it helped to elucidate, and to refresh themselves in its light.

The style of Chillingworth is the natural expression of his thought—simple, strong, and earnest, occasionally rugged and vehement. Particularly like his thought, it is without any artifice. He is concerned with what he has to say, not with his mode of saying it; and having thrown aside almost all the scholastic pedantries which in his time still clung to theological style, he gives fair play to his native sense and vigor. His vehemence is apt to hurry him into disorder, but also often breaks into passages of lofty and powerful eloquence. If we compare his style with that of Hooker or Bacon, it is inferior in richness, compass, and power, but superior in flexibility, rapidity, and point. It turns and doubles upon his adversary with an impetuosity and energy that carry the reader along, and serve to relieve the tedious levels

of the argument. If he must be ranked, upon the whole, greatly below such writers as we have mentioned, he is yet in this, as in other respects, much above most of his contemporary divines. The pages of Laud, or of his biographer Heylin, or even of Hammond, are barren and unreadable beside those of "The Religion of Protestants;" and even the richer beauties of Taylor, embedded amidst many pleasantries and affectations, pall in comparison with his robust simplicity and energy. With writers of the ordinary Westminster school, like his opponent Cheynell, it would be absurd to compare him: they are utterly without grace, life, or power; even the best Puritan writers, like Howe and Baxter, scarcely reach, in their best passages, his manly and inspiring eloquence.

II. Let us now turn to the argument of his work, and especially to the principles upon which it rests. The main question which it raises is the always vital one as to the *grounds of religious certitude*. How are we to know the Truth in religion? On what basis must faith rest? Who or what is the arbiter of religious opinion? This is the great issue between him and his Romanist opponent. It is unnecessary for us, as we have already said, to take up the successive details of assault and retort between them; but it is important, for the sake of clearness, to understand the manner in which they approach each other—the line of their controversial march towards the great principles in which the chief interest of the discussion lies.

After a detailed answer to the preface of the author of "Charity Maintained," the argument opens with the question of Charity as between the two sides. Is it uncharitable for Papist to maintain that Protestants cannot be saved? This had been the special question between Knott the Jesuit and Dr. Potter*—the one maintaining that "Protestancy unrepented destroys salvation;" the other, that "want of Charity is justly charged on all Romanists" who affirm this proposition. Chillingworth takes up the controversy from this point. The first pamphlet of Knott was published in 1630; Potter's answer in 1633; and then in the following year the Jesuit returned to the charge in "Mercy, or Faith, or Charity Maintained by Catholics;" and it is to the suc-

* Dr. Potter, of Queens College, with whom the controversy began. See *Contemporary Review*, vol. vi, p. 38.

cessive chapters of this book, printed in front of his own, that Chillingworth replies.

In his opening chapter the Jesuit holds to his point, but not without the qualifications repeated to our own day by all exclusive Sacerdotalists, Anglican or Roman: "Our meaning is not that we give Protestants over to reprobation. We hope, we pray for their conversion. . . . . Neither is our censure directed to particular persons. The tribunal of particular judgments is God's alone." Want of opportunity of knowing Catholic truth, want of capacity to understand it, "light declaring to men their errors or contrition, retracting them in the moment of death," are allowed as excuses. "In such particular cases," says Knott, "we wish more apparent signs of salvation, but do not give any dogmatical sentence of perdition."

In his answer, Chillingworth makes good use of the concessions of his opponent as to the salvability of Protestants. The question is no longer, he says, "simply whether Prostestancy unrepented destroys salvation, as it was at first proposed, but whether Protestancy in itself, apart from ignorance and contrition, destroys salvation." Knott has admitted, in short, that a Protestant may be saved, if he be either an ignorant Protestant—not having had the means or capacity of knowing any better—or if he join with his Protestantism the "antidote of a general repentance." Though Protestants may not be saved at so easy a rate as Papists, yet (even Papists being the judges) they may attain salvation. "Heaven is not inaccessible." "Their errors are not impracticable isthmuses between them and salvation." Nothing can be finer than the courteous sneer with which Chillingworth points his reply here; all the more impressive that he seldom indulges in this vein:—

"For my part," he says, "such is my charity to you, that considering what great necessity you have, as much as any Christian society in the world, that the sanctuaries of ignorance and dependence should always stand open, I can hardly persuade myself, so much as in my most sacred consideration to divest you of these so needful qualifications; but whensoever your errors, superstitions, and impieties come to my mind, my only comfort is that the doctrine and practice too of repentance is yet remaining in your church; and that though you put on a face of confidence of

your innocenee in point of doctrine, yet you will be glad to stand in the eye of many as well as your fellows, and not be so stout as to refuse either God's pardon or the king's."

He then engages to meet his opponent on the more limited question—as he concludes it to be—as to whether Protestantism possesses so much natural malignity as to be in itself, apart from ignorance and contrition, destructive of salvation.

The combatants start with an acknowledged proposition on both sides. Chillingworth grants that there must be "a visible church stored with all helps necessary to salvation;" and further, that the Church must have "sufficient means of determining all controversies in religion which are necessary to be determined;" "sufficient" means, but not necessarily "effectual," "for that the same means may be sufficient for the compassing an end, and not effectual, you must not deny, who hold that God gives to all men sufficient means of salvation, and yet that all are not saved;" further not for determining all controversies whatsoever, but only "*all which are necessary to be determined.*" Here, where so much of the general argument is to rest, he discriminates his ground carefully from the first. The end, he says, must be the measure of the means here and everywhere.

"If I have no need to be at London, I have no need of a horse to carry me thither. If I have no need to fly, I have no need of wings. So if I can be saved without knowing this or that definitely, I have no need to know it. The Church needs no means for determining points in which salvation is not involved. Is it necessary that all controversies in religion should be determined, or is it not?"

The question plainly put contains its own answer even to the Romanist in whose church, as in all churches, many questions remain undetermined, or open questions.

So far, therefore, there is common ground between Chillingworth and his opponent. They advance up to a certain point on the same line of argument. There must be a visible church in possession of the means of salvation. This primary generality raises no discussion. Further, they agree that there must be within the Church an arbiter of religious truth, some "infallible" means of religious certitude. The latter expression is, with both

writers, identical with the former—"means of salvation;" and Chillingworth is content to use the word "infallible" no less than his opponent.* But here the apparent agreement between them proves to be entirely hollow. The words they use have not the same meaning. The religious truth is not the same thing to each. Their mode of reaching it is entirely different. The question, in short, of the determination of religious truth, or what is necessary to salvation, opens up their antagonism from its roots. All the other points of their argument branch off from this, and are virtually settled by the conclusions to which they come upon this. While avoiding the details of the controversy, it may be useful to exhibit in a table the course of discussion as it unfolds itself in successive chapters. This may be stated as follows, confining ourselves as much as possible to the language used by Chillingworth and his opponent.

I. The question as to religious certitude, or "the means whereby the truths of revelation are conveyed to our understanding," and controversies in faith and religion are determined.

II. The distinction of points fundamental and not fundamental, whether it is pertinent in the controversy.

III. The question whether the Apostles' Creed contains all fundamental points or "all points necessary to be believed."

IV. and V. Whether separation from the Church of Rome constitutes schism and heresy, and

VI. (which is a mere corollary from IV. and V.), whether Protestants are bound in charity to themselves to become reunited to the Roman Church.

A mere glance at this table serves to show how the whole controversy is really summed up in the twofold question as to the source of religious Truth and the character or sum of this Truth. To this question, therefore, as handled by our controversialists, we address ourselves. It assumes a very speedy and direct issue. The source of religious certitude—the infallible means of determining religious Truth—Knott says, is the Church, by which, of course, he means the Roman Catholic Church. Take away the Roman principle of infallibility, and all religion falls to the ground. "None can deny the infallible authority of the Church,"

* The "means of deciding controversies on faith and religion," he grants, "must be endued with a universal infallibility *in what it propoundeth for a Divine truth.*' —P. i, c. i. Answer. Vol. i. p. 113.

are his words, "but he must abandon all inspired faith and true religion, if he but understand himself." Again, "If the infallibility of such a public authority be once impeached, what remains but that every man is given over to his own wit and discourse?" The principle of Knott, therefore, was the principle of the *Church's infallible voice.* Is any man in doubt, let him ask the Church. The Church is divinely authorized to pronounce what is true, and what every man is therefore bound to believe. This principle, whatever practical difficulties may be involved in it, is at least in its generality intelligible and consistent.

The position of Chillingworth as opposed to this principle, is the well-known Protestant adage so often quoted in his own words,* "The *Bible, and the Bible only, is the religion of Protestants.*" The Bible, not the Church, is the organ of religious Truth, and the only rule of faith. This is the Protestant principle, asserted by our author and professed by all Protestant Churches in its *generality.* But the merit of Chillingworth, of course, does not consist in his having enunciated this general principle. It did not remain for him to do this. It is his interpretation of the principle which constitutes all his distinction as a religious thinker—which could alone have given him any distinction. It is plain, for example, that when it is said to a man, the voice of the Church is authoritative, or, on the other hand, the voice of Scripture is authoritative, that the man is not greatly helped in a practical point of view. For he must then immediately ask, How am I to be sure of the voice of the Church, or how am I to be sure of the voice of Scripture? It is here that the real pinch lies. To take an illustration, there are ultra Anglo-Catholics who start from the same principle as the Roman Catholics, with both of whom (say, merely for the sake of clearness, Dr. Pusey and Dr. Newman) the *Church is always the last word;* but then the question arises, Which *is the Church?* and here the Anglican High Churchman and the Roman High Churchman separate. In a similar manner with the Presbyterian and Independent, or still more strikingly with the Calvinist and Arminian, and even Socinian of the old type, alike, the Bible is the last word—only the Bible. But then, not to speak of the modern question untouched by Chillingworth, What is the Bible? the further question at once arises, What is the voice of the Bible? what its true

* Vol. ii, chap vi. p. 410.

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meaning? and here these several classes of Protestants separate. After having gained an apparent certainty in the assertion of a general principle, uncertainty again begins. Admitting Scripture to be the rule of faith, how are we to know the meaning of Scripture? Now it is here that Chillingworth has done real service. Here where the real difficulty lies he has cleared up the question, and settled it in the only way in which it can ever be consistently settled by Protestants. We will endeavor first to state his conclusions in our own language as briefly as possible, and then quote several passages from his work which set forth his views fully.

Chillingworth has virtually said, There is no real difficulty as to the meaning of Scripture. The great principles of religion—what we are to believe concerning God, and what duty requires of us—are clearly revealed in the Bible. All Protestant Churches have seen and acknowledged them. The Apostles' Creed embraces them. They are patent to the "right reason" (the expression is his own) and judgment of every man. The matters that separate Christians, or at least Protestant Christians, are not matters of faith,—necessary elements of religious truth pertaining to salvation—but matters of speculation on which Christians may differ safely or without any detriment to their spiritual condition. Such is the position laid down by Chillingworth. He disposes in short of the question of religious certitude by reducing it to its simplest dimensions. The proper objects—the only valid objects of religious belief—according to him, are certain great facts or principles which are plainly revealed or made known to every open intelligence in Scripture. What lies beyond these facts or principles is either in its nature uncertain, or in its bearing unimportant. Religious certitude, in short, can be reached by every honest mind with Scripture before it. Where such certitude is impossible, it is unnecessary.

Let us now attend to Chillingworth's own statements, many of which are very significant. They are scattered over a wide surface, but we will endeavor to exhibit them in such an order as to bring out his meaning fully, and yet without exaggeration.

Speaking of Scripture in his second chapter as "the only rule whereby to judge of controversies," he says, that it is—

"Sufficiently perfect and sufficiently intelligible to all that have

understanding, whether they be learned or unlearned. And my reason hereof is convincing and demonstrative, because nothing is necessary *to be believed but what is plainly revealed.* For to say that where a place, by reason of ambiguous terms, lies indifferent between divers senses whereof one is true and the other is false, that God obliges man under pain of damnation not to mistake through error or human frailty, is to make God a tyrant; and to say that he requires us certainly to attain that end, for the attaining whereof we have no certain means, which is to say that, like Pharaoh, he gives no straw and requires brick; that he reaps where he sows not, that he gathers where he strews not, that he will not accept of us according to that which we have, but requireth of us what we have not. . . . . shall we not tremble to impute that to God which we would take as foul scorn if it were imputed to ourselves? Certainly I for my part fear I should not love God, if I should think so strangely of him."*

"Again," he continues, addressing his opponent—

"When you say 'that unlearned and ignorant men cannot understand Scripture,' I would desire you to come out of the clouds and tell us what you mean; whether that they cannot understand all Scripture, or that they cannot understand any scripture, or that they cannot understand so much as is sufficient for their direction to heaven. If the first,—I believe the learned are in the same case. If the second,—every man's experience will confute you; for who is there who is not capable of a sufficient understanding of the story, the precepts, the promises, and the threats of the Gospel? If the third,—that they may understand something, but not enough for their salvation; I ask you, why then doth St. Paul say to Timothy, '*The Scriptures are able to make him wise unto salvation?*' Why doth St. Austin say, *Ea quæ manifeste posita sunt in Sacris Scripturis omnia continent quæ pertinent ad fidem moresque vivendi?* Why does every one of the four Evangelists entitle this book, the Gospel, if any necessary and essential part of the Gospel were left out of it? Can we imagine that either they omitted something necessary out of ignorance, not knowing it to be necessary? or, knowing it to be so, maliciously concealed it? or, out of negligence, did the work they

* Vol. i, pp. 230–1.

had undertaken by halves? If none of these things can be imputed to them, then certainly it must naturally follow that every one writ the whole Gospel of Christ; I mean all the essential and necessary parts of it. So that if we had no other book of Scripture than one of them alone, we should not want anything necessary to salvation."*

Elsewhere, in a previous part of the same chapter, in reference to the statement that Scripture—admitting it to be a rule or law of faith—"is no more fit to end controversies *without* a living judge, than the law is alone to end such," he answers—

"If the law were plain and perfect, and men honest and desirous to understand aright and obey it, he that says it were not fit to end controversies, must either want understanding himself, or think the world wants it. Now the Scriptures, we pretend, in things necessary, is plain and perfect. Such a law therefore cannot but be very fit to end controversies necessary to be ended. For others that are not so, they will end when the world ends, and that is time enough."†

He repudiates the necessity of any judge to interpret Scripture.

"Every man is to judge for himself with the judgment of discretion." "For if the Scripture (as it is in things necessary) be plain, why should it be more necessary to have a judge to interpret it in plain places than to have a judge to interpret the meaning of a councillor's decrees, and others to interpret their interpretations, and others to interpret them, and so on forever? And when they are not plain, then if we, using diligence to find the truth, do yet miss of it, and fall into error, there is no danger in it. *They that err and they that do not err may both be saved. So that those places which contain things necessary, and where no error was dangerous, need no infallible interpreter, because they are plain; and those that are obscure need none, because they contain not things necessary; neither is error in them dangerous.*"‡

With such confidence does Chillingworth lay down the principle of the sufficiency of Scripture, and of its plainness and intelligibility in all things necessary for salvation, and therefore

* Vol. i, p. 232. † Do. ii, p. 169. ‡ Do. ii, p. 170.

necessary to be believed. He adverts over and over again to the great principle that the responsibility of faith is to be measured by the clearness and simplicity of the Divine Revelation. If God has spoken plainly, and man refuse to receive the divine testimony, he has no excuse to offer for him. This were to give God the lie, he says, and "questionless damnable."* "But as for other things which lie without the covenant,"† according to his expression, that is to say, which were either obscure in themselves or capable of different interpretations, according to the variety of tempers, abilities, educations, and unavoidable prejudices whereby men's understandings are variously formed and fashioned, "to say that God will damn men for errors as to such things, who are lovers of him and lovers of truth, is to rob man of his comfort and God of his goodness; is to make man desperate and God a tyrant." "When you can show," he adds in the same place, in a passage of great emphasis,—

"When you can show that God hath interposed his testimony on one side or another, so that either they do see it and will not; or were it not for their own voluntary and avoidable fault might and should see it, and do not; let all such errors be as damnable as you please to make them." But "if they suffer themselves neither to be betrayed into their errors, nor kept in them by any sin of their will; if they do their best endeavor to free themselves from all errors, and yet fail of it through human frailty, so well am I persuaded of the goodness of God, that if in me alone should meet a confluence of all such errors of all the Protestants of the world that were thus qualified, I should not be so much afraid of them all as I should be to ask pardon for them."‡

Scripture on the one hand, therefore, and the free, honest, open mind on the other hand—these are, with Chillingworth, the factors, and the only factors, of religious Truth—the essential elements of religious certitude. Scripture is an open mirror in which every intelligence may see the Truth if it only look for it. There is no necessity for any medium to transfer it, or any judge to interpret it to the understanding. It lies open to all in the simple statements of the Gospels—of any one of the Gospels. It is not

* Answer to Preface, p. 80. * Do. p. 80. ‡ Do. p. 14.

to be supposed that Chillingworth, in thus nakedly asserting the sufficiency of the individual judgment or reason to find the meaning of Scripture for itself, puts aside or rejects the necessity of Divine influence in reaching Divine truth. This special point was not in question between the two disputants. They alike recognized the reality of Divine revelation and the necessity of the Divine Spirit. What they differed about was as to the medium of the revelation and the organ of the Spirit. To the Jesuit the Church was both the one and the other—the revealing medium and the interpreting spirit. Scripture was merely a help to the Church. To Chillingworth, Scripture and Reason were the twofold Source of the Truth—the one external, the other internal. We have seen sufficiently what he says as to the first. Let us observe now what he says as to the second.

Knott had said that if the notion of Papal infallibility were given up, every man was given over to his own wit and discourse. Chillingworth replies:—

"If you mean by *discourse* right reason grounded on Divine revelation, and common notions written by God in the hearts of all men, and deducing, according to the never-failing rules of logic, consequent deductions from them;—if this be it which you mean by discourse, it is very meet and reasonable and necessary that men, as in all their actions, so especially in that of greatest importance, the choice of their way to happiness, should be left unto it; and he that follows this in all his opinions and actions, and does not only seem to do so, follows always God."*

Again:—

"For my part, I am certain that God hath given us our reason to discern between truth and falsehood; and he that makes not this use of it, but believes things he knows not why, I say that it is by chance that he believes the truth, and not by choice; and that I cannot but fear that God will not accept the *sacrifice of fools*. But you that would have men follow their reason, what would you have them follow?—their passions?—to pluck out their eyes and go blindfold? No; you would have them follow authority. On God's name let them. We also would have them follow au-

* Answer to Preface, p. 14.

thority; for it is upon the authority of universal tradition that we should have them believe Scripture. But then as for the authority which you would have them follow, you will let them see reason why they should follow it. And is not this to go a little about; to leave reason for a short time and then to come to it again, and to do that which you condemn in others?—it being, indeed, a plain improbability for any man to submit his reason but to reason."*

Every man, in short, must have some rational conviction at the root of his religion, however imperfect or concealed this conviction may be. He may accept his religion at first hand from the priest or the Church, but he must have some reason for believing the Church. He may believe that a doctrine is true because coming directly from the Spirit of God; but he must have some evidence, or, in other words, some reason, for believing that the doctrine does come from the Divine Spirit. Chillingworth is quite as much opposed to a superstitious and irrational Protestantism as to a superstitious and irrational Popery. The private judgment must not merely be "a particular reason that a doctrine is true which some men pretend, but cannot prove, to come from the Spirit of God," but a rational judgment founded upon evidence:—

"For is there not a manifest difference between saying, 'the Spirit of God tells me that this is the meaning of such a text' (which no man can possibly know to be true, it being a secret thing), and between saying, 'These and those reasons I have to show that this or that is true doctrine, or that this or that is the meaning of such a Scripture,' reason being a public and certain thing, and exposed to all men's trial and examination?"†

Such is the mode in which Chillingworth settles the primary question of religious certitude, or the source of religious Truth. The remaining questions scarcely admit of vital controversy after laying down such a basis. It is plain that differing here, the disputants must differ throughout—as to the sum or contents of religious Truth, for example, no less than its Source or Authority. The one question continually involves the other. Not only is the Church the authority with Knott, but all that the Church stamps

* Vol. i, pp. 237–8. † Do. pp. 235–6.

with its authority is vital or fundamental. All is truth which the Church affirms to be true. Not at all, argues Chillingworth. That is Truth only which is necessary to be believed in order to salvation. The Jesuit taunts him with the necessity of giving a catalogue of necessary or fundamental doctrines. This is not at all requisite, he says. "That may be fundamental and necessary to me which to another is not so." The question is one of privilege and opportunity, as the case of Cornelius shows:—

"In his Gentilism he was accepted for his present state; yet, if he had continued in it, and refused to believe in Christ after the sufficient revelation of the Gospel to him and God's will to have him believe it, he that was accepted before would not have continued accepted."*

As the Romanist, therefore, thinks it enough to say in general, "That all is fundamental which the Church has defined;" so it is enough for the Protestant to say in general, "That it is sufficient for man's salvation to believe that the Scripture is true, and contains all things necessary for salvation, and to do his best endeavor to find and believe the true sense of it."†

The Jesuit argues that "unless the Church be infallible in all things, we cannot believe her in any one." Chillingworth pours great contempt upon this argument. There is no more consequence in it, he says, than in this: "The devil is not infallible; therefore, if he says there is one God, I cannot believe him. No geometrician is infallible in all things, therefore not in these things which he demonstrates."‡ If it be meant, indeed, that the Church being fallible, we cannot rationally believe her simply on her own word or authority, there is no doubt of the proposition. The Church is only to be credited—everything is only credible—on fair grounds of reason and evidence presented to the crediting intelligence. That there shall be always a Church "infallible in fundamentals," he admits, for this is simply to say, "that there shall be always a Church." But that any given Church is always an infallible guide in fundamentals, is to say something quite different. This statement he entirely denies. "The true Church always shall be the teacher and maintainer of all necessary truth,

* Vol. i, p. 321. † Do. p. 322. ‡ Do. i, p. 347.

for it is of the essence of the Church to be so. But a man may be still a man though he want a hand or an eye. So the Church may be still a Church though it be defective in some profitable truth."* It follows, of course, that the simplest creed is the best creed, and that which alone offers any basis of reunion among Christians. That which is known as the Apostles' Creed best answers to this description. It has been esteemed "a sufficient summary or catalogue of fundamentals by the most learned Romanists and by antiquity." "What man or church soever believes this creed, and all the evident consequences of it, sincerely and heartily, cannot possibly be in any error of simple belief offensive to God."

It appears to Chillingworth that it would be of the utmost advantage for the Christian world if men would recognize the adequacy of such a creed as this, and hold all beyond as mere matters of speculative opinion. There appears to him no other prospect of Christian union.

"For this is most certain," he says, "that to reduce Christians to unity of communion there are but two ways; the one by taking away the diversity of opinions touching matters of religion; the other by showing that the diversity of opinions which is among the several sects of Christians ought to be no hindrance to their unity in communion. Now, the former of these is not to be hoped for without a miracle. . . . . What then remains but that the other way must be taken, and Christians must be taught to set a higher value upon those points of faith and obedience in which they agree than upon those matters of less moment wherein they differ; and understand that agreement in these ought to be more effectual to join them in one communion than their difference in other things of less moment? When I say in one communion, I mean in a common profession of those articles of faith wherein all consent; a joint worship of God, after such a way as all esteem lawful; and a mutual performance of all those works of charity which Christians owe one to another. And to such a communion what better inducement could be thought of than to demonstrate that what was universally believed of all Christians, if it were joined with a love of truth and of holy obedience, was sufficient to bring men to heaven? *For why should men be*

* Vol. i, p. 340.

more rigid than God? Why should any error exclude any man from the Church's communion which will not deprive him of eternal salvation?"*

Again, he says:—

"If men would allow that the way to heaven is not narrower now than Christ left it, his yoke no heavier than he made it; that the belief of no more difficulties is required now to salvation than was in the primitive Church; that no error is in itself destructive and exclusive from salvation now which was not then; if, instead of being zealous Papists, earnest Calvinists, rigid Lutherans, they would become themselves, and be content that others should be, plain and honest Christians; if all men would believe the Scripture, and, freeing themselves from prejudice and passion, would sincerely endeavor to find the true sense of it, and live according to it, and require no more of others than to do so; nor denying their communion to any that do so, would so order their public service of God that all which do so may, without scruple, or hypocrisy, or protestation against any part of it, join with them in it—who doth not see that, since all necessary truths are plainly and evidently set down in Scripture, there would of necessity be among all men, in all things necessary, unity of opinion? And, notwithstanding any other differences that are or could be, unity of communion, and charity, and mutual toleration, by which means all schism and heresy would be banished the world, and those wretched contentions which now rend and tear in pieces, not the coat, but the members and bowels of Christ, which mutual pride, and tyranny, and cursing, and killing, and damning, would fain make immortal, should speedily receive a most blessed catastrophe."†

The reader will notice the rising energy, the suppressed yet hurrying vehemence, which runs through this passage. This is Chillingworth's manner when fully under the influence of some great thought or feeling. His mind kindles, and his style catches the glow and impetuosity of a noble enthusiasm. There is no subject stirs him more readily or more loftily than religious freedom. The idea of this freedom, and how miserably men grudge it to

* Vol. ii, pp. 58, 59. † Vol. i, p. 404.

each other, and Christian Churches strive to thwart and limit it instead of seeking their strength in educating it, never fails to fire his language, and makes it move with that grand, if somewhat irregular, energy which is its highest feature. He acknowledges the authority of the Divine Word to control man's faith, and no other authority.

"Propose to me anything out of the Bible," he says, "and require whether I believe it or no, and seem it never so incomprehensible to human reason, I will subscribe it with hand and heart, as knowing no demonstration can be stronger than this: God hath said so, therefore it is true. In other things, I will take no man's liberty of judgment from him, neither shall any man take mine from me. I will think no man the worse man nor the worse Christian,—I will love no man the less for differing in opinion from me; and what measure I mete to others I expect from them again. I am fully assured that God does not, and therefore that man ought not, to require any more of any man than this—to believe the Scripture to be God's word, to endeavor to find the true sense of it, and to live according to it."*

Freedom of religious opinion was thus placed by Chillingworth on its true basis more than two centuries ago—six years before the Westminster Assembly met. If anything were needed to show the height to which he rises above the divines of the time, this simple fact was enough to show it. The principle of religious latitude had indeed been already laid down by the Remonstrant divines in Holland; but none had seized it more clearly or boldly than Chillingworth, and none had heretofore given systematic expression to it in England. It is to be observed that he announces it as a principle for the direction and government of Churches, and not merely as a barren concession to the force of philosophical and religious indifference. It derives all its interest to him from its connection with religious earnestness and its seeming to open up the way for the reconstitution and advancement of the Christian Church. The idea of religious latitude being something very good outside the Church, but an impossibility within the Church, is opposed to his whole conception. According to him, on the contrary, the only valid basis for the Church, the only hope of its ever becoming what it professes to be, *Catholic*, is the utmost

* Vol. ii, p. 411.

freedom in the light of Scripture. Whatever tends to limit or control religious faith beyond the one controlling authority of the Divine word is evil. This is absolute when we recognize it. Whatever tends to interfere with the simplicity of this absolute spiritual authority is a source of ecclesiastical disorganization—of unchristian disorder. It is when he touches this strain that his language rises to indignant eloquence.

"This presumptuous imposing of the senses of men upon the words of God,—the special senses of men upon the general words of God, and laying them upon men's consciences together, under the equal penalty of death and damnation; this vain conceit, that we can speak of the things of God better than the words of God; this deifying our own interpretations, and tyrannous enforcing them upon others; this restraining of the word of God from that latitude and generality, and the understanding of men from that liberty wherein Christ and the Apostles left them, is and hath been the only fountain of all the schisms of the Church, and that which makes them immortal; the common incendiary of Christendom, and that which tears in pieces not the coat, but the bowels and members of Christ. *Ridente Turca nec dolente Judæo* Take away these walls of separation, and all will quickly be one Take away this persecuting, burning, cursing, damning of men for not subscribing to the words of men as the words of God require of Christians only to believe Christ, and to call no man master but Him only; let those leave claiming infallibility that have no title to it, and let them, that in their word disclaim it disclaim it likewise in their actions. In a word, take away tyranny, which is the devil's instrument to support errors and superstitions, and impieties in the several parts of the world, which could not otherwise long withstand the power of truth; I say take away tyranny and restore Christians to their just and full liberty of captivating their understanding to Scripture only, and, as rivers, when they have a free passage run all to the ocean, so it may well be hoped, by God's blessing, that universal liberty, thus unrestricted, may quickly reduce Christendom to truth and unity."*

It is unnecessary to carry our exposition further. These extracts render Chillingworth's principles sufficiently apparent.

* Vol. ii, pp. 38, 39.

They are the principles evidently neither of the Laudian school, with which he was personally associated, nor of the Puritan school, to which he was opposed. He stands aloof from both, on a higher platform. From the school of Laud he is separated by his elevation of Scripture, not only into the supreme, but also into the only authority in religious opinion and controversy; and while the mere general assertion of this principle might seem to place him on the same level with the Puritan, the manner in which he maintains and interprets this principle separates him widely from it. While he recognizes Scripture as the only authority in religion, he recognizes at the same time the free right of the individual reason to interpret Scripture. Nor does he acknowledge this merely as a generality which Puritanism may be also said to do, but he accepts it as a living practical principle in all its consequences. The right of free individual interpretation of Scripture, for example, implies the right of religious difference. Beyond an obvious round of great facts and truths, to be found everywhere plainly revealed in Scripture,—to be found complete in any one of the Gospels,—there is no unity of religious belief possible or desirable among Christians. Beyond these facts of which the Apostles' Creed is the historical summary, he proclaims the principle of religious latitude. This is his distinction: Christianity is with him belief in Christ—the great facts of Christ's life and death for man's salvation,—without either a Sacramentarian theory, or a Calvinistic or an Arminian theory of the mode in which this salvation is made effectual to man. He requires of Christians, in his own language, "to believe only in Christ," "and will damn no man or doctrine without express and certain warrant from God's word." He recognizes the authority of God in religion, and no other authority. This authority is addressed to the individual reason, and conscience, in Scripture, so that the humblest intelligence may see and own it. There is no second authority entitled to speak for the Divine voice, or to interfere between it and the individual. The voice of the Church, the voice of creeds and councils, should be reverently listened to, but they possess no binding authority in themselves over the Christian conscience. In so far as they express the truth of Scripture we are to be thankful for them, accept and use them; but what we acknowledge in them is not the human expressions or temporary

form of doctrine, but the Divine substance and meaning which they have sought to render.

"By the 'Religion of Protestants,' I do not understand the doctrine of Luther or Calvin or Melancthon, nor the confession of Augusta or Geneva, nor the Catechism of Heidelberg, nor the Articles of the Church of England; no, nor the harmony of Protestant Confessions; but that wherein they all agree, and which they all subscribe with a greater harmony as a perfect rule of their faith and actions,—that is, the *Bible*."*

Chillingworth was thus a Protestant, not merely in name, but in truth and consistently. He recognized and, for the first time in English theological literature, fully expounded the meaning of Protestantism and its logical corollary, the principle of religious latitude, or of "agreeing to differ" in all matters of religious theory in which the varying tastes, tempers, and judgments of men necessarily create difference. He held fast to the supremacy of Scripture, the great watchword of the sixteenth century against Popery; but he appreciated, as the sixteenth century had not done, the free action of reason upon Scripture. To the cause of Protestantism and of liberal theology he has thus rendered an abiding service. There are few names, upon the whole, even in a history so fruitful in great names as that of the Church of England, which more excite our admiration, or which claim a more significant place in the development of religious thought. Chillingworth will not indeed be prized by either of the extremes of thought in our day—by those who have once more taken up the cry of priestly authority in religion, nor by those who recognize no authority save the conclusions of the scientific intellect. But the world is not yet, we trust, committed to either of these extremes —to Ritualism or to Positivism. Reason will survive the assaults of the one, and faith those of the other. Let us be assured that whatever progress yet awaits the human race will be a progress at once rational and religious, in which the rights of free thought and the instincts of a filial faith will meet and harmonize.

JOHN TULLOCH.

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* Vol. ii, p. 410.

XX.—BARON BUNSEN.*

In 1814, "on a certain cheerful evening," a knot of college friends, who had met after separation in the old university town of Göttingen, agreed to vow that each should in his lifetime accomplish something great. The fine enthusiasm of youth is never tired of laying down for itself a lofty design, undeterred by the failure of its predecessors, whose similar designs have shamed the results of their maturer labor; and this credulousness of its own strength, and resolute hope to conquer for its part obstructions before which other men have fallen, is a weakness too nearly akin to virtue to be harshly judged. Few at least can afford to smile at the Göttingen students. Far more fully than is the case with most, several of those German youths lived to redeem their college pledge. Professor Brandis, the historian of Greek philosophy, was one of them; Lachmann was another, whose critical labors on the New Testament first gave due value to the earliest accessible text, that which was current in Eastern Christendom during the fourth century; a third was Lücke, to whom we owe a commentary, at once the most learned and the most full of insight which we possess, on the writings of St. John. The center and soul of the band was a man of powers more fertile and varied than any of these, who, to indefatigable energy, joined a temper singularly happy, and an impulsive impressionable nature, which, as it lay open on all sides to influences of every kind, overflowed also by exuberant sympathies and such a frank bestowal of confidence as made it impossible not to love him. This was Christian Carl Bunsen.

After five years of university residence, Bunsen stood now, at the age of twenty-three, on the point of entering practical life, with a world of half-formed schemes for the future revolving in his brain and an insatiable hunger after study. He had, indeed, little to trust to for success in life except his scholarship. His father

* From the *Sunday Magazine*, April and May, 1869.

was a keen old soldier, hot-tempered, but kindly and upright, who had retired from the Dutch service with some wounds and a very small pension, to spend the quiet evening of his days at Corpach, the tiny *Residenz-Stadt* of one of the tiniest principalities, in the old thatched farmhouse which had descended to him from his yeoman ancestors. In this humble home where the family's slender income was eked out by clerical work at copying of deeds, Christian Carl, sole fruit of a late second marriage, grew up the only child, his half-sisters being generally in Holland or elsewhere. The boy was too joyous by constitution to suffer from that want of family companionship which often presses heavily on children brought up with none but grave and grown people about them; and there was in his home a deal of genuine old-fashioned German godliness, which, if it was a little hard, or even narrow, was not less likely on that account to give a healthy sense of duty and a firm moral fiber to the boy, whose somewhat easy nature, rich even to luxuriance, loved to lay itself abroad and bask in every pleasant influence. Patient toil with rigorous thrift, conscientious attention to each small detail in an uneventful life, Christian content and daily devout acknowledgment of God, respect for justice allied to a quite passionate love of freedom,—these were among the chief lessons he learned in that Corpach home. The circumstances which surrounded young Bunsen in his boyhood, as well as those which marked his removal from the town gymnasium to the University, first of Marburg and then of Göttingen, remind one strongly of the early life of many of our own Scottish youths, with, perhaps, this difference to be noted, that the piety of humble German families is freer than that of Scotland, less fed on dogma, and full of a simpler devoutness. Quite Scotch, at all events, was the love for learning in a crofter's house, which, with painful economy, sent out the clever son to seek, in a great university, the means of rising to high office and an European name. His father's well-saved hundred thalers went only a small way towards college expenses. A scholarship at Marburg tided over one year; but Marburg was too insignificant a university, and Göttingen, even with free commons, was costly; so the young German, like many a Scottish student, thought himself fortunate to give lessons in the third class of the gymnasium, and private tuition to a rich pupil.

From school, where his fellows wondered at his industry as much as at his talent, Bunsen brought to college a slender acquaintance, indeed, with books, but some knowledge of English and French, besides the usual classical attainments, great capacity for work, and a very modest ambition. His boyish bent towards the sacred ministry did not long survive entrance on college life. At Marburg, still more at Göttingen, under the shadow of the great Heyne, the love for languages steadily grew till it determined by degrees his course of study, and especially his purposes for the future. These were by this time of the boldest. Before he left the university in 1814, he had conceived a project vast enough to have filled half-a-dozen lives with learned labor. As matured and submitted to Niebuhr a year or two later, this project embraced a thorough investigation of the whole of human history, with a view to trace the various developments of the "consciousness of God in the mind of man." In other words, it was to be a complete philosophy of religious history. Inquiries along three separate lines, of philology, history, and philosophy, applied successively to three great groups of civilized nations, the Germanic, the classical, and the Eastern, were to conduct to a science of human development, resting on an exhaustive analysis of facts, yet comprehensive enough to embrace them under one system, and yielding the solution of the highest of all human problems. There is something touching in the patient enthusiasm with which Bunsen clung to this prodigious scheme. Those who feel its hopelessness most will be those who will best sympathize with the fascination which it had for him. How it shaped itself for years in his brain, how he made, or tried to make, his studies point to it; how for this he went to Copenhagen to learn Icelandic, and to Paris to study Persian "furiously," under De Sacy; how he planned a three-years' residence in Calcutta for the sake of the Indian tongues; how, by degrees, as circumstances broke down his plan, he reluctantly learned and confessed with a half apology, that its dimensions were out of proportion to the duration of a single life; how at last he came even to find, to his disappointment, yet with thankfulness, that the bold scheme of his youth had been vitiated through the omission of its real center, Christianity, without an inward and vital knowledge of which no philosophy of man's religious history is at all possible; all this,

which can be only hinted at here, forms a curious and almost pathetic story of intellectual ambition.

It was in 1816 that Bunsen first went to Rome. He had come into Italy to meet an intimate friend and pupil, young Mr. Astor of New York, on whose assistance alone rested all hope of carrying out his projects, especially that of the Indian journey. At Florence, he heard that Mr. Astor had been called back to America. On the instant, his plans seemed to collapse and leave him without a future, a resourceless, friendless stranger in a foreign land. Bunsen, in whose prosperous career there were few reverses, never forgot the bitterness of that hour. The very scene burned itself into his recollection. It was the Loggia de'Lanzi, that noble fragment of a colonnade which Orcagna designed on a scale too great for even Florence to complete it, that the news met him. "It was here," he wrote ten years later, when success had set his early trouble in relief, "on the stone seat placed along the inner wall of the Loggie, that I struggled through a mixture of sorrow, pain, and disappointment, while the old crowd of strangers passed before my eyes." Bunsen's good fortune did not long desert him. He took another pupil, went on to Rome, and found there, besides a patron in Niebuhr the Prussian minister, and a friend in Brandis his Secretary of Legation, a life-long companion and second self in that accomplised English lady to whose pious care we owe these memoirs of his life. Twelve months from that hour of desolation in Orcagna's Loggie saw him with the whole current of his life changed, lifted out of the fear of straits, and settled in a Roman home. From this point, advancement followed fast. It may occur to some to recall the curious passage* in which De Quincy suggests how fatal it was to stand in the way of a man so loved by fortune as his friend Wordsworth, when they read how, employment being wanted for Bunsen, Brandis threw up his secretaryship in ill health, and, some years after, Niebuhr himself vacated his distinguished post, as if on purpose to open in succession to the young student, the appointments of Secretary of Legation, Chargé d'Affaires, and, finally, Resident Minister at the Court of Rome. To Bunsen himself, his rise suggested more pious reflections. It was a saying of his own, that "he who does not find God in the guidance of his own

* Recollections of the Lake Poets.

life will find Him nowhere." By the influences under which he was so singularly brought at Rome, were molded the whole of his after career and the work which he lived to do for learning and the Church. These influences were mainly three: that of Niebuhr, of his wife, and of Rome itself.

To Niebuhr, Bunsen owed first of all that he abandoned abstract study for the practical duties of a diplomatist. The old passion for his cherished scheme of research struggled long against the trammels of office and his absorption in political business. It is probable that, but for the reverential and enthusiastic love, amounting almost to adoration, which he felt for the great father of modern critical history, and but for the splendid prospects which the friendship of such a man opened to him, it might not have struggled in vain. But at Niebuhr's feet he sat as a learner, and at Niebuhr's side he labored as a colleague, till the political interests of his adopted Prussian fatherland had grown to be part of his being. The marked favor shown him by the sovereign then reigning, Frederick William III., and the personal friendship of his late majesty, both before and after his accession, served to keep him till old age in a profession to which he had first been led in youth by the influence, as much as the advice, of Niebuhr. How far this was a benefit for the world may be doubted. To Bunsen himself, diplomacy brought position and means, and at length a peerage; but it is open to question whether the permanent results of his life might not at this day have been greater than they are, had his undistracted strength been given to religious history and biblical literature. It is certain, at all events, that the extent to which Bunsen in his early manhood subjected his judgment to the political maxims of Niebuhr, was for him a misfortune. It was not till after the death of the man to whom, for fifteen years, he trained himself to look as to the "Pharos in in the storm," that his mind can be said to have acted with independence on public questions.

However this may be, there is another influence than Niebuhr's which can be traced, after 1817, through the modest records of the Baroness Bunsen, and which seems to have been powerful only for good. It is her own. The careful reader of this memoir can scarcely fail to see that, though no word of the biographer's calls us to notice it, his marriage was for Bunsen the beginning of a new and far deeper period of religious life. Before that date,

indeed, materials from which to judge of his inner history almost wholly fail us; we know only that he did not lose as a student the reverence for religion and the habit of Bible-reading which he had brought from his father's house. Yet we cannot be mistaken in thinking that, after his marriage, a change took place in his attitude towards Christian truth; for, not only do we trace it distinctly through his allusions to the subject during the years 1817 to 1819, we even have at one place his own account of it, and of the source to which he referred it. It occurs in a letter to his eldest half-sister. No one had in his youth made a deeper religious impression on Bunsen than his sister Christina. During a visit which she paid to Corpach in his boyhood, and one which he paid to her in Holland, this clever and high-spirited woman, whose strong religious nature, poverty, chronic ill health, and a life-long disappointment seem to have soured rather than softened, secured the love and reverence of her younger brother to an extent which her character did not justify, and which closer contact at a later period sadly tried. Her influence was not valueless. Her rigorous fault-finding and hard ideal of duty helped to brace his character; and the aid which her position led him to extend to her formed a discipline in self-denial. He was grateful for these services; but it was Bunsen's nature to break out in extravagant admiration of those whom his love erected into ideals; and, while the illusion lasted, he credited Christina with every Christian virtue, and looked to her as the good angel of his life. To her, then, immediately after the Christmas which followed his marriage, when, for the first time for several years, he had taken the communion, he wrote as follows: "Herein I erred, that I supposed one might understand heathenism by itself, and that, as regards Christianity, one needed only so much knowledge as might easily be acquired; its documents and dogmas I supposed to be long known and understood, as far as understanding them was possible, and that that must be sufficient. Herein lay my error; for who knows Christianity but he who makes it the central point of his thoughts and actions? Who knows the Bible but he who makes it his confidential friend, his dictionary, and his grammar? Thus it is also with the calling to a comprehension of the highest things. To know Christ, and the Bible, and to extend on earth the kingdom of Christ, is the duty of every man, more especially of him who is busied with the contemplation of

the highest things. All this has been working in my head almost daily for the last six months," *i. e.*, since his marriage, "and little or nothing would I write on the subject, because I desired that it should ferment, and clear, and shape itself. Next to God, my wife has had the greatest influence on my meditations; for, as since 1814 you, by your life and your faith, have directed my mind to the contemplation of Christ and His teaching, so has Fanny now, in the same twofold manner. We have read the Bible together, as she was always accustomed to do before; and her acquaintance with the Scriptures (of which she knows a great portion by heart), her faith, combined with clearness of understanding, and the Christian spirit which regulates her life, have pointed out to me more and more the treasure of all treasures; and I see clearly, that without thorough and deep study of the Bible, and of Christianity and its history, I can neither accomplish anything good in my other philosophical and historical undertakings, nor find for myself tranquillity of spirit, and the means of quenching the thirst for inquiry, and for regulating contemplation. Wherefore, I am firmly resolved to undertake *this*, and see how far the Holy Spirit of God will help me forwards." The same conviction that only through inward experience of the power of Christian truth on heart and life can any real knowledge of Christianity be got, with the same desire after such experience, is expressed still more clearly, and sometimes even too strongly, in succeeding years. At the close of 1819, he was able to bear this testimony to the results of his changed views: "Since I attained to a clear consciousness, by inward experience, that there is no way of satisfying the needs of the soul, or tranquilizing the heart's longings, but by the inner life in Christ—aspiration after eternal blessedness, and consequent direction of the mind and its powers towards God—I am aware of an increase of power for the work of my calling, whatever it be, and of joy and spirit in performing it. Nothing external, no learning, no philosophy, no study of the various religions of the earth, can help towards the soul's blessedness and living consciousness of salvation; it is the inward man, the essential center of existence—after all that is accidental has been cast off—that must, with the grace of God, accomplish the work. Since I have clearly perceived this, I seek no more the things of religion far off, and without me; nor do I delay the seeking after the one thing needful, or suppose the finding it to

depend upon the higher degree of enlightenment to be attained by this or the other acquisition of knowledge (that is, it is my deliberate resolution so to do.)"

Plainly it was good for Bunsen when the influence of his wife supplanted that of a sister, whose religion—though she "could teach the highest and deepest truths of Christianity to the edification of others"—was "that of the understanding only." From this date, Christian theology and the Christian Church became the center of all his studies. To advance the one, and minister to the other's profit, were objects which he henceforth pursued through life with such earnestness as could only spring from decided personal religion. He was characteristically a scholar; and whatever he did in the domain of Biblical research, he sought to do with scholarly thoroughness and freedom. But the scholar was now also the believer. It was not an abstract or merely scientific interest which he took in studies from which, as a layman and a busy man of affairs, he might have easily held himself excused. In one of the latest and most touching of his published letters, he writes that "the search after truth, and especially after Christian truth, is not a path strewn with roses, but a thorny path, upon which all the evil influences of ignorance, conceit, prejudice, and, above all, of self-interest and of mammon, await the faithful inquirer; and every one would avoid entering upon it who does not consider the doing so as a sacred duty, as a mission, which must be accepted, on pain of becoming a faithless steward and a traitor." These are not the words of a dillettante in theology. To know the truth, and to make his fellow-Christians know it, to grow, and help them to grow, in Christian life; for this, with good success or with none, it is impossible to doubt that for more than forty years he toiled.

The immediate direction of his first literary labors was determined by the place of his residence. Rome forced him, as a thoughtful Christian, to the subject of the Church. In presence of the centered organization and full worship of Rome, he felt the defects which every serious man finds in the broken sections of Protestant Christendom. It appeared to him that, in his own fatherland in particular, Protestantism wanted all those three bonds of common life, without which, as he conceived, no Church can properly exist. A common creed it was hopeless to think of; discipline must be a growth of church life itself; but might not

a common form of worship, at least, be attempted? It was not only as a point of union where the divergent Protestants of Germany might meet to express, through accepted formulas, their common worship, that the idea of a new German liturgy had first commended itself to Bunsen; though in this view it acquired fresh interest from the scheme of union which the King of Prussia was then, with the best intention, but with ill-considered violence, pressing upon the Lutheran and Reformed Churches: it was also as an instrument of spiritual revival and a safeguard against doctrinal aberration or any future declension of life. In Rome, he believed he had a fair field for an experiment on a small scale. In 1818, a small congregation of Germans had been gathered there, and, through the influence of Niebuhr, a chaplain had been attached to the legation. Bunsen undertook to prepare a liturgy for this chapel. The liturgy was soon prepared; but the enterprise swelled into a labor of years, and, after prolonged and exhaustive inquiry, both into the Reformation hymnology of his native tongue and into the ancient liturgical treasures of the Greek Church, with the use which has been made of them by the Churches of the West, Catholic or Reformed, it resulted in the publication, in 1833, of a Hymn and Prayer Book. One wishes one could say that this result repaid the expenditure of so much of Bunsen's strength during the best days of youth. His hymn-book, indeed, rendered a noble and much-needed service by bringing back to the hearts of his countrymen the precious compositions of their first reforming fathers, freed from those alterations by which they had been falsified and debased in the rationalistic period. But his Common Prayers failed of acceptance, and brought undeserved suspicion on their author's Protestantism. It is possibly reserved for another generation of German or of Scottish Christians, by whom the need of full social expression for the highest idea of worship may be more felt than it is now, to do him justice. Few who have given the subject attention will doubt that he has, at least, hit the heart of it, while it will, in all probability, be many a day before another will devote half so much pains or learning to work it out. I cannot, indeed, attach to liturgical forms, even when used, as he would use them, in combination with free prayers, the importance which he attached to them. It was natural, perhaps, for Bunsen, with his eye fixed especially on Prussia and on England, to infer that had Prussian

worship been regulated by such a standard as the English Prayer-Book, Prussian theology might have wandered less seriously from the orthodoxy of the Reformation. It may be permitted to doubt the inference. Orthodoxy has, since the Reformation, been better preserved in Scotland, which, for two centuries at least, has had no liturgy, than in England, which has the best in the world. What Bunsen thought only a hymn and prayer book could accomplish for his own Church, has been accomplished for the Scotch by a Confession and a confessional catechism. In truth, if anything can guarantee to a Church the preservation of pure and living faith, which it seems too much to hope for, it must be something which has power in it to generate life, not that which, like a form of prayer, can only express life. For the perfect expression, however, of a Church's religious life on its devotional side, there are defects both in fixed and free worship which a wise combination of the two might avoid. Unliturgical services are in practice too often poor, diffuse, and often undevotional; at their best they necessarily tend to substitute the expression of a personal and temporary mood of the speaker for the common desires and feelings of the congregation. Liturgical service, on the other hand, tends rather more strongly to formalism; and at its best excludes the warm and natural utterance of such devotional emotions as it is always the expectation of Christian men to have stirred in them by the free Spirit of God. It were worth while to have the experiment of a combined system fairly tried on some adequate scale, as it might best be by the Nonconformists of England. But, whatever mode be preferred for the conduct of public worship, we owe to Bunsen thanks for pointedly reminding us of the main idea to be expressed by all Christian worship whatever. It is, as he puts it in his first letter to Arnold, the evangelical sacrifice of thanks and self-dedication, for the offering of which, as our "rational service," each believer has been made by Christ a spiritual priest. This "true idea of sacrifice belongs to a divine worship, or adoration as such, and not to the Communion, in the celebration of which, however, it has its most perfect adaptation." The more we strive to return to this scriptural and primitive conception of the service which a congregation or assembly of priestly men meets to offer unto the Father by the Spirit through their invisible High Priest, the more true, and full, and rich, will our public devotions become. If a liturgy compiled, as Bunsen's was,

on this plan from primitive materials—modified by whatever has been special in the past of the Church that uses it—would help us to recover, and, after we have recovered it, to retain, this central thought in our congregational worship, I, for one, should see in that result the most prevailing argument yet adduced in favor of liturgical forms. But how, if for us now, more even than in Bunsen's youth, questions more vital than those of *cultus* press for attention—questions which touch the being, and not simply the well-being, of the Church of Christ?

The twenty years which he spent at Rome were perhaps the happiest in Bunsen's happy life. His success was as yet undimmed; many children were born to fill up his home with wealth of blessing; he who, to use his favorite image, had crossed over Jordan with his staff, became two bands; to his pleasant house on the Capitol trooped accomplished visitors out of every land; in many directions his vast powers of mind broke ground; and, with an activity which, thanks to his splendid health, was full of joy because ignorant of fatigue, he went on amassing those stores of linguistic and critical erudition at which in later years men wondered. Champollion inoculated him with the new fever of Egyptian discovery; as a pupil of Heyne, and *protegé* of Niebuhr, he could not help caring for Roman antiquities; the artists of the German art-revival were around him; church-music linked itself to his liturgical studies; he endowed a Protestant hospital and an archæological society; for everything he found room and leisure. At the same time his public duties kept him in active intercourse with the politics of the Continent. But the position of Protestant minister at the Roman court was not without difficulty even in quiet times; and at length, through the attempt of Prussia to adjust her marriage laws to the mixed Catholic and Protestant population of those Rhenish provinces which had been ceded to her by the treaty of Paris, differences arose betwixt the courts of Rome and Berlin, which, after protracted negotiations, led to the withdrawal of Bunsen from his post. It was perhaps inevitable that the minister who had done his best to effect a reasonable compromise should be sacrificed to the violence of conflicting interests; but it was with a pain which he never quite overcame, that Bunsen went out to seek another Capitol elsewhere. The fall was made as easy as possible for him. One year's leave of absence, very pleasantly passed in England, where he was received

with much distinction, and another of light but honorable duty at Berne, were followed by his mission, first as envoy and then as ambassador, to the Court of St. James's.

It was in 1838 that Bunsen first visited this country; and his official connection with it, which opened with the negotiations for the establishment of an Anglo-Prussian bishopric at Jerusalem in 1841, lasted till 1854. Some thirteen years of his mature though as yet unbroken manhood came thus to be spent in England, in intimate intercourse with the most influential leaders of its intellectual and religious progress. It was such an opportunity as had never before occurred to a German scholar of European fame, and one which Bunsen was fitted, before any other scholar of his country, to improve. He was pre-eminently qualified to interpret to each other the two related peoples, into whose hands it should almost seem that Providence has put the fate of Protestant Christianity and the best hopes of Europe, but which, standing as they had done at opposite poles of intellect, have for sixty years or more needed mutual interpretation. No man saw more clearly than Bunsen, or regretted more sincerely, the cleft betwixt "real life and ideal thought," which makes the Germans and the English alike one-sided and each unjust so often to the other. Coleridge and Carlyle had done much through their speculative affinities to make us understand the philosophy of Germany; but so little had the benefit been extended to its theology, that, in 1828, Bunsen had, after his gushing manner, poured out his joy at having found in Thomas Arnold, first of all Arnold's countrymen, "communion with an allied spirit." Four years afterwards, he recognized in Dr. Pusey a still more rare "union of a practical Englishman and an intellectual German." As for Bunsen himself, he was drawn to England by many cords. He had known our language from a boy and wrote it like a native; he had wedded an English wife; he was rich in English friends; he loved the English Church; he admired the English people. England was his "Ithaca" because it became his "second fatherland." He saw in it "the grandest political existence of modern times." "I like the nation," he wrote, "and the nation likes me." This was true; but, beneath these private and all public bonds, at the root, too, of this great love he had for us, there was an element of character which made him English on one side of

his nature.* As a thinker, indeed, he was a German of the Germans, and nowhere more so than on English soil. Even at Cambridge, he missed what he called intellectual life. "In England," he wrote in 1849, "everything except the moral principle in the form of the fear of God, is death-like." His most strongly-marked intellectual qualities, good and bad, were such as are foreign to the English mind. He had all his countrymen's love of symmetry or completeness of system in his learning and of thoroughness in his methods; their audacity of conjecture, coupled with endless toil at research; their over-confidence in subjective grounds of judgment; with an absence of that patient reserve which waits in silence till the induction of facts shall be complete—for Bacon does not rule in German thought. On the other hand, he felt, what the typical German never feels, a pressure towards the immediate translation of his ideals into practice. The whole German system of study seemed to him "irrational," because it offers no bridge betwixt these two. The practical aptitudes of Englishmen charmed him. A better life for the Christian people in church and state was the end into connection with which it seemed as much a moral necessity for him to bring his critical or speculative inquiries, as it was for him an intellectual necessity to prosecute such inquiries to a scientific result. Two of the chief labors of his life were, the one, a manual of devotion for the German Church, the other, a Bible exposition for the German people.

This zeal for Christian life, and for agencies which aim at its extension, did much to recommend him at first to British Christians. Here, at least, he was at one with all parties. He spoke for the Bible Society; he went to charity bazaars and Jewish-conversion committees; he plead in German for the benevolent schemes of Mrs. Fry. He was the friend at once of Pusey and of Shaftesbury, of Joseph Gurney and Julius Hare. It was impossible not to like a learned foreigner who took so kindly to the activities of an Englishman. This practical impulse in Bunsen was quite real; but it was not more real than the inner life, of which it was a fruit; and by this also he stood allied to every section of Christians. Yet his Christianity, like his intellect, was

* "I am, once for all, a German, placing before me the ideal problem as being capable of solution, because that solution is an intellectual necessity; and, at the same time, I am an Englishman, who refers to history all questions concerning reality."

not wholly English. It rested very little on doctrine. It cared little to coincide with traditional symbols. It throve on conceptions of truth, too abstract for English taste. It permitted a treatment of Scripture which appeared in many English eyes, not rash only and perilous, but far from reverent. This union of a very free handling of the Bible and of theology with deep Christian faith and the most devoted attachment to our Saviour and his cause, is a phenomenon which, though frequent enough then in Germany, and now not unknown also in England, was sufficiently new to the "religious public" of this country in 1838 to throw it out of its calculations. Men who were at first most powerfully attracted by his piety came to be most decidedly repelled by his rationalism. Especially when it appeared that, while he never lost his rare power of sympathizing with simple Gospel faith wherever he met it, he yet kept drifting further and further away from orthodoxy; it was hardly surprising that the well-partitioned sections of British Christianity should have felt at a loss where to class so abnormal a Christian.

The fact is, however, that Bunsen himself underwent changes during this period, and that England helped to work them. The high admiration for the Anglican Establishment, which he brought with him, suffered somewhat on closer acquaintance. Within a few years after his arrival, too, the Tractarian party openly developed, not its unprotestant tendency, but its unprotestant convictions. So steady and consistent has been the progress of this party, that it is difficult not to ascribe to it at its outset the design which now in its maturity it avows, of leading the English Church back, step by step, as it shall be able to bear it, to its position before the Reformation. To do so would be as foolish as unjust. Tendencies, like tides, bear men to unforeseen issues, and refuse to be controlled. It was as hard in 1838 to suppose that men like Newman and Pusey could originate an anti-Protestant movement as it now is to believe that they did not from the first intend it to become what it is to-day. The discovery, when it came to be clear how far they would go, inflicted a shock on Bunsen. It was "heart-rending," he said.* His whole nature resisted the principles of Romanism. Lutheran training and Italian experience, had made and kept him soundly Protestant. Apostolical succession he rejected as false to history, and because it made the

* Referring to a reported conversation of Newman's with Spörlein.

orders of Presbyterians, and of his own national Church, invalid. In the Puseyite doctrine of the Eucharist, he saw the mass, and called it a "death-like superstition." Above all, the rock on which the faith of the whole party split was, in his eyes, "no other than what Rome split upon—self-righteousness out of want of understanding justification by *faith;* and hovering about the unholy and blasphemous idea of atoning for our sins, because they feel not, understand not, indeed believe not, *the atonement.*"* Repelled so violently from the school, it was natural for Bunsen to look to the "Evangelicals," as for distinction's sake they must be termed. The new school of English rationalism, which now claims him for one of its oracles,† had scarcely emerged. Had it been what it is now, he would certainly have liked its shallowness and want of spiritual instinct not much better than he liked the painful self-righteous earnestness of High Churchmen. The Evangelical section was at that time strong—stronger than it has ever been since. It still appeared, as well as claimed, to represent the true position in all essential respects of the Anglican Establishment. If it had been blessed with learning enough, and spiritual freedom enough, and the courageous faith in truth which fosters investigation, and welcomes discovery from any quarter, it might at that juncture have nobly served, might perhaps have even saved, the Church of England. A friendlier relation then betwixt the ancient gospel faith of Evangelical England and the modern critical inquiry of Evangelical Germany might have rested the faith of the one on a safer, because more assured and scientific basis, and infused into the other the interest of a warmer Christian life. So it seemed at least to Bunsen; and, in this spirit of a mediator, he wrote his "Hippolytus," which, in its second edition, grew into the larger title of "Christianity and Mankind." "One of my practical objects," he writes, "was and is, to stir up the English out of their spiritual slumber and materialistic tendencies, before the great conflict of minds, and perhaps nations, begins; and so far my book is a contest for Germany,—for our only indestructible and peculiar property, I mean, inward religious instinct and freedom of spirit." His attempt failed; and the failure produced in himself a recoil, which threw him more completely than before out of sympathy with the literal and confes-

* Italics are Bunsen's.

† "Essays and Reviews." Dr. Rowland Williams' Essay.

sional school. Thenceforward, he may be said to have gone his own way, as Low Churchmen have gone theirs. The change in Bunsen was not as great as it seemed to be; for it was no more than the freer working out of principles of biblical interpretation and critico-historical research, which he had imbibed from the teachers of his father-land. A scholar of Niebuhr, who had come under the intellectual influence of Schelling and Schleiermacher, and was the friend of Luther and Rothe, could not be other than he was, whether in earlier days, when Jesuits called him Pietist, or in later, when Evangelicals denounced him as a Rationalist or a Pantheist. He was in fact, and knew himself to be, the child of that newer school of critical theology which has as little sympathy with the unbelieving neologians against whom it reacted as with those sincere but timid Evangelicals, to whom it has close religious, though no intellectual, affinities. But it might have fared better with Bunsen himself, as well as with the cause of truth, if the dislike of inquiry shown by men to whom he had felt drawn by a love deeper than all science, had not provoked him to call them in return "Mahometans" and "Judaizers." The present aspects of Christendom offer nothing more utterly sad than this unnatural repugnance betwixt the theologians of conservative orthodoxy and theologians whose scientific processes are unembarrassed by any tradition. We are not yet done with it in the case of Bunsen, for it is the key to his whole later life. Shall we ever be done with it in the Christian Church? I might be tempted to call it a repugnance as hopeless as it is unnatural, did I not, with Bunsen, reject the word "hopeless" from my Christian vocabulary.

Diplomatic business was a yoke from which Bunsen had often struggled without success to free himself, and the pressure of it became no easier in the ceaseless whirl of London. It was only with utmost effort, and in virtue of a capacity for work granted to very few, that he had been able, in these long years of his English ministry, to carry on at all the studies on which his heart was set. With something like elation, therefore, did he welcome the moment when, on the outbreak of the Crimean war, he felt not only that he might with honor retire from his office, but that he could no longer hold it with a safe conscience. How this came about falls as little within the scope of this paper as any other portion of his long and active political career. But the change

did to Christendom this service, that it set Bunsen at liberty to devote his still untired strength and a spirit on which, at the age of sixty-two, no shadow of impending decay had yet fallen, to the task of gathering up into one great work for the Christian people of his fatherland the vast biblical learning which he had gathered through more than forty years of study, which, often interrupted, was never desultory. During all that time, the elucidation of God's revelation of Himself in human history had formed the center to which his very varied studies agreed in pointing; and when at last permitted to retire to congenial literary work, to this his remaining leisure was given. A home was found for him at Charlottenberg. Visitors to Heidelberg will recollect the large white house beyond the Neckar on the Ziegelhausen road. With a sunny hill at its back, and the river rushing past its front, "like the Jordan," as Bunsen said, it looks up across the stream to the palace-fortress of the Electors Palatine, noblest of mediæval ruins, which lifts its ruddy cliff of wall, rich even in decay, out from a green background of sloping wood that mounts above it to the Kaiserstuhl. In this charming retreat five years were passed: years, on the whole, of pretty continuous labor, in spite of increasing bad health, and frequent visits paid to Göttingen, to Berlin, Marburg, Switzerland, or Baden. The work which, though often retarded by minor undertakings, chiefly absorbed him during all these years, which he himself regarded as that for which his whole life had been a preparation, and which, since death called away the master-mind from the unfinished labor, has been by his assistants completed from the mass of materials, more or less worked into shape, which he left behind, is his "Bible-work for the Christian people."* With surprising eagerness the old man set himself to a task which so fully expressed his peculiar attitude as mediator betwixt the school and the church. Its idea is to interpret to the Christian public of Germany, and indeed of Protestant Europe, the best results won by biblical scholarship since its revival some eighty years ago. It assumes, with what justice not only every theologian, but nearly every educated man knows, that a considerable and even dangerous gulf has begun to divide the Bible of the scholar, from the Bible as read and usually understood by the people, or, for the most part, as expounded to the congre-

* Volständiges Bibel-Werk, für die Gemeinde, in drei Abtheilungen. Leipzig, 1858. u. ff.

gation. The translations in use in Protestant nations were drawn up betwixt 1520 and 1650. They were a result of an age made splendid both by sacred learning and by spiritual depth, which may be vaguely called the age of reformation; and they are its noblest monument. For more than a century after the latter date, Europe was theologically asleep; but now, during more than the half of another century, every point relating to the text of Scripture or its interpretation (not its theology) has been investigated with a zeal equal to that of the sixteenth century and helps which it did not possess, by a greater crowd of scholars than ever applied themselves to sacred study at any previous period. Though Germany was in its beginning the birthplace and home of this revived biblical science, England, France, Holland and America have received the impulse and added to the result. In the preliminary pages of his work,* Bunsen sums up the progress which has been made. Criticism has recovered for us with very tolerable certainty the genuine New Testament text of the third or fourth century, and verified by MS. authority that of the Old. Philology has set both the grammar and lexicon of the Hebrew language on firmer ground, and brought it into most helpful comparison with allied Semitic tongues. It has distinguished the New Testament idiom and its relation to classic Greek. Historical criticism has been created. Jewish antiquities have been investigated; and, by God's providence, unlooked-for light has been shed upon Jewish history from the monuments of those most ancient peoples which stood in near historical relations to it, the monuments of Egypt, Phœnicia, Assyria, and Babylon. Finally, the physical sciences, especially geography, geology, and astronomy, have grown up to rectify some mistaken interpretations and throw light upon some dark passages. An enumeration like this, needless for the expert, fails to convey to those who are not experts a sufficient idea of the extent to which our knowledge of Scripture has been corrected or enlarged in the course of two hundred years; but it will suggest at least that the exegesis of to-day must diverge in many particulars from that which obtained in 1650.

It is clear that to bring the Christian public abreast of all this scholarship, no revision of the vernacular translations will suffice.

* Bibel-Werk: Vorerinnerungen, pp. xxvi.–xxviii.

In Germany, indeed, such a revision is far more urgently demanded than in Britain. Luther's Bible is believed to contain fully a thousand decided errors, besides perhaps thrice as many inaccurate or obscure passages.* In our own Authorized Version, Bunsen found only fifteen hundred needful corrections.† In attempting a new German translation on the basis of Luther's, Bunsen in fact did only what had been repeatedly done before him. Still, no translation, however accurate, can bring home to the unlearned the whole of that light which learning has cast, and goes on casting, on the meaning of the Sacred Word. To this end, the press and the pulpit must co-operate. Here, of late, through preachers who base their sermons on an accurate exposition of the text, and through writers who seek to popularize recent discoveries bearing on Scripture, a good deal of certain sorts of information at least has begun to percolate to the people. In this country too, means are fairly within reach of any person of moderate cultivation for becoming acquainted, as far as is possible, with the chief results of criticism and exegesis. That the ignorance of Scripture in the common mind is still so great may be referred partly to indifference, and partly to the slowness of the clergy to exchange the formal and conventional treatment of dislocated texts for an intelligent exposition of the book. It certainly cannot be ascribed to any unwillingness on the part of such accomplished Bible scholars as we have to take the public into their confidence. In Germany it has long been otherwise. There, in its home, theological science, like all sciences, has been the property of a learned class, kept too strictly apart both from the pulpits of the working clergy and from the libraries of the people. Hence it has come that, as Bunsen roundly asserts with only too much truth, "where the most learned Biblical science obtains, the Bible is very little read by the people, and has already begun to be a strange book to them as soon as they are done with school and church instruction." Bunsen was as little disposed to leave the key of knowledge in the hands of a scientific guild as to place in the hands of a priestly guild the key of heaven. From this monopoly of Bible learning by theological doctors and college professors, he appealed to the congregation. To him the people, the *Gemeinde*, or community

* Baehring: Bunsen's Bibel-Werk nach seiner Bedeutung für die Gegenwart. Leipzig, 1861, p. 73.

† Memoir ii, 434.

of Christian souls, was the Christian Church, and not the clergy or the schools; and what he had faith in as the organ of God's promised Holy Spirit for the teaching and purifying of the nations, was the Word of God opened to full, free study in the face of this Christian community, by it, and for its profit. Too long had the Church been fed on the husks of science, instead of on its best and ripest fruits. It was, before all things, to his soul intolerable and unchristian that men should hold one sort of language to the congregation and another in the theological school. Betwixt the false and true he saw a deadly antagonism indeed, but no antagonism at all betwixt the faith of childhood and the faith of inquiring men. So, to all his fellow-Christians, in his own mother-tongue, he would speak out frankly whatever fifty years of labor had taught him to understand of the Word of God.

Bunsen sketched his plan, as was usual with him, on a large scale. His work consists of three main parts. The first is the text of the Sacred Books, in form and order as they have come down to us, newly translated, and paragraphed according to the matter, with needful notes, tables of chronology, maps, and such ordinary aids to better understanding of its words. The second part investigates these books to discover how they were composed, seeks to disentangle what earlier documents they may embody, compares them where they run parallel in time or touch on the same facts, and finally arranges them, thus readjusted, in their historical order; seeking to reconstruct, as it were, by means of original authorities, the development of divine revelation. A closing part resurveys the whole from the point of view of Jesus Christ and His Kingdom, as containing the key to the entire religious history of the world, or to God's revelation of Himself to men.

No such attempt has ever been made to convince, on the one hand, the half-sceptical intellect of modern Europe, and, on the other, honest but unlearned disciples of our ancient faith, that to apply science freely and boldly to Holy Scripture is to make science the handmaid, not the foe of faith. No man in Europe had a better right to hazard the attempt. A scholar equalled perhaps by no one for extent of scholarship, he was through life the advocate of the freest inquiry, yet also through life the no less earnest friend of all believers in that Gospel of Christ in which alone he had found rest. How such a work as this has been executed

seems to me to be of less moment than that it was undertaken. Its execution in fact has left a good deal to be desired, and offers even more to be regretted. Mistakes were inevitable. Traces of his early training in a school of destructive criticism cling to him. On a hundred points, indeed, it is open to us to differ from him; and the difference on some of them will be serious; but it remains none the less significant that Bunsen has left it thus on record that plain Christians both can and must be taught a more scientific understanding of their Bibles. For the sake of its greater practical usefulness, especially on this side of the Channel, I very much wish that the execution of the *Bibel-Werk* had been less affected by the author's peculiar methods and conclusions. A work which should be not less learned, yet more carefully restricted to the accepted results of learning, would be for the British Christian a more welcome help. Guesses ought not to stand in the place of results, when one would instruct non-professional readers. To say that Bunsen's criticism rests more than is just on subjective impressions and sometimes inadequate data, is to say that he is a German. His dislike of positive definitions of doctrine and the excessive abstractness of his philosophical language are grave hindrances to his usefulness as a popular teacher. Sometimes, too, he speculates where the modesty and reserve of true science would counsel silence; and the general instinct of Christians will censure as presumptuous some of those conjectural reasonings on the supernatural facts of revelation in which he himself had come to feel nothing unbecoming. Yet these are hardly hindrances to his usefulness in another direction. The majority of educated doubters will take less exception to such peculiarities, nor will his work succeed much the worse in bringing, as Frederica Bremer prettily says, "the reasoning spirit (the Thomas of our day, who requires to see in order to believe), to its Saviour, God in Christ."* It must also be said, on the other side, that, if Christian people are to be allowed to see and hear the ongoings of Biblical science at all (and how shall we hinder it if we would? or would we, if we could?) they must be taught, as soon as may be, where runs the line which divides the just domains of faith and science, and how firm a line it is. They must be left in no manner of doubt, first, that science has its own field of research, within which it has a

* Memoir, ii. 403.

divine right to labor after truth through its own proper methods, untrammeled by prescription, tradition, or any authority; and, secondly, that by no result of such freedom in scientific inquiry can the truth of God's Gospel, or the reality of spiritual life in Christ's church, be put the least in danger. Till men understand this, they will dread scientific study in theology. Till they understand this, no bridge is possible betwixt the school and the church. When they do understand it, they will cease to stumble at those differences which must be evolved by all free discussion on questions of criticism, of interpretation, of history, or of the philosophical forms of truth. These are not articles of faith. They are questions of science. Our knowledge of them grows, and, as it grows, our results alter with each generation of inquirers. If anything can imperil divine truth, it must be imperilled when its unwise champions hazard it upon the determination of uncertain points in the obscure history of a remote past, or on a theory framed by theologians before all the facts to be included had been discovered. It puts the church in a false position when her doctors are blamed for honest research, or viewed with suspicion because their conclusions on matters of critical and historical scholarship diverge from traditions accepted by the vulgar. No single result of scientific freedom is of half so much value as that science within the Church should be free. It will be a matter of small moment if exact Hebrew criticism shall prove the last six-and-twenty chapters of our Book of Isaiah to be by another hand, or shall succeed in identifying all the fragments of more ancient date which the compiler of the Pentateuch incorporated in his narrative; but it is not of small moment that a clear field be kept for such inquiries outside the pale of faith, so that the Christian *savant* may be saved from unjust reproach, and plain believers from unjust alarm.

The last two winters of his life Bunsen spent, for the benefit of his health, in the soft sea-air of Cannes. Heart disease of several years' standing had come to press heavily on the life which had been so buoyant and busy. Work, though bravely urged on in every interval of ease, became a pain instead of joy. The last half-year, from the spring of 1860, when he removed from Heidelberg to Bonn, till its October, was really lived under the shadow of the valley of death. Yet it was his to say, as he did say in his last letter to the Duchess of Argyll, "I *have* been supported,

and *am* continually supported, by that Eternal Love in which we live and move and have our being, and which manifested itself in Christ Jesus. The days have been heavy and the nights dark, but His light has surrounded and strengthed my soul, and will, I hope and believe, carry me through the gates of death to behold His eternal glory."* Fits of painful struggling for breath, alternating with moments of relief which were caught at and used for his dear *Bibel-Werk*, filled the days of that sad summer. But for the last month or more he died daily. The end was very beautiful. That during his later years Christ had come to engross more and more of his thoughts is witnessed to us by various testimonies. Of a visit paid to him in 1858, Principal McCosh, of Princeton, writes: "I am able to say, what I believe I can say of no other with whom I had so much intercourse, that we never conversed during those five days, for ten minutes at a time, without his returning, however far he might be off, to his Bible and his Saviour, as the objects which were evidently the dearest to him."† The impressions to which reference is made in these words of M. de Pressensé were also received near the close of Bunsen's life: "His conversation, so rich, so spirited and hearty, was quite penetrated with that Christian salt whose powerful flavor no man can imitate."‡ Best of all is the unobtrusive evidence of his own letters and papers, which leave on the mind the impression of a truly devout soul, growing, as life grows, devouter to the last. But, as the wrappings of a jewel are shrivelled up in fire, and leave the naked gem clear seen against the white heat, so, in the intense presence of death, there fall away at last all opinions, learned theories, creeds, or other such wrappings of the life, and leave the man's central faith in Christ to stand out well relieved. There was little to be seen then of Bunsen, save his faith. "It is sweet to die," he said. "With all feebleness and imperfection, I have ever lived, striven after, and willed the best and noblest only: but the best and highest is to have known Jesus Christ." "It is a wonderful retrospect upon this world and this life *from above*. Now first one begins to perceive what a dark existence it is that we have here passed through. Upwards! upwards, heavenwards! Not darkness, no, it is becoming ever

* Memoir, ii. 562. † Memoir, ii. 473.

‡ *Revue Chretienne* for Dec. 1860; quoted in Baehring, p. 18.

more and more light around me."* And much he said in the last days of love, of God's love and of our's in God; and that only in the love of God is there true life for us. Much, too, of Christ. "Those who live Christ—who live in love the life of Christ—they are His." "I am quite clear we are all sinners. There is only One, Christ in God." "Christ is the Son of God; and we are only then His sons if the Spirit of love which was in Christ is also in us." In Him, he triumphed over death: "Christus recognoscitur victor. Christus est, est; Christus victor."† But to speak grew difficult; then impossible. The strong frame battled long against the enemy; but it came at last, the last "Good night," and the closing of the eyes to eternal rest. He knows now even as he is known.

J. Oswald Dykes.

*Memoir, ii. 572. † Memoir, ii. 574–6.

XXI.—THE ANNIHILATION OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH.*

What would become of human society if the notorious Carl Vogt had his wish, who longs for "the annihilation of the Christian Church," no one acquainted with history can for a moment doubt. A new heathenism would emerge and a moral pestilence sweep over the world. For, first, the Christian religion is *the religion of humanity.* It inculcates the duty of recognizing in every man the image of God. Materialism, one of the most anti-biblical and anti-Christian systems of the day, knows no true humanity, because it recognizes and knows no true divinity. It degrades man to a mere animal, having no free-will and

* Translated from the *Beweis des Glaubens*, Oct., 1868.

consequently irresponsible for his actions. An animal knows nothing of good and evil, of virtue and vice. Moral ruin is the inevitable consequence of Materialism.—Next, Christianity is *the religion of love*, which resists and conquers selfishness. Apostacy from Christianity makes egoism the ruling principle. A furious enemy of Christianity, Max Stirner, preaches in our day this absolute egoism in a way that sinks man lower than the beasts, who at least love their kind. With the most absolute recklessness this Titan says: "I will be and will have all which I can be and have, entirely careless whether it is human or inhuman; enough that it stands in my power to will and to have. Right is for me what I make right." This is the right of the strongest. The history of mankind becomes a struggle of beasts for prey. Such phrases as "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity," have no power to check the furious outbreak of these wild beasts, as the history of the French revolution clearly shows. The "holy guillotine," the thirst for blood, the madness of rage and hate of those who would abolish Christianity, will never be forgotten.—Again, the Christian religion has brought the *purest morality* into the world. Apostacy from Christianity is also a breaking loose from morality. Voltaire, whose motto was, *Ecrasez l' infame*, was a man who wallowed in the mire of sensuality. La Mettrie, who sympathized with him in his bitter hatred of Christianity, had the shamelessness to write: "God, conscience, providence, judgment, eternity, are chimeras, which terrify no truly reasonable man, * * * virtue and vice are empty words. The chief care of a reasonable man should be, to satisfy his desires."—What will become of *marriage* and *domestic* life, if men bid farewell to Christianity, such men as Enfantin, George Sand, Heine, and the adherents of "Young Germany" have told us without blushing. With the utmost frivolity they repudiate the sanctity of Christian marriage: they pronounce it Philistinism and preach the so-called geniality of love, *i. e.*, that man and wife should live together, so long as they are attracted towards each other, and if this ceases they should separate. Enfantin desires free sexual mingling, like that of cattle. Heine, who lived with a woman of bad repute, pleads "for the rehabilitation of the flesh," as a "deliverance from the offensive seriousness of Christianity." He pronounces sensuality justifiable. Christianity preaches: "they who are Christ's have crucified the flesh with its affections and lusts." Heine says

in conscious opposition; Away with self-denial, let us have pleasure, the clanging of nymphs, nectar and ambrosia. Young Germany would be glad to rear "a new Greek Paganism" with all its goddesses and temples for lust.—That *education dissevered from Christianity* has no power to preserve domestic life, is illustrated by the family of Rousseau. This man, who in his "*Emil*" presented himself as a reformer in education and is still regarded by many as authority in such matters, lived in concubinage and sent four out of his five children to the foundling-hospital, with no sign of recognition and without ever caring for them again.—Christianity tends to regulate *the relation of capital to labor* in accordance with the principles of righteousness and benevolence. Let Christianity be forgotten, and egoism would become the ruling principle of both the rich and the poor, and so the disruption of society become inevitable. The egoismof the rich, wealthy manufacturers and others, seeks to reduce the working classes to mere machines, and to exact from their labor the utmost possible gain. The egoism of the working classes, in return, seeks a shelter in communism. The prophets of communism, Fourier, Cabot, Proudhon, who proclaim property to be theft and declare war against all who have it, well know that Christianity is the only firm barrier against their destructive ideas. Hence the constant endeavor to make men regard it as "a pest to society." Let them succeed, and such barbarism would appear as the world has never yet seen; "lust in place of charity, might in place of right, will in place of duty, selfishness in place of love."

The Christian religion is the guardian of private life, the foundation of civil society, the indispensable support of the public welfare. It never outlives itself, never grows old. It is the same now that it was in its early days. It preserves through all time its holy and renewing power. Would that all who bear the name of Christ sought to show more of his spirit.

XXII.—THE EXPERIENCES OF A 'VERT.*

Of all the motives which have concurred to seduce Anglicans into the Roman Communion, there is none which has operated more extensively or more powerfully than the yearning after visible and organic, traditional and historic, unity for the Christian Church. It has been taken for granted that to be real and historic the unity must be visible and organic. To attain to this unity has been the dream and passion of Anglicans. This is the *ignis fatuus* always hovering over the uncertain and treacherous ground that lies between Oxford and Rome, which has allured crowds of earnest and cultivated, although often, also, like Mr. Ffoulkes, imperfectly educated and disproportionately developed men, from the dim and antique seclusion of a semi-monastic university life to the ancient other-world fastnesses of Papal Rome, as claiming to be the "mother and mistress of churches." Having long gazed wistfully from Oxford, having been fascinated by the seeming vision of unity, having floundered long and wearily amidst the wavering uncertainties of Anglican Catholicism, with its vain pretensions and futile puerilities, they have at length made their escape from the mid-region of shifting lights and treacherous footing by betaking themselves to the causeway—of late years well beaten by the feet of perverts—which the Roman engineers have laid across the bog. This causeway has been built on the same principle on which Stephenson fixed his railway formerly over the quaking depths of Chat Moss. The great railway-maker knew that all that he needed to do was to cast into the bog material enough.

The process might be very long, the consumption of material immense. But in the end his ground, he knew, must be made good, and his railway should and would be laid. So the Roman

* From the *London Quarterly Review*, April, 1869: a Review of *Experiences of a 'Vert*, Ffoulkes's *Christendom's Divisions*, etc.

doctors, by dint of heaping assumption upon assumption, and, as Mr. Ffoulkes has found out at last (how wonderful that it should have taken him nearly thirty years to make this discovery!) forgery upon forgery, have made a solid seeming causeway on which to conduct inquirers after truth and unity into their own lines. There is, however, this difference between the case of the rail-way and that of the Roman arguments and pretension; beneath the shaking moss that underlies Stephenson's line, there is the firm deep basis and center of the earth itself, upbearing all, whereas underneath the cunning fabric of peculiarly Roman invention and sophistry, there is no foundation of truth whatever. All is false and unreal; false in metaphysics, but yet more flagrantly false in ecclesiastical assumption and historical invention.

Mr. Ffoulkes's pamphlet, although he is still Romanist in dogma, is a striking demonstration of the ecclesiastical falsity and imposture which invests the whole fabric of Romish usurpation and dominion.

Of Archbishop Manning it was emphatically true that what led him to join the Church of Rome was, mainly, his passionate longing after "unity," according to that mistaken conception of which we have spoken. This was a subject on which he dwelt much whilst he was Archdeacon of Chichester. Archdeacon Hare, his fellow-archdeacon in the diocese, dedicated to Archdeacon Manning his own admirable sermon on the "Unity of the Church," precisely because the theme was one on which his colleague insisted so often and so strongly, and at the same time held views so fundamentally at variance, as Hare believed, with the true spirit of Protestantism. According to Manning, a true "unity" could not be fully realized, except in connection with a visible "uniformity" of outward aspect and development. This was the view which he insisted upon in his sermons and in his charges, and especially in his work on *The Unity of the Church.* And, with this outward and visible unity before his imagination, he was dazzled and enamored. "Unity," says Archdeacon Hare, in the prolonged dedication to which we have referred, "the unity of the Church is of all things the dearest to your heart, at least only subordinate to, or rather co-ordinate with truth, without which, you well know, all unity must be fallacious; and as that which fills the heart will overflow from the lips, you yourself several times since this sermon was preached, have poured out your

earnest thoughts and desires for the unity of the Church." At this time Manning was one of the most beloved and admired men among the High Anglican party in this country. Hare, utterly as he differed from him, was very warmly attached to him. "Your wisdom," he says, "under God, has been our chief guide; your eloquence has stirred our hearts; your loving spirit has checked and healed the first outbreaks of anything like division."*

Holding by this *πρῶτον ψεῦδος* of an assumed external and visible unity, and therefore continuity, as one of the necessary "notes" and properties of the true Church of Christ, it is no wonder that Anglicans found themselves compelled to move Romewards unresistingly till they reached their goal in the Papal city.

For, on their principles, either the Anglican Church is the one Apostolic and Catholic Church, the Church of Rome being corrupt, heretical, and schismatic, and the Greek Church being schismatic, if not also corrupt; or the Anglican and the Greek Churches, being separated and held apart only through the schismatic perversity of Rome, are at root one and the same, and may be regarded as virtually the two branches of the one true and Apostolic Church; or the Anglican, Greek, and Roman Churches, together with any other orthodox churches which are lineally descended from the primitive and patristic Church, are branches of the one Catholic Church. But the first of these alternatives, making the Anglican to be the one true Church of the world, is really too absurd to gain a footing among reasonable theories, especially in face of the fact that the Church of England was, for centuries, only a part of the Roman Catholic Communion.

The second falls to the ground for the same reason; if the Anglican Church has no real *locus standi* in its ecclesiastical pedigree and pretentions apart from the great communion with which it was for centuries identified, as bone of its bone and flesh of its flesh, it cannot assume to join hands with the orthodox Greek Church as a twin sister, apart from the Church which it so long clung to as its "mother and mistress," especially when the Greek Church repels it as graceless and schismatic: and, as for the third view, to which Dr. Pusey still holds, to which Archbishop Manning and his disciple—Mr. Ffoulkes—clung as long as they could, there is against it this ominous fact, that the Roman Catholic

* *Hare's Miscellaneous Pamphlets.* Macmillan & Co.

Church holds the Anglican Church to be excommuicated, while the English has deliberately and explicitly separated from the Roman Communion. The Anglican Church is not merely (as Dr. Pusey says) "independent of" the Roman, as the African was in the days of Augustine. The Anglican Church is cut off from the Roman Communion; to which it must be added, as already noted, that the Anglican Church is held by Eastern Orthodoxy not only to be schismatic, but to be destitute of sacramental grace. An Anglican, accordingly, however much he may long to enter into the haven of unity, to become identified with the one visible Church, which, as he conceives, is the heir "of exceeding great and precious promises," of Divine authority and celestial glory, finds himself, if he is determined to be thoroughly consistent, in a condition of painful and perilous isolation, such as he cannot reconcile with his principles, and which does violence to his deepest and most passionate aspirations.*

Here, then, we trace the cause which has operated perhaps more extensively than any other in constraining Anglicans to

* In the preface to the first part of *Christendom's Divisions*, writing on the "Feast of the Conversion of St. Paul, 1865," Mr. Ffoulkes, holding still by his *prōton pseudos*, shows how it hampers all parties, and continues to hamper him. "It may be, therefore, that things will become still more paradoxical than they are. According to the ancient creeds, there is but one Holy Catholic Church upon earth—this is, according to the Roman Catholic theory, that body which is in communion with the Pope. Nor, indeed, according to facts, is there any other body capable of having the epithets 'one' and 'Catholic' both applied to it with any truth.

But it is part of that theory likewise that heretical baptism is valid. In that case, therefore, there are about half as many baptized Christians outside the Church as there are in it. According to the Greek theory, baptism, to be valid, must have been administered in the Greek Church. In that case, both Catholics and Protestants can belong to no church at all, and are not even Christians. According to the Protestant theory, there are as many churches as there are Christian communities. In that case there can be no Catholic Church at all that is one. For destructive purposes, it is curious to observe how all three theories act in harmony."

Mr. Ffoulkes's own conclusion and solution seems to be that,on the basis of a common hierarchical descent and of mutual concession, the different branches of the "Catholic" Church should enter into communion with each other, all agreeing to recognize a certain supremacy of the Roman See in cases of appeal. He does not appear to discern that his recent writings have in fact afforded a *reductio ad absurdum* of his fundamental principle of external and organic-ecclesiastical unity; that the consistency and completeness of his argument can only be made good by admitting into the scope of Catholic communion and unity non-hierarchical, *e. g.* Protestant churches; and that the final conclusion from the whole must be the abandonment of the "hierarchical" doctrine of sacramental grace.

become Romanists. It is not, indeed, the only cause. Some have yielded to a sterner compulsion. The austere sovereignty of "dogma," and the demands of intense spirits for "discipline," have forced some, against all their tastes and all their human heart, to leave Oxford for Rome. Only under the absolute authority of Rome could these keen and restless souls be held to rest, these fiery searching spirits be subdued to stillness. Such as these, to borrow the words of an eloquent prelate who knows well of what he speaks, have taken their flight "on the wings of an unbounded scepticism into the bosom of an unfathomed superstition." But this was not the case with the Anglican Archdeacon, who is now the titular Archbishop of Westminster, nor with Mr. Ffoulkes, formerly his disciple, but now his keen and determined critic. A passage from the first part of Mr. Ffoulkes's *Christendom's Divisions* will illustrate what we have been saying:

"'From the age of fifteen,' says one of the deepest of living writers (Newman), 'dogma has been the fundamental principle of my religion.' The deliberate conviction of a no less deep thinker and good Catholic in past time (DeMaistre) was different. 'Were it permitted to establish degrees of importance amongst things of Divine institution,' he says, '*I should place the hierarchy before dogma*, to so great a degree is the former indispensable to the maintenance of the faith. *One may cite, in favor of his theory, a splendid experience which, for three centuries, has been conspicuous in the eyes of all Europe. I mean the Anglican Church, which has preserved a dignity and weight absolutely foreign to all other reformed churches, entirely because the English good sense has preserved the hierarchy.*'"—*Christendom's Divisions*, part i, p. 200.

Even so, "the hierarchy before dogma," for where "the hierarchy" comes, grace and life come with it in necessary connection, whether anything be known of dogma, properly so-called, or not; whereas, there may be much of dogma without hierarchy, and therefore without grace; nay, even with the hierarchy in view, and dogma and creed strictly held, it is yet possible no grace may come to the mere dogma-holder. "Hierarchy before dogma," is the maxim of Mr. Ffoulkes still, as it was his maxim when he followed Archdeacon Manning into the Church of Rome. It is

and must be the maxim of the High Anglican yet more characteristically than of the Roman Catholic, and that for a reason not very far to seek.

The Romanist, who trusts in his Church as the channel of salvation, is accustomed to think broadly of the Church as such. She is to him the Primitive and Apostolic Church, the Catholic Church, the one and only grand and continuous Church which Western Christendom has known; she has antiquity, empire, prestige, tradition; she has queened it among the nations; many blended glories are hers, at least in the view of the good Catholic. What Church can compare with her for a moment? There may be heretical churches, poor and maimed and shorn, which affect to be national; but the Roman Catholic Church is European, is human, is identified with the family of nations. A Romanist, so deeming of his Church, regards her hierarchy as but one among her many glories, and the many sources of her power; but the Anglican Churchman who, at the present day, looking across Great Britain, sees the power, the culture, the intelligence and energy, the wealth and numbers and variety of the non-episcopal churches: in the north, in the south, Presbyterian, Congregationalist, Methodist; and feels it to be necessary to vindicate for his own Church sole and supreme legitimacy among them all; feels also, by a ready intuition, that he must look away from all other attributes of a church, whether orthodoxy or eloquence, or missionary zeal, or popular favor, or intellectual gifts, or even the power of godliness, and fix his regards on this one attribute—its hierarchy. The "Apostolic succession" is the alpha and omega of Anglicanism. It was the first instinct of the Oxford party to insist upon and expound this doctrine more than thirty years ago, and Anglicanism, as such, can never outgrow it. The hierarchical dogma furnishes its definition, and sets forth its one prerogative. Mr. Ffoulkes has learnt a great deal during the twenty years and more which have passed since he followed his leader to Rome, but he has not yet learned to unlearn this principle. He still says of the Church of England—"Let the integrity of her Apostolic succession be conceded, and the validity of the administration of her sacraments, one and all, is established." This pamphlet of his, however, which has made so much noise, shows that he is on his way to find out his error on this point as he has on some others. It has taken him more than twenty years of

close and original research to discover what he might have learnt not only from any Protestant authority on ecclesiastical history, such for instance as Mosheim, or Campbell, or Gieseler, but from such Catholic authorities as Fleury or Dupin, viz: that the fabric of specifically Papal authority is a structure of usurpations founded upon forgeries, upon the forged donation of Constantine, and the forged decretals of the pseudo Isodore. Thoroughly honest, very learned, pre-eminently a plodding student, it is yet evident that Mr. Ffoulkes has a peculiar talent for working his passage out to truth and daylight by the most circuitous way possible, and after the greatest number of attempts made in false directions. As he is certainly now beginning to make his progress clear and good somewhat more rapidly than he did twenty years ago, it may be hoped that before he publishes his next pamphlet he will have discovered what all besides himself must have discovered already, and at a glance, that the sound reasoning of the latter part of his pamphlet must, perforce, lift him quite beyond the limits of his hierarchical prescription, and teach him that the grace of sacraments and the grace which comes by truth and faith in the Spirit—and, whether it be through the sacred seal and symbol, or through the Divine Word, all grace is by the Truth through the Spirit of humble Faith—that all grace—flows freely wherever Christ's Word is truly taught, and truly believed and obeyed, whether such truth have been ministered by priests or preachers with or without a hierarchy. As we shall not return to the subject of a hierarchy and of Apostolical succession, let us close by citing some words of Archdeacon Hare, which are full of precious and seasonable truth.

"This is the great controversy between Romanism and Protestantism. Their stay is the *opus operatum*, ours *fides operans*. Faith, the gift of God, apprehending him through Christ, renewing the whole man, and becoming the living spring of his feelings, thoughts, and actions." . . . "In fact, the faith of the Romish Church, *so far as it differs from ours*, is not in spiritual powers and acts, but in magical. A spiritual power acts upon the will and conscience, and through them; a magical power produces its changes arbitrarily, independent of the will and conscience. Such is the baptismal change of nature, as substituted for the new birth. Such is the belief of a string of propositions

on the authority of another, without any personal conviction of their truth. Such is the infallibility ascribed to Popes, without any reference to their moral and spiritual condition. The Pope is nothing but a hierarchical Archimagus."—*Contest with Rome*, pp. 172, 151.

We have, in the foregoing remarks, held Mr. Ffoulkes in close connection with Archbishop Manning, because, in fact, they were closely connected together at the outset of their journey from Oxford to Rome, and for long afterwards; because to this connection Mr. Ffoulkes pointedly refers in the pamphlet of which one of the "ninth thousand" of copies published lies before us; because the self-same postulate of external unity, which has brought Mr. Ffoulkes into his present perplexities, has conducted the Archbishop into Ultramontanism, and so fitted him eminently for such high promotion as has not only carried him far away from Mr. Ffoulkes, who, indeed, has never submitted to reordination, and who is still busy, as for twenty years past, with his survey of the sources and early limits of the Church in the obscure watershed region of ecclesiastical history, but has also lifted him to an eminence from which he can overlook, in his Oratorian seclusion, one who is his senior, in not a few points his superior, and who, thirty years ago, was his leader; and because, finally, Mr. Ffoulkes having, by the divergent line on which he has traveled from the same starting place, been brought now into a position of something like antagonism to his former master and present ecclesiastical superior, has addressed this pamphlet, in the form of a letter, to the "Most Rev. Archbishop Manning;"—"Archbishop of Westminster," it is to be observed, our English Catholic, Englishman to the core, does *not* call his early teacher and friend. Mr. Ffoulkes is, in fact, a member, *and* a leading spirit in the "Association for Promoting the Unity of Christendom," of which the *Union Review*, a journal to which Mr. Ffoulkes has contributed, has been regarded as, in some sort, the organ. Against this "Association," Archbishop Manning, about two years ago, addressed a "Pastoral Letter" to his clergy, which, with a number of other "Letters," has since been published by him in a volume entitled "England and Christendom." The Holy Office, moreover, has condemned and prohibited any co-operation on the part of "Catholics" with either the "Association" or the journal which was

regarded as its literary organ. Mr. Ffoulkes, accordingly, although still a member of the "Roman Communion"—subject, as an Anglican would say, to the "Roman obedience"—stands, at last, on the borders of "malignancy," if not of heresy, and is committed to a set of opinions and a course of action directly contrary to the prescription of the Holy Office," and the injunction of his archiepiscopal diocesan. Cardinal Patrizi and the Holy Office insist, and Archbishop Manning is obliged to be their organ and mouthpiece, that to the Catholic and Roman Church alone belongs the name of Catholic; that to give any other body the name of Catholic is heretical; that all who are separated from the one Catholic Church are in a state of wrath," &c., &c. Mr. Ffoulkes, in this pamphlet, as in his former work on *Christendom's Divisions*, undisguisedly suggests and supports conclusions essentially opposed to these and to all such. Whether he still contributes to the *Union Review* is more than we know; but we presume that he does, for Mr. Hayes, who publishes the *Review*, is the publisher of his pamphlet, and slips recommending the *Review* are sent out with the thousands of the pamphlet. We observe that some of the "Catholic" journals are so angry with Mr. Ffoulkes, that they will not allow him to be a true "Catholic;" and we cannot doubt that his pamphlet has earned for him the honor of having his name inserted in the Roman *Index*.

The following are some of Mr. Ffoulkes's earliest words to Dr. Manning:—

"We were neither of us born or bred in the Communion in which we now are. The evidences which determined you to embrace the Communion of the Church of Rome, for the most part determined me likewise. You preceded and I followed! yet I neither followed you nor any one else blindly, as a party leader.

According to the best of my judgment, I followed truth whithersoever it led me, and by whomsoever it was suggested. Still, I should be the last to deny—why should I not be always proud to acknowledge?—the difficulties that I had unraveled for me in my searchings after truth continually by yourself, by the inimitable lucidity and high-souled earnestness of your discourses as a preacher; and by the noble example of devotion and self-sacrifice which you exhibited as a servant of Christ, in acting to the uttermost up to what you believed to be true. The result of it all

was that ultimately my convictions led me to follow in your wake; though there are still others, whose profound learning, and honesty, and piety, I have never for one moment ceased to respect equally with your own, as deliberately convinced as ever of the righteousness of the position abandoned by us as untenable so many years ago. I was far from undervaluing their testimony, even when I subscribed to your own in preference; and once removed to our new abode, I must confess my course to have been deliberately the exact opposite to what I believe yours to have been ever since. You, and very many more, probably, seemed to have joined the Roman Communion not only pledged never to find fault with it, but to see with its eyes, hear with its ears, and understand with its understanding, stand or fall by its judgment. Your argument, I presume, would be that the Church of Rome claims to be infallible: that you submitted yourself to it as such, in the fullest confidence that its decisions can never mislead you; that they are God's voice speaking to you, which you are bound at the peril of your salvation never to mistrust, much less dispute. I joined the Roman Communion on other grounds, and was accepted. Practically, no doubt, the Church of Rome claims to be infallible, and anybody who concedes, is dearer to her than anybody who disputes, her claim; but I was never required to profess this on entering her Communion, and perhaps might never have entered it, if I had been. 'Sanctam catholicam et apostolicam Romanam Ecclesiam, omnium ecclesiarum matrem et magistram agnosco,' a mediæval phrase, of which I knew the historical value, was the uttermost to which I gave my adhesion. And I said to myself on that occasion, if she is really infallible, she can stand much more searching criticism than the one which I am leaving for her sake, on behalf of which no such claim has ever been made. For I considered that after the extreme rigor with which the claims of the Church of England had been examined by us all it would be the height of disingenuousness in us to shut our eyes to any weak points of the system that we were embracing in preference, should any such exist. I felt that if I found the claims of the Church of Rome to be thoroughly in accordance with facts, I should ever afterwards regard her with tenfold reverence for having verified them myself. But till I had actually been received into Communion with Rome, it was my own impression, and I was assured by members of the Roman Communion over and over again, that I could

never judge of her system at all fairly or adequately; and this was one of my chief reasons for embracing it when I did. Afterwards I resided in various countries where it was dominant, and studied its worship in town and country, comparing them with what I had abandoned for it at home. Then I returned and set myself to work to improve my previous knowledge of its history in past ages, and its relations with other churches; paying especial attention to the causes which had produced estrangement between it and them for a time or till now. All this has been my constant employment for the last dozen years or more; so that I cannot be said to have drawn my conclusions hastily."

We cannot imagine a much more troublesome acquisition to the Church of Rome than such a convert as Mr. Ffoulkes. It is certain that whatever he may have embraced in the doctrine of the Romish Church, he has never given up the principle of "private judgment," and therefore has throughout been but an ambiguous sort of Roman Catholic.

About the time when Dr. Newman published his *Apologia* (in 1864), Mr. Ffoulkes, in the *Union Review*, published some confessions, entitled *Experiences of a 'Vert*, which were hardly in keeping with the character of a dutiful son of the Church. "I repeat," he says, "that the years I have spent as a Roman Catholic have been among the most useless and unedifying of my life; and therefore it is that I feel it to be my duty to speak to others lacking the same experience. Let nobody quit the Church of England for the Roman Catholic Church, on any other ground than of a distinct call from God to do so."* In the same article he asks, evidently with reference to Dr. Newman,—

"Has the Roman Catholic hierarchy been the means of unmaking, so far as in them lay, one of still greater name than the saintly Faber, or not less devoted Hutchinson? Is it the system which has sapped his excellence, or is he the same that he was formerly? . . . . Why is he, the most gifted intellect of the day, combined with rare piety, the most popular party leader within memory, now in dishonored retirement—the victim of circumstances or of intrigue, if report says true?"—*Experiences of a 'Vert*, p. 28.

* *Experiences of a 'Vert*, p. 30.

In the same article, besides, he, writing as a Romanist, argues that grace cannot be derived as appertaining to the ministrations of the Anglican Church. If this were not conceded by the Roman doctors, he contends, "the Christian lives of men in the Church of England would be one of those inexorable facts which logic cannot set aside."

This was written in 1864, a year before Mr. Ffoulkes published the first part of his work on *Christendom's Divisions*, three years before he had learnt, in the course of his researches for writing the second part, that the Roman Pontiffs had accepted the *Filioque* in the *Nicene Creed* on the mere compulsion of the Frankish Emperor, that the temporal power of the Pope was falsely based on the forged donation of Constantine, and that the Roman canon law, with all its portentious assumptions rested on the forged and pseudo-Isidorian decretals.

In fact, this inconvenient and unmanageable "chiel" has been, for these many years, "taking notes" among the "Catholics" into whose community he had entered, and, with dogged honesty, he has persisted in "printing" them.

The leading purpose in his present pamphlet is to furnish or suggest a reply to one of the letters on *The Crown in Council* in that volume of Archbishop Manning's to which we have referred.

The Archbishop casts in the teeth of the Anglican Church its Erastianism and the scandal of its having Henry VIII. for its royal and national head, the humiliation to which as a State-establishment under royal headship it has had for centuries to submit, and, in especial, its present powerlessness and helplessness in the face of heresy and schism. Mr. Ffoulkes volunteers to furnish Dr. Manning's "Anglican friend" with a *tu quoque* argument from which there is no escape. Charlemagne is the Henry VIII. of the Roman Catholic Church, not less unscrupulous, hardly less cruel, in no way a better Christian, and the imponent upon the Pope and the Roman Catholic Church of the *Filioque* addition to the Creed, which made the breach with the Greek Church irreparable, and of much besides.

"I ask you, my Lord, as a plain-spoken Englishman, whether it would be possible to conceive the Creed of the Church more deliberately impugned by the Crown in Council in the teeth of the Pope? I am persuaded at all events that there has been nothing

approacing it in the history of the Church of England since the Reformation. Charlemagne, as the mouthpiece of the Council of Frankfort, composed of his own subjects or allies, took formal objection to the Creed of the Church, as it then stood, and has just been promulgated for the fourth time by a General Council, confirmed by the Pope, because in the article defining the procession of the Holy Ghost it wanted those words, 'and from the Son;' and the formal answer of the Pope thus appealed to was, that its explicit teaching was perfect, though it wanted those words.

"Yet the 'Crown in Council,' we must conclude, was more intimately versed in theology than either the Church in Council or the Pope, for it carried its point after all—either this, or the Church of Rome in adopting those words submitted to its dictation: for there is no other alternative."

* * * * * * * * *

Thus Recared inaugurated the addition. Charlemagne patronized it: and Henry II. got it adopted by the Popes themselves. When this had been done, the pontifical oath was changed. Later Popes of course shrank from imprecating a judgment upon themselves, according to the terms of their oath, in case they failed to keep the decrees of the General Councils enumerated in it,'*usque ad unum apicem*,' when they felt they had notoriously failed to do so by the Creed. That clause was accordingly struck out. In the corresponding clause of the oath that was afterwards taken by them—the way in which Cardinals are mentioned in it associates it with the well-known decree of Nicholas II., 1059, respecting the Sacred College—they are made to say, simply, 'May God be merciful to me in that awful day if I do my diligence to keep all these things sworn to by me.' Had it been intended to intimate that they had been now and then forced to do otherwise, it could not have been differently worded."

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Long before I joined the Roman Communion, as my books testify, I thought then, and am doubly convinced now, after reading ecclesiastical history through again as a Roman Catholic, that if ever there was a justifiable revolt from authority, it was the revolt we call the Reformation: and most certainly had it been a revolt from a mere secular power, like that of the United States

of America from England, I for one should never have dreamed of transferring my allegiance from the Anglican to the Roman Communion, any more than I suppose any citizen of the United States in his sober senses would now dream of transferring his, on principle, to the British Crown. But all Scripture told me that there should be but one Church; and all history told me that a Primacy from time immemorial in that one Church belonged to the see of Rome: all history told me, moreover, that from the foundation of the see of Canterbury to the Reformation, the Church of England had been one with Rome, had voted freely and deliberately for the doctrine and discipline upheld by Rome, including the supremacy of the Pope, for centuries, and was at least as responsible for the corruptions that had accumulated in the middle ages and precipitated the catastrophe of the sixteenth century, as any other of the Churches in communion with Rome on the Continent. Hence, it certainly seemed to me that the Church of England had done wrong in separating from the body of which she had been so long a foremost member, and affecting to care for nothing so long as her own boat got off safe, instead of standing manfully by her colors, and assisting by every means in her power to bring the old ship safe into port. At all events, what excuse was there for our continued isolation? If I could trust to the Roman Catholic divines of this country, whose teaching I took to be faithfully reflected in a work entitled the 'Faith of Catholics,' printed in 1846, for the third time, by a living dignitary, since promoted, and dedicated to the late Bishop Walsh, I felt there was nothing in the Roman Catholic system *now*, to which I could not honestly, and would not willingly, subscribe, for the sake of breaking down the barriers that estranged us from the Churches abroad, with which our forefathers had lived and died in happy communion. It may be that I trusted those divines too implicitly: it is not long since I heard the term 'minimisers' applied from the pulpit by a living preacher, who may be supposed your mouth-piece, to those who believed no more; though it would be difficult to produce any Roman Catholic catechism in use throughout England in which more was taught. But this by the way. More intimate acquaintance with the Continental Churches, and a much more searching investigation into the merits of the schism between the East and West than I had ever been able to give to it before, has modified my views on the whole question

considerably between England and Rome. Let me begin with the last first.

"To the facts which some pages back I put into the mouth of your Anglican friend, you will doubtless remember my calling your attention privately just twelve months ago. Your only reply to me, so far as they were concerned, was that they were already known. This I construed as an admission on your part that I had stated them correctly. But if so, what other inference can be deduced from them, than that for the last 1,000 years the Roman Communion has been committed to the use of a Creed which is not that of the Church, but of the Crown. I do not say *therefore* to the use of a Creed which is heterodox. On the theological question involved in it I would wish to speak with becoming reverence: but this much is certain, that the addition which forms its distinguishing feature was made and had been in use many centuries before any Pope judged it allowable, much less necessary: many centuries before theologians in the West had agreed amongst themselves whether the term 'mission' and 'procession' were distinguishable. Doubtless it has since found able defenders; but among them there are scarce two who give the same account of it, historically or doctrinally: and some of them are neither consistent with each other nor with themselves. Others, in arguing for it against the Easterns, have grievously misstated facts, and numberless passages have been adduced in support of it from the Fathers, either wholly spurious or interpolated. I know of no parallel to it in this respect in any religious controversy, before or since. If the Athanasian Creed was not expressly coined for this controversy, it was employed in this controversy first as a polemical weapon."

We must, however, leave the question of the *Filioque* in the Nicene Creed. Nor can we give more than a paragraph to Mr. Ffoulkes's account of his discoveries in reference to the false donation and the false decretals. We have already intimated our astonishment that Mr. Ffoulkes should have had to wait till his life is waning into the sere leaf, and till he has given twenty years of study to ecclesiastical history, before he has become master of fundamental facts in ecclesiastical history, which, out of Oxford, would have been laid down in view of all Protestant students of the subject as elementary stepping-stones in their progress, always to be kept in sight. We have referred to Fleury and Dupin,

we might have added generally the French Benedictines; we have not named Fabricius or the Magdeburgh Centuriators, or Muratori, although to a learned student like Mr. Ffoulkes these should have been proximate authorities; we have not referred to Mosheim, in whose texts and notes, with the additions of his commentators, may be found much lore on these points; we shall content ourselves here with citing the following passage from Campbell's *Lectures on Ecclesiastical History*:—

"What but this favorite maxim can account for the many falsehoods and forgeries to which she so often recurred in support of her exorbitant claims? The ignorance and superstition of the dark ages that ensued (for those I have had occasion to refer to in this, and my two preceding lectures, are but as the evening twilight compared with those which followed) soon gave scope for attempting the very grossest kinds of imposition, and the friends and patrons of the hierarchy were not remiss in using the opportunity while it lasted. The fruits of their diligence, in this way, were fictitious decrees of real councils, false deeds of gift, such as the instrument of donation of Rome and all Italy, made, as was pretended, by the Emperor Constantine to Pope Sylvester, and his successors in the Popedom; the decretal epistles of the Popes, not to mention the little legerdemain tricks of false miracles, and other such like artifices. For the lying spirit which had gotten possession of the head, quickly diffused itself throughout the members, and every petty priest supported his particular credit among the people by the same arts, exhibited, as it were in miniature, which were on a larger scale displayed by the pontiff for the support of the great hierarchal empire. It must be owned the greater part of their forgeries, especially Constantine's donation and the decretal epistles, are such barefaced impostures, and so bunglingly executed, that nothing less than the most profound darkness of those ages could account for their success. They are manifestly written in the barbarous dialect which obtained in the eighth and ninth centuries, and exhibit those poor, meek, and humble teachers who came immediately after the Apostles, as blustering, swaggering, and dictating to the world in the authoritative tone of a Zachary or a Stephen."—*Campbell's Works*, Tegg's Edition, vol. v., pp. 268–9.

Mr. Ffoulkes has much to say about all the points we have noted; he has much to say respecting the traditional policy of the Court of Rome, especially in regard to the Greek Church, and respecting its usurped prerogatives; severe things he says respecting the general character of the Romish policy and of the Popes themselves, and the habit and wont, in a sense the necessity, of falsehood and tyranny, which had come to press upon them, so as to expose the Papacy long ago to the cutting rebukes of Bernard, and, since his time, of more than a few high Catholic authorities; as to the Crusades also, and their purpose and character, Mr. Ffoulkes has much evidence to offer, and strong thoughts to utter; nearly the whole of this part of the pamphlet being, in fact, a summary of much that is contained in *Christendom's Divisions*, Part II. All that we, however, can do, as regards these points, is to quote Mr. Ffoulkes's own epitome of his conclusions, as it is given near the end of his pamphlet:—

"I admit that up to the time of my inquiring into the true causes of the early schism between the East and West, I was not prepared to look upon the position of the Church of England as favorably as I do now; because I regarded it as the effect of schism—willful and deliberate schism—on her part in separating from the Communion to which she has been so long bound, and over which, with the full concurrence of her clergy and laity for ages, Rome ruled supreme. I expressed this unhesitatingly three years back in the first part of my book,* and am far from intending to retract *all* that I said then: but having since discovered the general system of Church government in which England, in common with all other Western nations, had up to that time acquiesced, to have been based upon forgeries, and opposed to the genuine code of the Church, I as unhesitatingly recognize the right—nay, the duty paramount—of every local Church to revolt against such a concatenation of spurious legislation as this, and scattering to the winds every link of the false chain that had enthralled it hitherto, to return to the letter and spirit of those genuine canons, stamped with the assent of the whole Church, and never repealed. Supposing this done, even the act of St. Augustine and his companions in establishing the jurisdiction of the patriarch of the West over the island, is found illegal, having

* *Christendom's Divisions.*

been declared null and void by anticipation in the eighth canon of the Council of Ephesus already quoted. 'So that none of the bishops most beloved by God do assume any other province that is not, or was not formerly and from the beginning, subject to him, or those who were his predecessors. . . . . But if any one introduces a regulation contrary to the present determination, the Holy General Synod decrees that it be of no force!' It is idle, or worse than idle, to assert that St. Augustine found England subject to Rome when he arrived: and it is quite true that he accomplished its subjection two centuries and a half or more previously to the publication of the pseudo-decretals; but it is no less true that its subjection was accomplished in the teeth of this canon, as well as of the protest of the native episcopate that he found in possession. It may well be doubted whether St Gregory was ever properly made acquainted with their prescriptive claims; in any case what was effected with his sanction was precisely what St. Leo the Great informed the East the canons would not allow of his conceding to the Constantinopolitan patriarch Anatolius at the fourth Council. The wily forger of the pseudo-decretals had his eye upon all such 'accomplished facts' in the West when he compiled his code, and either founded his maxims upon them or else sought to legitimatize them by the authority which he claimed for his maxims. Both, therefore, necessarily belong to the same category: neither can one possibly stand without the other. Anglican divines have long cited the ordinance of the Council of Ephesus in proof of their canonical independence of the jurisdiction of Rome; but they ought in fairness to have acknowledged themselves at the same time bound by the Sardican canons, that British bishops assisted in passing, admitting and regulating appeals to the Pope. This, I conceive, will be found to be the true limit of what is due to the Pope from England, according to the genuine law of the Church. The primatial See of England, whether at Caerleon or elsewhere, was originally independent and autocephalous, and never should have been made amenable to his jurisdiction as patriarch, whether for consecration or any similar purpose.

"I am well aware, my Lord, that this last inference of mine must cut at the very root of your position in England, should it prove correct: but as I have lived in the investigation of these questions for the last twenty years and upwards, you will scarce

accuse me of being influenced by personal considerations in getting to their final solution. I mean neither disrespect nor disaffection to the living authorities of the Roman Catholic Church, when I draw attention to the undeniable fact that they are daily violating the law of the Church.

What I criticize has been the work of centuries commenced ages since, and what all of them together, were they ever so righteously minded, could not possibly change all at once, still less make perfection. Again, what I criticize is not the faith of the Popes, but their governmental policy, and that only since they became temporal princes as well as bishops, and not before. Their court and see having been all one for practical purposes since the establishment of the former, it would be vain to attempt drawing the line between them, especially as it is their joint action upon the Church, not upon empires or men in general, to which the verdict of history is most adverse. I am well aware, and have frequently spoken, of the services rendered by Rome to the nations of Europe, morally, socially, and religiously, in promoting their civilization, in many respects a most up-hill task; and for these I am inclined to think there are some arrears of gratitude still due to it from Europe, and perhaps never likely to be settled, though I suppose none benefited more largely by their achievements in the middle ages than the Popes themselves. But when I contemplate the divisions of Christendom, past and present, and search history for their origin, I find it is the conduct of the Popes, more than anything else, for the last thousand years, in governing the Church, which has divided the Church. First of all they allowed crowned heads to tamper with the Creed of the Church, if not to the unsettling of her faith, at least to the dividing of her household. Secondly, they allowed a spurious code to be brought into gradual use, without troubling themselves to refer to their own archives for proofs of its origin, and ultimately to overlay and be taken for the genuine laws of the Church. Thirdly, they countenanced one part of the Church, then in a minority, making war upon, and taking possession of, not merely the temporalities, but the ecclesiastical revenues and sees of the other part of the Church, then in a majority, to the ruin of Christianity, and the triumphing of the Crescent over the Cross in those parts eventually whence the Gospel had first sped. They countenanced all this because it brought gain and aggrandizement

to themselves and to their see, conformably with the maxims of the false, but in opposition to the maxims of the true code. Fourthly, as I have proved elsewhere, they put off reforming the Church in their own patriarchate by fair means, till Providence permitted that it should be done by foul. Such is the verdict of history upon their conduct as Church governors since they became princes."—Pp. 59–62.

On all these points, however, Mr. Ffoulkes, as the Archbishop in effect told him, has but published in the year 1869, for the benefit of pamphlet and newspaper readers, what has, for generations past, been known to all Protestant students of ecclesiastical history, and to most well-informed Roman Catholic students, at least in Germany and France. The most remarkable part of his pamphlet consists of the results of his personal observations as an honest and liberal Romanist, and *quondam* Anglo-Catholic, in the two spheres, the Anglican and the Romanist, with which he has been familiar.

"Where, indeed," says Mr. Ffoulkes, "is the part of Christendom seriously purporting to call itself the Catholic Church in these days? Roman Catholic, Anglo-Catholic, Episcopal, Orthodox, or Presbyterian, all in their degree seem influenced by some hidden spell to abstain from arrogating to themselves or attributing to each other the epithet of 'Catholic' without qualification, as it is applied to the Church in the Creed. Test existing phenomena by this theory, and the results are plain and straightforward. One of its logical results would be that the administration of the Christian Sacraments might be frequented with profit outside the pale of the Roman Communion. Is this confirmed by experience? My Lord, my own experience, which is confined to the single Communion in which you formerly bore office, that of the Church of England, says emphatically that it is: and there is no canon or ordinance that I know of forbidding me to maintain it. You have preceded me yourself in expatiating on the workings of the Holy Spirit in the Church of England, with your accustomed eloquence, and have not hesitated to attribute to its members many graces in virtue of the Sacrament of Baptism, which you allow they administer on the whole validly: but here you stop. I feel morally constrained to go farther still. If I had to

die for it, I could not possibly subscribe to the idea that the Sacraments to which I am admitted week after week in the Roman Communion—Confession and the Holy Eucharist, for instance—confer any graces, any privileges, essentially different from what I used to derive from those same Sacraments, frequented with same dispositions, in the Church of England. On the contrary, I go so far as to say, that comparing one with another strictly, some of the most edifying communions that I can remember in all my life, were made in the Church of England, and administered to me by some that have since submitted to be re-ordained in the Church of Rome; a ceremony, therefore, which, except as qualifying them to undertake duty there, I must consider superfluous. Assuredly, so far as the registers of my own spiritual life carry me, I have not been able to discover any greater preservatives from sin, any greater incentives to holiness, in any that I have received since; though, in saying this, I am far from intending any derogation to the latter. I frequent them regularly; I prize them exceedingly; I have no fault to find with their administration or their administrators in general. All that I was ever taught to expect from them they do for me, due allowance being made for my own shortcomings. Only I cannot possibly subscribe to the notion of my having been a stranger to their beneficial effects till I joined the Roman Communion, and I deny that it was my faith alone that made them what they were to me before then, unless it is through my faith alone that they are what they are to me now. Holding myself that there are realities attaching to the Sacraments of an objective character, I am persuaded, and have been more and more confirmed in this conviction as I have grown older, that the Sacraments administered in the Church of England are realities, objective realities, to the same extent as any I could now receive at your hands; so that you yourself therefore consecrated the Eucharist as truly when you were Vicar of Lavington as you have ever done since. This may or may not be your belief; but you shall be one of my foremost witnesses to its credibility, for I am far from basing it on experiences of my own soul. My Lord, I have always been accustomed to look upon the Sacraments as so many means of grace, and to estimate their value, not by the statements of theologians, but by their effects on myself, my neighbors, and mankind at large. And the vast difference between the moral tone of society in the Chris-

tian and the pagan worlds, I attribute not merely to the superiority of the rule of life prescribed in the Gospels, but to the inherent grace of the Sacraments enabling and assisting us to keep it to the extent we do. Taking this principle for my guide, I have been engaged constantly since I joined the Roman Communion in instituting comparisons between members of the Church of England, and members of the Church of Rome generally, and between our former and our present selves in particular; or between Christianity in England and on the Continent; and the result in each case has been, to confirm me in the belief which I have expressed already, that the notion of the Sacraments exercising any greater influence upon the heart and life in the Church of Rome than in the Church of England, admitting the dispositions of those who frequent them to be the same in both cases, is not merely preposterous, but as contrary both to faith and fact as is the opinion that the Pope is Antichrist and the Man of Sin My Lord, there is no person in his sober senses who could affirm that you, for instance, began to be a devout, earnest, intelligent follower of Christ, an admirable master of the inner and hidden life, a glorious example of self-sacrifice, a deep expounder of revealed mysteries and Gospel truths, when you embraced the Roman Communion; or that all those graces which you exhibited previously in the sight of men could be deduced from the one rite which you received unconsciously as a child, conteracted by all the bad and unwholesome food on which, according to this hypothesis, you must have lived ever afterwards. In the same way there is no ordinary person in his sober senses who could affect to discover any fundamental change for the better in you, morally or religiously, now from what you were then. There are some, on the contrary, to my knowledge, of your existing flock who profess that they have not half the liking for the sermons which they hear you deliver as Archbishop of Westminster, that they have for the dear old volumes which you published as Archdeacon of Chichester, as fresh and full of fragrance to their instincts as ever. And I have heard the same said of another, whose parochial sermons, hailed as a master piece on their first appearance, have just burst forth into a second spring. People say that sermons which *ci-devant* Anglican clergymen of note preached formerly, read so much more natural than any that they have since delivered from Roman Catholic pulpits.

They argued impartially, then, as men whose sole desire it was

both to get at the truth, and uphold it at any cost; they never feared looking facts in the face, and were as little given to exaggerate those that made for them as to keep out of sight or evade by subterfuge those which they could neither excuse nor explain. They were never tired of confessing their own sins and shortcomings. In a word, their tone was frank, honest, and manly. Now, they may preach with the same energy, but it is as though they preached under restraint or dictation. Either they are high-flown and exaggerated: or else punctilious and reserved: weighing each word as if they were repeating a task: always artificial, never themselves: as if committed to a thesis, which they must defend at all risks, and to which all facts must be accommodated, or else denied. Hence, do what they will, there is a distinction between themselves and the cause they advocate, which cannot fail to strike the most ordinary listener; their words no longer carry the moral argument (*ἠθικὴ πίστις*) with them that they once did even among their own followers: and the judgment of public opinion on them is that they are vapid and destitute of force by comparison. What people say of those generally who have become Roman Catholics in England of late years, is that they have deteriorated as a body rather than advanced. The foremost of them have not progressed in any perceptible degree—perceptible by others, that is—beyond the high standard to which they had attained before, as their lives, their writings, and their sermons testified! others, every allowance being made for the peculiar trials to which they have been subjected, have notoriously descended to a lower level of Christianity since they became Roman Catholics, from that in which they had been working previously; and some have been driven from their moorings —in appearance at least—altogether. All this I hear said: and as far as my own experience goes, it is quite true: and for the life of me I cannot infer anything else from it than that sacramental grace is equally derivable from the same ordinances in both Communions, according to the dispositions of those who frequent them, and is not more indefatigable in the one than the other. What I have seen of Roman Catholics myself, since joining their Church, all points to the same conclusion. Till then, I knew them only by report, which, founded on prejudice, was far from being in their favor: and I was horrified to find how shamefully it had misrepresented them. I found them—I mean the educated

classes—all that in a general estimate members of a Christian Church should be: God-serving, charitable, conscientious, refined, intelligent; and I could discover nothing idolatrous or superstitious in their worship, nor anything at variance with first principles in their daily life. At home or abroad I was equally surprised to find them so different from what my traditional informants had described them, with so much to admire where I had supposed there was so much to reprobate. But afterwards—when my first emotions consequent on this discovery had subsided—when I came to ask myself the question, Are these, then, the only true Christians that you have ever known in life; and till you conversed with them, had you never conversed with a true Christian before? I can scarce describe the recoil which it occasioned me. Why, my own father and mother would have compared with the best of them in all the virtues ordinarily possessed by Christians living in the world and discharging their duties conscientiously towards God and their neighbors, in, through, and for Christ. 'All for Jesus' was as much their motto as it could be of any parents in Christendom: and well indeed would it be for all Roman Catholic children if they were blessed with no worse fathers and mothers than mine. Then I have, or have had, relatives and friends in numbers, members of the Church of England, whose homes I will undertake to say are to all intents and purposes as thoroughly Christian as any to be found elsewhere: and it would be sheer affectation or hypocrisy in me were I to pretend the contrary; or else to claim for my own friends and relatives any peculiar excellence distinguishing them from average specimens of the Anglican body.

"For a calm, unpresuming, uniform standard of practical Christianity, I have seen nothing as yet amongst ourselves in any country superior to that of the English parsonage and its surroundings: go where I will, I am always thrown back upon one of these as the most perfect ideal of a Christian family: a combination amongst its members of the highest intelligence with the most unsullied purity and earnest faith I ever witnessed on earth. It was a privilege to have witnessed it. It was not far from Brackley. You may have known several such yourself. On describing the 'daily round' of Christian life in the English Church—such as I have been accustomed to from a child—to the excellent priest who received me into communion on the Continent—our family

prayers, our grace before and after meals, our reading of the Scriptures, our observance of Sunday, our services at Church, our Sunday-schools—what did he do but mount his pulpit the Sunday following, and embodying all that I had told him in a fervid discourse, expatiate to a fashionable congregation in Paris on the many lessons of piety which they had to learn from their separated brethren on the other side of the channel? 'Such, too, was our general practice,' he said to me in a private conversation, 'before the Revolution: and we hope to recover it: but as yet there are few families where it exists.' Of my countrymen he observed, 'Leur bonne foi est acceptée pour leur vraie foi.' I took this explanation in trust at the time, but I have since given it up as inadequate. For if it be said that faith and integrity of purpose make members of the Church of England what they are without the Sacraments in mature life, by what argument, I should like to know, can it be proved that it is not to their faith and integrity of purpose solely that members of the Roman Catholic Church are indebted likewise for all the progress they make? The only test of the efficaciousness of the Sacrament appreciable by common sense lies in their influence upon conduct. If therefore it were capable of proof, as distinct from assertion, which it is not, both that all the Sacraments administered in the Church of England but one are shams, and all administered in the Church of Rome, without exception, realities, how comes it that we are not incomparably more exalted characters ourselves than we were formerly: or that Roman Catholic countries on the Continent are not incomparably more penetrated to the core with Christianity than England? Both these points, I dare say, might be affirmed by some: but they are denied, and I maintain with much more reason, by others, and therefore at best it can only be the degree to which the thing exists, not whether it exists at all, which is in question. I have already spoken of the eloquent sermon I heard preached in Paris, in which the Christian practices of my old friends in England were held up for imitation. The preacher himself had a history of his own hardly less eloquent. He had quitted the care of one of the most important Churches in Paris to found a religious community for the purpose of raising the tone of the French clergy. What had impelled him? Simply, the extremely devout demeanor of two *ci-devant* Anglican clergymen lately become Oratorians, whom he had watched

saying their masses at one of the altars in his own Church from his confessional. Certainly they could not have said a Roman Mass before they became Roman Catholic priests; but for all their preliminary training in piety, they were beholden as certainly to the Communion which they had just quitted: so that they who had been educated in Anglicanism were the means of suggesting to a Roman Catholic priest in France how much room there was for improvement in the training of his fellow-clergy."—pp. 45–51.

Now, this is plain common-sense, practical English common-sense. But then its scope extends much farther than Mr. Ffoulkes, whose powers of logical anticipation appear to be by no means subtle or swift, would seem to have any idea.

There are Christian communities which esteem it to be their advantage and safety that they have no "hierarchy," no "Apostolic succession." These, therefore, according to Mr. Ffoulkes, have no sacramental grace, except that imparted in baptism, lay-baptism being valid. Does Mr. Ffoulkes imagine that in these communities there is and has been less of Christian principle and influence than in the Anglican or the Roman Catholic Church? Let him think of Lutheran and Reformed Churches of the Continent during the last three centuries, of the Presbyterians of Scotland, Ireland, and England, of the English Non-conformists of the last two centuries, of the Methodists; let him give but a glance at the Anglo-Saxon American Christians, among whom the hierarchical Episcopalians constitute but the most insignificant fraction; and let him consider whether his argument must not, of necessity and in common decency, be so extended as to include within the sweep of its comfortable conclusions the great body of non-Episcopalian Christian Churches.

If he should need quickening on his way to accept an extension which, however opposed to his favorite postulate, to the fundamental error which has led him into all his ecclesiastical perplexities, is yet fatally inevitable, we can administer the needful stimulus to his movement, by a quotation from Dr. Manning, the authority of which, on such a point, Mr. Ffoulkes will not be able to deny. The words which we are about to cite occur, indeed, in the very passage of the Archbishop's letter to Dr. Pusey, to which Mr. Ffoulkes refers with approbation in the forty-fifth page of his pamphlet.

"It must not, however, be forgotten, for a moment, that this applies to the whole English people, of all forms of Christianity, or, as it is called, 'of all denominations.' What I have said does not recognize the grace *of* the Church of England as such. The working of grace *in* the Church of England is a truth we joyfully hold and always teach. But we as joyfully recognize the working of the Holy Spirit among Dissenters of every kind. Indeed, I must say, that I am far more able to assure myself of the invincible ignorance of Dissenters as a mass, than of Anglicans as a mass. They are far more deprived of what survived of Catholic truth; far more distant from the idea of a Church; far more traditionally opposed to it by the prejudice of education; I must add, for the most part, far more simple in their belief in the person and passion of our Divine Lord. Their piety is more like the personal service of disciples to a personal Master than the Anglican piety, which has always been more dim and distant from this central light of souls. Witness Jeremy Taylor's works, as much as I have loved them, compared with Baxter's, or even those of Andrews compared with Leighton's, who was formed by the Kirk of Scotland.

"I do not here forget all you have done to provide ascetical and devotional books for the use of the Church of England, both by your own writings, and, may I not say it, from your neighbor's vineyard?

"With truth, then, I can say, that I rejoice in all the operations of the Holy Spirit out of the Catholic Church, whether in the Anglican or other Protestant bodies; not that these communions are thereby invested with any supernatural character, but because more souls, I trust, are saved. If I have a greater joy over these workings of grace in the Church of England, it is only because more who are dear to me are in it, for whom I never fail to pray day by day. These graces to individuals were given before the Church was founded, and are given still out of its unity. They are no more tokens of an ecclesiastical character, or a sacramental power in the Church of England, than in the Kirk of Scotland, or in the Wesleyan Connection; they prove only the manifold grace of God, which, after all the sins of men, and in the midst of all the ruins they have made, still works in the souls for whom Christ died. Such, then, is our estimate of the Church of England in regard to the grace that works not *by* it,

nor *through* it, but *in* it, and among those who, without faults of their own, are detained by it from the true Church of their baptism.

"Moreover, to be just, I must say, that if the Church of England be a barrier against infidelity, the Dissenters must also be admited to a share in this office, and in the praise due to it. And in truth, I do not know among the Dissenters any works like the 'Essays and Reviews,' or any Biblical criticism like that of Dr. Colenso. They may not be very dogmatic in their teaching; but they bear their witness for Christianity as a Divine revelation, for the Scriptures as an inspired book, and, I must add further, for the personal Christianity of conversion and repentance, with an explicitness and consistency which is not less effectual against infidelity than the testimony of the Church of England. I do not think the Wesleyan Conference, or the authorities of the Three Denominations, would accept readily this assumed superiority of the Anglican Church as a witness against unbelief. They would point, and not unjustly, to the doctrinal confusions of the Church of England as causes of skepticism, from which they are comparatively free. And I am bound to say that I think they would have an advantage. I well remember that while I was in the Church of England I used to regard Dissenters from it with a certain, I will not say aversion, but distance and recoil. I never remember to have borne animosity against them, or to have attacked or pursued them with unkindness. I always believed many of them to be very earnest and devoted men. I did not like their theology, and I believed them to be in disobedience to the Church of England; but I respected them, and lived at peace with them. Indeed, I may say, that some of the best people I have ever known out of the Church were Dissenters or children of Dissenters. Nevertheless, I had a dislike of their system, and of their meeting-houses. They seemed to me to be rivals of the Church of England, and loyalty to it made me look somewhat impatiently upon them. But I remember, from the hour I submitted to the Catholic Church, all this underwent a sensible change. I saw that the whole revelation was perpetuated in the Church alone, and that all forms of Christianity lying round about it were but fragments more or less mutilated. But with this a sensible increase of kindly feeling grew upon me.

The Church of England and the Dissenting communions all

alike appeared to me to be upon the same level. I rejoiced in all the truth that remains in them, in all the good I could see or hope for in them, and all the workings of the Holy Spirit in them. I had no temptation to animosity towards them; for neither they nor the Church of England could be rivals of the imperishable and immutable Church of God. The only sense, then, in which I could regard the Church of England as a barrier against infidelity, I must extend also to the Dissenting bodies, and I cannot put this high, for reasons I will give."—*England and Christendom*, pp. 102–3, 116–9.

From all this it must follow, on Mr. Ffoulkes's own principles, that sacramental grace comes as really and as fully to Christians who have never been brought into contact with the priests of any "Catholic" hierarchy as to "Catholic" Christians, so called, whether Roman or Anglican. Practically, administratively, in effect, the "Catholic" hierarchist substitutes the priest and the sacrament for the Spirit and the Truth. "Faith cometh by hearing, hearing by the Word of God." Christians can only "purify their heart unto unfeigned love of the brethren in obeying the truth through the Spirit." The truth, indeed, speaks through the sacramental symbol, and the Spirit's power and blessing received into the believing soul fulfills the Divine pledge of the sacramental seal. But whether it be by the spoken Word, or by the Word in the Sacrament, it is ever true that Christians are "sanctified through the Truth," and that God's "Word is Truth." And so it must ever be "until we all come," even the whole Church of Christ, "in the unity of the faith, and of the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ."

Mr. Ffoulkes cannot really make good his escape from the perplexities which beset him, nor defend his "contumacy" in standing where he does, unless he will abandon the principles of necessary unity, continuity, and authority, and embrace instead the principles of free spiritual Christianity, the doctrines of immediate personal union with Christ, and of the invisible and spiritual unity in Christ of all true believers, who alone constitute collectively the true Church, "the body of Christ," "the fullness of Him which filleth all in all." The doctrines of hierarchical prerogative and of specific sacramental virtue must be aban-

doned, or he must be content to make his unconditional submission to ultramontane Catholicism.

We resume our question from Mr. Ffoulkes at the place where he brings us within view, from an interior point, of the varieties of Christianity, or of nominally Christian superstition, which are contained within the Roman pale. The glimpse we catch is very interesting:—

"I have another anecdote to tell of the same kind from what happened to me when in Spain much more recently. I spent the latter part of Lent, including Holy Week, at Seville: and had looked forward to the ceremonies immediately preceding Easter there with no small interest. But when the time for them arrived, I never saw services more coldly conducted or more scantily attended, and ceremonies less productive, in appearance at least, of any devotional feelings. I returned from them each time pained and scandalized. About the middle of Holy Week I fortunately had occasion to go to my banker's; and on entering I found a priest there waiting like myself to be served. Something induced me to accost him in English; on his replying to me in the same, we soon entered warmly into conversation. He turned out to be a young priest who had 'served his time' at the Brompton Oratory, though not a native of England. I confided to him what I thought of the services. He expressed no surprise: on the contrary, he dissuaded me from going again to the Churches I named. 'Come to our Church,' he said, 'and I think you will see things done as they ought to be, and a very different style of congregation.' I went, and found it all as he had told me. There was life in the services, earnestness in the celebrants, devotion in the worshipers. The Brompton Oratory, that heart-stirring creation of old Oxford and Cambridge men, had sent out missionaries to evangelize Seville. Nobody who had frequented and compared it with the churches all round, could dispute its claim to be the beginning of a new order of things here. As I am in Spain already, I may as well go on.

From Seville I proceeded to a small village in the neighborhood of the Sierra, of most primitive description. There I remained several months. There was early Mass most mornings of the week: but I seldom, if ever, saw any but women at it: and these rarely more than from ten to twenty. But on Sundays at High Mass, the church, which was of considerable size for a village

church, was crammed full of men and women, the former thronging the choir as far it would contain them, where I sat myself. I took some pains to examine, but I never could discover anybody, man, woman or child, in the whole congregation, who used a book besides myself: and whatever may have been their inmost feelings, which I do not pretend to decipher, the countenances of the men bespoke nothing but listless apathy. Vespers were invariably attended by the priest, one cantor, and myself: in all, three, and to the best of my remembrance, never more. There were no evening services of any description while I was there.

"The only spark of devotion I ever witnessed—and I record it with as much pleasure—was that now and then I used to see parties of four or five women sitting outside their doors in the cool of the evening reciting their chaplet. The priest was affable and intelligent: and seemed anxious to promote education; but he was a good deal mixed up in the secular affairs of his neighbors as well: and the honors of his house were always done by one who went by the name of his 'cugina' [*cousin*], but I was laughed at for supposing it meant the relationship that we understand by it. I could only therefore account for the average respect that was paid to him on the supposition that such things were not uncommon. Altogether, I quitted this village feeling strongly that there was certainly not more real Christianity practiced in it than in my own native parish in Wales, if so much: that the Welsh there were better educated and more intelligent in their devotions beyond comparison, than these specimens of Andalusia, and that the clergyman there could not at all events have a woman sitting at the head of his table who was neither his wife nor his relation. Yet this was a country that had remained exclusively Roman Catholic since its release from the Moors.

"From the south of Spain I proceeded to the garden of France, the heart of the Tourraine. There I passed some time pleasantly enough at a country house, long before I joined the Roman Catholic Church: yet I studied its workings then with no less interest. As there was no Anglican Church within reach, I accompanied the family to the parish church, from two to three miles off, just about the distance of my own at home. Church-going was confined to Mass on Sundays, high or low: Low when any of the family communicated, which was never oftener than once a month; High Mass otherwise. This was the only public service to which anybody, speaking generally, went in the neighborhood: and

that over, everybody met, gossiped, and promenaded up and down the village till the carriages were ready to take them home. This was precisely the custom of my own neighborhood: but with this difference, that most of the gentry came to Church twice on Sundays, and some of them likewise to occasional services during the week in Lent, Advent, or Christmas-time. There was one circumstance connected with my Sundays in France, there or elsewhere, which I shall not easily forget. I was always asked to the best parties, and to the best hunting or shooting, on Sundays: and being a keen sportsman in those days, it was no small act of self-denial, in obedience to my Anglican principles, to forego the latter. Well! the finest 'battue' to which I ever had a chance of going, was at a historic château not far from where I was staying at Tourraine, where, by the way, the church stood just outside the grounds, and the lady of the château, to her credit be spoken, attended Mass daily: the usual congregation, however, being herself and the acolyte, besides the priest. As this battue was on Sunday, I declined it equally, and went to church. Immediately before the Gospel—just in time to save Mass, that is—a bustle was heard outside the building, which made the congregation look up: and presently the principal actors in the 'chasse' entered, leaving their guns, dogs, and game with their retainers in the porch, and were thus corporally present. With the last Gospel they had disappeared to resume their sport. I thought then, and still think, that so far, we did things in reality better in England a hundred fold, notwithstanding that appearances were kept up there."

We must find room for quoting a part of Mr. Ffoulkes's conclusions:

"To come to my conclusions. The conviction impressed upon me by what I have heard and seen at home and abroad is, that English Christianity—by which I mean the members of the Church of England in general, I cannot speak from experience of any other—is as good and genuine, and for ordinary purposes as beneficial, as what is found in other nations—France, Spain, and Italy, for instance—so that either it is produced, fed, and nourished by all the Sacraments, as theirs is: or else, produced, fed, and nourished, by a single Sacrament, it penetrates society and forms character to the same extent as that which has the sup-

port of all the Sacraments, and is no less efficacious for good in most other respects; it may be isolated, but such is the position of England politically as well as geographically: its peculiarities are of a piece with the national character, it having its weak as well as its strong side: its short coming, historically traceable to the sins of our forefathers in no small degree. Among the strong points attributable to its influences, are a strong love of honesty in intention, of truthfulness in language, and of uprightness and manliness in conduct; and a still stronger abhorrence of falsehood and treachery to engagements in every form. Its virtues belong mostly to the practical and domestic order. Its weak points are too great self-reliance, too much disposition to criticize, too little faith in the Unseen. As a general rule, Roman Catholics are weak where Anglicans are strongest, and strong where Anglicans fail. Such results are due to the system in each case, showing imperfections in each. Anglicans may be compared with Catholics in this country, as boys brought up at a public school in England with boys brought up at a private school, or else at home. Anglicans may be compared with Roman Catholics abroad, as men educated at Oxford or Cambridge with men educated at the Universities of Paris, Munich, or Padua. Fundamentally, their faith and practice is the same: but they have been formed after different models in both. I trust the day is not far distant when the religiously-minded in both Communions will insist on associating together as brethren, and learning from each other as Christians, and combining for works of charity without distinction of nations. Too long—much too long—have they been kept in ignorance of each other, and thus prevented improving each other, through prejudice.

"The two points on which alone I notice any sensible difference between my own devotional practices in former days and now, are praying for the souls of the departed and invoking the Saints in glory. Both practices, I can unhesitatingly pronounce from experience, to be full of comfort and profit, of elevating and purifying influences: I am sorry for those who live in ignorance or neglect of them: and can hardly imagine any person who has tried them in the spirit of faith honestly abandoning them. Still every fresh page I read of Church history in the 14th and 15th centuries, convinces me more and more of the awful profanity that had attached to both in those days; and as even in the Roman Catholic manuals of devotion I use myself, there are frequent hyperboles of language that I could never adopt, and should

desire to see cancelled above all things, I cannot consider the excessive caution of the Church of England altogether directed against a thing of the past, and without excuse now. Words employed in non-natural senses are dangerous stumbling-blocks in any Communion. Our own liturgical offices were carefully weeded at the time of the Council of Trent, and contain no such extravagances. It would be well if we were never on any pretext allowed to exceed their measured language in our private forms. Neither our liturgical forms, indeed, as they now exist, any more than our private forms, embodying such devotions, were known to the primitive Church: and therefore the lack of them in the Church of England, however much to be regretted on all accounts, cannot affect the essence, though it may impair the tenderness, of the Christianity taught and imbibed there. I am therefore satisfied that the Christianity taught and imbibed there differs in no fundamental quality from that with which I have been conversant since joining the Roman Communion. I am morally certain that I have frequented the same Sacraments in both with profit: consequently I feel that I could die equally well in the one or the other: and can see no reason for changing from one to the other except on *secondary* grounds, or unless driven to it. 'When they persecute you in this city'—of *Israel*, that is—'flee ye into another,' was not said for the Apostles alone. In conclusion, it is my firm persuasion still—indeed much more so than in 1853, when I published my first book—that should Christendom ever be united, it will go down to posterity as having been brought about mainly by those who had been born and educated in the Church of England.

"With these convictions it may seem superfluous in me to add my belief that, having been ordained priest in the Church of England, I am a priest still. . . . On jurisdiction, I need not reiterate what I have said already, or am about to say. 'Who is the *custos* of the Anglican Eucharist?' is his chief difficulty. 'Could I, without distressing or offending an Anglican, describe what sort of *custodes* they—the Anglican clergy—have been and are to their Eucharist?' My Lord, it is anything but my intention to excuse or extenuate the scandalous irreverence that prevailed shortly before our own days, and I fear is not extinct yet, amongst Anglican clergymen in administering the Sacraments of the Church: but I cannot shut my eyes to the fact that it followed naturally from their low views of them, and their low views of

them were precipitated by the audacity that centuries ago was not afraid to say of the Eucharist, 'Sacerdos creat Deum;' of penance, 'Deus remittit culpam: Papa vero culpam et poenam,' and the like. But, taking our own views of the Blessed Eucharist into account, is there or has there been any tale of irreverence towards it amongst Anglicans, comparable for horrors with the history of poisoned chalices and poisoned Hosts amongst ourselves formerly, the extent of which is made patent to this day by the special precautions taken whenever the Pope celebrates mass most solemnly, that no such harm may befall him.

"Such perversions of the life-giving Sacrament to destroy life, as had to be specially guarded against whenever the Vicar of Christ pontificated, is absolutely without parallel in the annals of the Anglican Church since the Reformation. So that, notwithstanding our high views of it, the worst known profanations of it have been amongst ourselves."—pp. 55–59.

On the whole, we find Mr. Ffoulkes's writings conducive to charity. After reading them, we think better of Romanists, of Anglo-Catholics, and of the prospects of Christendom. We are, indeed, astonished anew, and more than ever, at the puerility which clings inseparably to the hierarchical system, and all its adherents; and at the self-confident isolation of thought and inquiry which is so peculiarly and remarkably characteristic of University men. For them to master the books which they happen to have heard of, or which they can find in certain libraries with which they happen to be connected, is fully enough. It appears scarcely to occur to them to make inquiry in the general world; to ask what may have been written by non-University men, or by non-Catholics, by Gallican authorities, Lutheran authorities, or Reformed authorities, by Scotch Presbyterians, or American scholars, or English Non-conformists. Hence, multitudes of them live and die, walking in a vain shadow, and disquieting themselves in vain, ignorant of all that has been done or written beyond the limits of their set, their University, or their ecclesiastical brigade. The errors, the defeats, the absurdities into which this exclusiveness—the fault of English society transferred to English studentship—has betrayed many English Churchmen, are innumerable. Meantime, we cannot but have the best hopes that an honest, candid, pains-taking man like Mr. Ffoulkes, will yet emancipate himself from the bonds and trammels of ecclesiastical prejudice and "Catholic" superstition.

XXIII.—PROF. PORTER'S HUMAN INTELLECT.*

Two conflicting systems of Philosophy are at the present day hotly contending for the mastery, both in Great Britain and America, and it is a matter of no small moment which of the two shall have the greatest share in cultivating the mind and shaping the thinking of the next generation. The influence of these schools reaches, directly or indirectly, every man of intellectual culture, and their practical outgoings penetrate the lower strata of human society. There is no denying that the influence of Mill, and his followers and fellow-laborers, is at present in the ascendant in England, not because the balance of truth is on their side, but because talent has turned the scale. The school is represented by a formidable phalanx of men, who, though unintentionally, yet have most effectually co-operated in establishing the predominance of sensational philosophy. Their thoughts are bold and vigorous, and their exposition of principles lucid and fascinating. This ascendancy has become more marked since Mr. Mill's dexterous attack, which was directed with so much marked force and acuteness against the weak and vulnerable portions of Sir W. Hamilton's philosophy; by which, in the opinion of many, the latter was dethroned from the proud position of being the leader of philosophic thought. All that the disciples and followers of Sir W. Hamilton have done has been to defend their chief with reference to a few of the positions assailed; but no attempt has been made to correct, corroborate, and complete the whole system. We, therefore, greatly rejoice at meeting the present volume, which surveys afresh the whole field, and aims at placing old truths on a more secure foundation, completing what, by its predecessors, was left defective, and correcting what was erroneous. The author freely admits the merits of his opponents and the

* From the *British Quarterly Review:* a Review of *The Human Intellect, with an Introduction on Psychology and the Soul.* By Noah Porter, D.D., Professor in Yale College. New York: 1869.

errors of his friends. To account for the form, as well as much of the matter of the present work, it is necessary to keep in mind that it was prepared primarily and directly as a text-book for colleges and high schools; and, secondarily, as a manual for more advanced students of psychology and speculative philosophy.

France and Germany abound in manuals of mental philosophy, representing every system and standpoint; America has several of considerable merit; but in England the only one embodying anything like a complete summary of the latest results of speculative thought, is Professor Bain's "Compendium of Psychology and Ethics," written exclusively from the sensational point of view, and expressly adapted for the numerous examinations in these subjects. And yet nowhere is such a work more needed, as far as the intuitive school is concerned. The important contributions to mental science of Morell, Mansell, and McCosh, are very fragmentary. Sir W. Hamilton never undertook to digest fully his views into a system, and to arrange them into one orderly and connected whole. They are contained in articles contributed to reviews, in learned and elaborate notes and appendices, in numerous memoranda written at widely-different intervals, and in early and hastily-composed lectures, with which later developments and modifications were never incorporated. Not simply do either or all of these put together present us with an outline of his system; but, from the circumstances under which they were prepared, they contain many inconsistences, and even contradictions, which confound the tyro and almost defy the most skillful to disentangle. While we regard Hamilton's contributions as invaluable in themselves, yet, taken as a system of mental science, they are singularly incomplete. For these and other reasons, we regard the volume before us as rendering a most important and timely service.

A manual of philosophy should neither go beyond the capacity of ordinary students at this stage of their studies, nor fall below the demand through lack of thorough and scientific treatment; it should present as far as possible the science of mind in its completeness and symmetry, and should include the latest scientific results. It should make the student acquainted, not simply with the different systems and doctrines, but also with their authors and history. In arrangement, it should be methodical and lucid, and in style concise and perspicuous. We are happy to say that the present work possesses these qualifications in an emi-

nent degree, and very successfully endeavors to meet the wants of students at all ages of their study.

As regards matters of detail, we have space only to indicate the author's opinions on some of the points, with reference to which different schools and systems divide and diverge. And, first, with respect to the origin of our notions, ideas, and beliefs—do they come wholly from experience, or are there any among them prior to and independent of all experience of the world without, springing up from the structure of the mind itself, and necessarily assumed in all its processes? On this point, the author most emphatically declares himself on the side of Hamilton, against Mill and the Associational School. Among the original furniture of the mind, he classes the reality of the distinction of substance and attribute; of the causative relation; of time and space, and the relations they involve; of uniformity in the indications and operations of nature; and of the adaptation of the beings and powers of nature to a certain end. These several points are elaborated with great skill and acumen. He clearly shows how and where Sir W. Hamilton went astray. A second landmark between the different systems is the theory of perception. The question is, are we, in an act of perception, cognizant of the object itself directly and immediately, or only of the sensations produced in us by the object? Sir W. Hamilton holds the former, and J. S. Mill the latter. Here Professor Porter, although opposed to the sensational school, takes important exceptions to Hamilton's doctrine. He draws a distinction, not simply between sensation and perception, but also between what he calls the non-egos of perception, of which there are three, viz., "the not-body, as distinguished from the body and soul united; the body, as distinguished from the soul; and the sensorium, as distinguished from the soul as pure spirit." He admits an immediate perception of the last, or intra-organic alone, but holds that our perception of the others, or extra-organic, is acquired by combining the muscular and tactual perceptions. For the clear and elaborate statement of the doctrine and its issues, we must refer the reader to the work itself.

A third point of contention is the theory of causation. Here, again, there are vital differences. Causation, according to Mill, does not imply any essential dependency, efficiency, or force, but simply uniform succession or constant conjunction, and is the

result of association. According to Hamilton, it implies more than is involved in constant conjunction; it springs, however, not from any power, "but from the impotency of the mind"—from its inability to conceive the absolute commencement of anything, or its absolute end. The author subjects both doctrines to the most destructive criticism, and clearly exposes the unsoundness of the reasoning on which they are sustained. He points out that Sir W. Hamilton's theory is only a particular instance of the more general "principle of the conditioned," and is to be traced ultimately to the same fundamental error. He shows, by an exhaustive treatment, that the law of causation arises out of the *positive* necessity of the mind, and meets all the criteria of necessity, certainty, and universality. With reference to the unconditioned, he first of all exposes the confusion and inconsistencies in the writings of Hamilton and Mansel, as regards the meaning and application of the terms infinite, absolute, and unconditioned, and the fatal error of placing faith and reason in perpetual conflict. Then, having defined what the *absolute is not*, he asserts that the absolute and the infinite *is knowable by a finite mind;* and, against Spencer, he affirms not only that such a mind can know *that it is*, but that it can know *what it is;* that our knowledge of the absolute is real and proper, though not adequate and exhaustive; and that in both the finite and the infinite there is a common mystery. The last subject that we shall enumerate at present, is the doctrine of design or final cause. Professor Porter, having examined the nature and given a detailed history of the doctrine, maintains that the "proposition affirming final cause is a first principle, an intuitive truth; that it is not in any sense dependent on observation, but is an original and necessary belief or category; that, so far from being derived from induction, it is the necessary ground on which induction itself depends for its validity and application." This view is enforced with a power and acuteness which, to say the least, render it worthy of the most careful consideration.

There are several other subjects of equal importance, to which we can only refer our readers, *e. g.*, the admirable analysis of consciousness and its functions, the exhaustive investigation of the logical operations of the mind, and the masterly handling of the so-called primary and secondary qualities of matter.

This volume of 700 pages (which, if printed throughout in ordinary type, would more than double its present size) is most

clear and methodical in its arrangement. First of all, is an introduction on psychology and the soul; then follows the treatise on the human intellect, divided into four parts, viz., presentation, representation, thought, intuition. Being primarily designed for a text-book, its leading definitions, propositions, and arguments are stated in large type and in carefully-numbered sections. This portion is intended for class-room purposes. Under each section are placed, in smaller type, concrete illustrations and practical applications of the most important topic of each section; and under these again, in a type still smaller, is given a large amount of historical, critical, and controversial matter: and this we regard the most valuable of all. It contains condensed comprehensive summaries of the most important systems, their authors, history, and criticism. To this portion of the work the mature philosopher will gladly turn, to freshen his memory and test his knowledge. It will also be of immense service to the student who is widely and deeply read in the different schools and systems, but is unable to determine their exact relations to each other and the fundamental principles on which they rest. Having read these *summaries*, they will no longer stand in isolation, but will assume their essential order in the development of thought. Indeed, we feel that the present work will take the proper place of a manual, which is not at the commencement of learning, but after considerable progress has been made. Its use is to present the reader with a conspectus of results rather than to furnish him with all his details.

This volume, we are informed, is the fruit of thirty years' patient and painstaking labor; and we predict it will not be in vain. It is evidently written in the service of truth, and is a work pre-eminently calculated to inform the mind, provoke thought, and challenge criticism; and, above all, to foster a nobler and more elevated feeling by the candor, generosity, and Christian spirit which characterizes the whole. We had jotted down some criticisms, but, in view of the transcendent merit of the work, we gladly pass them by. We trust that Professor Porter intends to present us at no distant period with a similar treatment of the emotions and the will, a field in which there is more ample scope for improvement, and for rendering still higher service to the truth. We sincerely hope that the favorable reception of the present work may hasten the appearance of another, comprising the remaining powers of the human mind.

XXIV.—AIM AND TENDENCY OF THE BOOK OF ACTS.*

The question concerning the historical character and worth of the Book of Acts, is for our times a highly important one. It has been forced upon us by the sharp discussions which have arisen in regard to historical Christianity, especially the life of Jesus, on which turns the controversy, which it seems to be the peculiar task of our age to fight out to its proper issue.

One form which this assault upon historical Christianity has assumed, is that of an attempt to destroy the harmony of Apostolic teaching, and to show that Paul's conception of Christianity differed essentially from that of the other Apostles. "Modern criticism" has endeavored to prove that the Apostle Paul occupied an entirely isolated position among the early Christians; it has pictured him as the champion of an idea, always viewed as negative, viz: the freeing of Christianity from Judaism, which has been represented as the single aim of his life and labors. On the other hand, the first Apostles have been described as held fast within the trammels of a bigoted Judaism, from which they never escaped; they shared all the prejudices of their nation, believed in its inalienable superiority over other nations, held that the Messianic salvation was destined for the Jews alone, and that the obligation of the Mosaic law is universal and eternal. They only differed from the other Jews in recognizing the fulfillment of the old Messianic hope in the person of Jesus of Nazareth, and consoled themselves for his death on the cross, by the expectation of his speedy return to establish Jewish rule over the earth.

This view finds its points of support in the differences between the Jewish Christian and the Gentile Christian tendency, which, already apparent in the Apostolic times, became, in their further development, diametrically opposite to each other, after the Jewish

* From J. R. Oertel's *Paulus in der Apostelgeschichte* (Halle, 1868), translated by Rev. John B. Pidge, Lawrence, Mass.

tendency, now become a heresy, had disappeared. The advocates of this view know how to make good use of this point of attack furnished to their hands. While they keep back all that is harmonious in the two tendencies, and indeed put it almost out of sight, they make the conflict between them especially prominent—they represent the two views as not merely different, but discrepant and irreconcilable with each other. What Paul has said in his epistles, especially that to the Galatians, concerning his position towards the Jewish Christians and the other Apostles, is set aside, so far as it contradicts this view. Whatever apparently favors it —(all the more plausible since it consists merely in incidental remarks)—is taken in the most literal manner, without regard to the reference actually intended at the time and the resulting limitation of the words. In this way it would not be impossible for this positive criticism, by an apparently historical method, to secure a sort of plausibility for its opinion, did not the Acts in its representation thoroughly and undeniably contradict it. One of two things only remains possible, viz: either to give up that view or else to overthrow the historical character of this writing. If the critics of this school succeed in showing an unhistorical tendency in the Acts, they gain a two-fold advantage. A gap would be thus revealed in our knowledge of the first Christian age, which could readily be filled up with alleged facts necessary for this dogmatic view, either newly discovered, or at least transformed and adapted to its purpose, on the ground of unexplained notices from the Apostolic times, with the aid of some inferences from later periods. They would thus secure the wished for opportunity for putting in the place of the hitherto accredited history an essentially different one, and of winning at small cost the name of "positive criticism." On the other hand, a new proof would have been won in this partisan writing, which it would not be difficult to employ in the interest of their unhistorical suppositions. If there should actually appear in the Acts the purpose to conceal an irreconcilable opposition between Paul and the other Apostles, the actual difference also of such opposition could no longer be doubtful. On the contrary, if our writing in substance and form is historical, then the unhistorical views of early Christianity maintained by these writers must yield, and at the same time the Acts by its character cover the remoter gospels, and disprove the results of the criticism in question applied to them, and arrayed so confidently against the general belief.

The Acts thus vindicates, effects this result, partly by its connection with the third gospel, which is from the same hand and composed with the same purpose, and through its representation confirms the accounts of the other gospels, especially the synoptical gospels, and partly, by its contents which, once recognized as historical, presupposes a life of Jesus that must bear the character and contain the facts which we find transmitted in the gospels. The Acts of the Apostles is the wall which criticism, in its destructive assaults against historical Christianity, has spared till the last, but must finally demolish, if it does not wish to see itself driven out of all the positions which it has supposed already won in its attacks upon the gospels, or else it will have boasted of its victory in vain.

RELATION OF ACTS TO LUKE'S GOSPEL.

The Book of Acts has been regarded by some, especially the school of Baur, as having been written in the interest of a party, and on this ground its historical accuracy has been denied. We must therefore meet the opponents of its historical character upon this ground, and inquire, from a purely historical stand-point, what the aim and object of the book may be. And first, we ask if the author himself has not spoken on this point. In the prologue of his gospel (i, 4) he has declared the object of that work, to which the Acts forms the second part (Acts i, 1). He is speaking, primarily, to Theophilus, and his purpose is to bring him (with other readers,) to a knowledge (*ἵνα ἐπιγνῶς*) of the certainty (*τὴν ἀσφάλειαν*) of the Christian doctrines in which he had already been instructed (*περὶ ὧν κατηχήθης λόγων*),* which for the most part are history (*εὐαγγέλιον*). Accordingly, his object is to establish his reader's faith upon a basis of historical truth. Doubtless at the beginning of his gospel, the writer did not yet have in mind this later composition, but since he expressly states the object of the former work, and declares the Acts to be a continuation of that, the reader is justified in attributing the second writing to the same design. We agree with Zeller, (p. 317), that this will be of no importance, if once it be admitted that the author in-

* The "words" are the single parts of the "word of God," which embraces first the appearing of Christ and the redemptive facts of his life, and secondly, the results thence ensuing.

tended to effect a reconciliation between parties by a pretended history; in that case he would have every reason to conceal his real purpose, and would not hazard it upon an expression false at bottom, like that in Luke i, 4. On the contrary, the differences between the gospel and Acts in regard to the time of the Ascension, are not of sufficient importance to prevent us from regarding the Acts as "taking up again the historical thread" which was broken off in the gospel. For, however we attempt to reconcile the two expressions, whether the first (Luke xxiv, 50) be considered the briefer form, or the second be regarded as an entirely different tradition and a correction of the first, we must at all events suppose that in some way the author united them, and it is possible, notwithstanding Meyer's objection, that the writer in v, 4 (Acts i, ἣν ἠκούσατέ μου) refers back to xxiv, 49 in the gospel, and thus indicates the first mode of reconciliation to be the correct one.

PLAN OF THE BOOK OF ACTS.

Different from this *object* of the book, but closely related to it, is *the plan* on which the author selected and arranged the varied information through which the reader, Theophilus, was to attain to a certainty of the historical truth of the instruction he had received. Such a plan, "a principle of arrangement," there evidently is, for a systematic representation unmistakably appears in the Acts. With the exception of a few hints concerning this in the book, the study of the writing itself can alone furnish us with the author's plan. Usually, it is *the plan* that has been meant, when an attempt has been made to define its *purpose.*

The conception of the Acts as a biography of the two Apostles, Peter and Paul, which Grotius assailed in his commentary, although the person of Peter is made particularly prominent in the first part, and that of Paul in the second, is nevertheless untenable; for though it is true we have Peter's activity described in the formation of the church in Jerusalem and of the other churches of Palestine, yet after his imprisonment by king Herod (xii), we lose sight of him completely until he reappears at the Apostolic council, while no information at all is given of his later history. And although in the second part the life of the Apostle Paul is more fully described, and there is a chronological consistency maintained in the narrative, from his conversion to

his arrival as a prisoner at Rome, yet much is wanting, as we learn from his letters, (comp. 2 Cor. xi, 23, xii, 7, Gal. i, 17), which a biography should contain, and even the labors of the Apostle at Rome are only mentioned in general terms, while his death is not referred to at all, although it seems to have taken place during the composition of the work.

NOT A GENERAL CHURCH HISTORY.

The opinion which holds the Acts to be a history of the church in the time of the Apostles, "the first attempt to present a history of the Christian church," has so much against it, *e. g.*, the want of any information about the fate of the church at Jerusalem after the stoning of Stephen, concerning the founding of the Roman church, and the development of those churches established in heathen lands, that its advocates were soon compelled to limit so general a statement. Thus Michaelis supposed that the writer wished to give only what he had seen himself or had learned from eye witnesses, but, though we admit that his own experience had an influence on the author's mode of narration, yet there is evidently too much plan and order in his work to be dependent on such accidental circumstances, and granting that he had personal intercourse with the Apostles, it is incredible that he has communicated all he knew about Paul and the other Apostles. Hence we are ever forced to the view that the author has made a selection from what he saw and learned from eye witnesses, according to a definite plan, and that the above statement of the plan does not suffice to explain the peculiarities of the *Acts*. Just as questionable is it to find the indispensable limitation of the conception, "a church history of the times of the Apostles," in the interest of Theophilus and in his present acquaintance with the subject treated. For though some individual matters should be referred to the relations of the nearest readers, *e. g.* that the Italian geography is assumed as known rather than the Palestinian, (i, 12, xxviii, 12, 13, 15), that an account of the founding of the Roman church is wanting, while its existence is assumed (xxviii, 30) and that only a general description of the Apostle's labors at Rome is given, yet we must suppose that the author had in mind, not merely Theophilus, but a larger circle of readers. Besides, on this supposition we are forced to hold the entirely im-

probable opinion, that the later history of Peter and the other Apostles, as well as the development of the churches planted among the heathen, were already known to Theophilus, or else possessed no interest for him, while the earlier experiences of the church at Jerusalem and the founding of the churches among the heathen, had either remained concealed or were alone interesting

NOT A HISTORY OF PAUL'S TEACHING.

The view of Credner also, who sees in the Acts a history of the church written from a Pauline stand-point, though in part correct, yet fails completely to explain the choice of material as a whole, for though this shows why the author lingers with so much pleasure over the account of the first conversions among the heathen (ch. x) and the story of Paul's conversion (thrice mentioned), and why he confines himself exclusively to the fate and labors of Paul in the last part of the book, yet it does not explain the fact that he only informs his readers about the founding of the churches, while he merely touches upon the repeated visits of the Apostle afterwards, and entirely passes by his later labors, and the difficulties which he encountered among them.

THE VIEW OF EICHHORN AND OTHERS.

The merit of directing the inquiry into the right path, belongs to Eichhorn, who in his Introduction denominates the Acts a "History of Missions for the Extension of Christianity." This conception is indeed too narrow, and belongs really only to the middle portion of the work (chh. viii—xix). He finds himself compelled to regard the account of the founding of the church at Jerusalem and of its first experiences, as a preparation and introduction to the real work, and in the last chapters to make the author purpose a "complete narration of the last and to himself well-known events in the life of the Apostle to the Gentiles." With this view of the object, the unity of the plan, at least in the last part of the book, is lost. Nevertheless, this author deserves the credit of having given a more just prominence to the extension of Christianity in his definition of the object of the book.

To this notion, Meyerhoff attaches himself, while, starting from our Lord's final words to his disciples, (Acts i, 8) he declares "the object" of the Acts to be to present the extensive as well as the

intensive spread of the Christian church from its formation in Jerusalem, the central point of Judaism. He regards the words which our Lord there speaks as corresponding to Rome, the middle point of heathendom, its limitations, which ever became means to its greater extension, and the inner formation of the church, and he shows, in eight sections, how the author has held fast his plan "in the constant progress" of the narrative.

BAUMGARTEN'S THEORY.

Baumgarten takes up Meyerhoff's thought, but formulates the plan of the Acts more definitely, as a description of "the progress of the church *development* from Jerusalem to Rome;" while he deviates from Meyerhoff, he claims for the writer of the Acts "the highest point of view," the "divine stand-point," and seeks to establish from the introduction of the Acts the view that the writer would present to us "in this second narrative," also the activity of the same Jesus (as in the first treatise or gospel), and that "the acting subject in the following history is also the exalted Jesus." We regard this in so far correct, that the writer considers the Apostles in their labors (ii, 47, xi, 21, etc.), and especially in their miracles (iii, 13, iv, 30, etc.), as under the divine guidance and in the enjoyment of divine support, and in appropriate passages makes this idea prominent. But the evidence of his having occupied any such stand-point as that assigned him by Baumgarten is entirely insignificant and artificial.* For the rest, this point of view does not serve to place in a clearer light the plan of the writing in its execution, unless perhaps we are willing to recognize all the references which Baumgarten has sought to establish through a forced explanation of the single narratives. Lekebusch also assents to the definition of the object which has been given by the writers just mentioned, and calls the Acts "a history of the development of the Christian church from its beginnings in Jerusalem to the preaching of Paul at Rome, the middle point and end of the world," and shows in detail how completely

* The "began" (i, 1), from the frequency of its use to give vividness to the narnative, will not admit of being so pressed as to signify that in the Gospel the beginning of Jesus' labors is described, and in the Acts their continuation (see Meyer *Comm* 3 *Aufl.* p. 25); and the other alleged "traces" find their sufficient explanation in the point of view stated by us above.

the narrative accords with the assumed plan, both in general and in particular.

THE TRUE STATEMENT OF LUKE'S PURPOSE.

If now we accept the formula which has been reached, that it lay in the author's plan to present historically the development of the church from Jerusalem to Rome, and hold besides that this description has been given from his own, *i. e.* a Pauline standpoint, we shall find a confirmation of our view in the writing itself, which begins with the founding of the church at Jerusalem and ends with an account of the arrival at Rome of the Apostle to the Gentiles, and of his two years of preaching there. Jerusalem, the birth place of the gospel and the home of the first Christian church, the chief place in Israel, that part of the human race for which Christianity was primarily designed, and Rome, the middle point of heathendom in the far West, and the capital of the world, were in the eyes of the author sufficiently important to form the two geographical limits to his narrative, especially as both, Jerusalem as the point of departure for the whole Christian movement, and Rome as the scene of the latest activity of Paul, the Apostle to the Gentiles, were fitted for this by the very events which took place in them. The peculiarity of the narrative, that as soon as it has left the mother church, it only gives a full account of Paul's labors in founding churches, while his subsequent visits are only mentioned casually and in general terms, is an evidence that the writer intended to present the progress of the gospel, the spread of Christianity. That the writer gives no account of the founding of the Roman church, whose existence is presupposed, is perfectly consistent with his plan; for if we allow that this was after the appearance of Paul on the stage of action, it was to give information only concerning the founding of those churches which were established by him. And if he only pictures in general terms Paul's labors at Rome, yet he follows the principle above mentioned, which evidently grows out of his plan, to give a particular account of the Apostle's labors in the formation of churches, but only a general description of his efforts in strengthening them and building them up. He had so much less occasion to make Rome, the goal of his narrative, an exception to this rule, because there his first readers were to be found, who

would naturally be acquainted with all the more special circumstances.

OMISSIONS ACCOUNTED FOR.

This conception of the plan of the Acts explains also in great part the omissions which have been made use of to support the hypothesis of a dogmatic purpose on the part of the writer. It is no longer "strange" but entirely natural, that the author, while he accompanies the Apostle Paul to Rome, should lose sight of the other Apostles and of the mother church, that he should pass by many sufferings of the Apostle (comp. 2 Cor. xi.), the most of which befell him while he was building up the churches, and not during their formation, should omit the conflicts which he had to maintain with the Judaistic party within the churches (*e. g.* in Galatia and Corinth), should be silent concerning their inward condition, and that the name of Titus should not appear in the Acts and his labors not be touched upon, for he did not assist the Apostle in forming churches, but entered upon his work at a later period, among churches already established (2 Cor. vii, 6; viii, 6, 16). It should as little surprise us, that the writer in chap. xv, did not mention the fact that, Titus was not circumcised (Gal. ii, 3), for, since he is there describing the victory of the Pauline doctrine of the freedom of the Gentiles from the law and from circumcision, the omission of circumcision in the single case of Titus explains itself, and for the writer's object is of no importance whatever, while the circumcision of Timothy, briefly mentioned in chap. xvi, 3, was full of significance with respect to the *spread* of the gospel among the Jews of that place, and accordingly the mention of the same was, in accordance with the plan of the work, of much more importance. On the other hand, it is an entirely groundless demand which Zeller constantly repeats, from a desire to support his favorite theory of the dogmatic aim of the Acts, that the Antiochian dispute of Paul and Peter (Gal. ii, 11) ought to find a place in the Acts; it produced no result for the spread of Christianity, and could have no place at all in his work, so long as the author followed his plan, while on the contrary the dispute with Barnabas could not be omitted, if the Apostle's separation from Barnabas, who had hitherto accompanied him, and his present attendance by Silas, were not to re-

main unintelligible. We allow with Lekebusch that there will always be some single matters requiring further explanation, as *e. g.* the omission of any mention of the journey into Arabia (Gal. i. 17), which was at least so incidental and produced so few results as to escape the notice of the writer, and the want (perhaps to be expected) of a full account of the establishment of the Galatian church;* yet we believe also that at times as *e. g.* in the narrative of the imprisonment and wonderful release of Peter, other subordinate motives, the remarkable character of the event, etc., have led to a more complete description, and should not think it strange if every single difficulty were not removed by our conception of the plan, since from the remoteness of the time when the work was written, from our ignorance of the circumstances in which the author wrote, of his relation to his sources of information, to his first readers, and to the actors in the narrative (except the Apostle Paul), it should scarcely be expected to be otherwise. It certainly remains the surest and most reasonable conclusion to hold fast the historical purpose of the book and the plan which we have found. There is so much in favor of this view that single, partially insoluble difficulties are not sufficient to destroy the testimony derived from the book itself, and it is more than doubtful whether any other alleged purpose and plan will solve these difficulties any better.

* It is doubtful whether it is the Apostle's first visit to Galatia when he founded the church mentioned in Acts xvi, 6, or whether he had been there before and was now only visiting the church. The brevity of the account favors the latter view, and also the fact that Lycaonia and Pisidia were at that time (after Amyntas' death, A.D. 26, (comp. Böttger, *Beiträge zur hist.-krit. Einl. in die paul. Briefe.* 1 Abth. S. 21), joined with Galatia proper to form the Roman province of Galatia, although the writer elsewhere distinguishes Lycaonia from Galatia (comp. xiv, 6). In this case Derbe, Lystra, and the vicinity, are meant;—for the first view we have the fact, that the Acts (also other Greek writings of this period), in spite of the provincial union, uses the popular names for the different sections, and here (comp. vv. 1 and 6) the cities are separated from Galatia (comp. Meyer, *Comm. zu St. u. Br. Gal.* Einl. 1). If in this case we miss a fuller description of the Apostle's labors (comp. xviii, 23), this omission is to be explained either from the haste of the writer to reach the journey in which he accompanied the Apostle (Zeller, S. 383, Lekebusch S. 142, u. 225, also Olshausen, Baumgarten), or from the want of information; at least this single departure from his general custom cannot disturb the plan everywhere apparent according to which he emphasizes the labors of the Apostle in found ing churches, but only casually mentions his subsequent efforts in them.

ALLEGED DOGMATIC PURPOSE OF THE ACTS.

We have next to notice the alleged aim of the writer of our history.

Even in the earliest period, germs of this view appear, without however any attempt to make this the occasion of an attack upon the historical character of the book. Chrysostom names the Acts a "Proof of the Resurrection" (*ἀπόδειξις τῆς ἀναστάσεως*); and Luther finds the chief motive in the composition of the Acts to be, the purpose to inculcate the doctrine of "justification by faith," and "a glossary upon St. Paul's epistles," but neither of these made the attempt to explain the peculiarities of the Acts from the alleged purpose of the writing itself. Eckermann approaches no nearer to this result, while he defines the purpose of the Acts to be, to prove the divine origin of Christianity from its wonderful spread. Paulus assumes the purpose to be the justification of the Pauline universalism, and is the first to attempt an explanation of the entire structure of the book from its aim. Even Eichhorn regards this attempt of Paulus as a failure, since there are many things, especially in the first part of the book, with which this view can be made to conform only by the most forced explanation, and hardly any one will be convinced that this hypothesis has its ground in the choice of material. Künöl agrees with Eichhorn.

In general, these forerunners of the dogmatic view have furnished nothing decisive for the present state of the question. The first who sought fully to establish the dogmatic aim of the Acts in the sense of Paulus, was Schneckenburger; and he indeed, in the judgment of the recent critics, has succeeded so well in this that they have followed in his footsteps, adopted his methods and results, and merely drawn other inferences from these.

DIFFERENT FORMS OF THE THEORY.

The conception of the Acts as a dogmatic partisan writing (*Tendenzschrift*), has been developed in three successive steps, and has run through all possible stadia and modifications. While Schneckenburger seeks the writer among the followers of Paul, attributes to him an apologetic aim, and in general allows to the writing an historical character, the Tübingen school, under the supposition of a conciliatory purpose, assigns his position between the two parties, Pauline Christians and Jewish Christians, and

Bruno Bauer puts him in the Jewish Christian party, with an alleged interest for Judaism; these last critics at the same time accuse him of a willful falsification of the history. It is evident that the historical view is possibly compatible with Schneckenburger's criticism, for a history composed with an apologetic aim, need not necessarily become a distorted representation of the facts, but if once the Apologetic interest predominates and the representation is admitted to be "one-sided," it needs only one short step more and a few assumed marks of untrustworthiness, to find the narrative also "altered" through that interest, and with the Tübingen school to admit its historical falsity.

The evidence which these critics have discovered in the writing itself in support of this unhistorical character of the Acts, is altogether so insignificant and uncertain, in spite of the zealous advocacy which it has received, that only critically-sharpened, *i. e.* dogmatically blinded, eyes can perceive it.

The narrative of the Acts must be made to become a mass of partisan transformations and explanations, of distortions and interpolations, before it will favor in the slightest degree the charge of a dogmatic and history-falsifying purpose, in the sense of these critics. If they were not completely uncritical towards themselves, they would not believe in their own alleged historical proofs, and would inspire no one else with faith in them. In examining singly the proofs which they seek arbitrarily and unjustifiably to extort from the narrative to support their suppositions, we obtain positive counter-proofs.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS.

We subjoin here a brief summary of the proofs in question.

It is thoroughly inconsistent with the alleged purpose of the writer, *i. e.* that out of favor towards the Jewish Christians he presents in Paul "the pious Jew zealous for the law," that in the account of the circumcision of Timothy he adds, "for the sake of the Jews" (xvi, 3), and in the undertaking of the Nazarite vow, (xxi, 23), relates the transactions which preceded and the purpose with which the Apostle assumed it, so as in both cases to make the conduct of the Apostle to appear as an accommodation, and the reader, contrary to the author's whole purpose, to look into the heart of the Apostle, so full of Christian liberty, and to see as it

were behind the scenes. It is as little compatible, as even these critics have confessed, with the refined premeditation attributed to him, according to which he is said everywhere to hush up the opposition of the Jewish Christians towards Paul, that he should suddenly depart from his role (xxi, 20), and allow the elsewhere concealed enmity of Jewish-Christian zeal against the Apostle to appear. Even from these three points it is evident, that the writer was altogether too unbiased to be the deliberate falsifier of history which such critics would make him out to be. He would at least be playing a dangerous game, if he were to pursue his conciliatory purpose in the way that they imagine. He must at any rate say to himself, that his artifice to remove all enmity towards Paul from the Jewish Christians and show it against the Jews while it might possibly separate the Jewish Christians from the Jews, and bring them nearer the Gentile Christians in a common opposition to the latter, would be as likely to have the opposite effect. It would serve, from a common hatred towards Paul, to attach the opponents of the law more closely to each other, both the Jews and Jewish Christians, who, according to these critics, differed but slightly from each other, and to widen and deepen more and more the present chasm between Jewish Christians, who from their stand-point assented to the persecutions which their brethren, zealous for the law, had instigated against Paul, and Gentile Christians, who would only feel themselves more repelled from their adversaries, who were fully equal to the unbelieving Jews (xxi, 20) in hatred to the Apostle of the Gentiles and Gentile Christianity. If the fact was as these critics imagined it to be, that Jews and Jewish Christians, one in respect to the ground of faith, beheld in Pauline Christianity their common opponent, yet it remains incomprehensible why the writer of the Acts did not from the outset see what was the defect in his undertaking, and how he expected his description of long past times (50 or 60 years at least intervene according to these critics between the events and the narration of them) to possess the power to destroy a living unity, resting upon a common ground of faith (between Jews and Jewish Christians), and at the same time to reconcile a living, inveterate opposition (between Jewish Christians and Gentile Christians). The opposite result was psychologically more probable and the fear of it better founded, viz: that by his narrative he would bring the Jewish Christians, enemies of Paul, nearer to the like-minded Jews, and,

on the other hand, would make them in their genuinely Jewish hate (see Acts xxi, 20) more odious to the Gentile Christians; and thus confirm both parties in their opposition. If to this we add the means by which he intended to work upon these adversaries engaged in active conflict, *i. e.*, by presenting to the Petrine Jewish Christians a sham Peter, clothed in a Pauline garb, and to the Pauline Gentile Christians a sham Judaistic Paul, zealous for the law, expecting that both parties, each boasting of the authority of its Apostle, would, upon his false representation, change their views of the actual or historical Peter and Paul, and hence also their entire view of Christianity, we must regard the conclusion of Lekebusch as right, namely, that the only psychological result possible was, that both parties, "embittered" against the "calumnious" deceiver who had fraudulently attacked the favorite characteristics of their Apostles, would have turned round, and, in an age, "preëminently inclined to Jewish Christianity," and biased in condemnation of the person, doctrine, and labors, of the Apostle to the Gentiles, the Jewish Christians especially would have protested against the machinations of the deceitful adherent of Paul. And when Baur, in opposition to this view, appeals to the fact, that men finally "believed what the Acts would have them believe," and draws from this a proof that the author "well understood his age and rightly comprehended what must be held fast in the common interest," he puts out of sight by a mere phrase the contradiction between his theory and reality, without stating how the palpable falsification remained concealed from eyes sharpened by mutual hate, and how both deeply hostile parties, in spite of their diametrically opposite interests, could be thereby appeased.

The fact of the rapid, unanimous acknowledgment of the Acts, even these critics cannot deny, a fact easily explained so soon as the genuineness of the writing and the historical character of its information, is admitted. It is also clear from their position that these critics must view this fact as the result of a shrewd falsification. But the simple inference from this, as to the very wonderful ingenuity of the writer, is no proof of a right conception of the historical fact, but rather looks as much like a subterfuge of necessity, as one egg is like another. It is an assertion without any basis, does not explain the facts, and does not make possible what is impossible, in the condition and position which the critic's own

testimony has assigned to the parties. The result is as follows:— All the signs of a conciliatory purpose in the writing, which have been so carefully brought togther, so laboriously prepared and skillfully combined, are shown to be deceptive; it is impossible to prove a dogmatic purpose in it, and still less an intentional falsification of history in the interest of a theological dogma or purpose. A narrator appears before us in the Acts, who gives us partly what he has experienced, for instance, in the second part, partly what he has learned from eye-witnesses and ear-witnesses; and as it appears, almost everywhere, where there is an opportunity to compare the narrative with other accounts, his work has been performed with the greatest fidelity, and at least unbiassed by dogmatic considerations. As a concluding result, we declare that viewed from the historical stand-point, if any writing whatever has a claim to historical truth and trustworthiness, it is the Acts of the Apostles, despite all criticism to the contrary.

BRIEF NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

We gladly place the critical notice of Prof. Porter's great work on the *Human Intellect*,* contained in the last number of the British Quarterly Review, in the present number of the Theological Eclectic, in the hope that it will lead many who have not already done so, to read the work for themselves. In the present state of theology, when the most vigorous assaults are made upon the fundamental principles on which all religious faith rests, a thorough mastery of many of the questions discussed in this volume has become indispensable to the most successful defence of the truth. The chapters on causation, on design, and on mind and matter, are all intimately connected with the defence of theism. As a comprehensive and carefully elaborated contribution to psychology, the work is a credit to American scholarship, and well deserves the praise it has received.

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* *The Human Intellect, with an Introduction upon Psychology and the Soul.* By Noah Porter, D. D., Clark Professor of Moral Philosophy and Metaphysics in Yale College. 2d ed. New York: Charles Scribner & Co., 1869. 8vo. pp. 673. $5.

Mr. Max Müller's recent work, entitled *Chips from a German Workshop*,* consists of a series of valuable essays on the science of religion and comparative mythology, and is especially timely now, when the bold project is avowed of constructing from the various elements found in all religions a new religion, which shall be superior to Christianity. The wide field of thought opened on these pages, the attractive manner in which the subjects are discussed, and the mass of trustworthy information in regard to the most recent studies in this department, unite to render these volumes most valuable in themselves, while their evident connection with Christian apologetics gives to them a special value for the theologian. To some of the author's conclusions, however, we can give only a qualified assent, while others must be decidedly rejected.

Those who feel alarmed at the iniquitous and demoralizing legislation of several of the United States in respect to divorce, and would gladly do something to bring about a change, will find a thesaurus of information on the subject, in President Woolsey's *Essays on Divorce and Divorce Legislation*.† His position is firm, that the Christian Church, in its discipline, must faithfully observe the laws of the New Testament, and that Christian ministers cannot be justified under any circumstances in solemnizing marriages prohibited by Christ and his Apostles. The work deserves and will repay the most careful study.

Dr. Anderson's work on *Foreign Missions*,‡ gives a most cheering view of the past history and future prospects of Christian missions, in a calm, philosophic and earnest spirit, which imparts to the work a remarkable power of impression, and renders it one of the most truly readable books to be found on the subject. No pastor or intelligent layman can read it without feeling a new interest in the great missionary work of the church, and a stronger conviction of the certainty of its final success.

The felicitous title of Dr. Bushnell's *Women's Suffrage, the Reform against Nature*,§ is followed up by many equally felicitous remarks in support of the general principle, that it is not the province of women to govern men, which is in general well sustained by the doctrine of the Scriptures, the testimony of history, and an exhibition of the probable effects of Women's Suffrage. A more full exhibition of the *family* as the true sphere of woman's activity and a somewhat less free handling of the Apostle Paul, while not diminishing the force of the author's argument, would have obviated some criticisms to which the work, as it now stands, is open.

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* *Chips from a German Workshop.* By Max Müller, M. A., Oxford. Charles Scribner & Co., 1862. 2 vols. 12mo.

† *Essay on Divorce and Divorce Legislation, with special reference to the United States.* By Theodore D. Woolsey, D. D., LL.D. President of Yale College. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1869. 12mo., pp. 308. $1.75.

‡ *Foreign Missions; their Relations and Claims.* By Rufus Anderson, D. D., late Sec. A. B. C. F. M. New York: Charles Scribner & Co., 1869. 12mo. pp. 373.

§ *Women's Suffrage; the Reform against Nature.* By Horace Bushnell. New York: Charles Scribner & Co., 1869. 12mo. pp. 184.

XXV.—PROFESSOR HUXLEY'S PHYSICAL BASIS OF LIFE.*

BY REV. JOHN YOUNG, AUTHOR OF THE "CHRIST OF HISTORY."

Professor Huxley's, discourse on the "The Physical Basis of Life," recently published in the *Fortnightly Review*, continues to attract extraordinary attention. The scientific eminence of the writer, his manifest ingenuousness and honesty, and the extreme simplicity of the conception (so far as it touches material life), which he has formed and presents to his readers, accounts for the profound interest which has been so widely created. There is an irresistible charm in the open, lucid, and vigorous exposition which he presents of a theory, in itself singularly beautiful and captivating, but quite apart from some of the conclusions with which he unhappily connects it. The strong tendency of the intellect—strongest in minds of the highest power and cultivation—is ever to unify the complex and to reduce the manifold and the discordant to simplicity and law. Thirty years ago, or more, admiring audiences, incluing many of the gravest and wisest chiefs of the modern Athens, listened to a youthful votary of science, discoursing of the primitive, essential unity of the material creation, and maintaining that all the endless forms and kinds of material substance had their origin in one simple created element. The late Dr. Samuel Brown, a true genius and a noble and beautiful man, died prematurely after years of suffering, and left his fond theory unestablished. But it is possible that science may yet demonstrate to be true what was only the conjectural speculation of an aspiring soul, and at the least, there is nothing unreasonable or at all unlikely in the conception that the innumerable varieties of matter may have all originated in one primitive substance, capable of undergoing endless transmutations, conversions, decays, and reconstructions.

* From the *Contemporary Review*, June, 1869.

Professor Huxley has demonstrated beyond all question, the essential unity of all *living matter*, and has shown conclusively that there is a substance, one substance, which is the invariable basis of material life, in which it begins and by which it is sustained and continued, and that this substance is essentially the same in all material living being or things—in the lichen on the rock, the fungus, the tree, the animalcule, the reptile, the fish, the bird, the beast of the field, and the man. At the same time one regrets here an occasional unguardedness and laxity of expression, perfectly undesigned, but calculated to mislead, and conveying much more than the premises justify. The writer is no materialist; he believes in living minds, as well as living bodies, and in a living God, a pure Spirit. But we meet now and again with such wide and loose modes of speech as the following: "a kind of matter common to *all living beings*," "protoplasm is the formal basis of *all life*," "*all living powers* are cognate," "*all living forms* are fundamentally of one character." No, by no means. There are living beings, not material; there is life, which has its basis in no protoplasm; there are living powers, not cognate, but fundamentally dissimilar; and there are forms of life which have nothing in common with those which meet the eye.

It is essential to keep perpetually in mind that the one subject of Professor Huxley's discourse is *material life* and that alone—life in matter, *living matter*, as distinguished from dead, inorganic matter. It is found that a complex substance, called in scientific language protoplasm, is the basis of living matter,—that is, it is the beginning of this form of life, and the invariable and indispensable condition of its continuance. It is quite possible that science has not, even in this, made its last discovery, and that a simpler and remoter issue may yet crown the patience and the genius of future explorers. But so far as observation has yet reached, there is no living matter except in the presence of this protoplasm, and science for the moment has announced her ultimate finding, that all living matter begins and continues in a substance which is essentially the same in all plants of all orders, and in all animals of all species, and amidst innumerable varieties of forms and powers and destinies.

To me the analysis of protoplasm and the story of its formation, of its deaths and resurrections, of its activities and of its results, are exquisitely beautiful and simple. I accept them implicitly,

as facts ascertained by an accomplished and faithful witness. Experiment brings out that this complex substance can be resolved into the four elements, carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen, but it proves at the same time that these, in their simple state cannot be assimilated. The combination of carbon with oxygen forms carbonic acid, the combination of hydrogen with oxygen forms water, and the combination of hydrogen with nitrogen forms ammonia. It is these compounds—carbonic acid, water, and ammonia—and not the uncompounded elements, which all plants take in, and it is from these that are produced the protoplasm, by which their own lives and the lives of all animals, man included, are sustained. Science is almost sublimated into poetry when the vital element, this protoplasm, a semi-fluid, is described as lining the inner surface of the tiny hair of the nettle, moving in ceaseless activity, with its countless granules, pouring in rapid streams, in the same or in opposite directions, the streams sometimes meeting in conflict till one forces its way, and carries the other along with it, whirling and rushing and roaring like another Maelstrom, had we only organs acute enough to see and hear. And all this has its higher counterpart in the activities of the animal kingdom. But plants are the only producers of living protoplasm out of inorganic matter, so that ultimately all material life, animal as well as vegetable, depends on the growth and the powers of vegetation. Plants first convert *dead* into *living* matter; but this life again must first die, and once more, through the agency of the animal powers, be rekindled. Throughout, the process, whether in the animal or the vegetable kingdom, is ever from death to life, and again from life to death, and at the last all animal and all vegetable existence resolves itself into the original inorganic constituents of which it was at first composed—carbonic acid, water, and ammonia—and these are simply and wholly no other than the ordinary matter of the world, the common dust and earth on which we tread.

But this is an old, old truth, and science has not after all advanced us a single point beyond it. Physiology and general physics have shed marvellous light on birth and life and death, have searched out many of their hidden secrets, have analyzed and sifted the phenomena with consummate patience and accuracy, have traced sequences and detected latent antecedents, and have unraveled and explained much that was unknown or dark.

The result is an immense and priceless increase of general intelligence; but so far as the last great issue is concerned, we are now no whit beyond the men who lived thousands of years ago. Millenniums before modern science was born, the great Book of God spoke in tones such as these: "All flesh is grass, and all the goodliness thereof is as the flower of the field. The grass withereth, the flower fadeth, surely the people is grass." To the first of men, the voice of heaven was this: "Out of the dust wast thou taken; dust thou art, and to dust shalt thou return." It has been the demonstration of eye-sight ever since the course of the world began, that the human body and all animal bodies and all forms of vegetation at last are resolved into common earth, the lowest constituents of our globe.

Without any exaggeration, there is a most humiliating side on which our poor nature may be looked at, but let us not forget that it also presents on another side an aspect of wondrous elevation and nobility. And it is not wise and not helpful to virtue or to strength, to dwell inordinately on the native degradation of humanity in the scale of being, above all to exaggerate that debasement and to represent it lower and worse than it is in fact. It would be most unjust to charge Professer Huxley with being guilty of this offense, consciously and purposely; but he does commit it, nevertheless. Perhaps beguiled by the patness and the play of a happy sentence, he passes now and again beyond the line of literal fact and truth. As an example, by no means the only one, of this transgression, take the following statement: "Traced back to its earliest state, the nettle arises, *as the man does*, in a particle of nucleated protoplasm." The words have the brevity, the sharpness, and the strength of an aphorism; but they are not true, they are beyond the truth in a very essential respect, and the final conclusion includes far more than the foregoing premises contain. The essayist has been dealing solely with life in matter, with *living matter*, in distinction from dead inorganic matter. The nettle is living matter, and nothing but living matter, and its entire being is comprehended in this definition. But living matter is not only not the whole man, it is the lowest and the least essential part of the man. The sentence, to be strictly true, *on the writer's own showing*, must have run thus: the living matter in the nettle arises, as the living matter in the man does, in a particle of nucleated protoplasm. But how im-

mense is the difference between the two modes of statement! Professor Huxley himself elswhere puts the fact in an unexceptionable form, "a nucleated mass is the structural unit *of the body*." Yes, of the body, but not of the man. It creates the deeper regret that a thoroughly upright controversialist should at any time incautiously and loosely make use of language unsustained by facts, liable to be mistaken, and whose tendency is to degrade humanity far below its deserts. If any one part of our nature is to be taken for the whole, all but confirmed materialists would pronounce that the soul, not the body, the living mind, is the man.

But withal, the distinguished writer has to my mind triumphantly and very beautifully made out what I take to be the main thesis of his discourse, namely, the real unity of all living matter, so far as it comes within our observation, and that organic substance is essentially the same in plants, in animals, and in man. Nor only so, for in the ultimate analysis it comes out that the common inorganic elements of our earth are the pabulum out of which, by countless appliances and through countless processes, the matter of all physical life somehow comes forth. It makes the whole world kin. Men, animals, plants, earth, air, seas, and skies, are allied mysteriously but really and essentially. It is a simple and glorious idea, it speaks alike of the parsimony and of the prodigality of nature, and it proclaims aloud the omnipotence and the infinite art of the plastic hand of the great Creator, and Fashioner of the universe. Thus far I follow the distinguised essayist with genuine admiration, but no further, and the arguments and the conclusions which he attempts to build up on the ground of his well sustained thesis, seem to me fallacious and misleading. He has here stepped out of the sphere in which he is an acknowledged leader, and ventured into a province with which, I presume to think, he is not so familiar, and in which he does less than justice to himself and to his readers.

In brief form, and with conscious impartiality, I give Professor Huxley's course of reasoning. The primitive elements, carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen, each and all are lifeless; their compounds also, carbonic acid, water, and ammonia, are each and all lifeless; but when these compounds are brought together under certain conditions, they give rise to protoplasm, and protoplasm exhibits the phenomena of life. So far all is plain and unanswer-

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able. These are the undoubted facts of observation, the fixed series of antecedents and consequents, and they include the whole of the facts and the entire series, so far as has yet been ascertained. The argument advances—"We think fit to call different kinds of matter carbon, oxygen, hydrogen, and nitrogen, and to speak of the various powers and activities of these substances as the properties of the matter of which they are composed. Water at a certain temperature is a fluid, at another is a solid, whose particles tend to cohere into definite geometrical shapes, and sometimes build up frosty imitations of the most complex forms of vegetable foliage." "We call these the properties of the water . . . . they result from the properties of the component elements of the water." "Is the case in any way changed when carbonic acid, water, and ammonia disappear, and in their place, *under the influence of pre-existing living protoplasm*, an equivalent weight of the matter of life makes its appearance?" "If the phenomena exhibited by water are its properties, so are those presented by protoplasm (living or dead) its properties. If the properties of water may be justly said to *result* from the nature and disposition of its component molecules, I can find no intelligible ground for refusing to say that the properties of protoplasm result from the nature and disposition of its molecules."

Thus it stands; and as one who, in common with the essayist, desires only to seek truth and fact, and to bow implicitly and reverently to both, I ask, Is there not a profound, essential, and inscrutable distinction between life, vitality, and, without exception, all the other agencies and changes in material nature. All the others are of one kind and class—all, whether insignificantly little or magnificently grand—all are wonderful, beautiful, and glorious, but they belong to precisely the same sphere. Life, vitality, on the other hand, to my mind, is alone, in a higher province, separated from all below by a distance that cannot be measured. All other agencies in material nature are strictly passive. Inorganic matter acts only as it is acted upon. There is no real origination of action in mere material nature. There is no selfhood in any sense whatever. Antecedents and consequents, in perpetual, unvarying succession, make up the history of inorganic matter. But life is an active power, to a certain extent a self-power; the principle of vitality is a true originator wherever it exists, and in whatever form. It means self-sustenance, self-

extension, (growth), self-propagation. The rock, the mineral, the metal, the earth, the water, the gas, save as they are passively acted upon by influences which they neither seek nor can reject, will abide the same for thousands of ages. They can do nothing for their support, their extension, or their perpetuation. But the plant and the living creature search out and find the material which is necessary for their sustenance, and as if they had the power of selection, they choose what is nutritive and reject what is deleterious. In addition to this, they not only preserve the life that is in them, but as if by a self-force they gather and consume nutriment for their progressive extension and growth. Last of all, they have the wondrous power—unexampled, as are also those of self-sustenance and self-growth, in all the other regions of material nature—the power of begetting their kind and of multiplying themselves indefinitely beyond calculation.

The distinction is immense and impassable between living things and beings, and all other forms of matter. There is here a principle, a power altogether new, separated essentially and immeasurably from, and exalted, *toto cælo*, above all else within our knowledge. We can—and it is passing strange that we can—say that life is *in* matter, for we see its manifestations there; but it is most palpably inconsequent to say that therefore matter *is* life, or that life *is* matter or only a property of matter. Professor Huxley argues that we do not assume that a something called aquosity enters into and takes possession of the oxide of hydrogen, and thus forms water. Certainly not. Aquosity means only the quality of wateriness. We can abstract the quality and think of it, but it has no existence except in our minds. Nobody imagines that aquosity is anything existing by itself, apart from actual water. But we do assume, and are entitled to assume, on the grounds which have been advanced, that there is a real something, a mysterious principle, a force which we distinguish as life, vitality, which exists indeed in matter, but which exists also in minds and in God. We are entitled to call this principle a wholly new element, a real and great addition to the elemental powers, not a mere form or modification of something before existing. And why? For this sufficient reason, that it is not only *sui generis*, but is essentially diverse and separate from all the lower constituents and forces of nature. Scientific research has gone down far into the darkness of the kingdom of life, and may yet

descend deeper and be able to strike out a gleam of light; but no plummet dropped from earth into the infinite void, can sound the bottomless depth, and no human eye can pierce the dark secret of eternity. In presence of the meanest plant, the merest animalcule, we stand before an awful and inscrutable mystery. Oh, life, life! what, whence art thou? Self-motion, self-growth, self-perpetuation! It is Almightiness! It is God! It is the power of God! It is God working! It is all and only this in the ultimate analysis!

The thought which we have now reached is capable of being extended over the whole range of the kingdom of nature. "If," says Professor Huxley, "the phenomena exhibited by water are its properties, so are those presented by protoplasm its properties." The statement seems fair and unobjectionable, but all depends on the meaning of that one crucial term, properties. It is more than time that the interpretation of this word, as used in science, should be exactly ascertained and fixed. It is very convenient, in relation to physical studies, and in the general ordinary use of language, to distinguish the changes which any substance produces on others, or which others produce on it as *its properties.* It is not only convenient, but almost a necessity, and entirely harmless, if the meaning be well understood and guarded. In one class of cases, and in one only, the term is capable of being used with perfect accuracy, and in its widest sense. It is the property of a rational being to perceive, to think, to feel, and to will. He is able, he has power—and *this is the essential idea* involved in the word property—to do these things, and he actually does them, if he chooses and when he chooses. It belongs to him to do these things; he is constituted and empowered by his Maker to do them. Such, in a true and real sense, is the property, the attribute, the power, of an intelligent nature.

But inorganic matter, in all its myriad forms and kinds, has no originative, active powers, no properties, in the strict and just meaning of that word. It does and can do nothing save in an indirect and passive sense. It acts only when and so far as it is acted upon. An electric spark guided by a human hand, or otherwise, passes through a certain combination of hydrogen and oxygen, and a quantity of water is produced. Or, again, water at 60° Fahrenheit is a fluid, at 32° it becomes solid, and if the temperature be raised, it passes again into the fluid state. Men

of science have, and most justly, a passion for facts. We are taught to abide by the facts, the exact facts, and all the facts, and are forbidden to step a point beyond them. Causes and effects are rigidly excluded: with antecedents and consequents in their invariable succession, and with them alone, we have to do. What, then, I ask, are the simple facts here? An electric spark, a combination of hydrogen and oxygen, the spark passing through the compound, these again displaced, and a quantity of water found instead, the water fluid at one temperature and solid at another. This is the entire amount furnished by the most minute and skillful observation. But we are told—and I ask, on what authority?—that the results are owing to the properties of the hydrogen, the oxygen, the electricity and the water. Our senses do not observe the properties, they witness only to the facts, and can detect no properties. It is mere supposition, and no more.

Admitting the convenience and even the necessity of attributing properties, in a certain modified sense, to matter, for myself, believing in their reality in a higher meaning than many would concede, I deny the right of any, on scientific ground, to go a step beyond observed fact. Certain substances are before us, and certain changes are witnessed. That is all we know, because it is all we see: these are the whole facts of observation, and anything beyond is hypothesis, and no more. Professor Huxley speaks strongly of human ignorance, and all but asks, What do or can we know of the real nature of anything? He actually puts the question, "Does anybody quite comprehend the *modus operandi* of an electric spark?"—a question which might fairly be extended indefinitely. "After all, what do we know of matter, except as a name for the unknown and hypothetical cause of our states of consciousness?" Again, he affirms that often, now in one case and again in another, "there is no sort of parity between the properties of the components and the properties of the resultant." And yet, withal, he is prepared to attribute physical results, universally, to the nature and properties of their antecedents. Referring to water, for example, he declares, "We do not hesitate to believe that *in some way or another* its properties result from the properties of its component elements."

This cautious, dubious language is very noticeable and suggestive, and may be translated in some such way as this—we do not see and cannot explain, but we believe that *in some way or another*

the effect is thus and thus produced. Men of science seem to be forced in spite of themselves, and by the fundamental idea of causality, rooted in their minds, though formally disowned, to seek *a cause* of phenomena, and therefore fall back on the nature and properties of things. But it is a pure assumption. Say that two or more kinds of matter come together, and that a definite result follows. All we observe are the substances, their proportions, their combinations, and the effect. Their action, the course, the process, the succession of changes till the last, we may see and follow, but why it is as we see, why the effect is what it is, we cannot observe, and, on merely scientific grounds, cannot know. We simply assume and assert that *in some way or another* it is owing to the nature and properties of that matter, of which we know little or nothing, except that it is "the unknown and hypothetical cause of our states of consciousness." Illegitimately, so far as the scientific ground is concerned, we go beyond the facts of observation. Denying causality, we introduce something very much like a cause, and adopt a phraseology which seems to account for phenomena, but which really accounts for nothing, and is very often no more than a blind for our ignorance.

There is no question here, as to the perfect adaptation of means to their end, throughout the kingdom of material nature. The wisdom and the power of the Creator are sufficient ground on which to build this conviction, were there no ostensible evidence of the fact before us. But the evidences are abundant, and it cannot be doubted that, as our knowledge extends, we shall find ever fresh proof that the relations of phenomena—arbitrary in one sense, because depending wholly on the will of Him who gave being to material nature, and endowed it with all its possibilities —are not accidental, but have their ground in the highest fitness of things. It is possible to make this out even now, to no small extent. One form of matter is seen to be adjusted and adapted to another; one so-called property, or set of properties, are seen to meet and respond becomingly and invariably to another. Water at one temperature is solid, at another is fluid; and we are accustomed to say it is the property of the water in the one case to freeze and in the other to be fluid. Fire applied to combustible materials consumes them. We are accustomed to say that it is the property of fire to consume, and the property of fuel to be consumed. It is perfectly convenient and legitimate, so far, to

speak of these as properties, but we must not be misled by words, which have a double sense, and may be either negative or positive. Water becomes solid, or becomes or is fluid: but does it *do* anything actively of itself to produce either of these results? It is fluid, it is solid—these are the facts; but has it done anything to create the facts? No. It has done nothing, so far as we know. It has been acted upon, and nothing more. Has, then, the heat done anything to bring about these changes? Nothing. At 32° water *is* frozen, at 60° it *is* a fluid. That is a fact—the result before our eyes; but how, or why, we know not. The heat has *done* nothing actively—has neither lowered nor heightened its temperature; it has been acted upon, and only acted upon. Again, fire is heat raised to a certain height. It has done and can do nothing to raise or lower itself; it has been acted upon, and nothing more. But fuel laid upon it is consumed; that is all we observe, and the how or the why we know not. The fire and the fuel, both, are passively acted upon, and an agency is manifestly conducted through their medium; but any active force of theirs may be supposed, but cannot be seen or proved, and *is not*, so far as we know, *in* them.

I am disposed to question altogether the existence, in any true and rational sense, of all save *passive* properties (the power not of acting, but of suffering action from without), in inorganic matter—or anywhere, except in organized beings. Even the meanest plant acts for itself and from itself; it truly originates action. The animal, in a yet higher degree, is a real originator, and an energetic and conscious actor. Man, highest of all, is a conscious, rational, free being, is gifted with properties and powers, which belong to his nature, and which he puts forth or not, as he wills. But mere inorganic matter, of itself, from itself, does nothing, can do nothing; universally it originates and can originate nothing. It is acted upon, and never acts of itself, *proprio motu*. The ball thrown by a human hand, or otherwise, rolls on. Yes and no. It is rolled, rather than rolls; it is caused to roll. It is only acted upon, and does nothing of itself. All the doing, all the property and the power, belong not to it, but entirely to the hand which threw it. It may strike a second ball, and this again is rolled, rather than rolls. The first, even in striking, is only acted upon, and does nothing actively. It does not send out the force which is in it; the force passes into the second—that is all we

know—and again into a third, a fourth, and a fifth, and onward indefinitely. But the agency—except in a passive sense—the power, and the property, are all and only in the original mover, and that never can be inorganic matter. We come to this: inorganic matter, as is manifest every instant, is the *medium* through which illimitable kinds of agency are conducted; but, itself, of itself, can never originate, can never begin and conduct agency of any kind; and for this sufficient reason, that it is capable of acting only as it is acted upon.

To act, to originate action, there must be (as we observe even in the lowest forms of vegetation) something of selfhood—a self. Again: to possess properties, powers, in any real sense, such as we observe in animals, and highest of all in man, there must be consciousness, intelligence, and will. But inorganic matter has no will, no purpose, no desire, no knowledge, and no consciousness. We rightly call it dead, insensate, in itself perfectly passive and indifferent in the extremest sense. And is this the ground, can this be the ground, in which originative force can find its sole basis, and out of which it can spring forth? It is impossible. Properties, powers, self-activity, can belong only to a being, not to a thing—in the highest analysis, to mind, not to matter.

We pass not into another region, but only into another quarter of the same region of inquiry, when we turn to what are called the laws of the material creation. Honor to the noble men, who by patient, severe, and long-extended investigation, and by cautious and profound reasoning, have discovered for us the great laws which reign in the phenomena and relations of matter. A priceless legacy they have bequeathed to the generations, which it behoves us not only to understand, but to test by our own observation and experience, and by the convictions and conclusions of our own judgment and reason. When we speak of mechanical, chemical, and physiological laws, the idea conveyed is, that matter in certain circumstances is found to undergo certain changes, and that always and everywhere it is found to undergo the same changes, the circumstances being the same. The invariability of sequence is the chief idea; but it is conveyed besides that the ground of this invariability is law, that is to say, the sequences are not a caprice, not a contingency, not an uncertainty, but are owing to some fixed order, to some distinct, determinate arrange-

ment. Most manifestly this order cannot have been fixed by the unconscious antecedents and consequents themselves, and the arrangement cannot have been determined by them. We are entitled to ask who fixed the order, who settled the arrangement?

That word "law" and the thought of which it is the sign refer us back to an origin and an author. The word includes at least two ideas—will and power. A law, if the word be really meant for anything and be not a mere blind for our ignorance, suggests, first, expressed will, and then power to enforce the will. If the well-established conclusion of science be, that all the operations and changes of matter are invariable, indicating no such thing as contingency, irregularity, or caprice; when it is added that this is their law, the real meaning, if there be a real meaning at all in the words, is this, that some will chooses and resolves, and that some power secures that it shall be so. But whether this meaning be intended or not, I am prepared to maintain, without the least fear of successful contradiction, that the simple fact of invariability clearly involves the necessity of these two things, will and power, and can no otherwise be accounted for. The earth, the mineral, and the gas, the inorganic, and very largely even the organic substance, all, we find by observation, have fixed laws, and never fail to act in perfect harmony with them. On a vast scale and for a vast duration they have never failed in a single instance. I despair of making the least impression on any mind which is unable to see that there is in this the presence, somewhere, of an unalterable will and of an invincible power. But as clearly, the power and the will are not in the unconscious things, but must and can only belong to an intelligent being, be he who he may.

That substratum, be it what it may, on which the laws of nature terminate, and all whose products and forms are simply the various effects of the operation of these laws, has no will, and as certainly it has in itself no power. Our globe has a motion upon its own axis, and it has also another motion around the sun. On the one hand there is a principle or law (so we speak), in virtue of which it is ever repelled from the central orb, and on the other hand there is a principle or law in virtue of which it is ever drawn in exactly the contrary direction, and the result is a nearly circular orbit. This is the law, as we speak, of the earth and the sun; but the words either convey no intelligible meaning, or they are utterly fallacious, unless we under-

stand that there is some living being who arranges that the two shall thus act and react on one another, and who besides has the power to secure that they shall thus act and react. No sane man imagines that there is a consciousness, still less a volition, in the earth or in the sun. They have no purpose, no choice in their movements, and no knowledge of them. The purpose, the will, and the knowledge, can only be in an intelligent being.

It is exactly the same with the so-called forces and powers which, by a kind of convenient fallacy, are spoken of as if they resided in matter. There is a force which on the one side attracts, and on the other side resists, and which is said to reside in the sun and in the earth. The adaptations of nature are perfect, perhaps most perfect of all, certainly most grand and awful, in the sphere of astronomy. There is a magnificent order in the relations of sun and earth, and planets and stars, and systems. It can be ascertained within certain limits, it can be calculated, it can be predicted with certainty. But do suns and planets, and stars and systems, know anything of this magnificent order? Have they any power, any choice, in regard to it? Do they, in fact, really obey any laws. No; they neither obey nor disobey. They act only as they are acted upon, have no voice, no knowledge, and no power either to give or to withhold. They are only the passive *media* through which agency, of which they know nothing, is conducted. Is the sun an agent, of himself exerting a virtue inherent in his personality, and by this affecting variously other bodies? Power is that which the possessor puts forth or withholds, and by which he produces, originates change. But a causer of change without volition, without even consciousness, is a contradiction. The power, the ability to cause change, can reside ultimately only in a person, not in a thing. Now, if we believe in a Creator and Ruler, if this be a truth, a fact, the highest truth, the highest of all facts, why virtually ignore it? Why leave it unnamed? Is it not true, simply true, that the Creator has so willed it, and that His causative power secures that it shall be done, and in the grandest and wisest possible way? It *is* true, and, what is more, this truth lies at the very root of the only intelligible, or even possible, interpretation of the laws of suns and planets, and stars and systems, and of all the forces and changes and phenomena of creation. At this moment, when the phenomena of so-called physical forces are before us, not ages

ago, and at every moment when the phenomena are presented, the fundamental and ultimate fact is this—the Creator wills, and His power effects.

The idea of the Almighty impressing a law on material substance at its creation which thereafter abides in force, and under which it of itself must forever continue to act, is a pure fiction, imposing on us by sounds which, on examination, are found to have no intelligible significance. If the law be regarded as His announced will or purpose, inorganic matter is incapable alike of understanding the announcement and of retaining the knowledge of it. It cannot receive a command, and cannot obey it. The volition or purpose of the Divine mind cannot be contained within it, and cannot even be imparted to it. In like manner, power, in the sense of ability to originate change, is incapable of being conveyed to it, or of being retained by it. It can never become an actor, an originator, a sender-forth of influence from itself. Power, voluntary activity, is in a person only, not in unconscious matter. The Supreme can make use, if he pleases, say, of the earth or the sun, to do what he judges fit; can cause them to act, the one or the other, as He desires. He can determine and secure that they shall act invariably in one way and no other, so that we shall understand that this is a fixed law. But the meaning, the only meaning is, that at every moment when they so act, He is the direct, the present, the immediate, the sole causer. The laws of Nature can mean nothing more or other than the will of the Almighty, the course which He wills and causes Nature to take. They have, and can have, no existence except in a mind. They are not in material nature, there is no *locus in quo* for them except in a mind. And even so, in like manner, the powers and forces of nature have no existence except in God. They are, and can only be, attributes of a being, not of a thing.

The whole course of material nature, in its minutest and in its grandest departments, is thus nothing else than the Supreme acting, directly, immediately acting. There is a substance, a material, be it what it may, in which and through which He acts—and this also was created by Him; but at every moment, everywhere He is the direct, the immediate present, the sole actor. The will, the purpose, and the power that are evinced are all His, *in* Him, and only in Him. In this light science is emphatically the record of Divine physical providence, it is the discovery and the announce-

ment of that fixed course, according to which the Great Being has chosen, and chooses to act, in all the spheres of material nature. And if this be so, must it not be a fundamental and perilous mistake, an immense loss of light and of power, virtually to ignore this highest truth, this first and grandest fact of the universe? Must it not fatally affect, almost necessarily falsify, our whole conception of the subject of study?

Conscientious materialists have no alternative but to imprison themselves within the limits of the facts of sense. To them there is no higher, no other sphere. But multitudes of scientific men, multitudes of the most distinguished votaries of science are devout Theists and genuine Christians. But they too, no less warmly than others, adopt the principle that in the sphere of science they can accept no testimony beyond that of observation. They must deal, as they judge, only with material phenomena, and with the facts of the senses. Quite so. But it need not be forgotten that there are facts of mind as well as of matter, facts of consciousness as well as facts of observation, and that there are internal, native intuitions, as well as sensations and impressions, produced by the external world. Are these to be virtually ignored? Whatever be the special direction of our researches at any moment, is one side of our nature to be darkened and blotted out for the time, in order that another may be unhampered in investigations, on which from the first side, all the while, there may fall a light that can be kindled nowhere else? This, surely, is not wise and not just; it must be dangerous, if not fatal, to truth.

Imagine a work of art before us. We look patiently and carefully, examine, scrutinize, and criticise. We seize in our minds the conception of the picture, we note the figures, the grouping, the background, the foreground, the colors, the shading, and the entire execution and tone of the whole. But should we gain nothing, should not our whole thought and impression be heightened, and a new, warm, vivid, deeper sense be created, if we admitted the idea of the living artist, and connected the work with the labor, patience, genius, and taste he had bestowed on it. Imagine a mechanical invention—say the first watch invented and made; take it to pieces, mainspring, balance, wheels, pivots, cogs, movements, workings, and counter-workings. Remake it from the foundation, see how each part answers to the other, how from the

simpler you rise to the more complex contrivances, and from these to the more complex still, until at last you have an accurate and faithful measurer and indicator of time. But who does not see and is not compelled to feel that it would immensely enliven and enlighten all his ideas, if he knew that the wondrous mechanism, instead of being admirable but mysterious, was a human invention, the work of skill and toil, the contrivance and product of a human intellect? What then shall we say when it is the great God who has not only constructed the mighty machine of this universe, with all its innumerable and perfect adaptations, and their transcendant results, but has literally created the materials themselves, and has endowed them with all and every one of the possibilities which they possess? And is this to be left out in our thought at any time? What harm to science, to the most rigorous investigation, or to any human interest, can be done by the distinct recognition of a fundamental truth? It need not be idly obtruded, but must it be ignored? Are we gratuitously to impoverish ourselves, to limit our vision, and deliberately to lose half, the largest half, of all the light that is accessible to us? Science begins and is conducted in the absence of its strongest natural support, unless it recognizes the one great underlying fact —the postulate of all postulates, God the Creator, Fashioner, and Ruler of the material universe.

It is admitted in the fullest sense that the strict and proper province of science is to observe, to examine, to test, to collect, to register, and to classify phenomena, and then to reason on the whole of the observations it has accumulated. Quite truly its sole business is announced to be to deal with facts, and with facts alone, and with all the facts which it is possible to reach. Let this great and noble work be done without fear or favor. Let the facts, the whole facts, and nothing but the facts, nakedly, literally, as they are, be collected and recorded. Let no concealment and no exaggeration be tolerated, however the testimony may seem to favor or to frown upon one theory or another. Be there nothing but perfect openness, perfect honesty and perfect impartiality. Let no prejudice, no prepossession, no unworthy fear, and no cherished idea be suffered to affect in the least the clear testimony of the senses. The truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, be our single aim.

But we are not wont, in pursuing a new study, to forget or

ignore what we have gained in other directions. Real and sound knowledge of any kind cannot be hostile, but must be only helpful and strengthening, in the investigation of truth in any region whatsoever. It could not quench, it would but inflame our intellectual enthusiasm in the study of the facts of science, and it would connect them with a profounder and more living interest; it could not make us less, but must make us more honest, more impartial, and more truthful in our researches, if the fixed conviction lay in our minds, that the facts of science were the reflex and the record of the thoughts of the living God. And shall we, can we, amidst the countless array of facts which crowd on our senses every hour, and amidst the more mysterious and awful wonders revealed by the microscope and the telescope, shut out from thought, the highest of all facts—God? Amidst the endless and invariable succession of antecedents and consequents are we not compelled to go back to the great first antecedent, without whom invariable succession is a line hanging from nothing in an eternal vacuum; that antecedent who is the sole fountain and causer of all life and all being, without whom the universe is a mockery and a mystery never to be solved? Shall we hide or evade the one sublime truth which converts the mockery into a divine benignity, which solves the mystery, and which is the golden key to unlock the dark secret of immensity—God, the Creator, Fashioner, and Ruler of the material universe?

At this point, were not the interests at stake so sacred and paramount, I would willingly lay down my pen, for, in painful distinction from the earlier portion, the last pages of Professor Huxley's discourse are palpably inconsequent in their reasoning and dangerous in their tendency in no common degree. "I take it," he says, "to be demonstrable" (he does not say demonstrated, for it neither has nor can be) "that it is utterly impossible to prove that anything whatever may *not* be the effect of a material and necessary cause." Passing by the strange inconsistency of these words, when it is remembered that the writer does not believe in such a thing as a material *cause* at all, and still less in a necessary cause, in any sense, I simply throw back the mere assertion, and require some proof or ground before it can have any claim to be considered. To me there is no real cause but one, the First Cause, and subordinate to this are created wills, which are true, though derived causes. All other so-called causes are secon-

dary, intermediate, unconscious occasions of phenomena rather than causes. But what the essayist pronounces a "philosophical impossibility" is not only a possibility but a certainty. Without difficulty it could be shown, for example, that mind can *not* be originated out of mere matter, and that the supposition is a direct and gross contradiction.

As another example of unsupported statement, it is asserted that "human logic is incompetent to prove that any act is really spontaneous." It may be so, though I am far from admitting it; but the reason of incompetence, if such there be, is very plain, namely, that the subject belongs not so much to human logic as to human consciousness. Every human being is distinctly conscious, and needs no logic to convince him, that many of his acts are perfectly and wholly spontaneous, and that what he has done, he has done entirely of his own accord, and from his own choice. It is added, "a really spontaneous act is one which by the assumption has no cause." The word spontaneous is inexact and equivocal. It is here used for voluntary, the correlative of necessary, else it is wholly out of place. Loosely, we call that spontaneous, which is done on the moment, almost without thought or knowledge. But substitute voluntary, which is the proper term for spontaneous, and the fallacy of the statement and of the inference built upon it is perceived at once: "a really voluntary act has no cause." On the contrary, it has the truest and strongest of all derived causes—the will of the voluntary agent.

Professor Huxley declares, "I individually am no materialist, but, on the contrary, believe materialism to involve grave philosophical error;" and again, "our volition counts for something as a condition of the course of events." I accept these statements implicitly and unreservedly as the utterance of an honorable and upright man. But it is not possible to reconcile them with many other statements of a totally opposite character. No one has a right to question for a moment that the essayist himself honestly believes that they are perfectly consistent; but to me they are hopelessly irreconcilable. The progress of science, according to this latest and very high authority—and the fact is announced with no word of regret—has ever led, and even now more than ever is leading, to "the extension of what we call matter and *causation*" (where does he alight upon this word?) "and the concomitant gradual banishment from all regions of human thought of

what we call spirit and spontaneity." Of modern physiology it is said, and without the least token of regret or dread, "here as elsewhere matter and law have devoured spirit and spontaneity." "The physiology of the future will gradually extend the realm of matter and law, until it is co-extensive *with knowledge, with feeling, and with action.*" And all the while the essayist affirms that we know nothing of this all-devouring *matter*, "except as a name for the unknown and hypothetical substratum of our states of consciousness." But where, one may ask, can be the seat of consciousness, unless in spirit? Let this pass. He adds, "What do we know of spirit, except as a name for an unknown and hypothetical cause or condition of states of consciousness? In other words, matter and spirit are but names for the imaginary substrata of groups of natural phenomena." All is unreal, imaginary, supposititious, according to this account. It would be false and injurious to conclude that the writer is a Nihilist; but if this be not akin to absolute Nihilism, I am incapable of understanding the meaning of the word.

Professor Huxley states it as the aim of his discourse "to point out the *only way* of escape out of that crass materialism in which we just now landed," and that way he pronounces is the adoption of the theory of the invariable succession of antecedents and consequents in material nature. Many are perverse enough to judge that this theory can mean nothing else than the blindest and the direst conceivable necessity—a purely *material* necessity, withal. True, we see only succession; our senses cannot detect the hidden cause or ground of it, but we do see the invariable succession. It has ever been, it is now, and we have no reason to doubt, but every reason to believe, that it will continue ever to be. In all this, the word "necessity" may be discarded, but the thing, the conception, is here a manifest reality. To most minds invariable succession means necessity, pure and simple, and can mean nothing else. This unquestionably, if this be all, is not an escape from an evil into which we had plunged: it is a deeper plunge into an abyss which yawns only the more horribly, the lower we sink into it.

There is an escape from brute, iron necessity—one escape, and only one; but it is not in matter but in mind, and in a living God. If the laws of matter are the thoughts of God, we have then, and only then, a refuge, strong and enduring, in the power,

the wisdom, the rectitude, and the goodness of our Maker. This is to believe, not in a necessity, but in a choice, in a purpose—a wise and deliberate purpose, the purpose of a Being in whom we can trust, and who is supremely worthy of our confidence.

Professor Huxley is not singular in his admiration of David Hume, if the native sagacity and subtlety of his intellect and the beautiful perspicuity, vigor, and ease of his style alone be regarded. But he is egregiously mistaken in thinking that it is in Scotland chiefly, or at all, that the philosophy of Hume has been accepted and honored. Perhaps there is no country in the world in which it has been so generally and thoroughly abjured. With the solitary exception of Dr. Thomas Brown, all the leaders of mental and moral philosophy in the North, in long succession, have persistently withstood the philosophical principles of Hume. Hutcheson, Reid, Beattie, Stewart, Wilson, and Hamilton, were wide apart from the school of Hume, and were all, more or less distinctively, intuitionalists.

But the spirit of modern science, the essayist states, is in entire sympathy with what I presume to call the *effete* materialism of a bygone age. It is grievous to think of, yet it is only too true. Men of science imagine that intuitions, intellectual and moral, are to be set aside because they are not observed by the senses. "They must be banished with other traditions," says Hume, and Professor Huxley consents. But human nature is too loyal to itself to sanction or to suffer this sacrilegious divorce, and it is too strong to yield up its deepest treasures and to displace them by that which meets only the eye and the ear. The testimony of the senses rests only and wholly on the witness of the inward consciousness, and the inward consciousness bears witness as clearly and strongly to the native and profound intuitions of the human soul.

Innate ideas are justly discarded, for the phrase can only mean thoughts formed out and fashioned, conceptions ready made and deposited in the new-born soul. But the native tendency in a human mind, the predisposition to form certain ideas, may be as real and deep, and no more inconceivable or incongruous than the native and invincible tendency of the beaver to build, or of the mole to burrow. I hold that the predisposition in man and the power to form certain ideas is native to the soul and as universal as any other fact of humanity, and that the evidence of its exist-

ence is the same precisely as that which we have for the facts of sense—no other than the voice of inward consciousness.

Amongst the ideas which we are natively predisposed and empowered to form, one of the very deepest and most sacred is that of causation. It is so fixedly imbedded and rooted in our nature that we cannot rid our minds of it. Even Mr. Mill, who denies the thing, admits the indispensable necessity for the word. We cannot do without it; and why, unless there be a real something within us which wants and must have a representative? Philosophers in vain exalt invariable succession, and marshal out antecedents and consequents; common sense demands something more—some ground of the succession, some reason for the sequences. All men see and feel that there must be some real *nexus* between antecedent and consequent. The idea of power somewhere linking the sequences and effecting all we observe is irrepressible. We may be, and are often utterly wrong in what we imagine to be the real cause. The immediate antecedent may be only the last and least influential in a series, which together constitutes the cause even in a modified and secondary sense. So far as material nature is concerned, we are wholly wrong until we go back and up to the Fountain of power, which, through the medium of material nature, is the one, sole, real Cause.

Professor Huxley admits that he has adopted a materialistic terminology, but his reason for doing so is suggestive of grave and painful surmise. Such terminology, he says, "connects *thought* with the other phenomena of the universe." So he affirms: and does not this recall words I have already quoted, but without comment, "matter devouring spirit and spontaneity," "the realm of matter gradually extending, until it is co-extensive with knowledge, with feeling, and with action?" In my humble judgment, and without in the least questioning the writer's entire honesty, these words are a naked and terrible utterance of the merest materialism. But more terrible still to my ears are the sentences which follow, and which I think fallacious and pernicious in the extreme: "All vital action may be said to be the result of the molecular forces of the protoplasm which displays it; and if so, it must be true in the same sense, and to the same extent, that the thoughts to which I am now giving utterance and your thoughts regarding them, are the expression of molecu-

lar changes in that matter of life which is the source of our other *vital* phenomena."

This passage is to me perfectly unintelligible unless it be an undisguised statement of materialism. Is there a soul in man, or is there not? Is there a rational, moral, responsible nature, distinct from his corporeal nature, or is there not? In opposition to the doctrine of the essay, it has been shown that even vitality cannot be resolved into a mere property of matter, for it exists in beings not material, and in the Great God, and therefore can have no essential relation to matter. Vitality is a real principle, a real force, perfectly new, and immeasurably distinct from all other mere material forces whatsoever. But in the words above quoted the essayist advances far beyond this earlier position. He distinctly asserts that thought is a property of matter, and must take its place side by side with "*our other vital phenomena.*" But thought is not merely or chiefly a *vital* phenomenon. It is the property of a living being, and of nothing but a living being, whether material or purely spiritual; but you do not define it, you utterly misconceive it, when you say that it is life, a *vital* phenomenon. It, itself, is not life at all, though it comes forth of a living being. It is the fruit, the product of an active intelligence, a will, and a conscience. Is there in man, distinct from his body, a seat and source of rational, moral, and volitional power —is there a soul, a mind, as well as a body?

The influence of body on mind is perpetual, pervading, and very humiliating. A fit of indigestion will render mental effort impossible or useless, will jaundice all our ideas of men and things, and sour, and almost deprave the whole spirit of a man. A generous meal, pure, open air, and healthful exercise, will restore and replenish the living protoplasm, and will empower the man for any intellectual or moral work that lies before him. No question but the body, and pre-eminently the brain, is the organ, the medium through which the mind, the soul, exerts its powers, and that the character and kind of all its action depend constantly on the state of the body. But it is one thing to say that the agent is affected by the organ through which he operates, and a very different thing to say that the organ *is* the agent, and that there is no power besides. Unless I wholly misapprehend the meaning of very plain words, it is distinctly maintained that the man is the body, and that the body is the whole man. All vitality in

him is material and only material; and all thought, in like manner, is equally material; and is "the expression of molecular changes in that matter of life which is the source of our other vital phenomena."

It arises out of this, that while Professor Huxley is only to be thoroughly credited when he declares that he is no materialist, we are obliged to think that what he means by materialism cannot be what is usually understood by that somewhat wide term. The old faith, or no faith, that the universe is an eternal series and succession—a necessary succession, without beginning and without end—no God, no Creator, no Ruler—has, it appears, disciples in these days. It is possibly *this* extreme form of materialism, perhaps more favored than many are aware of, which the essayist abjures, and abjures thoroughly and indignantly. "The materialistic position," he says, "that there is nothing in the world but matter, force, and necessity, is as utterly devoid of justification as the most baseless of theological dogmas." With hearty reprobation of such a scheme, he says, "fact I know, and law I know, but what is this necessity, save an empty shadow of my own mind's throwing?" Eternal, *necessary*, material succession, Professor Huxley entirely disowns, but it is as plain as at least any human language can make it, that in a narrower sense, in the customary and common meaning of the words, he is a materialist, pure and simple. Man is matter, and so far as this distinguished writer speaks, he is matter, and no more. All life is material, and all thought is material, and matter constitutes the whole of man.

In perfect consistency with this conception of humanity, the essayist deems it most wise to restrict our inquiries to the visible creation, and to the visible interests and destinies of man; and all the great and profound questions which have engrossed the minds, and still do, of all the noblest thinkers and sages of the world, he consigns to the limbo of "lunar politics," regarding them as little more rational than would be the research into the form of government established in the moon.

I turn last of all, to a quotation from Hume, introduced by Professor Huxley in words of entire sympathy. "If we take in hand," says Hume, "any volume of divinity, or school of metaphysics, for instance, let us ask, 'Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number?' No. 'Does it contain

any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence?' No. Commit it then to the flames, for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion." On which Professor Huxley says to his readers, as before he had said to his hearers: "Permit me to enforce this *most wise* advice!" So, then, figures and facts, observation and experience, are not merely very important things, but the highest things to humanity; the things which tell most powerfully on the interests and the progress of our race. Admitting that they have an importance of their own, a vast importance, I yet venture to question their title to the lofty position, the supreme and solitary glory which is here assigned to them. If these be the highest and the most useful studies for man, what shall we say of God, the soul, immortality? They are not observed by the senses at all, are not connected with quantity or number, and are not related to experimental reasoning. They are indeed matters of fact, and they are realities of existence; but no human eye ever saw them, no human ear ever heard them, and no outward sense ever bore witness to them. They are native intuitions, and they are attested only by the inward consciousness, which, however, is also the sole witness for all external phenomena. Must we give to the flames all experience that relates to them? Can inquiries and reasonings respecting them be only of trifling use for the help of our minds? Must all speculation or thought about them be full only of sophistry and illusion?

There is, there can be no just ground for jealousy of science, so long as it ranges within its own proper province—the faithful observation and record of facts. But it cannot justly be questioned that the reasonings which are built upon the facts are a fair subject of universal criticism, and that men of science are not specially prepared by their distinctive studies for this kind of service. Men of equal intellectual power are free to question the soundness of their deductions, and to reject, on sufficient ground shown, their most cherished conclusions. The extension of knowledge in any department whatever, is only devoutly to be desired, and is neither to be discouraged nor to be dreaded. Fear for any real interest from this cause, for any cherished theory, as if one truth could be endangered by the spread of truth in other directions, is senseless, stupid, and irritating to every honest soul. It is disloyalty to God, to truth, and to our own nature; and the spread of scientific knowledge has an interest and worth peculiar to itself.

It throws open the marvellous secrets of creation, it touches all life, and it bears on the happiness, the advancement, the refinements, the tastes, and all the secular capabilities and possibilities of humanity. Jealousy or fear of science are, both, alike dishonoring and unfounded. Perfect and unrestricted freedom, but not on one side only, on both sides alike, must be the recognized principle and law for the students of science and of philosophy.

But as a matter of fact and of fair historical evidence, we may ask, who are the men, and what are the influences that have told most powerfully on human well-being and cultivation? When it is affirmed confidently, if not somewhat arrogantly, that the investigations which have attracted and engrossed for a long life some of the strongest intellects which have ever opened on this earth, are full of sophistry and illusion, and that the record of them had best be committed to the flames, one is impelled to test the judgment by matter of fact, and to condemn it, on the first showing, as alike dangerous and unfounded. No one questions for a moment the immense benefits which genuine science has conferred upon the world. They can scarcely be exaggerated. But it is allowable to ask, who are the men, and what the influences that have most effectively touched and regenerated humanity? I single out the one greatest man of all antiquity—Socrates—and next to him his disciple, Plato, not for themselves only or chiefly, but because they fitly stand as types of the class—not a small one—which I have now in my mind. They knew little of quantity or of number, and still less of experimental reasoning, but their force upon the world down through all the ages has been incalculable. They are the men who have acted upon the deepest principles, the spirit, the tone, the rational and moral nature of mankind. And above all, one may be allowed to ask, what power is that which has literally turned the whole world upside down, which has elevated humanity, and is elevating it, as no other before or since has ever done? What is that, more than all other agencies combined, which has made men wise, and strong, and good, and which, on the vastest scale, and for a thousand ages, has influenced the intelligence, the education, the elevation, the civilization, the politics, the manners, and the happiness of the most important and mightiest populations of our globe, and is influencing them still at this day? Christianity—But that is not a science. Paul and Peter, and John, and the rest, were not men of

science, not devoted to statistics, not geologists, not astronomers, though they supplied a rich soil, and created a new and mighty stimulus for the growth and advancement of science. They knew nothing of "abstract reasoning on quantity and number," which Hume desiderates as all important, and nothing of "experimental reasoning on matters of fact and existence." But they announced principles true as God, and imperishable as eternity. They breathed out an influence and a spirit which were invincible, and they sowed broad-cast, in the earth the seeds of a regenerating and divine force. They touched the deep soul of the world, and the world felt and feels intensely at this day, and shall yet feel, throughout its whole length and breadth.

Why should science disparage all other studies in comparison with itself? Why should it aspire to be the highest, even the only real power on earth? Why should it tend, above all *seek*, to "devour spirit and spontaneity?" Let it spread its legitimate triumphs. There is scope and verge enough. Let no unworthy jealousy, and no yet more unworthy fear, stand in its way! The faster and the more vigorously true science spreads, the better for mankind. But it is not lunacy to believe that there is something higher, and mightier, and more benign, than science. We must persist, despite of Professor Huxley, in studying what he terms "lunar politics." We must blunder on (if so it be stigmatized) with ancient sages and seekers of wisdom, and (not to name Christian Apostles and heroic Confessors), with the modern students of a high and spiritual philosophy, we must believe not only in a living God, but in the living human soul, a spiritual being, endowed with spiritual attributes, intelligence, conscience, and will, and destined to immortality—an immortality of ceaseless elevation, and purity, and progress!

JOHN YOUNG.

XXVI.—THE PROBLEM OF EVIL.*

BY DR. ERNEST NAVILLE.

GENTLEMEN:—

WE are in search of the origin of evil, of the disorder which is manifested in humanity under the forms of error, of suffering, and of sin. We have considered that solution of the problem, which consists in the statement that, sin being granted, we recognize in the other elements of evil its natural consequence. To this position we have nothing to object. Wherever there is a revolt of the will of the creature against the law of its being, the consequent disorder and grief are explained in a manner which satisfies the conscience and the reason. But this solution contemplates only the action of individual wills. In this respect it has seemed to us insufficient, because it renders no account of the generality of grief, nor of an essential element of sin, whose origin is not to be found in individual actions. It exists, as we have said, as a principle of infection which vitiates the heart. Whence does it come?

It is of extreme importance for the right regulation of life that we should recognize the essential character of evil. If we do not know that humanity is found in a condition of fundamental disorder, we are always disposed to take the general state of facts, the common use, as the rule of that *which ought to be;* and from this there results a frightful enfeeblement of the conscience. As to the question of the origin of this bad condition, it may appear, at the first glance, to be a question purely speculative. It is not indeed directly practical. From the moment that we admit that evil ought not to be, it results that if our hearts be evil, we should resist them. We have said, at the beginning, that the whole result of our studies as to the conduct of life, is included in the

* Translated and abridged from "*Le probleme du mal, Sept Discours* par ERNEST NAVILLE, correspondant de l'institut de France;" Paris: 1868; by Rev. C. M. BUTLER, D.D.

simple maxim, to hold evil in horror, and to cleave closely to the good. In a practical view of the question, we might at once proceed to treat of the combat of life. But I cannot admit, in an absolute sense, the moral indifference of the question which we approach to day. If we have no opinion as to the origin of evil, there is always danger that we may consider it to be necessary—which depraves the conscience, or refer it to God, which deplorably injures the religious sentiment. Without being directly practical, our present study has an indirect but real bearing upon moral order. Moreover, the instruction which we address to you, has been proposed under the title of philosophy, and the condition of philosophy is to seek instruction wherever we encounter a problem. It is important, however, to say that, if you admit without restriction or reserve, the obligation to combat evil, the doubts which you may entertain as to the solution which I am about to propose, will not destroy the value of the considerations which will terminate this investigation. After we shall have separated upon a question of theory, we shall find ourselves re-united upon the field of practical application.

I proceed, therefore, to propose my solution for the problem of evil; to indicate its historical sources; and to develope it, by indicating its consequences, according to the idea which we should form of the primitive state of humanity, and of the origin of its present condition. The historical sources of this solution—the primitive state of humanity—the origin of its present condition—the proof—the solution and the answer to objections. Such is the order of our thought.

SOLUTION PROPOSED.

We study the problem of evil as it refers to all created spirits; but inasmuch as humanity alone among the families of spirits whose existence we may suppose, lies within the field of our observation, it is to humanity that we apply an universal theory of its nature. The solution which I propose is, that a primitive act of humanity has created, by the abuse of free will, by a revolt against law, the evil heart of humanity. Hence it follows that in each individual it is necessary to distinguish two things. (1.) His personal will, responsible for his acts, and for his consent to the inclinations of his nature. (2.) The human nature which is

in him, and for which he is responsible for his part, not as an individual, but in his quality of man. There are found here two affirmations, which ought to be maintained with equal firmness; viz: the collective responsibility of humanity, and the individual responsibility of each of its members. These affirmations do not contradict, but limit and complete each other. I shall be called, by the nature of my task, to insist upon the first, but it is important that we should not ignore the second.

In order to accept, and even to comprehend the solution which I propose, it is necessary to conceive humanity as being, not simply a collection of individuals, a mass, a heap, but a real existence, which may be the object of a moral imputation. If we hold the common language of men to be correct, there is nothing in this statement by which we need to be detained. We speak of the human conscience; we constantly attribute sentiments and acts to humanity. But when we reflect, it seems to us that this language is deceptive; it seems to us as if individuals alone existed, and that the word *humanity* is an abstract term, which designates no other reality than the collection of individuals. This view has appearances in its favor, and also a philosophy which easily obtains credit, because it applies itself to the justification of those appearances. The theory which I defend impinges violently, I admit, against the first suggestions of common sense. But this is in accordance with the agreement which I have proposed to give, in consequence of the difficulty of the subject. I do not engage to terminate these studies by a conclusion in which I shall declare that I have destroyed all objections and dissipated all darkness. On the other hand, I ask you not to respect an idea which I present to you, because it may appear to you to be new.

I may remark, that contemporary sciences, for the last half century, have all concurred in placing the human mind in the presence of the solution which I propose. I might address myself to that legitimate tendency which makes us love novelty; and to that perversion of this tendency which leads us to disdain that which is well known. I might say to you, that I lead you, not by modern science, but by a science more modern than the modern, since it is the science of the future. And indeed, in the order of science and philosophy, the solution which I propose to you is new, so new that it is as yet in the process of its birth.

But under another form, this solution is very ancient. It exists in the world as an old truth, which science begins to spell out, and which it will untimately read;—such is my conviction. Not to state this fact, and to be willing to flatter your taste for novelty, would be to expose myself to the danger of being justly reproved by all those of you who know the history of human thought. It would be also to employ a vulgar falsehood, and an unworthy artifice. It is right, then, that I should briefly speak of the historical origin of the proposed solution; but let us thoroughly understand the nature of this obligation.

A scientific doctrine is a supposition, or, to employ the term of the scholar, it is an hypothesis designed to explain facts, and which is demonstrated to be true in proportion as it explains them. Its origin is of no importance as to the question of its truth. For example; universal gravitation was, in its origin, a simple supposition. This supposition has become a demonstrated law, because it has accounted to reason for the movements of the heavenly bodies. It is demonstrated because it has explained the facts, and not otherwise. The discovery of this great law is attributed to Newton. It has been pretended recently, on the ground of documents whose authenticity is doubtful, that the discovery belongs in fact to Pascal. This contest has some historical interest, but it has no bearing upon the law of gravitation, which is proved by observation of the stars, and by calculations, in a manner entirely independent of the name of its discoverer. The question of origin is, then, without influence upon the proof of a doctrine. In the case with which we are occupied, it is important, moreover, to mention the origin of our solution, in order to enter into explications, the importance of which we cannot ignore.

HISTORICAL SOURCES OF THE SOLUTION.

Our solution has various antecedents in the history of religious doctrines. It has always been included implicitly in a real and serious faith in God. It has been disengaged and proposed to the world in a positive manner, but not under a scientific form, in the Christian Scriptures. This then is the affirmation in which all my teaching in reference to that which concerns the solution of the problem, is embraced.

The Christian dogma of the fall of humanity, includes the philosophical doctrine which renders the best account to reason of that which is exhibited by the experiences which give rise to the problem of evil.

The importance of this affirmation demands that it should be explained with care. We proceed, therefore, to define the sense of each of these terms; *the fall of humanity, dogma, and philosophical doctrine.*

And first, what is the Christian doctrine of the fall of humanity? I present it here, it is almost superfluous for me to add, on my own responsibility, and in the sense in which the idea appears to me common to all the great manifestations of Christian thought. The affirmation that there exists an essential disorder in human nature, has an importance of the first order in the organism of evangelical dogma; it is indeed the corner-stone of the structure. Evangelical doctrine contains in fact three principal thoughts: the creation of humanity, its redemption, and its moral restoration, or sanctification. Redemption and sanctification have for their design to re-establish the primitive plan of the creative will in the bosom of a state of disorder. If the affirmation of essential disorder is suppressed, there is then no place for redemption, and there is no means of comprehending restoration; there remains nothing but Deism, or the doctrine of creation. Then the Christian finds himself in the presence of an irresistible objection of the Deist, who says to him:—"What idea have you of your God? You think that it was necessary for him to interpose in the affairs of the world by a supernatural act; it must be, then, that he is an unskillful workman, since he did not at first complete his work, and was obliged again to take it in hand." The argument is without an answer. The Christian who is so ill advised as to have ignored in his system the place which the doctrine of the essential disorder of the world occupies, will find himself reduced to silence, or embarrased in a series of contradictions. It will be necessary for him at least to change all his vocabulary, in which Christ is called a Saviour, and in which he speaks of salvation and restoration. Now it is manifest that only that which is in danger of being lost can be saved; and that a work of restoration can be accomplished only where the original order has been destroyed. On the other hand, from the moment that it is admitted that human nature has been vitiated, we comprehend the

intervention of God for the re-establishment of order, an intervention supernatural for the nature which is fallen, and which has for its design the re-establishment of the primitive nature.

A fundamental disorder introduced into the plan of creation—this then is the corner-stone of the edifice of Christian doctrine. This disorder—whence did it come? If it were necessary to admit that a being like one of us had sinned, and that this sin had been imputed to other beings—*other* in the absolute sense of the word; if it were necessary to admit that reinforcements which came from without into a garrison, should be treated as guilty of an act of sedition which had been committed before their arrival, this idea would shock so directly the sentiment of Justice, that the human conscience would not be willing even to examine the proposition. But this is not the Christian teaching. That involves an affirmation which may be expressed as follows: The act which has troubled the order of creation is not the act of an individual, in the sense which we now attach to that word, but of a primitive individual, who not only participated in human nature as one of us, but in whom, because he was the primitive man, that nature was found concentrated entire in such a way that he may be called *l' homme-humanité*. His acts united two characters, which from that time have been distinct; they were at the same time individual and human, in all the generality of the latter term. Humanity entire was really present in him who fell, and who was its chief, its germ, its source.

Is this the sense of Christian teaching on this subject? This is a question of fact. You may refer to documents if you wish. Open the Catechism of the Council of Trent, the Catechism of the Orthodox Eastern Church, the Institutions of Calvin. You will find in all the same care taken to avoid the thought that sin passed from one individual, to other individuals with whom he had no relations. You will see everywhere the employment of the idea of a beginning, of a germ, of a source. "God," says Bossuet, "regards all men as a single man in him from whom all men were to issue." I heard, on one occasion, M. Charles Secrétan, in a beautiful and admirable commentary upon the words of the Bishop of Meaux, observe that the regard of God cannot be deceived, and that to say that God sees anything, is to say that it *is*, in the most profound and serious sense of reality.

Now what is this dogma? A dogma is an affirmation which

is not supported directly by reasoning or experience, but upon faith, upon the authority of testimony. If we take the term in its general signification, we must say that our ordinary thought is full of dogmas. How do I know, for example—I who have never been in England—that there is a city named London, which is the capital of the country? I know it neither by reasoning, nor observation, but by testimony; yet I hold it as an absolute certainty.

But the term *dogma* is usualy limited to the domain of religion. What is a religious dogma? It is an affirmation which is accepted on the authority of a supernatural testimony, that is, upon testimony referring to facts which are beyond the circle of human experience. A Christian dogma is an affirmation whose foundation is the authority of the testimony of Christ, which is the dogma of dogmas. By its very nature dogma remains immovable, by virtue of historic facts. It is an immovable truth, which may be more or less comprehended, the understanding of which may be progressive, but which remains fixed in itself. It is this which revolts many minds from dogma, because the authority which imposes it is regarded as a chain. Believers, on the other hand, finding their strength precisely where others supposed that there is weakness, and their help in what seems to others hindrance—believers say that it is not certain that it is best to unloose all bonds, and to break all chains. They observe, for example, that the bark, which had lost its masts and sails, would not do well to cut the rope which unites it to a ship which takes it to the shore; and they do not curse the chain which permits them at need to cast anchor, and to preserve the cargo and the rigging, from the violence of the winds and the fury of the waves.

The authority of dogma being but a result of faith, it is clear that this authority exists but for the believer. The authority of dogma is an imposition upon those who do not believe any idea opposed to reason. By the employment of force, men are constrained to acts; if they are cowardly, they are constrained to utter lying words; but to pretend to obtain by the employment of force an act of faith, is a palpable absurdity. This absurdity, realized by the employment of civil power in matters of religion, has been very fatal to us. The smoke of the fires of the Inquisition still obscures the heavens; and to pass from a great to a small example, the flames which devoured Servetus, do not create

a light which attracts favorable regards towards the Gospel. The confusion of the authority of dogma for the believer, and of the authority of dogma imposed upon those who do not believe, was the scourge of the Middle ages.

Having explained the terms *the fall of humanity*, and *dogma*, it remains for us to state what we understand by *a doctrine of philosophy*. Philosophy searches for a general explication of the Universe, free from all dogmatic presupposition. From the moment that there exists, at the basis of a science, any dogmatic presupposition whatsoever—the authority of Jesus Christ, that of Mahomet, that of Buddah, or of any other revealer, who is regarded as the organ of divinity,—then knowledge is no longer philosophy. Shall we say that for this reason philosophy is the search of reason emancipated from all authority? Surely not! An investigation conducted independently of all authority, would be mere aimless roaming. Philosophical investigations are subjected to the authority of facts, the authority of logic, the authority of natural testimony; but philosophy never appeals for the establishment of an affirmation, to a testimony supernatural and divine.

We have explained the terms of our fundamental affirmation. I reproduce it.

The Christian dogma of the fall of humanity encloses the philosophical doctrine which renders the best account to reason of the phenomena of experience, which give rise to the problem of evil.

Now, gentlemen, shall I not be the faithful interpreter of the thought of some among you, if I address to myself, on your behalf, the following propositions? "Faith being the domain of authority, and philosophy being the domain of liberty, there is an incompatibility between philosophy and dogma. The design of our reunions is a philosophical study. You depart from the programme, therefore, when you introduce dogma."

Is not this precisely what some among you think at this moment? The subject is important; it concerns us to know it well. There is no place for dogma, and for the authority of dogma, in a philosophic discussion. Here and between us there can be nothing of this kind. Consequently, if I ever employ the argument of authority, if I ever say: this affirmation is true, for it is contained in such a text, or it has been proclaimed by the Ecclesiastical authority to which we should submit, I declare in advance every argument of this nature out of place; I withdraw it and retract

it in advance. But if in dogma we believe that we find a solution of problems which perplex the human mind, shall we not disengage this solution from the *ensemble* of dogma, and see in it but a doctrine which is offered to us to resolve a problem, and study this doctrine in the conditions of a science—that is, having no other rule than that of confronting it with facts, in order to see if it explains them, and renders a true reason for them? This is that which I propose. I invite you to examine freely a philosophic doctrine, in announcing that this doctrine is inclosed within the Christian dogma. Who can refuse a proceeding of this nature? *Christians?* But if one may establish, by means of a discussion perfectly free, that there is in the Christian dogma, a doctrine which is the light of science; if we can thus demonstrate that upon points which most interest humanity, the simple word of Jesus of Nazareth includes the solution of problems which the wisdom of the Greeks and the Orientals has not succeeded in resolving fully, would not Christians comprehend that there was here a very powerful argument for their cause? Would they not comprehend also that this argument would be valuable only as they should be discussed with the perfect independence, without which there is no true science, not the dogma, but the doctrine which they extract from it? Or will it be *free thinkers* who will refuse to enter upon the course which I have indicated? Why? Gentlemen, because a doctrine is for many of your fellow-men an article of faith, are you unwilling to examine it, to discuss it, to weigh it seriously? Where then would be your liberty? Would not your boasted independence be then a real servitude? In this case you would profess the maxim that it was permissible to believe everything except that which your fathers had believed. I think it would be well for your children, in this point at least, to imitate your example, and not to think like you.

I trust that you now discern clearly the path upon which we proceed. The historic origin of the solution which I propose to you, the fact that this solution is included in the Christian dogma, is a circumstance exterior to our discussion. I am bound to indicate its origin to you in good faith, precisely as if I should defend before you one of the most celebrated theories of a Greek philosopher. I should not wish to unfold it without indicating its source. But the solution which I am about to unfold and defend, and

which I affirm to proceed from the Christian dogma, rests here upon my own responsibility. Please, therefore, to regard it in this point of view, and not to complicate it with any foreign question. Let us enter upon the development of our solution, and begin by establishing what was the primitive state of humanity.

PRIMITIVE STATE OF HUMANITY.

"Everything is good which issues from the hand of the Author of all things." This celebrated phrase of J. J. Rousseau, shall be our point of departure. As it issues from the hand of God, every creature is good—that is to say, according to the definition of good which we have given, it answers to its destination. But from the fact that it is good, does it result that it is perfect in the sense of its completion, of its total accomplishment? No! This view is false even in reference to the material creation. When we speak of matter, we may well, in theory, represent nature as issuing finished from the hand of the Creator, in a fixed and definite order. But that which we may thus conceive in pure theory, is not in conformity with facts. Material nature has not issued finished from the hand of God; and the proof of the fact is, that it develops by continual movement. The movement of nature is not fixed. The earth, for example, moves about the sun. In circulating about the sun, does our earth always trace the same circle? No; astronomers teach us that the sun moves in space with his *cortege* of planets. The sun moves and carries us with it, and from the commencement of the world to the consummation of the ages, the earth, in traversing its orbit, may never perhaps pass twice over the same line. This moving earth is also the theater of a continual movement upon its own surface. It was not at its origin what it is now; it will not be after the lapse of ages what it is at present. There remains then a plan for nature, but it has not been realized at once, and nature is always tending to its completion. The plan of nature—will it be finally completed? Will the celestial spheres at length be fixed in an uniform movement, or will they pause in the immobility of perfection? The question transcends, I think, the powers of the human understanding. But that which is positive is, that nature has been made and well made at the outset, but that it has not been completed.

The same idea becomes more evident, in passing to the world of spirits, because it is impossible to conceive, even in theory, an original perfection of the spiritual world. The destination is good and to good; the order in which it is found is happiness. Their constitution marks their design; and we have in this case the guarantee of reason applied to the idea of creation, for, as I have sought to establish in another series of discourses,* love is the only motive which we can conceive as having induced the Supreme Power to produce the universe, and the good of the creature is the only object which we can assign to creative love. In order that it may correspond to its destination, the spirit should enclose a free will, which is its foundation and its very essence, a clear conscience, which indicates its law to the will, and finally a pure heart, in which there is no predisposition to evil. The spirit thus constituted is put into the presence of the law, in the accomplishment of which its good is to be found; but this state is not perfection. To conceive of a spirit as originally perfect is a contradiction. A spirit is a power, and its law is to realize itself by its own act, itself to do, and to become perfect of itself. The primitive state is a free will, not in its perfection, but in its innocence. The paradise of innocence needs not only to be guarded, but to be cultivated by the will, created free in order that it may become that celestial Eden, the plan of which is revealed to the consciousness of a free being as the true law of its destiny. The age of gold is the dream of innocence contemplating in a vision of marvellous beauty the end proposed to its efforts by eternal love.

The perfection of a spirit must be the work of its liberty, and to demand it otherwise of the Creator, is to demand of him not to create free spirits. But the liberty which should conduct a spirit to its perfection—must it be perfect in its origin? No: Liberty at the outset can only be conceived as an imperfect liberty. It should pass by its own act from an inferior to a superior form. Let us give particular attention to this thought.

The word liberty has two senses. It is, first, the faculty of choosing, which includes necessarily the possibility of evil. In another sense we proclaim a being free who does all he wills. Recognize carefully these two ideas; both of them exist in your

* Le Pere celeste.

mind. You conceive of liberty as the possibility of choice; and you have also a higher idea of liberty, that of a will which does all that it wills, without being limited to choice. In the first case, liberty supposes a law. A finite power which should not be in the presence of a law which it could either violate or observe, is not intelligible as a moral power; the idea of such a power is lost in that of a lawless caprice, or of a blind force, which yields to impulses from without, and has not within itself the origin of its determinations. A law is needed which shall rouse the will, and reveal to it its liberty of choice. In the second sense, liberty supposes the absence of all law, for law limits the employment of the will by inclosing it within the alternative of obedience or revolt. These two ideas of liberty appear to be contradictory. They are not so, however, and their reconciliation is to be found in the mystery of the heart; and the mystery of the heart has been revealed to us already in the considerations to which it is necessary that we again refer.

In the phenomena of habit we have observed that will is transformed into nature. When we have voluntarily done an act a certain number of times, this act becomes a habit, and habit creates a power, a solicitation; it encrusts itself, so to speak, in our hearts, where it becomes love, in the most general sense of the expression. Now, what is the effect of love? Love wills that which it loves; and when the soul acts in loving, it does all that it wills, since it wills nothing beyond its love. For him who loves the good, law then disappears, because it is absorbed in love, and the command of the conscience is grounded in the impulse of the heart. The liberty of choice between good and evil remains, then, that which in philosophy is called a metaphysical possibility, but evil becomes morally impossible. To the—"*thou shalt not*"—of conscience, answers the "*non possumus*" of the heart. Taking a departure from the liberty of choice, the will, by that which it chooses, may thus make a choice which shall be definitive, and the struggle end in triumph. The will may pass by its own act from the inferior form of liberty to the superior, that state of a soul which does all that it wills.

We may then conceive the plan which humanity should realize manifesting itself in individual existences, but manifesting itself in harmony, in unity, by the common will to execute the divine plan. Taking its departure from evil as simply possible, that is

to say, from a state of innocence, and by the effort of a free being which resists possible evil, to annihilate this possibility itself, to arrive to the state of perfection, or of sanctity, characterized by the fact that liberty is employed for good—such ought to be the development of virtue. If the will does at every moment that which it ought to do, it obtains a final triumph over the possibility of evil. Evil has not appeared. Evil has become impossible without having been ever destroyed, because it never has been realized.

All this it is difficult for us to understand, because, engaged as we are in a world where the reality of evil weighs upon us, a continual effort is necessary, in order that we may comprehend this passage from primitive liberty to perfect liberty, without passing through disorder. Yet in our own experience we have some manifestations which permit us to rise to this conception. The two senses of the word liberty are revealed to us in familiar examples. Whom do you regard, for example, as more free than the young merchant who, opening for the first time his establishment, demands of himself whether he shall endeavor to deceive his patrons, or whether he will conduct an honorable commerce, and who has in this very hesitation the testimony and the consciousness of his liberty; or this same merchant, grey with honorable toil, chained by the reiterated acts of his will to the law of honor, and who, feeling himself henceforth incapable of deception, is made, by the very employment of his free will, the servant of probity? We esteem him free in the highest sense of the word who is emancipated from evil. Obedience in the face of temptation conquered, is the act of the new born liberty which chooses the good; and when the temptation has disappeared before the love of the good, the obedience, full, entire, joyous, and without hesitation, is the accomplishment and the plenitude of liberty. It is thus that in our very darkness we recognize some rays of light which permit us to comprehend the passage from primitive liberty to full liberty, without evil having appeared at all, because it was simply possible, without having ever been accomplished.

This programme of spiritual development, has it ever been anywhere accomplished? Lift your eyes towards heaven—I mean the heaven of the astronomers. The world is great: You do not think, I suppose, that the whole family of God is confined upon our earth, that the Eternal Shepherd of souls has under his crook

only our little flock. We laugh at our ancestors for making man the center of the universe. It was the result of ignorance rather than of perversity, at an epoch in which it was believed that the sun was but a torch, and the stars, lamps fixed in the solid vault of heaven. But what shall we say of the thought of the *savants* of our day, who, now that science has opened the immeasurable spaces of the skies and peopled them with worlds, dare to think and say that there is not in the universe an intelligence superior to that of man? Lift your eyes then towards heaven and regard a star, and ask yourselves: Is it a happy star? Does there exist upon one of those globes which spangle the heavens, a family of intelligent and free beings, who have employed their liberty only to confirm themselves in good; who, continually advancing in the knowledge of truth, have advanced at the same time in joy, and are astonished day by day at the measure of constantly increasing felicity which the heart can hold? Is there a family of free beings who may present themselves before God without commencing their worship with the confession of common sin, and sending a pure hymn of gratitude and love to Him from whom all things proceed, by whom everything exists, and who has bestowed upon them the inestimable boon of life, and the glorious privilege of that liberty by which they have attained the happiness to which they were destined by eternal love? If I affirm that such a world exists, I may provoke your smile. If you affirm that it does not exist, I shall permit myself to smile in return. In either case that happy star is not our planet; this family of creatures without sin is not the human race. Let us return to humanity.

ORIGIN OF THE PRESENT STATE OF HUMANITY.

What has been the origin of evil is the solution which I propose. The design proposed to humanity was, to realize the harmony and the happiness of the spiritual society. Humanity, in its source and its origin, revolted against its law; that is our supposition. The created will wished to establish itself in reference to the law in a state of entire independence; that is to say, it wished to become its own law. What use will it proceed to make of its independence? Its acts, whatever they may be, will be acts of disorder, since they are accomplished in contravention of law,

which is, in its essential being, order. Now order being the subjection of matter to spirit, and the submission of spirits to the law of charity, disorder will manifest itself in the domination of the spirit by matter, and in a principle of self-seeking, and of domination over another, which will produce in the development of society, struggle in the place of harmony. Sensuality and pride will be the two forms of the revolt.

The human heart being vitiated, liberty will be compromised. A nature, born originally of the will, at length paralyzes its exercise. Dominated by his propensities, man will find himself the slave of his vices, and preserve only in his remorse the evidence of his liberty. Error will be born from the perversion of the heart and the enfeeblement of the will; and error, veiling the natural light, will deform the conscience. Then also suffering will appear as chastisement in the order of justice, and as remedy in the order of benevolence; and humanity entire having participated in its source in the primitive revolt, every man, by virtue of the fact that he is a part of the human race, will be subjected to the consequences of this revolt.

When these thoughts are admitted, the individualistic solution which we have rejected as insufficient, is transformed, and becomes complete. What in fact is wanting in this solution? It takes no account of a considerable part of evil, of which we cannot find the origin in the individual action of the will. But now this part of evil is also explained. At the very origin of our race, before the commencement of history, an act of humanity has corrupted the heart of humanity; and it is humanity itself which, by its own revolt, has precipitated itself into error and suffering. The generality of sin is explained by the existence of temptations inherent in the human heart, and by the enfeeblement of the will, which the evil inclination of the heart produces. We comprehend also the general prevalence of suffering. Prodigious mysteries still remain in the individual distribution of grief and of temptations; but we have made a considerable advance on the side of light, because we have assigned a cause to a part of the grief, and to the element of sin which observation has shown to us in every man, in his quality as man, and independently of his personal acts.

Evil is essential to our world, such as it is, such as it was made by the revolt of the creature; but evil itself is accidental. It is,

but it ought not to be. Its possibility is the condition of liberty; but its realization is directly contrary to the plan of the universe, to the divine will. Thus the cloud which evil raises between God and us is dissipated, and the glory of the Creator shines forth in changeless purity. Henceforth, when the poet shall demand,

> Pourquoi donc, o Maître suprême
> As-tu crêe le mal si grand?

We answer to the poet that God has not created evil.

Between the Creator and the world, such as it is, is found the sad creation of the creature. This doctrine has most important consequences for the government of thought. The immediate passage of the world, such as it is, from God, is the source of the gravest errors of philosophy, and of many other irregularities, which are found within the limits of the schools. It is from passing from the world as it is, to God, that philosophy loses itself in the negation of evil, in departing from this incontestible maxim, that everything which proceeds from God is good. It is from the same source that those rash apologies proceed, which are often fatal to the doctrine of a divine providence. For example, if you impute to the will of God, not the essential and constituent laws of human society, which form a part of the plan of creation, but of our society as it is; if you wish to repress the complaints of those who suffer from real social abuses, by sheltering them under the hand of Providence, you will seek in vain to cover the evil of a consecrated authority; you will not secure submission; you will but add to revolt against society, revolt against God. It is by admitting that general and permanent facts, which do not depend upon individual will, make part of the divine plan, that an apology for war is constructed, which presents it, not as the bloody trace of sin, but as one of the primitive and good elements of the universe. The world, in all its constituent elements, is the work of God; and in humanity, all that which constitutes us, is good in itself. The heart, as the power of loving, is good; reason, as the power of knowing, is good; the will, as the power of acting, is more than good, it is the root and condition of all good. But the world as it is, is a disordered world, and between the world as it is and God, is found the fall of the human race, which has created an evil power, which weighs upon our destinies. A general fact, a universal fact may be evil, since it may

be the consequence of the primitive revolt of humanity against its law.

Comprehend, I pray you, the practical importance of this thought. If you are ignorant that the world is disordered, you will reach forward towards the good, according to the first impulse of your heart; and upon encountering ill in life, your heart will be bruised. Mingle in the march of society with the thought that human nature is good—you will soon feel discouraged, and at length a bitter sadness will possess your soul. If, on the contrary, you know that human nature is fallen, you will encounter without surprise, disorder, grief, and sin; you will fight as a good soldier in the army of the good, and in firm confidence in the final triumph of your cause.

I employ these considerations as the answer to a thought which is very frequently repeated in our day. You will often hear the doctrine of the fall spoken of as the old religious doctrine, and the doctrine of progress as the new philosophical doctrine; and that it is necessary to choose between two irreconcilable conceptions. Progress, they say, is the law of the spiritual world, as gravitation is the law of the material world. Now the law of progress excludes the idea of a fall; for the fall of humanity would be precisely the opposite of progress. This mode of reasoning rests upon a great confusion of ideas, which is produced by the use of the word law. A physical law being, as we have said, the expression of constant facts in a domain where liberty does not exist, every law excludes its contrary, and the knowledge of the true law permits us wholly to deny the law which contradicts it; in the same manner as the certain knowedge of a fact permits us to deny its contradiction. But the moral law proposed to a free being may be followed or violated according to the decisions of liberty. The idea of progress is opposed to the doctrine of the fall. It would be as valid to oppose the idea of progress to the idea that Nero developed in iniquity as he advanced in age; for if progress be for humanity a law always realized, in the same way as physical laws, then that which is true of humanity must be true of all its members. If humanity had not fallen, Nero could not have progressed in crime. The idea of progress, then, does not render our solution superfluous.

Progress renders no reason, as has been thought, of the existence of evil · for progress, as the primitive law of creation, could

accomplish only good. True progress tends from imperfection to perfection; but imperfection is not evil. If there be both imperfection and evil, it must be through the revolt of the will. If progress appear in our world under the form of restoration, which takes its departure from evil, this very fact is itself a striking proof of the doctrine of the fall. To admit that progress consists in increasing distance from evil, and that this is the fundamental law of the universe, is to admit that evil, the condition of progress, is a primitive and necessary element of things; is, we again repeat, to proclaim that it is good, or in other words to deny its existence. There is no room for a choice between the two ideas, progress and the fall. They are both necessary in order to render a right reason for the present state of humanity. Man has departed from the state of innocence, where the heaven of spirits was presented to his thought, as the end which he should attain, as the gift of the Creator which he should appropriate by the exercise of liberty. Heaven is veiled from the view of his conscience by the consequences of his fall, but remains still the object of his aspirations.

THE PROOF AND ITS EXPOSITION.

In the presence of the absolute moral law, we discover a principle of evil in the hearts of all men. This principle of evil is inherent in humanity. We are not all thieves and robbers. There are men whom the instinct of modesty and the law of chastity preserve from the evil solicitations of the senses; there are men who are sober; there are men who are generous and compassionate; but a principle of evil is inherent in us all, because we are inclined continually in some direction contrary to law. The moral law requires that every individual will should have for its object, for its fundamental direction, the good of all, in which each should find its legitimate portion. At the point of view of social morality, we call that man honest who uses his liberty as he understands it, without wounding directly the rights of others; but the true law of our being demands the consecration of every individual to the general good of the spiritual society. Now in studying the human soul we encounter a tendency, which is invariable, in the present state of things, to an unregulated love of self. Pascal has thus expressed this thought:

"We are born unjust, for everything tends to self. This is wholly against order; it should tend to the whole; and the tendency to self is the origin of all disorder." Such is my affirmation. I affirm that there is in every man a principle of egotism, which has the nature of sin. Whence comes this evil principle? From an act of the humanity, of which we all are members; an act which has vitiated the human heart, such as it is, in all of us. Every one of us, as an individual, is personally responsible for his personal acts. But every one of us, also, as a man, is responsible for the fall of humanity. This doctrine shocks a certain sort of good sense; but it is a question whether it offends that superficial good sense which depends upon first appearances, or that profounder sense, which is the expression of human reason and the judge of truth. The following considerations may aid us in pronouncing a judment upon this question. Let us hasten to indicate some great fact which our hypothesis will explain in such a manner, as by that very explication to show itself worthy of a serious examination. I choose for this purpose the fact of the existence of a double nature in man, a fact which is a prominent element of the problem which we study.

When the will is developed and recognizes itself, when man assumes the possession of himself, he finds himself possessed of a double nature. This is the reason why the smile which the sight of an infant almost always awakens has in it a touch of sadness. We not only fear for it, as it shall enter upon life, the accidents of our existence, but we have presentiments of the miseries which await this will, still innocent, when it shall be at issue with the elements of a corrupted nature. I might quote the Apostle Paul, and for those who do not wish this authority, the Latin poet, Ovid. I might cite for some the Christian poet Racine, and for others the Greek, Euripides. I might find everywhere in human litera ture the affirmation of this double nature which exists in each of us. A phrase of Pascal is a resumé of all these thoughts: "There are two natures in us, the one good and the other evil." Without multiplying citations, I prefer to appeal to your own experience. You all know that there are two natures in you, whose conflict often rends your heart.

Our theory explains this great fact. Whenever an individual proceeds upon the life of humanity, of which he is a representative, the true design of liberty is demonstrated to his conscience.

The dream of gold is re-produced. The heavenly Eden appears to him. This is the man of God; this is the good nature, the primitive constitution of the soul, which shows itself at the outset of life. The other, and the evil nature, is the man of humanity, the sad creation of the creature, the result of the common fall. We then have the means of explaining these two natures.

We have also the means of explaining why the evil nature predominates in the development of life. Indeed, it results directly from the idea of the fall, that the human will is not in its normal state. Liberty, as we have said, realizes itself and increases, when it gives itself to the good; but the will is enfeebled and lost in giving itself to evil; for evil is strange and hostile to the constitution of our soul. Man is possessed of the inestimable privilege of liberty, which renders him capable of goodness and of happiness; but in itself it is empty; and there is no other alternative but to become the free servant of righteousness by the practice of good, or to become, by delivering himself to evil, the slave of sin. The revolt of humanity has then for its consequence not only to vitiate the human heart, by making it the seat of evil solicitations, but also of paralyzing the will.

Our solution, then, renders an account of the evil principle which observation reveals in our heart. What other solution can we adopt which shall reach this result? Evil is here; it is essential to humanity, and the consideration of historical wills does not explain its existence. Whence does it come? Do you regard evil as necessary? That is to deny it; it is not to resolve the problem, but to take away one of its terms. Do you refer evil to an eternal principle? That is Dualism; and this is no longer, in our day, a subject of discussion. What then remains? Shall we seek the origin of evil in God? This we cannot do. It is necessary, then, to seek the origin of evil in an act of humanity. This is the foundation of my proof. I consider as worthy of the most serious examination every solution of the problem, which shall relieve God of the responsibility of evil, without having recourse to the nature of things, which would be a second principle co-eternal with God; but I do not know of any other than that which I propose to you, which has this characteristic, and this is the reason why I attach myself to an exposition which is free from such a supposition.

We here encounter upon our path a science which treats facts

of this kind with disdain, and designates them as *sentimental.* One of the most considerable of the interpreters of French Positivism said recently, that he knew of nothing but matter and its properties. German materialism, declared by its organ, M. Professor Büchner: "It is impossible that the force of facts should be long resisted." Now in the opinion of these writers' conscience, the need of adoration, and all spiritual phenomena in general, are only facts; there are no other realities than those which are revealed to our senses. If it is said: The science of matter knows only matter and its properties, the affirmation is sufficiently trite; but these writers wish us also to admit, that the science of matter and its properties is universal science. Let us examine this proposition. The properties of matter exist but under the conditions of matter, which itself exists but under the form of figure and of weight. Be kind enough therefore to state what is the form of honor, and what is the weight of infamy. Tell me, if you please, what is the microscope which permits us to appreciate the geometrical dimensions of disinterestedness, and to measure in fractions of millimètres the length of selfishness. What confusion of ideas is necessary, what darkness must be accumulated, in order to succeed in extinguishing the natural light which lightens every man that cometh into the world, even to the extent of admitting, that vice and virtue, honor, probity, devotion, esteem, contempt, blame, praise, admiration, honor, are matter, or the properties of matter!

You have heard it said that the science to which our age more and more inclines is materialism. I believe, on the contrary, that it is in the process of issuing from it, and that the darkness of which complaint is made is but the obscurity of the close of the night, which is redoubled just before the dawn. Have I not a right, Gentlemen, to state this opinion, in view of the warmth with which you gather here to study the problem of evil, the problem of the conscience and the heart, which constitutes alike the torment and the glory of the soul of man? Does not this fact prove that you loudly proclaim, by a solemn manifestation, that the conscience and the heart of man are not objects unworthy of the most serious study of the reason?

EXAMINATION OF DIFFICULTIES.

Let us approach, now, the examination of difficulties raised by the solution which constituted the object of our study. What do we propose? To find such a statement of the case as shall satisfy the reason, and maintain the safeguard of the conscience. Now, at the first view, our solution appears equally repugnant to conscience and to reason.

It is said to be impossible to conceive of sin in a state of innocence. That *we* should do evil—there is nothing easier to explain than this, because we are in the presence of the evil solicitations of our own hearts. We are exposed to the temptations of sensuality under all its forms, and to those of vanity in all its modes. Evil being in our hearts, we can comprehend that we should yield to its seductions; but take away evil from our hearts and you can never explain how the will can start aside from good. The good, in fact, exercises an attraction by itself. To balance this attraction, a temptation is necessary, which must result from the pre-existence of evil. Without temptation the fall cannot be explained; and to admit a primitive state of innocence, is to exclude all temptation, and consequently the possibility of evil. Such is the first difficulty which is offered for our examination.

I do not wish to respond to the objection by an abstract definition of liberty, to the effect that the will may be free of itself to decide for evil without any solicitation. I admit that in the absence of all temptation sin is inexplicable. What then have I to do? I must show that in the entire purity of the heart there exists a temptation inherent in the will, and that it cannot be suppressed, but by the suppression of the will itself; so that, a free will being supposed, with a heart absolutely pure, this temptation, but this alone, would exist. What is it? *The temptation of liberty.*

A power, free and created, possesses as power a principle of action; but as created it is not and cannot be in a condition of absolute independence; it finds itself in the presence of absolute law, or of God. Now from this situation there arises a temptation for created power to ignore the consequences of his position as a creature, and to make his law for himself, and to reject the law which subjects him to God. This is a temptation to revolt, pure and simple. Is this unintelligible? By no means so! Is

this temptation possible? It must be; for it exists in us. This temptation, pure and simple to revolt, is veiled, and as it were stifled, under the enormous mass of the solicitations of our heart; and when we do evil, it is more frequently because we yield to the direct solicitations of evil in us. We can recognize, however, although in a feeble degree, the seduction of independence, in itself. Examine this case: You have a desire to do a certain act. Some one, who has no legitimate authority over you, arrogantly commands you to do the thing which you desire. What happens? Almost all of you would rebel against this commandment; perhaps you would refuse to do that which you desire, and would do something which excites in you no desire, simply to vindicate your independence. Your resistance is legitimate, in the case supposed, in the presence of a commandment which has the character of oppression. But this spirit of independence is also in the presence of the legitimate authority of conscience, and of the law of God. This is so true that many young men who would repel with disgust certain base temptations, which were directly presented to them, would become the victims of the diabolical machinations of those who excite in them a spirit of independence, in order to lead them gradually to do that which was contrary to their natural inclination. The forbidden fruit has the savor of revolt. Remove by your thought this temptation, and evil is no longer possible. But when there is no evil possible, there is no liberty. The elementary form of liberty, from which it should part in order to rise to full liberty destructive of the possibility of evil, this elementary form of liberty supposes choice. Remove the choice between disobedience and revolt, and you will have slain free being by that conception. We demand sometimes of God a creature who cannot sin, that is to say, one who would be *necessarily* good. We do not in that case reflect, that necessity excludes liberty; and that where there is no liberty, there is neither good nor evil; inasmuch as the idea of a being necessarily good includes a distinct contradiction.

The original fall then is explained by a temptation which is inherent in free power, the only one which can belong to an innocent creature, the only one which can find an echo in a free will, joined to a pure heart; and this temptation is thus expressed: "Thou shalt be thine own God." All other temptation must follow this, and be the consequence of a previous adhesion of free

power to the temptation, inherent in liberty itself. This is why, when Milton, seeking to ascend from the transmission of evil to its origin, explains the revolt of the rebel archangel, by the desire of a power which would constitute a law for himself, and make him free from the government of the universe, shows himself to be no less a good philosopher than poet.

Now you say to yourselves: "Here then, after all, is evil at the very origin of all things—here is evil inherent in the creature by the very quality of creatureship!" No, not evil, but the possibility of evil, the possibility which is the condition of created liberty. Liberty supposes possible evil, and includes a temptation without which liberty does not exist; but the reason of realized evil exists no where but in the will, which revolts against law.

There is then a temptation inherent in liberty, independent of every evil propensity of the heart. Our solution is in no case absurd. It is, on the contrary, perfectly reasonable; and if you give to it sufficient attention, it becomes perfectly clear. I wish I could say as much for the point which follows.

When one recognizes that the fall of a free being is possible in a state of innocence, a new difficulty and more formidable than the first, presents itself to the reason, and seems to bar the way. We have said—but it is necessary to repeat—that the solution proposed to our examination is not that the first man, or the first human pair rendered themselves guilty of a purely individual fault, and that other individuals, really *others*, bore the consequences of a fault wholly foreign to them. Understood in this sense, the solution would be false. The solution which we examine affirms our participation, not individual, but still real, in the common fall. It is humanity which has revolted and bears the consequences of its revolt. It is thus only that our doctrine can be reconciled with justice; or to speak more accurately, our doctrine alone permits us to reconcile with the ideas of justice the facts revealed to us by experience. Our discussion turns upon this point: Is every man a personal existence, and also an existence of humanity? We do not understand that humanity may be an entity apart from individuals, but we admit that every man includes in himself two realities, which are distinct without being separate, and thus present a double aspect; insomuch that he is

himself in his personal existence, and that he is man by the presence of humanity in him.

The question now is concerning our responsibility for the common fall of our species. You do not object that we have no recollection of the primitive revolt; for the absence of memory is not a difficulty. We undergo every day the consequences of acts, perfectly voluntary, of which we have lost the memory. That which constitutes the objection is not the loss of memory, but the absence of existence. If the human race has fallen, it surely was at a period before we appeared upon the scene of the world; and in the presence of the idea which I propose to you, you may be tempted to say with the lamb in La Fontaine: *Comment l' aurais-je fait, si je n' étais pas né?* You did not exist? Not in any sense? Is this certain? The question being the same for every living being, let us examine it in the case of a vegetable. I take the fir-tree, which is to-day in the forest. Whence did it come? Its present substance came from the soil and the atmosphere, by a series of movements and transformations, of which science renders us an account. It is not long since M. Professor Candolle explained to us the recent progress of botanical science, which gives an account, by the laws of physics and chemistry, of the development of a vegetable, from the moment when its germination commences. He told us how the increase of plants was to be explained. But under what condition? Under the condition that the plant must be then living in its germ. Now the germ of a plant is not the result of the movements of matter; a living germ is not an aggregate of *molécules*, like a stone or a crystal. Before developing itself, the fir-tree, which I considered, existed in its germ. This germ—Whence did it come? Do you believe that God directly created it? Do you believe that every year God directly creates all the seeds of the fir-tree, and all the seeds of corn? In this case, the creative power forming every germ by the act of Almightiness, the fact that the seeds of the fir-tree came upon the fir-tree and not upon the oaks, and that acorns were not found in marshes, would be facts purely accidental. You do not believe, you never have believed, you cannot believe, in the presence of the spectacle of nature, that every living germ proceeds directly from a new creative act. The germ of the fir-tree, therefore, exists in the fir-tree which has produced it; and in like manner from tree to tree, until you reach

the origin of the species. But how and in what sense does it exist? Philosophers say that the germ exists *in power*, (this is their word), in the life of the individual from which it proceeds. But what are we to understand by this word, *power?* Do we attribute to a vegetable a will, and do we suppose that it creates germs? By no means. The germ exists before it shows itself, and that which in this case we call power, does not create, but only manifests that which already is. How shall we conceive of it? Shall we suppose that all living beings existed in infinite smallness in a previous germ? Shall we admit that the first seed of the fir-tree, the origin of all firs, past, present and future, being opened and placed under a microscope of infinite power, would have disclosed all the fir-trees of the world inclosed, as in a box? You smile, Gentlemen, and if you admit the indefinite reproduction of living beings, metaphysics justifies your smile. It would indeed be necessary that there should be in the first germ an indefinite number of real beings, and all numbers being essentially determinate, an indefinite number cannot be a number. The fir, then, which constitutes the object of our study, has existed a hundred or a thousand or ten thousand years, up to the origin of the species. But how does it exist? How can a vegetable exist in its species? With form and matter? Certainly not—unless it exists completely formed in infinite smallness. It is impossible for us, however, to comprehend the existence of a vegetable otherwise than under the double condition of form and and matter. It exists, then, in a manner which is to us incomprehensible. Here is the mystery of life.

We return to our subject. Before manifesting itself in its individual existence, the tree exists in its species, in a manner which we do not comprehend. In the same manner, man, before his personal appearance, exists in humanity. How? In a manner which we do not comprehend. We comprehend the existence of a vegetable only with its form and its matter, and yet reason leads us to admit that it exists in its species without form or matter. We comprehend the existence only under the form of the individual; yet it is necessary for us to admit that there is for him another mode of existence in humanity.

The difficulty raised in reference to our solution by the thought that we did not exist at the supposed fall of the human race, disappears from the moment that we admit the existence of all

men in humanity, not as an individual, but as man. But in order to admit the reality of species, it is necessary to remove all weight from the appearances, to which is added the weight of a philosophy which is all the more easily accepted because appearances are in its favor. Without plunging into the more profound depths of this discussion, I limit myself to the statement that some of the most illustrious representatives of reason have seen the difficulty on the side opposite to that in which it has been here presented. Individuals pass away, but species remain. Where are the oaks which shaded our fathers? Where, some years hence, will be the birds which sing in our woods, the cattle that draw our wains? Everything ends and disappears from the surface of our globe, but species remain. The oak, the cattle, the horse, man—all maintain themselves in the midst of the incessant destruction of the individuals who represent them. Many philosophers have been so struck with this consideration, that, the reality of species being for them the primary certainty, the existence of individuals has become the problem.

This oneness of humanity further appears from a law which observation recognizes constantly more and more,—the law of solidarity. And this law, which observation recognizes with ever increasing clearness, civilization constantly exhibits more distinctly in its character and import. The consequences of a war of savages expire in the forest which they stain with blood. In the civilized world, war cannot be kindled upon one point without an injury to all associated nations. The fact is so. It is true that human justice endeavors to render to each individual that which belongs to him, and to limit punishment to the offender. It ought to realize this end as completely as possible, but it cannot do so in an absolute manner. The nature of things does not permit it. Who is so isolated that the sword of the law can strike him, or justice mark him with the seal of infamy, without making others by the side of him suffer? We wish in vain to reach only the individual, but individuals are never isolated, and in touching one we touch others.

Human solidarity, then, is a fact. It is not only actual in this sense that we suffer or enjoy the actions of our contemporaries, but it is hereditary also. We undergo, in good or evil, the consequences of actions accomplished by generations past, and future generations will collect the heritage which we prepare for them.

These are experiences which no one can deny. Now no one *justly* bears the consequences of other actions than his own—such is the axiom of conscience. It is necessary then to choose between these two ideas: We suffer from the fault of others, from whom we are entirely disconnected, who are *others* in an absolute sense; and in this case injustice is at the basis of creation, since solidarity is a general fact. Or, on the other hand, the human race is bound together, under the diversity of individuals, by a real unity, in such a way that a collective responsibility is justly united to our individual responsibility. Such is the alternative which is presented to thought, unless it renounces the solution of the problem. To admit that injustice is at the foundation of the universe, is to violate reason and destroy conscience. We are thus thrown upon the conception of human unity, of a collective responsibility; and we accept it in spite of the obscurities which gather around it, as the only idea which reconciles experience with reason, the realities of life and the testimony of conscience.

Individuals then are distinct, but they are not separate. Isolation is the word of Cain; it is the cruel phrase which once escaped from J. Jacques Rousseau, when he wrote: "Why should I be concerned as to what will become of the wicked? I take very little interest in their fate." Charity, the supreme law of the spiritual world, does not speak like Cain and Rousseau. Charity practices two maxims. The first is this:—"To each one the consequences of his acts; no one can throw the responsibility of his faults on others." This is the clear dictum of conscience. Charity conforms itself to this decree, for charity is just, and it is not possible to be truly good without being just. The second maxim is this: "We are many and yet we are one." Here the heart is in advance of the reason, and to arrive at the possession of truth upon this difficult subject, it is but necessary to repeat the theory and the practice of the heart. Pascal has said: "The heart has its reasons, which the reason does not understand;" but this is the fault of reason, for an essential part of its task is to arrive at a comprehension of the reasons of the heart. Pause before an edifice in the course of construction, and you see the different stones which are to be arranged upon the ground. You observe often upon these stones marks, which indicate that a place is designated for each of these fragments, in the unity of the edifice which is about to be constructed. Now we are stones for an edi-

fice, and the heart is the mark which fixes our destination. Our diverse individuality should be united into a harmonious unity. God wills persons to be free and individuals agents, but He wills them also to be a spiritual society, which is as real as individuals, since the will of God is the supreme expression of that which ought to be.

We have then to maintain two truths; our personal existence, with all its consequences, of which the most important is, that no one can evade the responsibility of his voluntary acts; and our collective existence, with all its consequences, of which the most important is, that we should bear each other's burdens. Of these two truths we see the one, that is our personality, perfectly, and in many cases we see it but too much. The other is obscure. We do not discern clearly the spiritual edifice in view of which we live, and which should realize the fundamental unity of our nature. Why is this? I do not pretend entirely to lift the veil, but only to raise it, if possible, a little. Why is this? May it be from that egotism, which, being the essential form of sin, is found at the same time to be the cause of error? Is it not the devotion, the sacrifice, the part of charity which is in each of us, which, in a measure, dissipates our darkness? Do we not accept the solidarity in the limits and in the proportion of our love? The members of a united family accept and practice, without thinking of being astonished at the fact, a solidarity which is real. The citizen who is animated by true patriotism raises no doubt as to the legitimacy of the bond which attaches him to the nation. Nor can we deny that by increasing in charity we advance in truth, and that we shall succeed in understanding our common heritage in the fall, in proportion as we accept the work proposed to each of us, in the common work of the renewal of the race.

Our solution of the problem of evil includes two principal ideas; that of liberty and that of solidarity. Philosophy in our days has too often ignored the rights of liberty, which alone constitutes the reality of a spiritual being. The direction followed by a part of the modern world runs the risk of throwing minds into an opposite error, that of ignoring the law of solidarity, in which is expressed the existence of a spiritual society. It seems often to confound the individual existence of a human being with an individualism contrary to the nature of things. "*Individuality*," says Vinet, "is not *individualism*. The latter refers

everything to self, and sees self in all things; individuality consists solely in wishing to be self, in order to be something. Individualism and individuality are two sworn foes, the first being the obstacle and the negation of all society; the second, that to which society owes all that it has of savor, of life and of reality." We should separate ourselves from the evil current of humanity, and become personal conscientious beings, not in order to remain isolated, but to enter freely into a community. Each one should become *self*, not to limit himself to self, but to consecrate himself to the common good, according to the will of the Universal Father.

Socialists and individualists, ranged in two camps, struggle in the schools and in the world, with the disjoined members of truth. Indeed, the normal development of society induces always the moral complete formation of true individuals; for society is not an aggregate, a mere collection of individuals, but a spiritual organism, formed of wills which possess and are united in, a common intention. On the other hand, the individual who does not exist in isolation, develops himself according to his own nature only by realizing by liberty the law of solidarity. Harmony, as Pythagoras says, is that word which expresses the enigma of the world.

We have, Gentlemen, a beautiful national motto, and it is not only to the hearts of the Swiss that it speaks. When we are truly serious, it awakens in us manhood, in its profoundest depths, for it is the expression of the supreme law of the universe: "*Un pour tous; tous pour un.*

LANGE ON ROMANS.*

A new commentary on the most difficult book of the New Testament, if possessing critical ability, and written in an impartial spirit, is a resolution of forces, and represents the last impression made by former conflicts on this old battle ground. Those who take up the long expected work of Dr. Lange on Romans, with this thought in mind, will not be disappointed. Dr. Lange himself, in consequence of neglecting English and American commentators, has certainly failed to consider all that should be attended to, but this defect has been well supplied in the first six chapters by Dr. Schaff, whose additions are numerous and valuable. But while the general result is obtained, the form of presentation cannot be called attractive. First, we have Dr. Lange's views, often obscurely expressed, and requiring the utmost efforts of the translator to render them intelligible, and then, an enlargement and very frequently a correction by the editor. Indeed, the theological views of Dr. Schaff are so prominently and fully brought out, that the general impression made upon the reader will be likely to proceed from him, rather than from the author, which we regard as no drawback upon the value or interest of the volume.

But while greater unity of presentation is desirable in an ideally perfect commentary, the present volume will be read with interest and advantage, especially by those already somewhat familiar with the ground. In opposition to Dr. Bushnell, the philological meaning of "righteousness" is well presented, but the theological statement of the doctrine is not equally satisfactory. The realistic explanation of the connection between Adam and his posterity, recently revived in this country, is advanced with great positiveness in explanation of Rom. v., and the theory of imputation resting upon representation, so persistently defended for many years by Dr. Hodge, of Princeton, is treated with little ceremony. We cannot persuade ourselves that realism can ever again gain a foothold, to any great extent, in theology, but its partial revival, recently, has led us to place a translation of Dr. Naville's ingenious defense of it in the present number of the *Theological Eclectic*. Its plausible and weak points will be easily seen.

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* *The Epistle of Paul to the Romans.* By J. P. Lange, D.D., and the Rev. F. R. Fay. Translated from the German by J. F. Hurst, D.D., with additions by P. Schaff, D.D., and the Rev. M. B. Riddle. New York: Charles Scribner & Co., 1869. Royal 8vo. pp. 455.

XXVII.—RECENT LIVES OF CHRIST.*

"I would rather," said one of the noblest men who have taught Ethics from a University chair to this generation, "I would rather be the author of a brief series of expositions of the life of Christ, executed after the idea of Lord Bacon's *First Flowings of the Scripture*, so as to help my fellow-men to understand that life better, than be the author of the grandest system of speculative ethics." The volumes before us go far to realize this aspiration. Their pre-eminent aim is to unfold the Sacred Individuality of Christ, in its unique glory, as that is seen in the successive incidents of his human life. They show, without parade, the results of much meditation on problems not directly stated, with an insight that is rarely delicate as the great Character they strive to delineate. Fragments of apologetical evidence are thus interwoven into the course of the narrative, and some deep soundings of moral evidence are taken in a very simple manner, while the lectures contain hints of some ulterior questions touching the very essence and genius of the Christian faith. Though enriched by contributions from several foreign fields, they are a genuine product of British soil, and will appeal peculiarly to the British type of mind.

Six years ago Dr. Hanna offered to the public the first volume of this series, selecting "the last day of our Lord's Passion" as his special theme. His aim in that volume was to construct "a continuous and expanded narrative, intended to bring out, as vividly as possible, not only the sequence of the incidents, but the characters, motives, and feelings of the different actors and spectators in the events described, refraining from all critical or doctrinal discussions." In the following year, the author issued a companion volume on "the forty days after the Resurrection." In

* From the *North British Review*, July, 1869: a Review of *The Life of our Lord*, by Rev. William Hanna, D. D., in six volumes: Vol. I. *The Earlier Years of our Lord's Life on Earth*; II. *The Ministry in Galilee*; III. *The Close of the Ministry*; IV. *The Passion Week*; V. *The Last Day of our Lord's Passion*; VI. *The Forty Days of our Lord's Resurrection.* Edinburgh: 1868–1869.

its preface he states that he "has long had the conviction that the results of that fuller and more exact interpretation of the books of the New Testament to which Biblical scholars have been conducted, might be made available for framing such a continuous narrative of the leading incidents in our Redeemer's life as would be profitable for practical and devotional rather than for doctrinal or controversial purposes." While that volume was passing through the press, the *Vie de Jesus* of M. Renan was published. Dr. Hanna makes a brief allusion to this work, and while expressing his desire that "a full and critical exposure of all its arbitrary assumptions and denials, affirmations without proofs, doubts without reasons, inconsistencies and contradictions, errors historical and exegetical," should be undertaken by some competent critic, he speaks of

"A simpler, more direct, and more effective method of dealing with the work, by exposing the flagrant failure of its capital design and object—viz: to eliminate all that is supernatural and divine from the character and life of Christ, and yet leave him a man of such pure and exalted virtue, as to be worthy of the unreserved and unbounded love and reverence of mankind." "The singular result of this attempt to strip Christ of all divine qualities and properties is, that it mars and mutilates his character even as a man. Without any controversial treatment, the effect of M. Renan's work may be neutralized by a simple recital of the life of Jesus, so as to show that the blending of the natural with the miraculous, the human with the divine, is essential to the coherence and consistency of the record; that the fabric of Gospel history is so constructed that if you take out of it the divinity of Jesus, the whole edifice falls into ruins."

These sentences sufficiently explain the design of the two earlier volumes. The success which attended their publication encouraged their author to complete the series; and at intervals, during the last four years, he has issued one volume devoted to "the Earlier Years," one connected with "the Passion Week," and two relating to "the Public Ministry."

The idea which lies at the root of this latest effort to unfold and illustrate the life of Christ, is, that the facts recorded by the four evangelists are their own best witness-bearers, evidence, and defense; and that the record is historically inexplicable, if the

divine element which the Church catholic has inferred from it be eliminated from the life of Jesus. In this respect there is a marked affinity between the work of Dr. Hanna and the treatise of Dr. Young, entitled, *The Christ of History.* Dr. Young starts with the presupposition that the records of the Gospels are but fragments of ancient history, in which we may expect to find all the characteristics of past literature transmitted to a modern age. He claims for them in the first instance no higher credit than that which criticism accords to the pages of Herodotus or Livy. But as he proceeds to examine the record of the four evangelists, he finds that they narrate the acts and words of One whose existence is utterly inexplicable as a product of the known forces that work in history and form human character, as they reveal a life from first to last ideally perfect; and as it is an axiomatic truth that like ever produces like, he infers that such a character could not have arisen out of the soil of humanity propagated from the past, but must have been a descent into that soil from above. We have come into contact with a life which historical processes cannot explain, and which cannot, on any *scientific* principle, be ranked in the common category of men. Its solitude, uniqueness, and completion, force us to infer that it could not have sprung from a parentage that was incomplete, one-sided, and defective. To say that the loving adoration of the biographers and others, transformed a really imperfect life into one ideally complete, is but to transfer the miracle from Christ to his followers. For, granting the perfection of the character, that has come down to us (whatever be the origin of the record, and the process of its transmission), its existence, without a reality to give rise to it, is much more inexplicable than is the reality itself. The poetic idealization by a band of disciples, who should all agree as to details—illiterate men, sprung of a biassed, schismatic race, creating out of their own enthusiasm, with the most slender basis in fact, the only pattern of a life approaching to the measure of the stature of the perfect of which history makes mention, is much more difficult to account for than is the appearance of the ideal itself.

To a mind amenable to this and cognate processes of reasoning, Dr. Hanna's work will appear a valuable complement to Dr. Young's. In almost every page he will find corroboration of the line of argument. The evidence arising from the character and moral individuality of Christ, as the ideal of humanity made real,

is the center round which everything else revolves, and to which everything is made subservient. The outlying questions of religious criticism are passed over. We have no discussion as to the origin of the Gospel narratives. The vexed question of date and authorship are not entered upon. The problem of the supernatural in its relation to natural law and order, the philosophy of the Christian faith as to the person of its Founder, the historical preparation for the Advent at the confluence of the several streams of oriental and of western thought, the relation of Christ to the religious systems of the past, and the existing sects of Judaism, are no where formally discussed. In short, all the *prolegomina* to a study of the life are subordinated to a simple recital of the life itself. The former inquiries are, doubtless, essential to a learned and scientific theology. Questions of philosophy and of history, in the words of Pressensé, "hold the approaches to the subject;" and we may even admit that everything depends upon the accuracy of our historical narrative, and upon the precise date of the documents which record it. But, on the other hand, if the main event recorded—the divinity of that human life—carries its own light within itself, it may indirectly prove the accuracy of the story. A distinct function is, therefore, fulfilled by those who adopt the less ambitious method of portraying the Life in its divine sequences and harmonies, that it may be left to attest itself, and be its own evidence. We hold it possible for a wise and thoughtful mind, without the aid of a vast critical apparatus, and with nothing but the four Gospels in his hand, to arrive at a conclusion, *strictly philosophical*, as to the origin of Christianity and the claims of its Founder.

Historical study cannot solve the questions which the course of Church history has raised. Those who have gone most deeply into the problems of modern criticism are convinced that mere archæological research cannot clear up any controversy touching the supernatural. Erudition is not needful for the determination of the main question at issue.* The critical questions are as to

* On this point we have the testimony of Strauss himself. In the Preface to his *New Life of Jesus*, written for the German *populace*, he says, "It is a mere prejudice of caste to fancy that ability to comprehend these things belongs exclusively to the theologian or the man of learning, On the contrary, the essence of the matter is so simple that every one whose head and heart are in the right place [N. B.], may well rest assured that whatever, after due reflection and the proper use of accessible means, still remains incomprehensible to him, is in itself of very little value."—(Page viii. of Preface, Eng. Trans).

the authenticity of date and authorship, and the competency of the historians; as to when and by whom the books claiming an Apostolic origin were written, and whether their authors were competent witness-bearers. To solve these questions we must proceed backwards up the stream of time, studying century by century, examining the quotations of successive commentators and opponents, that we may be sure that the books have come down to us unimpaired. We have to pierce through the accumulated literary strata of eighteen centuries. Without much difficulty we can traverse fifteen of these. When we come, however, to the second, or even the third century, we find the ground less firm, while the air grows gradually dim with mist. The further back we travel, our authorities are fewer and less trust-worthy, less scientific, more given to gossip, less able to distinguish between fact and rumor. The age of the first two centuries of our era was one of manifold literary activity, but the majority of its records have perished, and its testimony is on the whole obscure. Hence the difficulty of reaching the solid ground of scientific certainty by the processes of historical criticism alone. We must satisfy ourselves that the writings of the early fathers, which allude to the gradual formation of the canon, are themselves authentic; we must discover the qualifications which these writers possessed for forming a judgment on the matter in question, the range of their critical insight, their freedom from bias, their love of fact and reality, and their success in reaching it. This leads us into the domain of contemporary literature—to a comparison of the religious and the secular writers; into questions touching the philosophy, morality, the social state and customs of that age; and the very treatises accessible to the student of history, are, for the most part, written in some special interest, and are the product of some foregone conclusion. But suppose our critical apparatus complete, and the historical inquiry ended, the very question which we had hoped to solve by history *returns*, in all its magnitude, *as a problem of philosophy.* Therefore, since it must in any case remain for solution after the critical inquiry is closed, its study may validly precede any attempt thus to ascend the stream of history. In short, the function of historical criticism seems to lie in an intermediate region between the preliminary question of the supernatural (which is one of speculative philosophy) and the problem to which we must in any case

return,—the religious significance of the life of Christ (which is a philosophical inference from certain unique moral phenomena).

The idea of re-writing the Life of Jesus, already written in the Gospels, is a thoroughly modern conception. So long as the doctrinal conclusions of the Church, as to the person of Christ, were more valued than the facts of the sacred Biography itself, and so long as the work of our Lord overshadowed his life, anything approaching to a psychological analysis of his character and acts, seemed an idle, if not an irreverent procedure. It is not too much to affirm, that the divinity of our Lord for ages overshadowed his humanity, so as to cast it into the shade. But during the latter portion of the eighteenth, and more particularly from the beginning of this century,—mainly through the influence of Schleiermacher,—the attention of theologians has been increasingly turned towards the human life, in its relation to the age in which it appeared, and the revolution which it has accomplished in the world. And it is only *in its humanity*, as a life exhibiting the signs of growth and progress, that a historical or biographical study is possible. Within the last hundred years, innumerable "Lives of our Lord" have been written by friend and by opponent; and it is singular that while in each case we must mainly revert to the four original recorders, alike for our materials and for the touchstone by which to try any new commentary or analysis, such is the hidden wealth of these four biographies, that it has been impossible for any one mind, or for any single generation, to exhaust their fullness, and, by drawing it fully forth, to supersede the need of future commentary. It is equally evident that the four biographers, being contemporaries of our Lord, and addressing a contemporary audience (while ignorant of the vexed controversies as to their record that would arise in the future), would necessarily take much for granted, would leave many gaps in their narrative, unimportant in themselves, but which would give room for future study and reverent conjecture. They present us, it is true, with more than a skeleton record, yet they leave much for the tact of a wise interpreter in collecting the fragments of their narrative, and illustrating their significance as a whole. The task of those who attempt this work anew is thus to transplant themselves to the Apostolic age, and to re-state, in the light of their own time, the distinctive features of that "life which is the light of men." The very multiplication of these

"Lives of our Lord" has become an indirect testimony to the grandeur of the Original. Successive historians exhaust the life of an ordinary man, and future recensions of it become tedious, repetitive, and bald. For example, if we compare the two biographic sketches of the greatest Greek of the ancient world, the Socrates of Plato and of the Memorabilia, with the manifold attempts to write the Life of Christ, the contrast is arresting. Strauss has indeed asserted that the picture of Socrates is the clearer of the two; and that a comparison of Xenophon and Plato with Matthew and John, is unfavorable to the latter. Such an assertion is not surprising from one who has had the hardihood to affirm, that however consistent the testimony for the Apostolic origin of the latter might be, he could put no faith in it, simply because it bears witness to the supernatural. But this much is self-evident,—that the world has not welcomed so many lives of Socrates as of Christ; and biographers have not attempted to write them, because, in the former case, they have not found the moral uniqueness, the many-sided and mysterious grandeur, which has drawn successive interpreters to the latter. And we affirm with confidence that the issue of new lives of our Lord will never cease. Each future generation will be impelled by an inner *necessity* to travel backwards for itself along the stream of history to the fountain-head, carrying thither the burden of its perplexities for solution.

We have a guarantee, in the very nature of the case, that the biographers of our Lord would be more faithful to their original than the friends of Socrates were. Far from attempting to idealize their Master, they were from the first incapable of understanding his ideal greatness. Little as they understood him, they felt that they were in contact with a character far above themselves. Their adoration, though imperfect, would restrain them from putting into the lips of their Master what he did not really say, or recording what he did not really do. Exaggerate his greatness they could not; diminish it they dared not. But the fact that Plato, a philosophic thinker of equal caliber and greater comprehensiveness, was the recorder of the moral teaching of his predecessor (much of which he rejected and superseded)—instead of being, as Strauss asserts, a guarantee of impartiality and historical veracity, might easily lead the founder of the Academy into exaggerations to which the fishermen of Galilee were not ex-

posed. It was of less consequence to Plato and to Platonism that the dialogues should exactly reproduce the oral teaching of Socrates, than it was to the disciples (who had no philosophy but that of their Master), to draw a photographic portrait of his life.

We have alluded to the peculiar difficulty we encounter in ascending by the light of history to the Apostolic age, from the dimness of some of the intervening links, from the breaks in the continuity of the stream. In addition to this, the very growth of theological opinions and creeds, the venerable edifice of systematic thought, and the endless divergent commentaries of churchmen, prevent us from seeing the first age with our own eyes as clearly as we would wish; and if they do not at times confuse our vision, they become at least "something between a hindrance and a help." But we are in reality much nearer the age of the Apostles and of our Lord, than we are to the two subsequent centuries, and much nearer (except in actual time) than were the critical inquirers of the third and fourth centuries. We can understand it better than we understand some of the periods of modern history. No age can measure itself. It must be subjected to the sifting scrutiny of the future before it becomes intelligible. And though we have lost some of the links in the process of transmission, the fact that Christianity, thus sifted and winnowed, now gives forth a clearer light as to its origin, while it holds its ground in the forefront of modern enlightenment, is an indirect testimony to the divinity of its birth. Subjected to the extreme rigor of critical analysis, the life of Jesus is surrounded with a new halo of glory; its significance is enhanced by the strain it has endured, and the assaults it has resisted. And our remoteness in time, our distance from the Apostolic age, enables us to compute the historical triumph of Christianity by the silently increasing monument which the ages are building to its Founder. Remote from the Apostles, we do not breathe the atmosphere of a time when the very haze of floating philosophies and vague aspirations, with the obscure origin of the new religion, might have hid its divinity from us; and while we do not rest the evidence of our faith upon a process of critical inquiry, the fact that the efforts of destructive criticism have continually failed in tracing Christianity to a natural source, is an accumulation of testimony the other way, and reduces to a minimum the likelihood of any future discovery adverse to the faith of Christendom.

The conclusion which we reach, independently of historical criticism, is not likely to be shaken by a series of puzzles which criticism itself is yearly diminishing.

There are other reasons which lead us to prefer the psychological study of the Gospels. When the merely critical instinct is predominant, it usually renders the mind as unfit for weighing moral evidence wisely, as the exclusively mathematical intellect is incompetent to deal with positive evidence. It sometimes checks the more sacred instinct of worship, and, sharpening one faculty, it blunts another. It may disqualify a man for duly appreciating some of the grander facts of history, of which the causes are hid, because they have their origin in the mystic region of personality. It may diminish reverence for what is obscure, only because it is deep and fathomless, and may conceal the latent glory of those phenomena of human history which point upwards to the supernatural. The best antidote to this one-sidedness will be found in a devout study of the facts of our Lord's life on earth, in their sequencies and harmonies, in the relation of the parts to the whole, and of the whole to the parts, in their origin, import, and final purpose. In these facts, theologians of the most opposite tendency, and who have reached very opposite conclusions as to detail, will find their common meeting-ground and rallying point. The theory or doctrine of inspiration which they may chance to hold is of less consequence than their treatment of the facts which the inspired documents authenticate. And the theology that is by each successive system-builder derived from a fresh, patient, and earnest study of these facts, will be at once larger and deeper, more exact and more profound, than any that tradition can transmit or criticism can construct. Theology becomes a series of wise inferences from the words and acts, from the scope and tendency, of our Lord's life; not a mere articulated skeleton, formed by the juxtaposition of texts, but a living body of interdependent truths,—in a word, *the interpretation of fact.* But to accomplish this, many things are needed: the patient skill of an interpreter, "one among a thousand," who can appreciate the divinest elements in human life,—the far glance of the religious seer,—freedom from bias and preconception of what the life ought to be, or to accomplish,—humility wedded to insight,—intellectual integrity in alliance with the docile spirit that has learned its own ignorance,—and, we must add, an appre-

ciation of the world's need of light, as well as a readiness to welcome the supernatural ray.

A brief glance at some of the efforts to write a harmonious narrative of the life of our Lord, may suffice to bring out the points of resemblance and contrast between them and this latest British work. We must confine ourselves to a few, excluding the commentaries and dissertations, however excellent. The bibliography of the subject is very fully given in the fourth edition of Hase's *Life of Jesus.*

In patristic times theologians merely sought to arrange the facts of the sacred biography in a harmonious order. Criticism was then unknown. The mediæval Church-commentary was tedious and fastastic, consisting chiefly of catenas from the fathers; while the tendency to write legendary lives of the saints, led some to add apocryphal stories to the narrative of the four Gospels. Not even at the time of the Reformation was the theological mind turned with any freedom to the human side of our Lord's life. It may even be said that the idea of a psychological explanation and study of it is foreign to the genius of all the Christian centuries, till we come down to the last hundred years.

The *Great Exemplar* of our English bishop, Jeremy Taylor, however excellent in design and felicitous here and there in detail, is circumlocutory, diffuse, full of irrelevancies, and burdened with superfluous learning. It may be doubted whether any reader of that treatise ever reached a more enlarged and luminous view of our Lord's life as a whole by means of it. It is only just, however, to remember that the great English prelate speaks most humbly of his work, as but "an instrument and auxiliary to devotion." He was "weary," he tells us, "and toiled with rowing up and down the sea of controversial questions," and therefore turned to that "which is wholly practical, and which makes us wiser, because it makes us better."

Shortly after the middle of last century, J. J. Hess, of Zurich, published an admirable sketch, in which we recognize two noteworthy features. The value of the miraculous element in the Gospel histories he considers as entirely subservient to the moral results to be attained. As a mere display of power, apart from these results, it could have no inherent value. Hess was also one of the first to signalize the ideal *beauty* of our Lord's life, and the satisfaction it affords to the purest æsthetic sense, as one evidence

of its origin. He was a careful, reverent compiler, and whenever a miracle can be explained as an acceleration of natural phenomena, he abstains from supposing any other agency at work in the process.

In 1796, Herder published a treatise on the synoptics, and a sequel in the following year, on the narrative of St. John. He concentrated his attention, almost exclusively, on the moral and spiritual aspects of the divine life, and their influence on humanity, striving also to harmonize the different records. The miraculous element he thought of little moment, incapable either of proof or of disproof, by a later age. All the miracles that could (in his estimation) be explained by natural causes, such as the exorcism of evil spirits, the transfiguration, the phenomena attendant on the baptism, etc., he thus accounted for; others, such as the cure of the sick, the transformation of water into wine, and the resurrection of Lazarus, he explained as symbolical of the spiritual truth of Christ's influence over the lives of men. It is difficult to understand Herder's exact position in reference to this second class of miracles. Possibly it was not clear to his own mind. He seems to admit the reality of the resurrection, yet he attaches little value to its outward form. The spiritual and continuous miracle of moral resurrection which it symbolized, is to him the main point in the narrative. Nevertheless he firmly maintained the divinity of the life of Christ.

Paulus, in his *Gospel Commentary* and subsequent *Life of Jesus*, further develops the view of Herder, carrying it, however, to a one-sided extreme. A disciple of Spinoza and of Kant, he rejected entirely the idea of the miraculous as supernatural. He seems to regard it as a later addition to the original record of the text, appended by unwise interpreters. The evangelists, he thinks, make no assertion of supernatural power attending the works of Jesus; they rather hint that he employed natural means to effect his ends. He does not wish to explain away the reality of remarkable works (such as cures of the sick, etc.), but only to put these on an intelligible basis. For this purpose he endeavors to divest the recorded miracles of a certain clothing of opinion, which he imagines to have been wrapped around them—subsequent accretions to the original fact—forgetting that in the narrative of the evangelists these details are the very substance of the story.

He was followed by Schleiermacher, one of the most powerful intellects and one of the noblest men that Germany has produced. He held fast by the divine element in the life, but denied the violation of natural law in the miracles; and to account for these, he stretched the idea of the natural to its widest limits. He endeavored to account for Christ's foresight by supposing an organization marvelously susceptible. The healing of the sick he explains by the simple forth-putting of unique power upon the minds of the diseased, which in turn reacted on their organism. Miracles were wrought by the supernatural might of one who was above nature, but that power effected its end through natural agency. However we may dissent from his explanations of the miraculous, we cannot forget the reverence and faith of Schleiermacher. He has contributed perhaps more powerfully than any single mind in modern times, to direct the current of theology to the person of Christ, and to the ethical significance of his work. His influence is everywhere traceable in subsequent theological literature.

In the year 1829, Hase offered an important contribution to German theology in his *Manual*. Following Schleiermacher in his rational explanation of the miraculous, as far as that is possible, and attributing our Lord's works of healing to the power of the will over the body, the raising of the dead to the restoration of suspended animation, he nevertheless held that all these works were strictly miraculous, "the clear dominion of spirit over nature; no interruption of Nature's laws, but only a restoration of her pristine harmony and order." Unknown powers, possessed alone by Jesus, accelerated natural processes; this sinless perfection giving him an unique control over the material,—a power of which sin had bereft the race. "In every matter of fact," he says, "which has been handed down as a miracle, it belongs to science to search for its natural causes; when these cannot be shown with historic truth and certainty, then the miracle indicates either the limits of our natural powers and natural knowledge, or else those of the age in which the miracle is recorded." He thus defines the fundamental thought of his book, "that a divine principle revealed itself in Jesus, but in a purely human form." The reports of our Lord's words and acts, however, he thinks may contain minor inaccuracies, due to the imperfect narration, and the blending of their own opinions by the his-

torians. Hase, even more than Neander, represents the *via media* in German theology, midway between a frigid naturalism and a blind uncritical supernaturalism.

Six years later, in 1835, Strauss issued his famous *Life of Jesus*, intended only for the learned; and, after twenty-nine years, he has followed it by a *New Life of Jesus*, designed for the populace. The aim of the former treatise, as defined in the latter, was to show that "all attempts to conceal or explain away the supernatural in the Gospel details were vain, and that consequently they were not to be claimed as strictly historical." The miraculous element was to be rejected *a priori*, and in addition, a number of "contradictions and inconsistencies" could be freely pointed out. But how to account for the origin of the Gospel image of Jesus, was the special puzzle which Strauss set himself to solve. His solution is well known as "the mythical theory." He admitted an original substratum of fact in the narratives, but round that nucleus of fact an imaginary series of myths had gathered, and the function of the historian was to separate or disintegrate the two. The original fact might be somewhat as follows:— There existed at the time of Christ's birth a special Messianic hope in Palestine. A remarkable Jew appeared, and conceived the idea of morally revolutionizing his age, in accordance with the prevalent hope that God was about to interpose in behalf of the nation in some signal manner. His early popularity led some of his followers enthusiastically to call him the Messiah. He received the homage reluctantly at first, but afterwards willingly. Coming into collision with the traditional Jewish party, he without difficulty, foresaw his own death, past instances of the prophet's fate perhaps suggesting it. After his death, his disciples, mourning his lot, began most naturally to idealize their departed master. They found in the books of the Old Testament, words which they twisted into Messianic predictions of what had actually happened. They believed that their late teacher was not really dead; and by their excited imaginations, spectral visions of his presence were easily mistaken for the reality. They proceeded, under the delusion of his continued existence, to magnify the events of his previous life, freely to idealize them, and to attribute to him the highest conceivable greatness. Thus Strauss finds in the four Gospels, instead of the history of the real Christ, a later idealized conception of him, "a legendary deposit of con-

temporaneous Messianic ideas, the latter, perhaps, partially modified by his peculiar individuality, his teaching, and his fate.

The fundamental assumption which runs through Strauss's work is, the impossibility of any history of a being other than one "entirely and clearly human. A personage half human and half divine, may figure in poetry, but never in fact." Miracles are absolutely and inherently impossible. Miracle he repeatedly *defines* as "that heterogeneous element in life that resists all historical treatment." He refuses to believe in its real occurrence on any conceivable evidence whatever. To hear testimony from an eye-witness, "would do no good; we should tell him downright that he was trifling, and that he must have dreamed it, if we did not lose our opinion of his honesty, and accuse him of absolute falsehood." As to the evangelical miracles, "not one has been recorded by an eye-witness, but, on the contrary, by those who were disposed to do anything rather than try their tradition by a critical test." He therefore proceeded to apply the same principle of explanation to the Gospel miracles which had been applied so successfully by Welcker and others to explain the growth of Greek legends and Oriental fables. They were a series of later myths, which the reverence of an after age had created, and by which it had surrounded a remarkable man with a halo of posthumous glory! And these myths had been, by the same process, historically displaced, and thrust, like a fault in geologic strata, backwards in time. The Christian myths were "not, in their original form, the conscious and intentional invention of an individual, but a production of the common consciousness of a people or religious circle." The term "myth," Strauss would limit "exclusively to those original unconscious formations which arose as by necessity."

But gradually other stories palpably unreal were invented. In the narratives of the fourth Gospel, in particular, he has the hardihood to assert that we meet with much that is conscious and deliberate invention,—mere fraud, in short. In his later work, Strauss acknowledges that, "mainly in consequence of Baur's hints, he allows more room than before to the hypothesis of conscious and intentional fiction." Retaining only the fundamental ideas of his former work, the principal if not the sole consideration is, to decide what the gospel history is *not*. The negation consists in this, "that in the person and acts of Jesus, no super-

naturalism shall be suffered to remain; for no single Gospel, nor all the Gospels, can make us debase our reason to the point of believing miracles." The affirmative counterpart to this negation is twofold—1st, The determination of the real history of Jesus, and 2dly, The explanation of the way in which the unhistorical parts of the narrative arose.

We need not follow Strauss minutely in a counter-analysis of his "peculiar apparatus for causing miracles to evaporate in myths." It is of more importance to show how he has failed, as a historical student of the era which witnessed the rise of Christianity. A deeper analysis of the state of Palestine at the time of the advent, will prove the impossibility of the growth of a series of myths in the Apostolic age. The very chaos of that time, the heterogeneous character of the Jewish sects, the perplexed state of political relationships, the variety of forces at work in society, the absence of simple spontaneous movements and social impulses—in short, the general alertness and multitudiousness of the time—was fatal to the growth of such a series of legends as those which Strauss has indicated. The age of the Apostles was more critical and reflective than spontaneous and impulsive. There was doubt and hesitation, as well as expectancy, in the general mind. Enthusiastic idolatry of men was rare, hero-worship almost unknown. But it is only in the infancy of a nation that the mythical instinct has any range or field of operation—only in the twilight of national culture that fiction is mistaken for fact; while it is to the deification of the powers of nature (as in the polytheistic tendency), rather than to the deification of a man, that the mythical instinct turns. But long prior to the advent, the Jewish mind had reached a high-water mark of intellectual vigor. Palestine had been divided for generations into opposite philosophical schools, led by astute and learned rabbis: and during the lifetime of our Lord a hot controversy raged between the pure theism of the Pharisees and the materialism of a sect which boldly denied the supernatural. If the existence of the sect of the Sadducees, and our Lord's frequent collisions with its leaders, be admitted, it is easy to see how eagerly they would have seized upon any alleged miracles that could be denied, and exposed them. This sect continued to flourish, and was variously modified, after the founding of the Apostolic churches. If, then, some of the earliest acts of the church-

leaders consisted in the elaboration of mythical incidents, it is inconceivable that the history of the first century should not have preserved some record of the collision of the disciples with the rationalistic sects of Palestine. The recorded "acts of the Apostles" make it clear that no such collision took place; and the Apostolic epistles give no hint of controversies within the churches, or around them, as to the reality of our Lord's miracles,—which may be deemed a proof that no such controversies existed,—while the historical evidence we possess as to the moral character of the Apostles, excluding on the threshold the supposition of conscious fraud, equally forbids the idea of credulity and acquiescence in imposture. Further, the imagination of the Apostles could scarcely have created the facts, when one of these which they record, is their own incompetence to comprehend their Master's character, and the wonderfully delicate, but far-piercing rebukes they received for their repeated obtuseness of soul: truly a highly elaborate myth for a company of fishermen to concoct! In the Gospel narratives we are indeed in wonder-land; but it would be the *ne plus ultra* of marvels to imagine the disciples to have invented this fact, implying a dexterous artificial fraud, and a wholly modern ingenuity, the better to secure their credit. Besides recording without scruple these facts against themselves, some of them shortly afterwards sealed their testimony by their death. Men do not willingly die for the honor of legends. They must, therefore, have believed them to be facts; and if they could not easily be impostors, they must either have been true witness-bearers or the dupes of fallacious evidence. Let us therefore examine those documents received as authentic by almost all critics,—the epistles of St. Paul to Rome and Corinth, and his first epistle to Thessalonica. These letters are based upon the facts of Christ's life. They imply that they were recent and well known; and we ask if a legend could grow in twenty years into such dimensions? Could a series of elaborate and unparalleled myths spring suddenly into life, and sway a whole community, within the space of two decades, especially when we remember how slowly great movements grew in that age, compared with the swift current of our modern times?

Still further, while the creation of myths is thus negatived by the character of the first Christian age, the unopposed reception of fabulous stories in the second or third age, in reference to an event so

momentous, is equally inconceivable. There were hundreds and thousands of contemporary Jews, who could have silenced the testimony of a few Apostles, if it had been possible to contradict or to expose it; while there were many cultivated Greek and Roman minds, not predisposed in favor of Jewish tradition or Oriental legend generally, who, during the lifetime of the Apostles, gave in their adherence to the Christian faith. The conquest of *their* minds by a series of Hebrew myths, is a fact which Strauss does not attempt to explain. Nor does he inform us how, if this be the natural genesis of the Christian faith, it has arisen but once, in one age, and amongst one people. The formation of such myths should have proceeded equally from several centers, and thus the uniqueness of the Christian faith is unexplained by the mythical theory. Strauss has told us that he will admit the uniqueness of Jesus only "when other instances of the same unique perfection shall be clearly proved from history;"—an utterly unwarrantable dictum. But we may validly reply, that we will believe in the *possibility* of a mythic origin of the Gospel narratives, when other instances of the same unique perfection shall have been proved to spring from legend, or even if we could discover one parallel instance of such a growth from such a nucleus.

In the positive part of his work, Strauss endeavors as he had done in his earlier treatise, "to point out what might have formed the historical kernel." By the most reckless and haphazard guesses, he tries to remove the first deposits of the unhistorical, and to show how layer after layer may have risen above each other. But we are left in the end to gather up the fragments of an imaginary Straussian Christ. The contrast between such individual conjecture and the ascertained results of modern science (with which it invites comparison), is even startling. Guesses are not tolerated in the scientific world, though a modest conjectural hypothesis may lead the way to the discovery of unknown laws. But while the temple of science is slowly reared by pupils, who build humbly on foundations laid by their teachers, literary critics do not scruple to begin their labors by an attempt to abolish the work of their predecessors.

The admirable work of Neander on the life of Christ was mainly a reply to Strauss. But its controversial portion is not so valuable as its positive contribution to a true estimate of the life. It is so well known that it need scarcely be referred to; and

amongst all subsequent "Lives" it still holds a place of honor. Defective on many points, and unmethodical in others, the manifold wisdom of the book, its large suggestiveness and rich detail, are unrivalled; while its innate truthfulness has called forth a tribute, even from Strauss. Neander explains miracles by referring them to "laws of Nature as yet undiscovered," a fertile hint, which has been largely developed since, but which may be delusive, if the new processes are put in the same category of "law" with the old.

Baur, Weisse, Ewald, Olshausen, Tholuck, Harless, Lange, Stier, and Ebrard, amongst German theologians, have since treated the life of Jesus with varying talent and success. Ewald, is learned, profound, intense; Lange, rich in devotion, felicitous in fancies, but attenuated in his moral insight, is occasionally so fantastic that some of his thoughts depend for their beauty on the mere form of the words. There is a good deal of the mirage in his work. Stier is rich in exegetical suggestion, more imaginative than discriminative, prolix at times, and, though with occasional narrowness, has written an earnest and loving treatise on our Lord's life and works. Ebrard's is one of the most condensed and learned treatises on the subject. He considers the Gospel history first, according to its form, and next, according to its contents, his primary aim not being polemical, and being convinced that the statement of what he regarded as the true facts of the case, is the best way to reply to objections. His tone is occasionally imperious and pragmatical, and there is a slight admixture of vanity in his work; all others having, in his opinion, failed to do that which he has succeeded in doing.

The work of M. Renan, which startled Europe in 1863, is a well-known book. Within a year it is said to have called forth a hundred replies. It is the natural sequel in the province of French religious criticism to the dominant *Philosphie Positive.* In the years 1860–61, M. Renan had charge of the French scientific mission to Phœnicia; and he tells us that, while traversing the country in all directions, "the history which at a distance seemed to float in the clouds of an ideal world, took a form, a solidity, which astonished me. The striking agreement of the New Testament text with the places, the marvelous harmony of the Gospel ideal with the country which served it as a framework, were like a revelation. I had before me a *fifth Gospel*, torn, but

still legible." But as his philosophy abjured the supernatural, he had to *construct* a new life of Jesus by eliminating the miraculous element; and, given the problem, how to find a natural explanation of the origin of Christianity by reducing its alleged marvels within the limits of natural causation, or denying the more unmanageable ones as fictions, the ingenuity of M. Renan is great, though tainted by recklessness, and the "easy" morality which winks at minor faults. It is not difficult to see that a system which starts by denying the personality of God, cannot end by admitting the divine personality of Jesus. It is a slight concession, that M. Renan admits the Apostolic origin of the fourth Gospel, against the school of Tübingen. This Gospel, no less than the others, he must critically test by a process of excision; and no single discourse can be received as authentic, because there were "no stenographers present to fix those fleeting words." It is noteworthy that, while he addresses himself to the stupendous task of reconstructing the history, he is not content with suggesting a few facts as a possible nucleus, but he freely enlarges on its probable details. He has assigned himself a task almost rivaling the labor of Cuvier, who, from the fragment of a fossil bone, reproduced an ancient skeleton; and yet this seems to him one of the simplest processes in the world, requiring only modern enlightenment and the studied rejection of the miraculous! The result and the process together are utterly unscientific. He rejects and accepts at pleasure, events which have the same historical vouchers, and for the mutilation of which he supplies us with no other crucial test than his own critical fancy. One fact is taken, and another is left. This event is true, but that is interpolated, and this is a forgery. No law of selection is stated except the *a priori* dictum, that all the supernatural is legendary.*

Strauss and Renan have both said that the miraculous is "that resisting element which defies historical treatment." But to give

* He has indeed told us of "an excellent touchstone" to be found in "a kind of splendor, at once mild and terrible, a divine strength which emphasizes the authentic words, and detaches them from their apocryphal context. The real words of Jesus betray themselves spontaneously." (p. 21, Eng. Trans). A more unscientific dictum could scarcely be devised. We may well ask whether, if a whole synod of critics were assembled, and urged to apply this touchstone independently, two of them would agree in their "detachments" of the text, or the reconstruction of its fragments—either in their analysis or their synthesis? A scientific touchstone should be precise, and not arbitrary or confusing.

the investigator license to select, abridge, or erase at will, from a series of documents which come down to us with the identical witness of past testimony, is to transform history into legend, and criticism into romance; and the "fifth Gospel" which M. Renan "saw," and has striven to relate, is reduced to the level of an apocrypha. It is of little use to tell a historian in search of reality that "nothing to be found in the Gospels is strictly authentic," and yet that they "are truer than the naked truth, because they are truth idealized;" while the chemical test which will dissolve the spurious compound, and precipitate the pure truth, is the mere idealistic fancy of a learned and ingenious dilettante. The chief source to which, according to Renan, we are to trace the early development of Jesus, was the influence of nature, and the delightful climate of Galilee. The poetic aspiration after a brighter national future, nursed amid the valleys of the north, and beside the waters of its lake, imparted a soft and delicate tone to the earlier years. That delicious pastoral country inspired our Lord with his first ideas of the kingdom of God. Renan asserts that all the earlier teaching of Jesus was mild and gentle, in conformity with the gentleness of the district in which he was reared,—quietly ignoring a dozen facts to the contrary! From the "delicious idyll" of the earlier years, we pass by an abrupt transition to the period of action, when Jesus "most unwillingly became a thaumaturgist," and the gentile Rabbi glided into "the charlatan with a high purpose." The hiatus between these two periods, M. Renan has not filled up, even on his own theory. He contents himself with dogmatically assuming the change, as at the fall of the curtain in a drama. Though Jesus commanded his followers, "Let your Yea be yea, and your Nay, nay," and asserted that he came himself to "fulfill the law," M. Renan can affirm that he quietly made a compromise with truth, finessed with his contemporaries, and winked at the innocent enthusiasm of the populace, who ascribed unreal miracles to his power. "His greatest miracle," says he, in a delusive epigram,—"his greatest miracle would have been his refusal to perform any." Yet they were "disagreeable to him," "imposed upon him." Some he only "thought he performed." Some were natural cures idealized by the populace, in their hunger for marvels; for example, the exquisiteness of his person cast out many devils! All the while the Founder of Christianity was utterly unacquainted with the

processes of nature, and in a state of exquisite "poet ignorance" of her laws.

It is unnecessary to follow M. Renan through the legendary details of his own work of fiction. Its caricature of the original, its travesty of Christ's doctrine, its outrageous assumptions and utterly reckless manipulations of the story, its errors against art, have been admirably dealt with by M. Pressensé; and the rose-water adulation of the exquisite prophet of Galilee has been well described by another as "a betrayal of the Lord, but not without the kiss."

Immediately, on the appearance of the *Vie de Jèsus*, M. Pressensé wrote a short pamphlet in reply, entitled *The Critical School and Jesus Christ.* Few Fragments of controversial literature are superior to this small book. He has since then compiled a larger treatise, entitled *Jesus Christ, his Works, Life, and Times*, which covers the whole field discussed by Strauss and Renan. He briefly announces his aim to be to "dissipate some of the misconceptions by which the God-man is veiled from the eyes of my contemporaries." In an orderly manner, dealing first with those questions of philosophy and history "which hold the approaches to the subject," he vindicates the supernatural on speculative grounds, and seeks to prove the originality of the Christian faith by comparing it with the decaying religions of the East, and those Oriental and Western philosophies amidst which it came as a new birth. Pressensé has ably shown that Christianity was not "a product of the various elements in the ancient world, the confluence of its streams," though the resemblances between them prove that the new religion was "made for humanity, to answer its utmost needs." He has brought varied learning to the more delicate task of literary criticism, to which he next advances, dealing with the documents in which the records of Christianity have come down to us, to establish their place and value; and he concludes by unfolding the actual life of our Lord in its chronological sequences. In the latter part of his treatise we find a marked similarity of aim to Dr. Hanna's work. In Pressensé we find the French faculty of clear comprehensiveness. He traverses a wide area, and condenses the results of his survey in a few weighty paragraphs. His sentences shine like cut crystal; but they lack the calmer depth of German thought, and the warm glow of reverent enthusiasm, which pervade the Scotch divine. Clear, subtle,

and eager, he has the characteristic fire of the best French writers on morals ; but the meditative depth and the poetic sight of the British mind is, on the whole, more valuable in one who would attempt the great task of writing the Life of the Son of Man.

But the leading characteristics of Dr. Hanna's work will be more fully seen by comparing it with recent efforts in our own literature. We have alluded to Dr. Young's *Christ of History*, a volume of pre-eminent power. It stands somewhat in the same relation to Ullmann's treatise on the *Sinlessness of Jesus*, as these volumes of Dr. Hanna to such a work as the Life by Lange. It is full of genuine English sense and sagacious philosophy, and is pervaded by a high tone of reverence. Ullmann may deal in a more philosophical manner with his special department of evidence, but for comprehensive wisdom in interpreting the phenomena of our Lord's life, and drawing the legitimate inferences from them, we know no volume equal to Dr. Young's—though Dr. Bushnell has also ably discussed the same question in a more condensed form, in one chapter of his treatise on *Nature and the Supernatural.*

In the Bampton Lectures for 1859, we find the Bishop of Gloucester endeavoring "to illustrate the connection of the events in our Lord's life, and their probable order and succession." These lectures of Dr. Ellicott's are pervaded by a lofty tone of pious emotion ; but they are diffuse, rhetorical, and of slight apologetic value. The notes are better than the text. The aim of the Bampton lecturer was similar to Dr. Hanna's—"to arrange, comment upon, and illustrate the principal events in our Redeemer's earthly history ; to show their coherence, their connection, order, and significance." But we miss in this treatise those clear and luminous outlines which Pressensé gives us, and those glances into the inmost secrets of the divine life,—that insight joined to catholicity which pervades the volumes before us. Dr. Ellicott is intense, poetic, reverential. He trembles with emotion in all that he writes. But his thought is too fluent. It loses precision in a deceptive rhetorical glow.

The Rev. Samuel Andrews has compiled a useful manual on the life of our Lord, dealing chiefly with its chronological aspects, in which he mainly follows Tischendorf's *Synopsis Evangelica.* His introductory essays on the dates of our Lord's birth, baptism,

and death are valuable. The book is learned and accurate, but it presents a bare outline, useful only for reference.

The late Dr. Kitto has left a volume of "illustrations" of the life, which bears a certain resemblance in its aim to Dr. Hanna's. It contains picturesque and vivid descriptions of the chief events of our Lord's ministry. His relation to contemporary Jewish life and the society of Palestine, the state of opinion in reference to him, its fluctuations, and the results of his life-work, are drawn with rare felicity. Kitto is a photographic archæologist, who vivifies his descriptions of place and of manners, with an almost Oriental wealth and profusion of detail.

We notice another English work, not so much for its intrinsic merit as for its partial anticipation of the order and plan which Dr. Hanna has followed. It is a series of seven volumes, by the Rev. Isaac Williams, Fellow of Trinity, Oxford, written in comparative ignorance of the questions of modern criticism, and even with a fear lest "his own inquiries should degenerate into a merely critical or scholastic dissertation;" but in which the devout author ranges over the periods of our Lord's life, with the view of introducing into his work "something of the depth and devotional thought of ancient interpretation." It is a work based largely on the ancient catenas, especially on the *aurea catena* of Aquinas. But it is curious to note that the author began with the last day of the passion (issuing a tentative volume), and proceeded thence to the rest of the life, as Dr. Hanna has done. The titles of his volumes are, *The Nativity*, *the Ministry*, (2 vols), *The Holy Week*, *The Passion*, *The Resurrection*.

In the remarkable anonymous work titled *Ecce Homo*, we have one of the ablest and most reverent attempts to estimate the meaning of our Lord's life, and his influence in the world. But as it is rather a treatise on Christian Ethics than a biographic study of the sacred character, we abstain from further reference to it.

Adequately to write the Life of our Lord, so as to bring out the wealth which lies half concealed and half revealed in the record of the Evangelists, the biographer would require to possess such a combination of separate excellencies, that we can never expect to find the task executed to perfection. If it be true, as some one has said, that "it would require a second Christ to comprehend the first," it would no less require a divine biog-

rapher adequately to record a divine life. Knowledge of the philosophy of human nature, poetic insight into the physical universe and into human life, a wide knowledge of men, of the course of history, and of the forces that swayed the world prior to the Christian era, familiarity with antiquarian lore, a topographical knowledge of Palestine, the power of keen analysis and of large constructiveness, with personal reverence and devoutness of heart, are all prerequisites to the task. These are not combined in any single individual. It is therefore vain to look for a realized ideal of biography that shall surpass the story of the four Evangelists.

The latest complete effort to reproduce the scenes of that distant age, and to reset them in the framework of the nineteeth century, now lies before us. And while most of the "Lives" written recently excel this of Dr. Hanna in some one respect, it may be doubted if any of them presents such a combination of excellences. The historical, analytical, literary, topographical, and devotional features of these six volumes are less remarkable in themselves than in their union, and throughout the whole work there breathes an admirable humility. There is no parade of learning, no distracting foot-notes, no allusions for the erudite alone. It is an unencumbered, unartificial work. We are presented with the products and not with the processes of reasoning; with the results of scholarship without the display of the critical knowledge on which they are based. Dr. Hanna takes, as we have said, all the facts supplied by the four evangelists, and believing that each has its own significance, weaves the whole into a connected thread of narrative. Many surface discrepancies are thus harmonized, and the consecutiveness of the life, with its silently increasing purpose, is disclosed with a singular freshness. In addition, unsuspected harmonies reveal themselves, and evidence to which the harmonist who starts with the idea that the record is full of flaws, which require the correction of modern criticism is blind, becomes apparent. It is true that Dr. Hanna relies less on critical analysis in his expositions than on that loving insight which sees into the heart of questions, when verbal exegesis stands still at the door. He deals much more fully with the events themselves than with the records or channel by which they come down to us. His pre-eminent aim is to ascertain the inner character of the agents in the scenes, and especially the central Character in the narrative.

Varied psychological insight reveals itself in all his analyses of character, especially in the account given of St. Peter, St. John, and St. Thomas. From incidental phases of thought and feeling, a large significance is developed. The character of the betrayer, and the motives which led Judas to the commission of the crime with which his name is associated; the "inner workings of conscience and of humanity" in Pilate; the differences between St. Peter and St. John; the explanation of the denial by the former, and of the meaning of the look which led to his repentance; the conflicting elements in the soul of St. Thomas, are all admirably rendered. The dramatic portraiture is vivid, yet most delicate: photographic, as we have said, in the sharpness of the outlines, yet with colored light and shade preserved, and with many of the phases of individuality suggested rather than portrayed; while the recital of the events of our Lord's life, so uncontroversial and undogmatic, so reverent and careful, leads at every stage to the adoration of faith. The classic grace with which the style of these volumes flows on, may prevent many from perceiving the real depth of the stream, how clear the waters are, and how the heavens are reflected in them. The pervading tone is that of reverential thoughtfulness and repose. We think that Dr. Hanna's descriptions of place excel those of any other writer, with the exception of Dean Stanley, in a quiet picturesqueness, in the subdued light of local coloring with which he has invested the localities he describes. By a few vivid touches he carries us into the very heart of the scene. We have the advantage of the writer's personal visit to the localities,—a fact never obtruded, but which gives a steady background of reality and of vividness to all his descriptions. We have no highly-colored figure-painting, but an exquisite *felicity*, a directness and pictorial precision, which leave little to be desired.

In their descriptions of Nature, and its possible influence on our Lord, the difference between Renan and Dr. Hanna is noteworthy. According to the former, "the aspect of Nature" was "the whole education of Jesus." The soft beauty of the Galilean lakes and meads, woods and hills, created a correspondingly soft beauty in the soul of the tender phrophet of Nazareth; and thus the whole history of his earlier years is "one delightful pastoral." To the deeper insight of our author, Nature's influence over Christ was only inspiring and suggestive. It supplied illustra-

tions of the laws of his kingdom for the disciples, and the framework of parables for the people. Dr. Hanna does not presume to indicate the thoughts which the thirty years' residence in Nazareth may have quickened, but the place, "so retired, so rich in natural beauty, with glimpses of the wide world around for the morning or evening hours," where he had—

"watched where the lilies grew, and saw how their Creator clothed them, had noticed how the smallest of seeds grew into the tallest of herbs; where, outside the house, he had seen two women grinding at one mill, inside, a woman hiding the leaven in the dough; where in the market-place he had seen the five sparrows sold for two farthings; where the sheep-walks of the hills and the vineyards of the valleys, had taught him what were the offices of the good shepherd and of the careful vine-dresser—all those observations of thirty years were treasured up, to be drawn upon in due time, and turned into the lessons by which the world was to be taught wisdom."

It is instructive to note the difference between these two travelers, who have both gone over the same ground, and traced the footsteps of Jesus so far as they can be now identified, the one with a faith in the supernatural, and the other without it,—both accurate observers and exquisite narrators. The difference between their interpretations is wide enough, but are we wrong in ascribing the failure of the latter to his prepossession *against* the supernatural, so that "his eye saw only what it brought with it the power of seeing?"

As a specimen of picturesque beauty in Dr. Hanna's narrative, we may select the description of the source of the Jordan at Cæsarea-Philippi (*Galilean Ministry*, p. 317); and for instances in which the visit of the author to the places he has described, has enabled him almost to photograph the scene, we may refer to his account of Jacob's Well, of the road from Bethany to Jerusalem, past the hamlet of Bethphage, of the shores of the Lake of Tiberias, and his identification of Wady Fik as the ancient Gadara.

But the description of Nature is subordinated to a recital of the main incidents of the Life, and these incidents are again subservient to the development of character. The outward invariably yields to the inward, the physical to the moral and spiritual.

Every other interest revolves around the Sacred Biography itself. The figures of the disciples move around their Master, and serve as a background of contrast to him; while all the minor characters, Jewish, Greek, Roman, Syro-Phœnician, are sketched by a delicate pencil and with singular tact. So that from a perusal of these volumes we believe that the sympathetic reader will carry away a more distinct image of the character and life of Christ, and his relation to his contemporaries, than he can gain from the more brilliant page of Pressensé, or the more elaborate discussions of Neander.

In the evangelical narratives there are frequent *breaks* in the continuity of the story, to fill up which by wise inference and not by rash conjecture, is one end of historical study. These gaps are due, not merely to the silence of the narrators, and the consequent want of connecting links, but to our ignorance of the motives which led to this or that course of action, and of the feelings with which our Lord's acts were accompanied.

Much of what we may call the outward drapery of the scenes of the ministry is altogether omitted by the Evangelists; and this, when supplied by a discreet interpreter, sheds peculiar light upon the incidents themselves. Or, again, when several possible explanations of an event may be given, it is the part of the interpreter to choose the most likely, and, by a wise selection, it is singular how much light may be cast upon the narrative, while all trace of a hiatus between the events disappears. By thus clothing a scene with its unrecorded moral drapery, much apparent harshness and arbitrariness vanish. For example, in the case of our Lord's cursing the barren fig-tree, when we see that he was "enacting a parable," selecting a type of moral barrenness, and shadowing forth its doom, the very act of destruction becomes morally beautiful. We may instance a few of these suggestions which occur in Dr. Hanna's volumes. The explanation of the sigh which escaped from our Lord's lips before he cured the deaf and dumb man at Bethsaida (*Galilean Ministry*, pp. 307–8); the explanation of the vernacular Aramaic word "Ephphatha," then used in the district of Decapolis, or the use of the Hebrew phrase "Talitha-cumi," to the dead maiden in Jairus's Hebrew-speaking household; the reasons suggested for our Lord's visiting, at a particular time the northern district of Cæsarea-Philippi, where he was "surrounded by the emblems of various faiths and worships;"

or the analysis of the motives which led the Greeks in Jerusalem to wish to see Jesus,—the act of cleansing the Temple having impressed them (*Passion Week*, p. 144); or the reasons why Galilee was selected as "the chosen trysting-place" for the appearances of the risen Lord with his disciples (*Forty Days*, pp. 109–11). In reference to all the manifold breaks in the narrative, we may say what Dr. Hanna says of one set of them:—

"We cannot doubt that if all the minor and connecting links were in our hands, we should be able to explain what now seems to be obscure, to harmonize what now seems to be conflicting. But in the absence of such knowledge we must be content to take what each writer tells us, and regard it as the broken fragment of a whole, all the parts of which are not in our hands, so that we can put them connectedly together."—(*Forty Days*, pp. 25–6).

Another advantage of such a study of the Life of Jesus as this, is its unfolding of the exquisite *sequences* both in the acts and teaching of our Lord, and in the progressive testimony of others to his claim, those singular "ties of thought and of incident, to which Dr. Hanna so often refers, the orderliness of the development of his plan, and the harmonious evolution of his whole work towards the world. The very key to the interpretation of one scene is often to be found in its sequence or connection with another. The continuity of the story is marvelous, and when a blank occurs which cannot be filled up, a reason for a hiatus can usually be found. Incident leads on to incident, disclosure to disclosure. Testimony is added to testimony. Christ himself teaches only as the disciples are able to receive his teaching. Enigmatic gleams of truth are dropped, which become intelligible only in the light of the sequel. This characteristic is one in which the life of Jesus differs from all other lives. There was no immaturity of plan or act, and no tardy development: nothing came too soon, nothing too late. The life advanced "without haste, yet without rest." Thus forming a grand and growing unity, it suggests, in its very uniqueness, that its subject himself "saw the end from the beginning." We can even see that to change its order would be to mutilate its parts, to reverse its sequences would be to mar its perfection.

In connection with that inexhaustible fullness which Dr. Hanna most happily and sometimes unconsciously signalizes in our Lord, his lectures are eminently suggestive of new phases and unexhausted processes of thought. They raise a multitude of open questions at which they merely hint, and the curtain falls upon them, leaving them unsolved. Hence their catholicity. They proclaim one great Faith throughout, but they refuse to dogmatize upon details. It is difficult for a man, with strong convictions which he holds firmly, to be catholic towards those who differ from him; while it is easy for one who sits apart, holding no form of creed, to be blandly tolerant of all. But when we find catholicity in alliance with a strong faith, the union is as admirable as it is rare.

The most distinctive feature of these volumes remains to be noticed. It is the frequency with which the soundings of moral evidence are taken in the simplest manner. The author is not writing a formal *apologia*, but he has indirectly written one.

Thus in one of the earliest chapters, on the Nativity, our attention is turned to that "strange timing of events that then took place." Dr. Hanna shrinks from the attempt to penetrate within the veil which hides from us the secret things of God; but he finds it possible to detect "some natural and obvious benefits which have attended the coming of the Saviour at the particular period when it happened." It has enhanced the number and force of the evidences for his mission. For had Christ appeared at an earlier age, there would have been no room or scope for prophecy; and the record of his miracles, coming down to us from a time when contemporary history was in the main legendary, would have been more open to question than it can possibly be when it proceeds from a literary age, and reaches us "through the same channel, and with the same vouchers for its authenticity, as a large portion of ancient history." Further, the world seems to have been left for a long time to itself, "to make full proof of its capabilities and possibilities." Some of the highest forms of civilization had already appeared; and the culture of Greek philosophy and art had failed to elevate human nature morally. History anterior to the advent seems to prove that, while human nature may variously elevate itself by efforts proceeding from within, and on its own plane, it cannot thus rectify its disorder and reach its ordeal. Between the political condition of Pales-

tine at the exact period of our Saviour's birth and the work which our Lord had to accomplish in the world, Dr. Hanna finds another pre-established harmony:—

"Had Jesus Christ appeared one half-century earlier, or one half-century later than he did; had he appeared when the Jewish authorities had unchecked power, how quickly, how secretly had their malice discharged itself upon his head! No cross had been raised on Calvary. Had he come a few years later, when the Jews were stripped even of that measure of power they for a short season enjoyed, would the Roman authorities, then the only ones in the land, of their own motion, have condemned and crucified him?"—(*Earlier Years*, p. 33).

Again, in comparing the four Gospels with the apocryphal narratives, we are arrested by the immense chasm between the two. "Men who wished to honor Christ in all they said about him;" men "better taught, many of them, than the Apostles, men who

"had the full delineation of the manhood of Jesus before them, could not attempt a fancy sketch of his childhood without not only violating our sense of propriety, by attributing to him the most puerile and unmeaning displays of divine power, but shocking our moral sense and falsifying the very picture they had before their eyes, by attributing to him acts of vengeance."—(*Earlier Years*, p. 120).

The harmony between the life of childhood and youth at Nazareth and the period of public labor, is found to yield another testimony to the miraculous in Christ's life:—

"His self-recognition as the Son of God in Jerusalem, when twelve years of age, his declaration of it to his mother, his acting on it throughout life, his words in the Temple, followed by eighteen years of self-denial, and gentle, prompt obedience, his growing consciousness of divine lineage, and of the selfishness, worldliness, and hypocrisy he detected around him, his divine reticence, his sublime and patient self-restraint, his refraining from all interference in public matters and all exposure to public notice," are the natural signs of the development of a life sprung not of this world.—(*Earlier Years*, pp. 134–5).

In the call of the first disciples, a sign of the supernatural is seen at the very opening of the ministry:—

"Silently, gently, unostentatiously, Christ enters on the task assigned to him. Would any one sitting down to devise a career for the Son of God descending upon our earth, to work out the salvation of our race, have assigned such an opening to his ministry; and yet could anything have been more appropriate to him who came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, than this turning away from being ministered to by the angels in the desert, to the rendering of kindly services to John, and Andrew, and Philip, and Nathaniel?—(*Earlier Years*, p. 241).

Similarly, the self-denial implied in Christ's turning from the Samaritan villages, where a ready reception was accorded to him, and sending his disciples exclusively "to the house of Israel," (*Earlier Years*, p. 346), is inexplicable on the naturalistic theory of his life.

Dr. Hanna points to the unbroken unity of plan running through the course of the public ministry, as a further evidence of the supernatural, for it indicates "a previous foresight." He whose life was never deflected from its course by any of the cross-currents of human affairs, must have seen the end from the beginning.

"It has not been so with any of those men who have played the greatest part on the stage of human history. Their own confessions, the story of their lives, their earlier compared with their later acts, tell us how little they knew or thought beforehand of what they finally were to be and do. There have been shiftings and changes of place to suit the shiftings and changes of circumstances; surprisals here, disappointments there; old instruments of action worn out and thrown away, new ones invented and employed; the life made up of a motley array of many-colored incidents, out of which have come issues never dreamed of at the beginning. Had Jesus seen only so far into the future as the unaided human eye could carry, how much was there in the earlier period of his ministry to have excited false hopes, how much in the latter to have produced despondency! But the people came in multitudes around him, and you can trace no sign of extravagant expectation. The tide of popular favor ebbs away from

him, and you see no token of his giving up his enterprise in despair; no wavering of purpose, no change of plan, no altering of his course to suit new and obviously unforeseen emergencies."—(*Earlier Years*, pp. 262–3).

The thread of a consistent harmony thus runs through the life, from beginning to end; and here we meet the counter-assertion of M. Renan with a direct and peremptory negative. Neander had already admirably replied to the attempt of De Wette and Paulus, to prove a change of purpose in our Lord's life; and the remarks of Dr. Hanna, with the criticism of Pressensé, are a sufficient reply to Renan.

The mysterious moral power which our Lord at times exercised over men, offers fresh evidence of his superhuman origin. In the scene at the cleansing of the Temple, whence came that singular spell "over those rough cattle-drivers, and those cold calculators of the money-tables," that at the bidding of the youthful stranger all power of resistance vanished? And on the brow of the cliff at Nazareth, as well as in the garden at Gethsemane, whence came that sudden irresistible power over bands of men, that yielded they knew not why? No psychological analysis will explain these three events, without the element of the supernatural.

Again, the evident ease and sense of power (never paraded) with which our Lord wrought his works of healing, points in the same direction. He gives no explanations, and offers no argument to prove that he is the Christ, but simply and naturally, as one who held the key of Nature's storehouse, he proceeds to work a miracle as we would set about the commonest acts of our lives. When the miracle-workers of antiquity (as Elijah) are represented as raising the dead, they claim no personal power to do so; and it is only "with trouble and with pain," after long delay, and as the delegates of Jehovah, that they succeed, showing that they had to rise above themselves in the act. Our Lord, on the contrary, acts without any sign of rising above his accustomed level. He speaks to the dead, "in the style of him who said, Let there be light, and there was light."

A still more remarkable characteristic of our Lord's life remains to be unfolded, one which leads us to the very root of the moral evidence for his divinity. It is the infinite assumptions that he makes, which, if unsupported by an inward consciousness of their

reality, would sink him, morally, beneath the majority of men. So that we must choose between the horns of a dilemma: either he was much more than human, or much worse than his calumniators. This is admirably indicated by Dr. Hanna. Take the words on the ground of which alone our Lord was condemned to die. "Art thou the Son of God?" was the question of the judges, and it was from his reassertion of the fact, that he was condemned as a blasphemer. But if the fact was not true, in the unique sense in which Jesus claimed it, and in which his accusers knew that he claimed it, it must have been the very height of blasphemy in him. No passing delusion could lessen the sin of such a reiterated assertion by one of sane mind, were it false.

"If only a man," says Dr. Hanna, "Jesus was guilty of an extent, an audacity, an effrontery of pretension, which the blindest, wildest, and most arrogant enthusiast has never exceeded. The only way in which to free his character *as a man* from the stain of egregious vanity and presumption, is to recognize him as the Son of the Highest. *If the divinity that was in him be denied, the humanity no longer stands stainless.*—(*Last Day*, p. 73).

To apprehend the full bearing of this remark, we must consider it in relation to the successive incidents of the life, and the continuity of the claim Christ made. He speaks of his oneness with the Father, of an hour coming in which all men, and even the dead, should hear his voice and live. "If this were but a man speaking of the Creator, and to his fellows, we know not which would be worst, the arrogance in the one direction, or the presumption and uncharitableness in the other." (*Earlier Years*, p. 375). Again, in pronouncing a doom over the cities of Chorazin and Bethsaida, *for rejecting himself*, he "anticipates the verdict of eternity." (*Galilean Ministry*, p. 123). At Cæsarea-Philippi he minutely and circumstantially predicts the details of his own death; and on his last entrance into Jerusalem, foretells the destruction of the city, which Josephus informs us was to the letter fulfilled. Strauss seems to perceive the force of this, as he admits (*New Life*, vol. i, p. 45) that "this previous certainty (if real) must have been as supernatural as the event itself." And in accordance with this theory, the prediction must be construed as an Apostolic after-thought, to enhance the mythical glory of the Master. But it is not to the fact of Christ's prevision that we

now point, but to the claim associated with it; the assumption of the right to judge mankind, his certainty of a future empire over the world and the realm of the dead; and the conviction is forced upon us, that if no supernatural consciousness supported our Lord in making these assertions, he sinks at once to the level of an inhuman impostor. He denounces terrible woes over the Pharisees. Could the greatest of the prophets have ventured to speak to them as from the throne of heaven, as one who would shortly be seated there? And if this was a delusion on his part, his words not only lose all meaning, but are from first to last profane, and might be turned against himself. In the house of Simon, the Pharisee, he quietly makes the assumption that to him all debts are owing, and that by himself alone they could be forgiven. He arranges the future destinies of his disciples, pre-announcing and fixing the time and manner of their death. Deity incarnate alone was entitled to use the language, "If I will that he tarry till I come, what is that to thee?" He washes his disciples' feet, and thereafter says, "Ye call me Master and Lord, *and ye say well, for so I am.*"

"No one ever made pretensions so high, no one ever executed offices more humble, no one ever claimed to stand so far above the level of our humanity, speaking of himself as the light of the world, having rest and peace and life for all *at his disposal.* No one has made himself more thoroughly one with every human being whom he met, or was so ready with the services which one man may claim from his brother."—(*Passion Week*, p. 290).

Again, in the very institution of the Lord's Supper, Dr. Hanna sees a unique testimony to the supernatural in Christ. He says it must have been instituted at the time asserted in the narrative; for "how could any body of men, without a falsehood in their hands which every one could detect, at any posterior period *commence the celebration?*"

"But who would ever have risked his reputation, his prospect of being remembered by the ages that were to come, by exhibiting such an eager and premature desire to preserve and perpetuate the remembrance of his name, his character, his deeds? They have left it to others after them to devise the means of doing so; neither vain enough, nor bold enough, nor foolish enough, to be

themselves the framers of these means. But who is this who, ere he dies, by his own act and deed, sets up the memorial institution by which his death is to be shown forth? Surely he must be one who knows and feels that he has *claims to be remembered* such as none other ever had? Does not Jesus Christ, in the very act of instituting in his own life-time this memorial rite, step at once above the level of ordinary humanity, and assert for himself a position towards mankind utterly and absolutely unique?"—(*Passion Week*, pp. 330–1).

Again, as to the Resurrection. "It is by this event," says Dr. Hanna, in common with many others, "that we desire the entire question of the supernaturalism of our religion to be decided." The most remarkable attestation of this fact is to be found where we would least expect it, viz: in the state of the disciples' minds before and after the event occurred. No writer of fiction, no elaborator of floating myths, would have conjoined with the predictions of Christ as to his resurrection, before he died, such an entire forgetfulness of these facts on the part of the disciples a few days afterwards; "such an utter prostration of all faith and hope as that which the Evangelists describe, lasting till the most extraordinary means were taken to remove them, and yielding slowly even then." We can easily account for the state of the disciples' minds when their hopes seemed shattered by their Master's death, and the very power of remembering his words had vanished: but we cannot understand how the inventor of a cunningly devised fable, or the credulous idolatry of a number of disciples, full of faith and idealism, could have conjoined these two almost repugnant facts—facts which no man could have foreseen, on a calculation of probabilities, because they run utterly counter to the ordinary course of human action. We need not insist on the fact that Christ had "periled his own reputation on its occurrence;" nor do we rest so much on the positive testimony borne by multitudes to the fact itself. But the puzzle which anti-supernaturalism cannot explain is, the moral status between the utter gloom and dismay, nay, even the despair of the Apostles at the time of their Master's death, and the sudden kindling of their faith (the faith of martyrs), which, within a few days, leaped into flame. What link connected these two states of mind in the Apostles? Could it have been wholly subjective? There is a gap to be filled, a moral

chasm to be spanned, and no bridge but that of the supernatural reality will span it. This becomes even more evident when we consider the origin and education of the Apostles. They were rude, unlettered men, slow of heart to believe; men without the faculty of poetic idealization; some of them with a large infusion of the spirit of honest doubt. It is a mistake to suppose that the rustic mind of a peasant is usually more amenable to spectral delusions than the soul of the imaginative thinker; and these Jewish peasants, the fishermen of Galilee, required the strong, clear evidence of fact, before they would believe that which at first seemed to them too good news to be true. Then it might have been possible for *one* disciple to have elaborated the myth of the resurrection, for one excited woman to report that she had seen a ghost, and that it resembled the dead Master, whose loss they all mourned: but a mixed multitude of diverse minds, in every variety of circumstances, united their testimony to the fact; a cloud of witnesses declared it with one voice. And such was the force of the evidence to them, that they willingly sealed it by death, while the resurrection became the central fact of Apostolical testimony and of missionary preaching, for years. No link but that of a real resurrection, the re-appearance of the historical Christ for a season with his disciples, can explain this victorious faith of the men, the rapid assent to their doctrine, the planting of innumerable churches, and the speedy power of Christianity in the world.

But perhaps the best contribution to this line of evidence will be found in Dr. Hanna's chapter entitled "The Great Commission." In the narrative of one of those manifestations of Jesus to his disciples after the resurrection, we read that "he came and spake unto them, saying, All power is given unto me in heaven and on earth." "How," asks Dr. Hanna,—

"How could a man of woman born, who had lived and died as we do, have been regarded as other than the vainest and most arrogant of pretenders, who said that all power in heaven and earth was his, had there not been something in the whole earthly history of this man which corresponded with and bore out such an extraordinary assumption? The simple fact that there was a man who lived for three-and-thirty-years in familiar intercourse with his fellow-men, yet, ere he left the world, was recognized

and worshiped by five hundred of them, as one who was guilty of no presumption in saying, 'All power is given unto *me* in heaven and in earth,' goes far to sustain the belief that he was indeed the Son of the Highest. To imagine that a Jew, the son of a Galilean carpenter, educated in a village in the rudest part of Judea,—that such a man, being a man and nothing more, could have lived so long upon the earth without saying or doing anything to belie the belief in his divinity, presents a far greater difficulty than does the doctrine of the Incarnation."—(*Forty Days*, pp. 157–8).

The commission to the infant Church followed this claim of power—"Go, preach the gospel to every creature:"—

"A mission so comprehensive was as novel as it was sublime. Familiarity with the idea blunts the edge of our wonder; but at that time, when, in a remote Jewish province, Jesus gathered a few hundred followers, and sent them forth, assigning them a task not to be accomplished till all nations had been brought to sit under his shadow; the idea of a religion addressed to all, equally adapted to all, and needed by all, had never been broached, never been attempted to be realized. Prior systems gloried in their exclusiveness; and, both socially and religiously, the Jew of the Saviour's time was one of the most shut in and bigoted of his race. His faith and his patriotism were one; and the deeper the patriotism the narrower the faith. And yet it is among this people—it is from one brought up in one of its wildest districts, it is from one for whom birth, position, education, had done nothing in the way of weaning him from the prejudices of his countrymen; it is from him that a religion emanates, whose professed object is to gather into one the whole human family. The very broaching of a project so original, so comprehensive, so sublime, in that age, and in these circumstances, stands out as an event unique in the history of our race. Had Jesus Christ done nothing more than set this idea for the first time afloat, that it was desirable and practicable to frame for the world a religious faith and worship, which should have nothing of the confinements of country, or period, or caste, he would have stood by himself, and above all others. But he did more than this. He not only announced the project, but he devised the instrument by which it was to be accomplished. He

put that instrument in its complete and perfect form, into the hands of those by whom it was to be employed. That instrumentality has never asked for, because it has never needed improvement or change. When Jesus said, 'Go make disciples of all nations,' he announced, and that in the simplest, least ostentatious way, as if there was no novelty in the project, no difficulty in its execution, as if it were the most natural thing in the world, that it should be taken up, and the surest thing that it should be carried out, the most original, the broadest, the sublimest enterprise that ever human hands have been called upon to accomplish."—(pp. 156–166).

Dr. Hanna has not written a book for scholars, yet in his volumes there are hints of problems which the most learned scholars may very easily miss. To a devout imagination and a mature judgment, aspects of truth are sometimes disclosed to which mere erudition is often blind. We may mention several of these questions underlying the narrative of facts, which are hinted at rather than discussed by our author. The significant absence of any information as to the mode of ordination of the twelve Apostles—Christ "having done nothing with his own hand to erect or organize the church" (*Galilean Ministry*, p. 329); the pretended primacy of St. Peter (pp. 332–6); the exposition of the relations of Church and State, in the analysis of the saying, "Render unto Cæsar the things which are Cæsars, but unto God the things which are God's" (*Passion Week*, p. 79); the trial to our Lord in bearing the burden of insoluble problems which should hereafter perplex his Church, as, for example, the destination of human souls after death (*Galilean Ministry*, pp. 124–5); the possible pain arising from the restriction of his earthly ministry, and its insignificant results (*Passion Week*, p. 147); the "room for the patriotic sentiment in Jesus, that love of country by which every true man is characterized; and, mingling with that which was divine and broadly human, purified from all imperfection, narrowness, and selfishness, that patriotic grief which wept over the overthrow of Jerusalem" (*Last Day*, p. 168). In the answer to the question of the Sadducees (*Passion Week*, 90) the root of the system of materialism is disclosed; and the relation of a free personal being to his creation, with the possible changes which nature may undergo in the economy of the future, is alluded to. In the clas-

sification of the miracles, as wrought upon nature and upon man, and the reasons given for "the vast preponderance of the latter," we have a glance into the philosophy of the miraculous. To display omnipotence was not Christ's aim, or he could have done so far more strikingly than he did. His omnipotence was veiled under the moral import and the spiritual end to be reached. A deep question in morals, and the relation of the central commandment to the separate precepts, are discussed in connection with the lawyer's question, "Master, which is the great commandment?" (*Passion Week* p. 103). We may further notice the reasons assigned for our Lord's delay upon the earth for forty days, between the resurrection and the ascension, and for the brief mysterious glimpses of these days, viz: that both the humanity and divinity should be signalized; the one by his residence so long, and the clearly human appearances; the other by their peculiar character, brief and fugitive, *almost* spiritual and spectral. Had the old Galilean life been resumed, the "rising faith in the divinity" of Jesus would have been checked. Had he ascended immediately from the tomb of Joseph of Arimathea, "in the blaze of that new glory around his person, the man Christ Jesus had been lost, the humanity swallowed up in the divinity" (*Forty Days*, p. 39).

The view taken of the nature of our Lord's resurrection body, is also note-worthy. It is represented as undergoing, during the forty days, a gradual transition from the material to a spiritual state, "the corruptible being on its way to the incorruptible, the mortal *putting on* the clothing of immortality" (*Forty Days*, p. 53). Strauss has affirmed that on this point there is an insuperable contradiction in the accounts of the Evangelists: one statement representing the resurrection body as physical, because able to digest food, another representing it as a ghost, because able to pass through closed doors. He therefore speaks of the story as a "fantastic imagination." But the supposition that the body which arose from the grave was physical, but that it gradually became etherealized, though not new, is so exceedingly suggestive, that we wonder it is not generally received by the Church. We have some analogies which bear it out. The spirit may gradually exercise a vast ascendency over the body; and in proportion as a man acquires victory over the senses, the form of his organization is refined. Matter may finally yield to spirit, so as to be its elastic

and ethereal vehicle, rather than, as now, its impediment and drag. Spirit may gradually be able to dispense with the aid of matter, and after having been educated and enriched by it, may stand less and less in need of its coarser stimulus. And in the resurrection body of Christ we have the type of what the bodies of men may become in a more etherealized universe. It is only in keeping with other divine laws to which he was subject, that the process of transition in our Lord's case should have been gradual.

There are occasional repetitions in the course of these volumes, arising no doubt from the order in which they appeared. We have, for example, the analysis of the character of St. Peter, given twice over in the same words. Had they been written in a consecutive series, beginning with the Nativity, the retrospect in the fifth volume on the *Last day of the Passion* would not have occurred; nor such regressions as the biographical sketch of the Virgin, which is suggested merely by Christ's address to her from the cross. The admirable sermon on "the great invitation," introduced into the recital of the Galilean ministry, may be justified by the grandeur of the theme, and because it contains the very essence of our Lord's message to the world; but it somewhat breaks the continuity of the narrative, and, if treated in its evidential character, as testifying to him who could alone invite a world to find repose in himself, it would have been more homogeneous and complete. The two discourses on the parables of the Virgins and of the Talents, and the description of the day of final judgment (in the *Passion Week*), might have been retrenched, especially as some other discourses revealing the inner life of our Lord, are briefly passed over. The reference to the abuse of works of fiction, introduced into the lecture on the weeping for the daughters of Jerusalem, is scarcely relevant.

While it is true that we find in these volumes some things more adapted to the pulpit than the permanent literary page, they are a very note-worthy specimen of Scottish Christian teaching. It is to be regretted that a philosophical analysis and defense of the great data of the Christian faith is seldom heard from the modern pulpit. A notion seems to prevail, that the elementary facts of the gospel of Christ ought to be the staple of the teaching there. It was not so always. If we consult the specimens which survive even of patristic and mediæval preaching, or examine the great

masters of English Platonism in the seventeeth century (to select but two instances), we shall find that their ideal was widely different. The exclusion, or even the subordination of these fundamental themes, with which reflective men are struggling, from the place where they should be welcomed and cherished, will impoverish, if it does not arrest, the power of the pulpit. Believing as we do, with the *Spectator*, that questions of an "apparently refined and scholastic nature lie at the very basis of national energy and national morality," we think that these should be freely discussed from the place of direct Christian education.

We would suggest to Dr. Hanna the expediency of following this series of volumes with another, dealing with some of the questions which he takes for granted in these. Though the series is complete in itself, a supplementary discussion of some of the problems which the Tübingen school has raised, would form an appropriate introduction. Much remains to be done in this direction. We have not as yet an absolutely accurate history of the results of modern criticism as to the origin of the Gospel narratives.

We should also have relished from the same pen some chapters devoted to the still more arduous task of gathering together the main elements in the teaching of our Lord, summarizing its results, and showing the re-appearance of its germs in the Apostolic doctrine of the Epistles. If we proceed beyond a mere recital of events to ponder the *meaning* of the facts narrated, we are immediately led into the region of doctrinal form. Doctrine is but the *explanation of fact.* But we think that the collection of "the first flowings" of Christian doctrine, from the words of its Founder would reveal some curious discrepancies between it and the creeds of later ages, some modern growths and incrustations, possibly also some losses and departures from its first ideal.

We cannot part with these volumes without a further reference to the fundamental feature which distinguishes this Life of our Lord from those by Strauss and Renan. The admission or rejection of the supernatural determines that fundamental feature. Its recognition is the touchstone of success, its rejection the badge of failure. From the account we have given of the French and and German works, it will be seen that they agree in pronouncing the supernatural unhistoric. Renan has not the hardihood to assert that miracles are impossible, but in the name of universal

history he says, that "up to this time no miracle has ever been proved," as none have ever occurred in presence of men capable of testing its miraculous character. Strauss is at once bolder and more rash. In his judgment, miracle is "that heterogeneous element which makes history impossible." He would admit nothing supernatural, no matter how numerous the witnesses or harmonious their attestation. Philosophy pronounces the verdict *a priori* which scientific history ratifies *a posteriori*. Miracle is contingency and lawlessness within an orderly world. It implies that God acts against his own laws. It amounts to a correction of the universe, and consequently involves its imperfection: and as the evangelical recorders had no critical tests, their evidence loses all power of proof.

It will be observed that we have here a gigantic *petitio principii*, a gratuitous assumption utterly inadmissible in philosophy, unless supported by the evidence of an intuition. But its advocates deny the validity of the intuitions, and found it on an induction from historical phenomena. As such it ignores the boundaries of human knowledge. It illogically infers a universal conclusion from a number of particular instances of fixed order in nature (these instances being irrelevant to the argument, as they are admitted on both sides). And it may be directly negatived by positive testimony to the opposite. We therefore turn Strauss's dictum against his own theory, that "there may be things so incredible in themselves that this incredibility would invalidate the evidence of a witness in other respects the most credible of men" (by which principle he would reject a miracle, however attested). It may be applied with the greatest cogency to the assumption that Jesus was merely human, notwithstanding any amount of evidence as to the origin of the Gospel narratives. This is an assumption so incredible, that its incredibility would shake the evidence of any witness from the first century that attested it.

But we decline to admit the postulate from which Strauss and Renan, and all anti-supernaturalists start. They first define a miracle in a fashion which travesties the doctrine maintained, and then refuse, on the ground of their dogmatic postulate, to admit the relevancy of the only kind of evidence that could substantiate that which they reject. Even although the occurrence of a miracle were tantamount to the suspension of Nature's laws (which it is not), to be entitled to assert that such a violation of

Nature was impossible, the objector should be conversant with the inmost secrets of natural phenomena, to be absolutely sure that no new force or set of forces had escaped his notice, or was held by the Divine mechanician in reserve. In short, if miracles are impossible, man in his ignorance cannot know the fact. The secret would belong exclusively to Him who has chosen to reveal the opposite. For a creature of limited intellectual vision to deny the possiblity of miracle, is indirectly to arrogate omniscience. M. Renan has seen this, and hence has fallen back on historical ground, and contents himself with affirming that no miracle has ever been critically attested.

The question of the miraculous thus recedes into a problem of speculative philosophy. Miracles are impossible except on a theistic theory of the universe. But no theist can validly deny their possibility. It remains for historical and moral evidence to authenticate the fact. But the first postulate of theism, the free-will of God, and the existence of an infinite *reserve of power* in the Divine Nature,—power unexhausted in the creation and upholding of the universe,—supplies us with a firm philosophical basis on which the fact may repose.

Searching for a human analogy to the transcendent power which theism thus conceives as ever within and behind the veil of Nature, we do not betake ourselves to marvels and apparitions; for we find the true analogue within the human will. If our will is free in any sense, it is a source of power; it can originate new processes. By the forth-putting of our free causality, we can produce a new series of effects, which, however, blend throughout the whole process with the customary sequences of Nature. We change the order of Nature by introducing a new force within its realm. And if God be free, if human freedom is but a dim reflection or adumbration of his, it is self-evident that he may introduce at will new forces within the existing order of things. We can alter no law of Nature; we can only discharge a new force from the center of our personality amongst existing laws. And in the miracles of Christ we see Nature amenable to a Divine will, as it is amenable to the supernatural action of our human wills. The difference is not in the nature of the effects produced, but in the rank and power of the Agent producing them. The reign of law is unbroken; but Nature is flexible, and bends before a new-born power. The novel and seemingly

anomalous agent blends harmoniously with the existing framework of causation, and is itself subject to the sweep of mundane law, the moment that it is introduced. Its miraculous character lies in its source. The new element is not lawless, nor does it come to violate law, or dethrone it. The supernatural is but *the higher natural.* God does not readjust his former work; he supplements it, out of the infinite reserve of his nature. Without the rigor of fixed law, confusion and anarchy would reign: and without the presence of a supernatural will behind the orderly phenomena, the universe would be locked up as in the chains of fate; and intermediate between the chance of the one system and the rigor of the other, between causalism and fatalism, the doctrine of a supernatural and living will emerges.

But we cannot affirm that the presence of God is more real in a miraculous event than in a natural process. That would be to banish God from the realm of Nature,—to limit him to the abnormal, and exclude him from the normal. The spiritual and supernatural is rather the *source* of the natural and material. The latter is an apocalypse of the former, a revelation of God, "the garment we see him by." And the "signs and wonders" of the New Testament were not more truly (though they were *as* truly) the signs of the supernatural, than were the lilies of the field, or the fowls of the air, from which our Lord deduced the doctrine of a universal Providence. What we see in the phenomena of the universe is the apparatus by which God reveals himself constantly in Nature; what the disciples saw in the miracles of our Lord was, the apparatus by which he revealed himself once in his Son. The supernatural is the same in both cases. We cannot affirm that the presence of God is less real throughout Nature at all times (though we may not discern it) than it was in the peculiar and unique machinery of the Christian advent; or, to make the distinction more emphatic, that in the *resurrection* of Lazarus, God was more specially revealed than he was in the natural *death* of Lazarus. The former incident was but a selected means to impress upon a callous generation the reality of the supernatural, and to supply a type of the continuous miracle of history. But why should our biased "men of science" so persistently deny the possibility of such a gentle incursion into the realms of Nature of that power which ever sleeps behind phenomena? They deny that there can be "aught in heaven or

earth but what is dreamed of in their philosophy." But Science itself is only the human interpretation of natural phenomena, and the human classification of Nature's powers. Why refuse to include within the limits of historical fact a series of new manifestations, of which the cause is occult, underworking, and divine? We do not fall into the abyss of oriental dualism by so doing; for between the ordinary and the extraordinary the difference, as we have said, is only one of degree. And a miracle is the highest revelation of Nature, because of the supernatural Power which resides behind and within it everywhere. Apparent violations of order are but instances in which laws that are inferior yield, normally, before the power of the superior.

But some reason for the introduction of the new agency within the old order may be shown to exist. Nature was already marred by the introduction of moral evil, and the necessity for the supernatural arises simply from *the failure of the natural*—a failure not due to any physical defect within the universe, but to the loss of moral power in man. The original and normal state of the creature had, by his own act, become the abnormal; and the introduction of the supernatural was a means of his restoration to the normal, as human nature had failed to raise and regenerate itself. If the present condition of the earth were its normal state, and evil were merely a defect to be balanced in due time by excess, there would be no room for supernatural agency. But if evil be a moral blot on the universe, the interposition of God to remove the blot of the creature, is immediately seen to be but the restoration of order.

But the restorative process which is introduced will be in strict conformity with the nature of that which it comes to restore, *i. e.*, it will be mainly spiritual and moral. The physical wonders which may accompany it will be altogether secondary and subordinate. Now, in discussing the Christian miracles, attention is often fixed on the physical marvels, which have no value and little meaning apart from their moral end. A prodigy is a mere finger-post pointing to some moral truth. And possibly the Christian miracles have repelled the scientific world, mainly because of the attention which Christian apologists have bestowed upon their outward forms. But the physical is the accidental, the moral is the essential in a miracle; and the radical conception of the supernatural in Christianity is, *the restoration of a lost moral order*,

by the free act of one whose power is the mere energy of his love. Thus considered, the supernatural is not only an essential part of Christianity, it *is* Christianity *itself*. Eliminate it, and you eliminate root, branches, and the whole tree; and the religion of Christ falls at once to the level of the other religious systems, if it does not (because of its claim to the supernatural) sink beneath them all.

Strauss had attempted to show that if a belief in miracles has any warrant at all, it may be as freely extended to those of the Greek mythology, or oriental Buddism, or mediæval Catholicism, as to those "signs" which accompanied the birth of Christianity. As we reject the former marvels as unhistorical, and make an exception in favor of the Christian miracles, we must show some valid reasons for the exception. If we can prove that it would involve a greater marvel, and tax our credulity more, to treat the Christian miracles as legends, than to accept them as facts, we have a presumption in their favor; just as if, by the rejection of all miracles, the life of Christ could be made to yield a more satisfactory result, we should have a presumption on the other side. We therefore accept the challenge, and point to the totally different *character* of the Christian miracles, from the poetic idealizations of Greece or the apocryphal legends of Jewish story. The test of a divine moral purpose, in which power is ever "vassal unto love," will easily distinguish between the spurious and authentic; while the evidence of facts is in the one case clear, and in the other obscure. We think that the volumes of Dr Hanna have abundantly proved this point. But a scientific vindication of the miraculous is comparatively useless to those critics who assert their impossibility *a priori*. Strauss virtually says, "I will not be persuaded though one rose from the dead." Renan desires that the alleged marvel should be performed before the Academy of Sciences, and *repeated frequently*, that no illusion or slight-of-hand be mistaken for reality. But this demand is fatal to the very idea of the miracle. It is wrought, not to excite wonder, but to produce a moral result. Renan ignores the spiritual element in the physical prodigy. But no miracle could be wrought to gratify the scientific curiosity of men already biased against its evidence. It is recorded in the Gospels, that in certain districts our Lord "could do no mighty works, because of the unbelief" of the spectators. But his miracles were varied sufficiently

to prove that by no stock process, legerdemain, or fraud, could any one of them have been wrought; while the whole key-board of Nature was amenable to his will.

Pressensé has well said, "Falsehood may have its hour, but it has no *future*;" a maxim by which it would be unwise for any generation to test a novel doctrine submitted to it. But the advance of history, with its "increasing purpose," the gradual extinction of those forms of faith which have no permanent root in human nature, or in the facts of the past, and the severe strain to which those must have been subjected which have outlived the scrutiny of the ages, warrant its application to history at large. What stands the criticism of time is true; and if error lives, its vitality is due to the truth with which it is in all cases mixed up. The constant and distracting succession of hypotheses as to the origin of the Gospels, and the twilight of uncertainty to which most of them conduct, present a strange contrast to the light which the supernatural casts upon the life of Christ. The first work with the majority of the critics is to abolish the conclusions of their predecessors. This is consistent enough in those who hold with Renan that "the ideal is ever a Utopia." But we pronounce his dictum philosophically false, and historically untrue. The ideal *has been realized* in One Human Life. Its solitariness and its ideal completeness is the source of its unique power in the world; and it has "possessed the future" much more completely than it conquered the age in which it first appeared.

We have sufficiently indicated our high estimate of the work of Dr. Hanna, and of the contribution he has made to the apologetical literature of the Church. It has been written mainly for those who have not been perplexed by the questions of modern thought—rather for the Church than for those outside its borders. But its function is much wider than its author states it, and it may yet take precedence of more ambitious treatises in the estimation of the Church catholic.

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XXVIII.—JOHN STUART MILL AND CHRISTIAN MORALITY.*

By Christian morality we mean the morality of the New Testament, and not merely that body of ethical codes to which Mr. Mill refers, as having "been gradually built up by the Catholic Church of the first five centuries."† Mr. Mill recognizes, and in express terms signalizes, the distinction between these two systems of morality, but the course of his argument confounds them, and makes it difficult to ascertain, in all cases, what he means by "Christian ethics," and "Christian morality so-called." We are persuaded that he has not purposely juggled with the two conceptions, but the reader requires to be incessantly on his guard because of the rapidity with which he passes from the one to the other. Mr. Mill wonders that any one "who derives his knowledge of this [Christian morality] from the book itself [the Bible], can suppose that it was announced or intended as a complete doctrine of morals."

It is somewhat difficult to comprehend what Mr. Mill means by the phrase a "complete doctrine of morals." If he means a perfect system of precepts and regulations, which shall apply specifically and in express terms to all the conditions of human life, superseding the exercise of individual thought and the judgment of the individual conscience—a system which shall render the discernment of duty as easy and as mechanical as the consultation of a ready reckoner—confessedly, his charge against Christian morality is valid. But in this case, his conception of "a complete doctrine of morals" is one which can never be realized in our world. There is not one relationship of life, whether domestic, or social, or political, on which the Bible has given, or on which any book could give such detailed and elaborate directions as that there shall be no room for mistake in our interpretation of the duty which any given setting of circumstances may require at our hands. Or, if Mr. Mill means a methodized arrangement of morals in philosophical form, then again his complaint is well

* From the *British Quarterly Review.*

† *On Liberty*, p. 28.

grounded. But we submit that ethics are taught in the New Testament in a far more impressive manner than could have been secured by the systematization of moral rules into a scientific scheme. So far as Mr. Mill's language is meant to affirm that there are moral principles which are not found in the doctrines and precepts of Christ and His Apostles, but which have been borrowed from heathenism, or elicited from the general experience of mankind, we contend that it is at issue with the facts of the case. We affirm that the New Testament contains a "complete-system of morals," in any sense of these terms which is at all compatible with the conditions of human life and action; that general and fruitful principles are enounced for the guidance of man; and that these principles cover the whole sphere of human obligations in relation to both God and man, to this world and to that which is to come. It is to be regretted that Mr. Mill has not been more explicit in his exposition of those special points in which Christian morality is alleged to be defective. The one particular he has cited renders him but doubtful service; for he says, "While in the morality of the best Pagan nations duty to the State holds even a disproportionate place, infringing on the just liberty of the individual; in purely Christian ethics that grand department of duty is scarcely noticed or acknowledged."* Now we regard the command, "Render unto Cæsar the things which are Cæsar's," as a sufficiently emphatic acknowledgment of our duty to the State, so far as the "State" represents the constituted authority amongst any people; and if by "State" Mr. Mill means the commonwealth as a society apart from the ruling power, there is no book which inculcates the duties which arise out of this relationship with such clearness and force as the New Testament. Where is the doctrine of universal brotherhood so impressively taught and enforced? and the practical reception of this single doctrine becomes itself a substitute for a thousand rigid and cold injunctions, which, however they may be rung in men's ears, cannot create the spirit by which alone they can be obeyed. It is a far nobler thing to implant a principle than to announce a law, for the principle in itself becomes both light and power, at once showing the path of duty and inspiring the soul with determination to pursue it. To beget in a man a keen sense of justice and

* *On Liberty*, p. 29.

honor is worth ten thousand specific commands and prohibitions; and it is but a narrow and superficial conception of Christianity which fails to realize that it is one of its chief purposes and results so to enthrone in the heart good principles, as to reduce to a minimum the number of mere verbal regulations. Given, the existence of an affection which loves one's neighbor as oneself, and what has Mr. Mill to suggest as a substitute, or even as a supplement? Have we not in such an internal force a guarantee for both justice and benevolence? If the husband "love his wife as his own body," and the wife "reverence her husband," are not these the most effective and the most unfailing securities against conjugal infidelity and misery? Whose rights will be outraged when the injunction is fulfilled, "render to all their dues—tribute to whom tribute, custom to whom custom, fear to whom fear, honor to whom honor?

When Mr. Mill proceeds to affirm that in the morality of private life, "whatever exists of magnanimity, high-mindedness, personal dignity, even the sense of honor, is derived from the purely human, not the religious part of our education, and never could have grown out of a standard of ethics in which the only worth professedly recognized is that of obedience," he writes with a recklessness which indicates more of passion than of calm and philosophical desire to reach or state the truth. It is simply not true, that the only worth "professedly recognized in the Christian standard of ethics is that of obedience." Obedience to what, or to whom? Mr. Mill has but just charged it against Christian morality, that it scarcely notices any duty to the State. It cannot, therefore, in such case, enforce obedience to the will of the State. What is the standard of Christian ethics that Mr. Mill has been studying? It cannot be that which represents the first expounders of Christianity as defying alike Jewish magistrates and Pagan kings. It cannot be that of the "noble army of martyrs," who have "resisted unto blood," and who preferred the flames, or the amphitheatre, or the cross, to the ignominy of a falsehood by which they would have saved their lives. It is not needful to reverse the statement of Mr. Mill, and to say that "whatever exists of magnanimity, high-mindedness, personal dignity, even the sense of honor, is derived from the religious, and not from the purely human part of our education." The moral depravation which has befallen the heart is not so complete as to have

blinded it to all perceptions of the noble and the ignoble, and to have left it absolutely dependent upon the teachings of a revelation for the discovery of these important distinctions. There are truths and duties which have never been lost sight of even among nations who have never enjoyed the light of the Scriptures; but when Mr. Mill credits the purely human, and not the religious part of our education with being the productive source of *all* the "magnanimity, highmindedness, personal dignity, and even the sense of honor" which exist in the morality of private life, he practically discards the very principles of induction which he himself has so ably expounded; and he overlooks facts which ought to have been too notorious to escape attention; viz: that during his own lifetime whole tribes of savage and even cannibal barbarians have derived the high moral qualities of which he speaks, from the Christian part of their education alone. There is not, we venture to affirm, one Christian precept or doctrine which does not directly tend to the nourishment and growth of these personal virtues; and we further affirm that Mr. Mill is not in a condition to pronounce how far what he designates the "purely human part" of our education may not itself be the product of Christian influences. A process of careful elimination, which should leave as *residuum* the "purely human part," uninfluenced by the doctrines and precepts of Christianity, might astonish our philosopher by its infinitesimal quantity. Notwithstanding all that Mr. Mill has written on this point, the truth still stands unaffected, that in the man who should embody in perfection the precepts and spirit of Christianity, would be found the most harmonious and complete development of which humanity is capable. He could not be dishonest who "provides things honest in the sight of all men;" nor selfish, who "looks not only upon his own things, but also on the things of others;" nor unjust, "who gives to every one the things that were equal;" nor rebellious, who "is subject to the powers that be, and are ordained of God;" nor meanly submissive, who, listening to the voice of conscience, can say, "I must obey God rather than man;" nor rude, who obeys the injunction, "Be courteous;" nor immoral, who abstains "from the appearance of evil;" nor inhospitable, who is "not forgetful to entertain strangers;" nor quarrelsome, who, as much as lies in him, "lives peaceably with all men;" nor prejudiced, who "proves all things, and holds fast that which

is good;" nor slothful, who "works with his hands the thing that is good;" nor relentless or revengeful, who forgives "as God in Christ has forgiven him;" nor deceitful, who has the "wisdom without hypocrisy;" nor morose, who is "gentle to all men;" nor a willful perpetrator of any evil, whose life is inspired by that gospel which teacheth that "denying all ungodliness and worldly lusts, we must live soberly, righteously, and godly in the present world."

XXIX.—MORAL PHILOSOPHY AND CHRISTIANITY.*

Christian moral philosophy has been singularly unprogressive since the days of Butler. Even the system of that philosopher did not owe its origin to a deliberate attempt to investigate the relation of man's moral and spiritual nature to the great truths of the Christian revelation. On the contrary, it was elaborated partially and unsystematically in his efforts to combat the sceptical principles of the eighteenth century. It therefore overlooks, or only partially treats, of some of the great truths of the Christian revelation, and does not attempt to deal with them as a whole. Still less does it attempt to take a philosophic view of those parts of Christianity which are peculiar to itself, and distinguish it from every other mode of moral and spiritual teaching. During the present century, moral philosophy has formed an important portion of the studies of the University of Oxford; but she has made no additions to the science. Her manuals are still Aristotle and Butler, although of late years the study of the latter has greatly diminished, and the partial light which he has thrown on Christian ethics has been superseded in favor of writers who have certainly not addicted themselves to the study of the peculiar features of the moral teaching of our Lord or his Apostles. A great work, embracing the whole range of Christian moral philosophy, remains yet to be written. Its effectual handling will inflict a dangerous wound on modern infidelity. Among persons who professedly handle these subjects, great misapprehensions prevail as to the relation of Christianity to the moral and intellectual nature of man.

Every fresh form of unbelief reiterates the objection that Christianity has made no new discoveries in morality; or, at any rate, that they are so inconsiderable as to render it ridiculous to suppose that a divine revelation was necessary for their communication. Mr. Mill has gone so far as to state his belief that Christian

* From the *Contemporary Review*, July, 1869.

ethics are imperfect. The state of our moral philosophy is in a great degree responsible for these objections having even the appearance of plausibility. It would have been impossible to maintain them, unless we had been allowed to remain in ignorance of the relation in which the great truths of Christianity stand to our moral and spiritual being. The object of this paper is not to elaborate the moral philosophy of Christianity, but to draw attention to the unsatisfactory state of our present system, contemplated from a Christian point of view.

If Christianity is a divine revelation, it is hardly possible to conceive of a worthier object for the exercise of the human intellect than a careful examination of the relation in which its truths stand to the moral and spiritual nature of man. Previous systems of moral philosophy had clearly pointed out where the wants of human nature lay. Do they fully satisfy those wants? Is the assertion true that neither our Lord nor his Apostles have made any additions to our stock of moral truths, or to our power of enforcing them? If this is not true, let the philosophy of Christianity be set forth in so clear and distinct a form as to make it disgraceful for well-informed men to be guilty of reiterating such objections. At present our best systematic treatise on this subject was written more than two thousand years ago by a heathen philosopher.

We are fully sensible of the desirableness of supplementing a great system of Christian moral philosphy by one elaborated quite independently of the influences of divine revelation. Nothing is more satisfactory than to be able to show that the truths taught by Christianity fully correspond with the deepest researches which the wisest and the best of men have been able to institute into the moral nature of man. But we want more than this—viz: a demonstration of the suitableness of the discoveries of revelation to satisfy the entire aspirations of the moral and spiritual nature of man.

It is impossible to say that the collective writings of Butler present us with a complete system of the philosophy of Christianity. They were not designed to do so. The utmost which can be said is, that they contain hints for the construction of such a system. In his writings, Christianity occupies the place of one who is claiming toleration, rather than of one who is asserting its inherent right to be the conqueror of the world. Owing to their

peculiar standing-point in relation to infidelity, their aspect is rather negative than positive; consequently, many of the features of divine revelation which exert a most powerful influence over our moral being, have received from him little or no treatment. The most cursory reader of the New Testament is aware that the principle of faith is viewed by our Lord and his Apostles as the most mighty influence which can be brought to act on the spiritual and moral world. But although the principle itself is recognized, yet its supreme importance as the foundation of Christian ethics is nowhere developed in his philosophy.

The question, therefore, that lies before us for solution is, what is it which constitutes the difference between Christianity and every other system of moral teaching which preceded it? Is it a fact that it has thrown a great illumination on man's moral and spiritual condition? Does it not represent its Christ as the central power in the moral and spiritual world? If it justly makes these claims, we ought to recognize them and assign them a proper place in our philosophy. If Christianity has imparted no additional moral and spiritual power to man, its claim to be considered a divine revelation must be abandoned.

We must endeavor to ascertain the nature of the influence which our Lord designed to exercise on man. To effect this we must examine what was the basis on which moral obligation had been made to rest by moral teachers previously to the advent. What did philosophy succeed in accomplishing? We will put in the ethics of Aristotle, the highest culmination of philosophical effort, as the best answer to that question.

Ancient philosophers viewed moral philosophy as a branch of politics. To a certain extent they were right in this view. They had no other objective standard of obligation. A well-constituted state formed the only educator through whose agency the philosopher saw even a chance of training mankind in virtue. Ancient morality was ignorant of the idea of duty in the sense in which Christianity has brought it to bear on the mind of man. Its idea of duty was two-fold:—First, a subjective one, which was measured by the obligations which a man owed to himself. Secondly, an objective one, measured by the obligations which he owed as a member of political society. Beyond these he possessed no standard. The ancient religions were incapable of bringing any sense of moral obligation to bear on the human

mind. All of them were poetical, and the aspect of their deities was such, that no improvement in morality could come from making them the subjects of imitation. To enable religion to strengthen the moral power by the creation of a real sense of duty, God must be clearly apprehended as the Great Moral Governor of the universe; and man's relationship to Him must be clearly felt. The lack of moral power which was inherent in the ancient religions was not supplied by any discoveries of the philosophers; their deity was either an impersonal one, or one purely intellectual. The moralist was, therefore, forced to look on political institutions, and a course of training under their influence, as the only power on which he could rely to enforce the sanctions of morality. From them alone could he deduce the nature of moral obligation. Uncertain about the nature of God, how was it possible that he could enforce morality by appealing to his character, his will, or the relation in which man stood to Him?

But while the philosopher contemplated moral philosophy as a branch of politics, the imperfection of all existing political institutions rendered it necessary that he should find a less fluctuating basis than opinion as the measure of obligation. He, therefore, attempted to determine the nature of morality by investigating what is the true end of human existence. This he determined to be happiness. The question then arose, in what does true happiness consist? If this could be ascertained, it was possible that it might become the foundation on which to erect a moral law. Another mode of arriving at the same conclusion was, by inquiring to what end do the various faculties of man point, each in their due subordination. This involved considerations of considerable difficulty.

Taking their ethical treatises as our basis, we are justified in assuming that the philosophers had determined that true happiness consisted in the best possible exercise of man's highest functions; and on this principle they had evolved a general code of ethical duties more or less perfect. This code, however, presents us with several striking defects; and, on the confession of its authors, it was devoid of sanctions sufficiently powerful to act on the mass of mankind. The desire of happiness, though universal, is only one out of many forces by which man is impelled; and in the contest for the mastery, those other forces generally exert a preponderating strength. Such a principle of duty, therefore, being

wholly devoid of a religious basis, was necessarily weak. The very conception of duties which a man owed to himself, implies an absence of all binding power. Such a conception of duty can never elevate itself to that of disinterested virtue. Self becomes both debtor and creditor; self-love has to enforce obligation against the overwhelming impulses of passions, all of which terminate in self-gratification. It was on the basis of man's position as a member of political society, that the practice of disinterested virtue could alone be made to rest. But how was the reality of the duty to be demonstrated? How was the obligation of self-sacrifice to be proved? If demonstrated, how was a moral force to be imparted to it of sufficient strength to enable it to struggle successfully against the power of the feelings and affections, which terminated in self?

The philosopher endeavored to strengthen his position from considerations derived from the moral beauty of virtue. But on men of imperfect morality these were comparatively weak; they freely confessed that such a consideration was only fit to act on select minds. On the masses it was powerless.

Unable, therefore, to deduce a sense of duty from the relation of man to a personal Creator, heathen morality could furnish no other source of moral power than the relationship of man to man as a member of a political society. It, therefore, never could elevate itself to a sense of responsibility. To whom was man responsible? Except in his political relations, he was so only to himself. Accordingly, the philosopher never succeeded in evolving a nearer approach to the idea of duty than that of the moral beauty of a virtuous action. Where could he find it, if he was destitute of the conception of a personal God, who was the moral Governor of the universe and the Creator of man? He had no other weapon with which to combat the violence of the passions. But the question by what power could the vicious, or the imperfect, be made virtuous, forced itself on his consideration. The only real force which his principles of political philosophy supplied him with, was that of habituation.

This principle is one of the mightiest in human nature. Through its influences men have slowly become what they are. In a great degree, our modes of thinking, of acting, and our whole moral environment, have grown up under the power of habit. But habituation, from its very nature, is powerless to grapple

with a state of moral evil and corruption. Its operation must be slow; for very gradual change is one which is implied in the very conception of habit. To enable it to struggle against a state of corruption, it requires a vantage-ground from which to commence its operations. If a bad or an imperfect man is to be made good by habituation, the means must be provided for coercing the vehemence of passion, while his moral character passes through a succession of slow stages of improvement. In a word, it is necessary that he should possess a certain amount of goodness before the principle of habituation can exert any salutary influence in his reformation. It can act on an unformed character with comparative ease; but how can it be brought to bear on one where the evil appetites are predominant, and the power of self-restraint has been weakened or destroyed? Ancient philosophy, therefore-rightly viewed an advanced stage of moral corruption as one lying beyond its power to remedy. What had it to preach to the morally corrupt? The beauty of disinterested virtue, which such charac, ters were unable to discern, or the cold considerations of prudence, which were easily overborne by passion. How was a new power to be created capable of appreciating them? The only answer which she had to give was through the principle of habituation. But how was this principle, at once slow in its operations, and which involved a gradual course of training, to be called into action? While the seeds of virtue were germinating, they were in danger of being choked by the full-grown weeds of vice. The moralist, therefore, did not hesitate to confess that he could only benefit those who had a strong natural tendency to virtue. He was compelled to leave the great masses of mankind in their corruption. He labored to hide his weakness from himself by imagining an ideal state, the institution of which should habituate its citizens to virtue. But he was unable to create the material to make his ideal state an existing fact.

Hence it is that in the speculations of the ancient philosopher, ethics assumed the form of a department of politics. It was evident to him, that under the ordinary forms of society, and with the forces at his command, no fresh influence for good could be exerted; because they had been the instrumentality through which evil had been generated. The philosopher, therefore, saw that the only mode in which the single moral force with which he was acquainted could have fair play, was by creating an en-

tirely fresh set of conditions, under which men might be trained to virtue from their earliest infancy. These conditions involved no inconsiderable subversion of the existing order of society.

In his hands the ideal state never went beyond a speculation, or attained the dignity of a fact. While they all attempted to delineate one, it never occurred to any of them to endeavor to erect a Church. With the exception of the Pythagoreans, and perhaps an unsuccessful attempt of Plato to convert the tyrant Dionysius, they never attempted to create a political organization. Human nature would not bear their nostrums. No one teacher of ancient morals succeeded in inspiring his disciples with the faith necessary for becoming missionaries. It was reserved for the Founder of Christianity, in his solitary dignity, to give utterance to the words, "Go ye into all the earth, and make disciples of all nations." He had already laid the foundation of the kingdom of heaven in his person; and these words brought together the materials necessary for the erection of the spiritual building.

While philosophy had attained a general view of what constitutes a virtuous and vicious course of action, its delineations of actual morality were tinged by the political aspect in which it was compelled to contemplate it. This led it to extol the heroic, and to disparage, if not to deny, the existence of the humbler virtues.

Ancient moralists had also succeeded in analyzing the nature of those influences which cause men to succumb to the power of temptation. This has been most ably done by Aristotle, though the relation of his philosophy to the entire system of ancient thought, renders it necessary that his analysis should be translated into its modern equivalents before it can be made the basis of a living Christian philosophy. But even his analysis reveals to us the weakness of philosophy as a teacher of morals. While the whole process of deterioration is laid bare, the philosopher is unable to supply any effectual power by which the force of temptation can be overcome. Still less has his analysis recognized anything analogous to the great announcements of the Christian revelation.

Nowhere is the impotence of ancient philosophy more strikingly displayed than in her attempts to analyze the principles which connect man's moral and intellectual nature. She has nowhere

attempted to point out the relation in which the various principles which constitute our rationality stand to our spiritual and moral being. The utmost which is attempted in the ethics is an imperfect analysis of the principles of the understanding, of our intuitions, and those of practical wisdom connected with them. Aristotle had nothing to propound as to the connection of our rational and moral powers; still less did he conceive of the former as the fountain of the latter. It seems not to have occurred to any ancient philosopher, that the moral resurrection of man must be laid in the recesses of his spiritual being.

Such is the general aspect of ancient morality. We must now inquire what is the nature of Christian teaching on this subject; and what are the additions which Christianity has made to our moral knowledge. Taking the subject generally, the point for our consideration is, what was the work which our Lord proposed to effect in the moral and spiritual world, and what is it which pre-eminently distinguishes Him from all other teachers of morality?

To the latter question we can return an unhesitating answer, that the most distinguishing feature of our Lord's teaching was his great doctrine of faith; and that his great act was the creation of the Christian Church. We do not assert that faith was unknown before our Lord, but that He was the first of teachers who conceived of it and used it as the great power by which alone man's moral and spiritual regeneration could be effected.

All inquiries into the principles of morality divide themselves into two portions. First, the determination of the nature of the moral law itself. Secondly, the providing a power which is able to impart to the moral law, when known, such vital force as to enshrine it as the dominant power in the human heart. The former of these can be ascertained, with more or less accuracy, on independent grounds of moral obligation. The latter, it is the pre-eminent glory of Christianity to have discovered.

With respect to his actual teaching, there is one feature of morality, as taught by our Lord, which stands in marked contrast with that of all others who have preceded Him, viz: the high place which He has assigned in his ethics to the humbler virtues, and His comparative disparagement of the heroic ones. Our space will not allow us fully to discuss the grounds of this distinction; but the origin of it is plain. Our Lord based virtue on the moral nature of man in relation to the obligations which unite man to

man, and man to God; whereas the political aspect of ancient morality compelled the philosophers unduly to estimate the heroic ones. The fact is beyond dispute that our Lord's teaching reverses the order of the virtues, and assigns to the milder and the more unobtrusive ones, the highest place in his spiritual temple; whereas the philosophers unanimously pursued the contrary course. Their successors have generally been of the opinion that our Lord was right in thus revolutionizing morality.

The only moral power with which philosophy was acquainted, besides the principle of habituation, was some modification of what we now designate conscience. But the precise form of conscience, as it is conceived of by Christianity, is not to be found in the Greek philosophers. Their views of its character are both low and imperfect. But while man possesses a moral nature, it is certain to make its appearance, in some form, in every system of morals. Conscience, as enforced by Christian teaching, is inseparable from a perception of man's relation to a personal God, and directly derived from it. In the philosophers we meet with it, in a modified form, in the conception of right reason, or the fitting, the right, the morally beautiful, or the true. But a conscience which advanced into no higher regions was impotent against the mighty struggles of the appetites and the passions.

We will now briefly glance at the view which Christianity takes of morality itself. What is the Christian idea of holiness? Wherein does it consist?

Morality may be viewed under different aspects; and the same precepts may be evolved from each separate principle on which it is based. First, we may contemplate morality as deducible from the principles of enlightened self-love, or the desire of man to realize his own happiness in its highest form.

To evolve a system of morality on this principle, it is necessary that the intellect should be able to determine in what our highest happiness consists. Such an inquiry is a purely intellectual one. If morality is viewed as that course of action best suited to realize our happiness, it is evident that the whole of our conceptions of what constitutes the moral law, must be regulated by the views taken by the intellect as to what is the amount of gratification of our different affections, appetites, and passions which will, on the whole, best realize that end. But, although a moral law may be erected on this foundation, it is hardly correct to say that it

involves any real principle of moral obligation; because it is based only on self, which becomes at the same time the person to whom, and from whom, the obligation is due. Still the morality may be of an elevated standard; for the intellect may clearly comprehend that the constitution of the order of the universe is such that our greatest happiness is realized by a suitable exercise of the benevolent affections, as well as those which more immediately point to selfish gratification. Contemplated in this point of view, morality would be self-love, regulated by knowledge, and the moral law would result from the enlightened decisions of the understanding.

Self-love is one of the essential principles of human nature, and our Lord has not disdained to enlist it in the service of holiness, while He is careful not to erect his morality on it as a foundation. Christianity embraces within its wide catholicity everything which is genuine in man. Our Lord has therefore assigned to this principle a suitable place in his moral teaching. But the great foundation on which He has erected Christian morality is by concentrating the force of religion on the sense of duty.

Philosophy had been compelled to deduce the moral law from the subjective state of the mind, or from the relations of man to society. Its views of its extent and efficacy were therefore necessarily limited by its intellectual power of investigating these relations The highest conception known to the Greek philosophy, was that of the morally beautiful. This it endeavored to strengthen by considerations derived from the relation in which the individual stood to the State. These exercised a modifying influence on a morality which was confessedly founded on the desire of happiness. Under its influence self-sacrifice was, in a strict sense of the word, impossible. The moral beauty of virtue, and the political aspect of morality, formed the two great redeeming features in ancient ethics.

These imperfect bases on which philosophy was able to erect a moral law, Christianity has carried out to perfection. It has enunciated in the highest form the idea of duty. It has deduced a moral law from the relations in which man stands to man, and shown its reasonable character. But it has gone further, and enlarged and enforced it by bringing to bear on the mind a distinct conception of the relation in which man stands to God.

Philosophy had caught imperfect glimpses that it was reasonable that man should do to another as he would wish to be done by. Our Lord announced this precept as an objective rule, which embodies the universal principle of morality, viewed in its social and political aspect.

But the idea of what is reasonable between man and man, though a great advance upon the ancient notions of heathen morality, does not come up to the full idea of duty. To attain its full conception we must take into consideration the relation in which man stands to the great moral Governor of the Universe. The want of a conception of a personal deity rendered the ancient philosopher utterly unable to erect a moral law on such a foundation, or to enforce its motives by a corresponding idea of duty. The sense of duty can only be fully felt when it is conceived as owed, not to an abstraction, but to a living personality, in whom all obligations center. Such was the view conceived of it by our Lord. He first concentrated the whole force of religion on morality by revealing God in his character of a Creator, a moral Governor, a Sovereign, and a Father, who embraces in his person the entire force of moral obligation; and then educed a law out of the perfections of the divine character. The idea of duty in its highest form is evolved by Him out of the conception of the self-sacrifice on the part of man, which the conception of God in his aspect of Creator, Lord, and Father, involve. A moral law founded on these principles is the single discovery of Christ.

But there is a higher conception of morality than duty or law, which exclusively belongs to the teaching of Christianity, viz: the foundation of the moral law on the principle of love; and the measuring of its obligations by it. Morality, viewed as duty, requires obedience, because we ought to obey it; or because it is imposed on us by an external authority. Viewed as love, the external and the internal mutually coincide and embrace one another. It then becomes the presentation of self as a willing offering. As duty, morality is restricted within the definite limits of obligation. As love, it transcends all limits, and earnestly desires to surrender the entire faculties of the mind to the work of goodness and holiness more and more. Such an aspect of morality could be presented to us in its fullness by no teacher who did not possess the attributes of a Christ. A perfect being, like Himself, is the only power by which such a spirit of voluntary self-sacrifice

could be generated; and for the rendering such self-sacrifice possible, it is necessary that the obligation on which it rests should be deduced from, and made to center in, his person.

But if we wish to form a correct idea of our Lord as a moral teacher, and of the end which He proposed to accomplish, we must survey those peculiar aspects of Christianity in which He is exhibited in a point of view differing from all the other teachers of men. This will be found not so much in the moral code which He taught, but in the great principles of motivity which He brought to bear on the whole of man's moral and spiritual being.

What then did the Author of Christianity propose to accomplish? Was it merely to publish a new and more perfect edition of the moral law? Certainly not. He had higher aims, such as no teacher had ever aspired to before Him. He grasped at nothing less than to regenerate the world. The philosophers left the masses of mankind alone as utterly hopeless. The utmost that their aspirations ascended to was the establishment of a small republic on the model of existing Grecian states, in which a few thousands of mankind might be trained to virtue; but of which philosophers were to be the magistrates. In this humble attempt they never succeeded in getting beyond the theory. But the conceptions of Jesus soared higher. He determined to attempt the regeneration of the masses of mankind, to reform those very classes which the philosophers pronounced hopeless, and to make them the subjects of his spiritual empire. He therefore sought to create a spiritual influence which should outweigh every other, and make it center in Himself. This power was one which was to strengthen the holy in their holiness, and which was at the same time capable of renovating the morally sunken and depraved.

The greatness of our Lord's achievement can only be fully estimated by contrasting it with the powerlessness of the philosophers. They not only were ignorant of any moral or spiritual power which was capable of infusing holiness into the masses of society, but, for the most part, they candidly confessed it. What is more, they were of opinion that such a work was incapable of being accomplished. The doctrine that mankind was on the road to a state of progressive improvement was certainly not theirs; on the contrary, they concurred with the poets in placing a golden age, not in the future, but in the past, though their faith in its past existence was by no means firm. Their views as to the fu-

ture prospects of mankind were dark, and the utmost that they hoped was by some device to stay the progress of deterioration. Their hopes were set on only a few in whom goodness was a sort of natural gift; and on these they hoped to act through the principle of habituation.

But to get this principle into operation, it was necessary to create a state. The mode of effecting this was very far from obvious. The elect were very few; and the masses were dull of hearing, and sunk in sensuality and vice. The philosopher felt he had no spiritual power which he could bring to bear on them. To use a metaphor taken from mechanics: while he had a fulcrum in the principle of habituation, he could get no lever; and this left his fulcrum, however strong in itself, utterly useless. Until a sufficiently virtuous community could be formed, it was impossible to set to work at training men to virtue. His principle of habituation came to a stand-still, simply from lack of means to work it with. Conscious of this lack of power, the thought of turning missionary never occurred to him. But our Lord created a power by which the bad could be made good; and then he proceeded to institute his own ideal state, the Christian Church, in which this power should be exhibited as an actuality. In instituting this society, He recognized the importance of the philosophic principle of habituation. But He advanced beyond this. He provided it, through the influence of another principle, with the requisite working machinery. That principle was faith.

It is impossible to form a correct estimate of the originality of the moral teaching of the Author of Christianity, unless we observe the central position which it assigns to the principle of faith. It is viewed throughout the New Testament as the means through which alone man's moral amelioration is possible. By it holiness is implanted in the soul. It forms the foundation of the spiritual life, and is the instrument of its subsequent growth. The principle of habituation is intended as an auxiliary power, by means of which the new principles implanted in the mind, through the instrumentality of faith, are gradually developed and strengthened.

It has been often said that the intention of our Lord was to create a society, and to attach the members of it to Himself in the relation of disciples to their master. This is true, but it involves a very inadequate conception of the position which faith occupies in His moral teaching.

Apart from all dogmatic statements, it is obvious as a fact, that mankind divide themselves into two very unequal divisions: those whose tendencies are more or less virtuous, who constitute by far the smaller portion of our race; and those whose moral character has undergone a contamination by vicious indulgence. Our Lord intended to present Himself as the center of spiritual life to both of these classes.

How would the philosopher have attempted to deal with them? Those who had virtuous tendencies he would have submitted to a course of moral discipline through the principle of habituation, for the purpose of strengthening and developing whatever was good within them. He would have taught, and taught truly, that by performing virtuous acts you will create habits of virtue; and thus what is virtuous and good, will, after long exercise, become a deep-rooted and permanent habit in the soul. The power of self-command will be gradually established, and the strength of temptation will be proportionally enfeebled. He would even have advanced one step beyond this. He would have told the select few to attempt to elevate themselves to a more perfect state, by contemplating an abstract idea of holiness. But he was obliged to confine himself to the world of abstractions; for it lay utterly beyond his range of thought to conceive of it as embodied in a living person.

Such a course was sufficiently reasonable when the principles of virtue already exerted a considerable force in the mind. At the same time, it should be observed that that powerful influence on man's moral nature, which the Author of Christianity has created, is entirely wanting. But it must be admitted that if such characters are to be found, the mass of mankind are of a very different description. Apart from the question as to the original corruption of the moral tendencies themselves, which does not belong to our present investigation, their existing character has been formed under the influence of that moral atmosphere by which they have been habitually surrounded. Under its vitiating influences the principle of self-restraint exists in a most imperfect form, which makes that of habituation destitute of a vantage-ground whereon to commence its operations. It can easily be brought into operation in favor of the development of vice, but not of virtue. To such persons it would be simply absurd to say, by doing virtuous acts you will become virtuous, when the whole power, wish, and tendency to perform them was

wanting. Before such a principle could be invoked with the smallest advantage, a powerful coercive agency would have to be created. To talk to a man in a state of moral corruption to elevate himself by contemplating the abstract conception of holiness, is somewhat a similar absurdity as to ask a blind man to admire the beauty of color. With respect, therefore, to the masses of mankind, the principles known to the ancient moral philosopher were utterly at fault. Before he could use the only power with which he was acquainted, men required to have breathed into them the principles of spiritual vitality.

But the Author of Christianity announced that his work extended to both these classes of persons, and that He had a mighty influence at his command to operate upon them. He even declared, that the very class whom others abandoned to their fate, were the special subjects of his mission. When men wondered at his conduct, they heard the announcement, which had never before passed from the lips of a human teacher, "I came not to call the righteous, but sinners to repentance."

Has he succeeded in this superhuman undertaking? He has. Even the opponents of Christianity cannot help recognizing the fact, that He has rescued multitudes of abandoned men from a state of ruin and degradation; that he has produced a most ameliorating influence on society; and that He has imparted to multitudes of good men a power, which, previously to his appearing, was unthought of by poet, priest, or philosopher. The fact is an indisputable one, and it claims a place in the moral philosophy of man.

If we inquire what is the new influence which distinguishes Him as a power in the spiritual world, the answer cannot be doubtful, with the New Testament in our hands. It must be that our Lord propounded faith as the great power by which alone it is possible to establish the reign of holiness in man.

It would occupy too much space if we were to attempt minutely to examine the statements of the Gospels on this subject. We must assume it as an unquestionable fact that our Lord did so teach; that He took a very wide view of the nature and character of faith, and ultimately made its highest acts to center in his own person. He taught faith in truth, faith in God, and faith in himself; and propounded the last as the great center of his system of teaching, and the special power by which He designed to act on men. He declared that the influence of truth was powerful to sanctify the heart. This teaching was abundantly supple-

mented by the Apostles. In addition to the discovery of this great spiritual power, He created the great institution through which that power might be applied and developed, the kingdom of which He proclaimed himself the King. That kingdom is his Church—a kingdom which differs in its nature from all others which have been created by man, being one entirely spiritual and wholly destitute of coercive power in the form in which it was conceived of by Him, and established by his Apostles.

Such being the unique character of faith as a spiritual and moral power in the system of Christianity, the question arises, Will it stand the test of the application of the principles of a sound philosophy? Is the instrument suitable for the purposes intended? Does our current philosophy of human nature recognize the importance which our Lord has assigned to it? To answer these questions fully, it would be necessary to compose a treatise of considerable size; or rather, to elaborate a complete system of Christian moral philosophy. Still, however, we must throw out a few hints for the purpose of showing the importance of directing inquiry to this important subject.

It is hardly necessary to observe, that our existing philosophy fails to assign a prominence to the Christian doctrine of faith. The principles on which it is based, and the power which it exerts in the spiritual and moral worlds, can hardly be said to have been investigated, and assigned a place in the philosophy of mind. As a consequence, men of thought in various departments of knowledge, have a very inadequte conception of the real bearing of Christianity on man, and a still more imperfect idea of the true character of Christ as a moral teacher. From this cause originates the objections of those who have given no close attention to the teaching of Christ, and their allegations of its imperfection. Perhaps Christian writers have been deterred from investigating this subject from a fear that they might appear guilty of scrutinizing too deeply the operations of the Divine Spirit. But God acts by law in the spiritual, no less than in the material world; and there is no greater irreverence in investigating the mode of his action in the one, than in the other. Through whatever media it may be traced, it will be ultimately found that all spiritual vitality, no less than all material force, ultimately centers in Him. Facts of all kinds fall within the province of philosophy, and demand her investigation. Her business is, not to dogmatize on them, but carefully to investigate and systematize

them, and to deduce the truths to which they point. Christianity, and the history of its evolution, and its action on the human mind, present us with a great mass of moral and spiritual facts. As far as they come within our cognizance, they are the appropriate subjects for the investigation of moral philosophy. All other powers and principles, which act on the mind, which stimulate it to action, which make us better or worse, are admitted to belong to it. Why is the mode in which Christianity proposes to regenerate the mind, to be the one subject excluded from its investigations? Hitherto moral philosophy has been chiefly occupied with the examination of one side of human nature only. She has left the most important field of the relation of our rational and intellectual powers to our moral and spiritual being, almost wholly unexplored. The investigation of this subject would prove that Christianity is perfectly adapted to the wants of the moral and spiritual nature of man. The interests of revealed religion suffer from the neglect.

The principle of faith is not even alluded to by the great author of the Ethics as a moral and spiritual power. The nearest approach to anything like a faint conception of it, is to be found in his analysis of man's perfect and imperfect habits of self-restraint. But here he only approaches to the confines of the subject, and it immediately eludes his grasp. The views which he has maintained of the relation between our intellectual and moral being, are founded on arbitrary principles, and are utterly inadequate. It is perfectly true that the history of man prior to Christianity was not well suited to bring forth the importance of rational conviction as a moral power. But it is somewhat singular that he never subjected to a distinct analysis those forces which form the center of action in the heroic character. The history of his race might have supplied him with many glorious examples of self-sacrifice, so as to form the basis of such an analysis, and from them a faint view of the principle of faith as a spiritual power might have geen suggested. The same defect pervades the whole of ancient philosophy. It was not aware that truth is one of the most powerful principles which can be brought to bear on the moral nature of man.

The Author of Christianity has accomplished what those who preceded Him failed to effect. We must again call attention to the fact, that Christianity looks to two powers for the regeneration of man, the due appreciation of which ought to form the

foundation of all Christian moral philosophy: the creation of the Church, or Kingdom of God: and the generation of a power adequate to sway the affections of the heart, superior in strength to the evil principles of our nature.

We often fail to assign to the institution of the Church the important place which it evidently occupied in our Lord's plan for the regeneration of the world. A considerable portion of his own personal labors was devoted to its erection. His own public teaching began with an announcement of its near approach. We cannot, however, consider it as established as a positive institution, until after the termination of his ministry. It was intended as a great institution for the purpose of training men to holiness, in which the whole force of the principle of habituation might be called into active energy.

By the institution of the Church our Lord accomplished all that the philosopher had hoped for by the creation of his ideal state. The influences for good which the philosopher thought that he could accomplish through the latter, our Lord realized through the former. But in one important point the conception of the kingdom of heaven differed from that of the philosophic state. It was to be a purely spiritual kingdom, founded on the conviction of truth, and resting ultimately on intense attachment to the person of its founder. Of the society, when formed, the founder was to be the perpetual King. This forms the most peculiar feature in its constitution, and proves the entire originality of the conception of our Lord. Both the Church and the ideal state sought to realize the same ends. Both were to be institutions in which the character was to be formed and trained. In both the power of the principle of habituation was gradually to modify the mind. Through its gradual operation evil principles were to be eradicated, and good ones strengthened and confirmed. In civil society man lives in an atmosphere of thought and feeling which gradually shapes and modifies his being. In the same manner, in the kingdom of God, a new moral and spiritual atmosphere was to be created, replete with the principles of life, which was to exert a similar influence. As in civil society these influences are frequently unholy, in the kingdom of God they were to be of an opposite character. It was to subject man to a course of training, and, by practising him in holiness, to call into operation all the power which the principle of habituation is able to exert in the modification of the character.

But our Lord has gone beyond a mere conception. Christianity has now, for a space of eighteen centuries, been a living reality, modifying the condition of mankind. Nor can those who doubt the divine origin of Christianity assert that its influences have been small. It has imprinted deep traces of its power on the whole moral and intellectual atmosphere which we breathe. It has mightily regenerated language, the substratum of human thought. It has stamped an indelible impress on an entire conception of morality. It has entered the depths of man's spiritual being, and we can trace its influence alike both in the lowest and highest walks of literature. In fact, our Lord's institution has exerted a visible power, and deeply impressed itself in the whole range of human culture. Instead of being born under the influences of heathenism, and drinking in its principles from their earliest consciousness, men are now born and educated under those of Christianity, and of them no subsequent act of man can wholly and entirely divest him.

But because the kingdom of heaven, as constituted by its founder, is destitute of that coercive power without which no earthly state could exist, and the ideal philosophic state would have been powerless for good, and the inability to attain which prevented one ever from being instituted, is it an imperfect institution compared with the actual or philosophic state? How did our Lord supply the defect? for, contemplated in a human point of view, such it must be esteemed. He did so by the introduction of a more divine machinery. The principle of faith in his own person, which He announced as a central bond of union, imparted to it a power and a vitality which all other states might envy. It formed both the principle of cohesion and of development.

It is impossible to exert an influence for good on a mass of moral corruption, without generating a new principle in the mind, or awakening one which was previously dormant. To effect a change for good in our moral and spiritual nature, a power must be called into existence of sufficient strength to overbear all opposing influences, or to impart a new vigor to those which already exist, but which had previously succumbed in the struggle. Unless this can be accomplished, the old forces will go on in obedience to the same laws, and produce the same results. How can it be otherwise? The only force in human nature to struggle against the principles of corruption, is that of reason and conscience. In those who are corrupt, that power has already proved

inadequate to resist the force of evil. But, in addition to this, as corruption advances, its energy diminishes. How, then, is the force of the principle of evil to be counteracted, or that of good to be generated, or to be called into lively energy where it is dormant?

Moral affections will not grow up spontaneously. They must be generated from some cause. Man's reason is that cause. This is the only road through which new moral conceptions can obtain access to the mind. They must be presented by some power to the intellect, until they have produced a definite conviction. We use this word in the widest sense, as including the whole rational powers of man. A powerful influence can be exerted on our spiritual and moral being by introducing a new conception, or evolving a new conviction in the intellect; and the influence which it will exert will be powerful in proportion to the intensity of the belief with which it is accompanied. The same power is equally effectual to call dormant affections into lively exercise. Such was the influence by which the Author of Christianity proposed to act on the mind of man, and He has conceived of one all effectual for his purpose. A holy thought enters the intellect, and lives there in the form of an intense conviction. From the intellect, by this act of faith, it penetrates the heart, and creates or calls forth holy feelings, holy affections, a new mind, and a new spirit. As a question of moral philosophy, we are only called on to recognize the fact and the *modus operandi*, not the remote cause. Faith is the instrument through which the Divine Spirit acts on the human soul. It is not every conception of the intellect which will act on our moral nature. Mere scientific thought cannot do so. It must be a deep conviction on some subject intimately connected with our moral and spiritual being.

There are two modes in which an intellectual conviction may become a great moral and spiritual power. The first is, by creating a conception to which the mind has been previously a stranger, and by a steady contemplation of it. The second is, by producing an intense conviction of some particular truth. Both these are acts of faith, and are so viewed by the sacred writers. Faith is described by them as consisting in intense conviction of truth, an embracing by the mental eye of the reality of things unseen. In this sense it is laid down by the sacred writers as the great principle which purifies the heart. It is directly applied by them to convictions strictly intellectual. "He that cometh to

God must believe that He is." Contemplated in this aspect, faith with the writers of the New Testament means conviction, and is directly conceived of by them as originating in an intellectual act. But it is also presented to us in the form of trust. In this point of view it consists in the presentation to the mind of an object supremely lovely, and the continued contemplation of it, until it imparts its influences to our own moral and spiritual being. Thus, St. Paul speaks of "beholding the glory of the Lord, until we are changed into the same image from glory to glory." The Author of Christianity has provided a great body of truth suitable to act powerfully on man's moral and spiritual nature, corresponding to the first aspect of faith; and the glories of his own person, corresponding to the second. Through these He has operated mightily on the human heart.

Thus, the rational principle is that which renders conversion and sanctification possible. It affords the means of introducing into us new feelings, new affections, and new motives. A presentation of truth to the intellect kindles a corresponding affection in the heart.

The following may be viewed as a very brief analysis of its mode of action. The conception of a new truth is introduced into the mind, either by the direct action of the Divine Spirit, or by his awakening conceptions previously dormant. It becomes the subject of intense belief. Its contemplation, or the conviction arising out of it, kindles a corresponding affection in our spiritual being. That affection struggles for the mastery with the other affections of our nature. If the one be good and the other evil, the contest will be continued within us until the holy affections get the victory over the unholy ones, or the reverse. The success of the struggle will depend on the intensity of the conviction. In the one case sanctification will be the result; in the other progressive deterioration.

The great truths revealed by our Lord constitute a spiritual power which is able to probe the very depths of our moral being. As distinct from all forces common to Christianity and previous systems, they consist of a clear discovery of man's relationship to God; the character of his moral government; the paternal character in which He stands to his creatures; and the manifestation of that character in the living personality of our Lord, especially as exhibited in his self-sacrificing life. To these we must add his great disclosures respecting man's responsibility, with all its man-

ifold results. Such are the moral forces with which our Lord acts in the spiritual world; and they have more than compensated for the want of the coercive power of the philosophic State. They have created Christendom; they have regenerated the unholy; they have imparted a power to the virtuous, compared with which all previous power was as nothing.

It follows that faith is an influence partly intellectual and partly spiritual and moral. It takes its origin in the intellect and penetrates to the heart, and thence introduces a new spiritual life into the soul. A new conviction penetrates the mind; it may be a conviction respecting the responsibility of man, such as we have never felt before; the glory of holiness, the character of sin, or a fully-realized conception of the attributes of God. This summons into existence corresponding affections of our moral and spiritual nature. These constitute a power capable of exercising a reformatory influence on the whole character. As the conviction of truth is profound, its action will be powerful.

The principle which calls into existence these powers of our moral nature, takes its origin in our rationality. That creates the conception of the holy thought which forms the object-matter of faith, and which, when intensely contemplated, kindles into living energy the affections of our moral and spiritual being. These affections cannot energize without an object to excite them, and that object can only be presented to them by a conception of our reason. This conjoint action of the intellect working on the affections, is what we designate faith. Our previous analysis shows that it does not consist of an intellectual act only, but of one influencing our moral and spiritual being. The bare understanding is not a moral power; but our reason, which stand related to our moral and spiritual being, is.

In its doctrine of faith, the teaching of Christianity stands in marked contrast with that of the philosophers. Plato considered virtue as knowledge, pure and simple. Aristotle narrowed the operation of our reason in morals to practical wisdom (φρονησις), to which he ascribes no power to move the affections. But according to the teaching of the Author of Christianity, faith is a deep and earnest conviction of the mind, which penetrates and stirs the profoundest depths of man's moral and spiritual being. It may be considered as the final act of our rational processes, and is substantially the same principle in relation to religion as in the ordinary affairs of life. The difference consists mainly in

the subject-matter of the conviction itself. We never act unless impelled by a conviction of some kind. We usually assign the term faith to our religious convictions; but when we analyze them as mental acts, there is no real difference between them. The merchant in his operations is actuated by faith, though that faith is entirely on secular objects; but the pre-condition of his acting is belief or conviction. Much obscurity has been thrown on this subject by confounding faith with a belief founded on small or inconsiderable evidence. This has been too frequently done by religious men, who have represented that such a belief has a particular merit in it. Hence faith has frequently run great danger of being confounded with credulity. But this is entirely devoid of any rational foundation. Faith is conviction, on what ever evidence founded; and in rational beings, convictions ought to be founded on evidence capable of satisfying the reason. It derives its spiritual and moral power from the intensity of the conviction. Such is the faith recognized by Christianity.

Faith has been frequently identified with trust. This is incorrect. Trust is one particular aspect of faith, but it is far from being a complete description of it. They are not identical; for vast numbers of our convictions involve no trust, except in the certainty of the convictions themselves. Many have fallen into this confusion of thought, because the most important act of faith, as set forth in the Christian Scriptures—viz: faith in God and Christ—involves trust. But conviction of the reality of great truths, although unquestionably an act of faith, is certainly far from necessarily involving one of trust. In conformity with this view, the author of the Epistle of the Hebrews represents that an act of faith in the being and attributes of God, must precede every possible act of trust. "Without faith," says he, "it is impossible to please Him; for he that cometh to God must believe that He is, and is a rewarder of those who diligently seek Him." Such a belief is not trust, but the foundation on which all trust must rest; and it is beyond dispute that it involves a high act of our reason.

Another class of thinkers are never wearied of opposing faith to knowledge, as though they belonged to two distinct and separate functions of the mind. Different classes of truth unquestionably rest on different degrees of evidence, and present themselves to our minds with different degrees of assurance. But it is impossible to lay down any real distinction between faith and

conviction which is tenable in a philosophical point of view. We believe in every truth of the certainty of which we are convinced. We more frequently apply the term faith to assent to practical rather than theoretical truth; but between the mental states involved there is no other distinction than that of greater or less degrees of certainty, and a proportionate difference in the intensity of the conviction. Even if we could confine the application of the term faith to practical rather than theoretical truth, still there would be a sense in which we exert faith, even in the latter. We exhibit a practical faith in the demonstrations of geometry, when we take the third side of a triangle as the shortest road, instead of going round by the other two. The truth of the proposition becomes a matter of practical belief.

Although the Author of Christianity has elaborated the true principle of the moral law in a manner which leaves all his predecessors in the same line at a remote distance, and although we have a right to claim for Him, as His peculiar work, the elevation of the humbler virtues to their proper place in our moral constitution, and the foundation of all morality, on the principle of universal love, nothing more distinguishes Him as the teacher of mankind than the mode in which He has used faith as a great spiritual power, and the erection of His spiritual kingdom. By means of this He has exhibited Himself as the living center around which all pure and holy affections circulate, summing up in His divine person the entire force of all spiritual and moral obligation. The investigation of these peculiarities of our Lord as the great teacher of men, is the special function of a system of Christian moral philosophy.

A careful analysis of the relation in which man's rationality stands to his spiritual and moral being, is therefore a pre-condition of its successful elaboration. Until this has been accomplished, we shall have but an imperfect apprehension of the glories of Christianity as the regenerator of mankind, or of its perfect adaptation to the wants of human nature. Such a system ought not only to embrace a complete analysis of that portion of morality which is essentially Christian; but it ought to exhibit the relation in which the great truths of revelation stand to our spiritual being. When this has been accomplished, Christianity will be found to be in most complete accordance with the profoundest truths of the philosophy of man. We want to have distinctly exhibited to us the mode in which its great truths act

on the human mind; how their power may be most successfully brought to bear on vice and degradation; and to have the whole principle of motivity submitted to a successful analysis. Even our ordinary systems of philosophy overlook the bearing of the higher impulses of the human spirit on our moral character. Those principles which impel men to the sacrifice of self, to the enthusiastic pursuit of an object, and the whole spirit of heroical devotion, have received but a most imperfect recognition in our moral philosophy. They are closely allied to those by which Christianity acts. Her great wish is to induce man to surrender himself as a voluntary sacrifice to an object external to his own being. Christianity has satisfied this want of human nature by presenting to it a Christ.

All systems of moral philosophy must therefore be imperfect analyses of human nature, which do not recognize the principle of faith as their chief corner-stone. All the other powers which act on our moral being have their legitimate place in Christ's spiritual temple; but this forms the bond of union which unites the building into a whole. Next in importance comes the Church, or kingdom of God, in its character of the educator of mankind.

Assuming, then, that Christianity is true, the time has come for the Church to prove to the world that all the great principles of Christ's teaching are in conformity with the soundest philosophy of human nature. It is of the highest importance that it should be clearly understood on what foundation the moral teaching of our Lord really rests. If it can be shown that it fully agrees with the best results of philosophic inquiry into the nature of morality, which have taken place previously to our Lord's appearing, and that it fully supplements all its deficiencies, we cannot have a more striking proof of its divine origin. A system of philosophy, in which the great principles of divine revelation received their due recognition, would be the best answer to the sceptical objections of the day. It would be impossible for the most credulous to assert any longer that the Gospels chiefly consisted of matter which was either mythic or legendary. Christianity has now been in operation as a great spiritual power for upwards of eighteen centuries. She no longer wants toleration. She has vindicated for herself the highest place in the history of the world. No influence has acted with equal power on the human heart before or since. Her attractive power has obtained the adhesion of the holiest, the noblest, and the best, who have been unanimous in

enthroning in the highest place of their adoration, Christ our Lord. On inferior natures she has acted with a power compared with which all others have been feeble. Her influence has been interwoven with every stage of the last great development of civilization, its literature, its science, its art, its poetry, and its political institutions. The old world was crumbling into decay. She has created a new one out of its ruins. She is gradually more and more leavening society with her principles. All the great benevolent institutions of the modern world are her children. Even in her corruptions she has proved herself to be the mightiest of spiritual powers. The present age has produced philosophies in abundance. Every department of philosophy and science is being carefully investigated, and reduced into a systematic form, in which its various principles are becoming the subject of definite knowledge. The time is arrived for the system of Christianity to vindicate for herself a definite place in the philosophy of human nature. She no longer requires to be apologized for, or calmly tolerated. It is time for her to abandon the defensive and assume the offensive attitude. Let her demand the homage of the world, and exhibit herself as possessing that within her which is adequate to supply all the wants and all the aspirations of man. Let her claim her right to a distinct recognition in every sound system of philosophy, as the most powerful principle which can operate on human nature. It is an undeniable fact that even Christian writers have overlooked her claims. Can we be surprised that others have neglected them? It is not too much to say that we have no system of moral philosophy in which the great principles of Christianity have obtained a distinctive recognition. We cannot point out to the sceptic their distinctive place in the constitution of man. The University in which moral science has been most persistently studied during the present century, still puts into the hands of its students, as its best manual, the work of a heathen philosopher. Those who devote themselves to the study, have to harmonize Christian truth with existing systems as they best can. Our error has been to assume that the work was ended when it was only begun; and we have rested complacently as though it had been accomplished. We cannot expect that we can repair at once the effects of past neglect. Experience tells us that all great advances in scientific knowledge have been preceded by attempts at its elaboration more or less imperfect. The effort to systematize frequently forms the means

of bringing forth the mind which is able to erect the temple of truth out of many imperfect models. Many depths of the human mind have yet to be sounded before we shall be able to contemplate the Christian revelation in all its glory. The duty of gifted Christian men is to labor for its accomplishment. Every fresh discovery of truth will show that the teaching of Jesus of Nazareth has penetrated to the depths of man's mental and moral constitution; that he has supplied the deficiencies of all previous teachers; and that he has discovered a system of truth suitable to the developments of human civilization from age to age. Other systems have been partial and imperfect; that of Christ is founded on the universal nature of man, and is capable of universal accommodation to its ever-varying conditions. We may ask, as in the days of old, From whence had this man wisdom, having had no human teacher? The only rational answer must me, This doctrine was not his, but God's.

C. A. Row.

XXX.—RENAN'S LIFE OF PAUL.*

BY DR. E. PRESSENSÉ.

M. Renan's "Saint Paul" has appeared after a delay of more than a year. The book will excite no surprise: it is in perfect keeping with his "Life of Jesus" and "The Apostles." We find in it the same general qualities, the same defects, and, on the whole, the same method of embellishing and belittling the grand past of the Christian church. The ability of the author remains unimpaired; he imparts a lively interest to all questions, even the dryest. No one knows better than he how to make learning attractive. He is still a first rate painter of the scenery of Greece and of the Orient. His pictures are of small dimensions but finely drawn. All the information that general history can furnish on the state of Roman society, on the decline of Judaism, on the countries affected by the Apostolic missions, is truly exhausted in this book. The science of numismatics is applied with skill as well as knowledge. The fine chapter on Athens, at the time of Paul's visit, is especially worthy of notice. It glows with that incomparable light which bathes the Parthenon, the reflection of which will never grow dim in the memory of those who have once beheld it.

Nevertheless, we must charge M. Renan with not having taken, any more than M. Taine in his fine articles on Greece, the highest view of the Greek religion, which, in its best days, was not solely an artistic performance, in which "life was regarded as destitute of supernatural elements, and without background." The Eleusinian mysteries, the worship of the goddesses who had their temple on the Areopagus, the moral sentiment animating the Greek tragedies, show to us, behind Olympus and its pleasing mythol-

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ogy, the sacred and majestic height to which the Greek mind had attained in Phidias, Æschylus, Sophocles, and Plato.

The following description of the Hellenic race is more pleasing than trustworthy:—

"Such simplicity of conception is due in a great measure to climate, to the purity of the air, to the surprising exhilaration imparted by breathing it, but still more to the instincts of the Hellenic race, which was wonderfully idealistic. Anything, a tree, a flower, a lizard, a tortoise, inspires the remembrance of a thousand metamorphoses sung by the poets; a jet of water, a tiny crevice in the rock, which they call a cave of the nymphs; a well, with a cup on its margin; orange-trees, cypresses whose shadows stretch over the sea, a small grove of pines among the rocks, suffice in the Greek mind to produce that contentment which beauty awakens. A walk in the gardens at night, to hear the grass-hoppers; to sit in the moon-light, playing the flute; at family festivals, to hang a garland of leaves over the door, to wear a chaplet of flowers; on public festivals, to carry the thyrsus adorned with leaves; to spend the day in dancing, in playing with the tamed goats; such are the pleasures of the Greeks, the pleasures of a race, poor, economical, forever young, inhabiting a charming country, finding its happiness in itself, and in the gifts of the gods. The pastoral of Theocritus was in Grecian countries an actual fact."

M. Renan's book contains no more successful paragraph: he has well shown the hill-side on which these great artists easily glided; but the slope does not exclude the summit. Now, I maintain that there is something in the Greek literature besides this pastoral so full of freshness and beauty. The disciple of Socrates not only heard the grass-hopper in the reeds of the Ilissus and the Nereid in the blue waves which surrounded Attica; he heard the sacred voice of conscience, and that spoke to him of a God greater than his Jupiter and Apollo. This is what drew from the lyre of Æschylus those austere tones, and caused the noble complaint of Plato, when in his Phædrus he sighed for that glorious land where in former times the soul gazed upon immortal beauty. Humanism has recognized the moral nature in man, and has found God in its lowest depths. This is why it has not received Jesus "with a smile," according to M. Renan's expres-

sion. Such men as Justin Martyr, Clement of Alexandria, and Origen, were the children of Greece and disciples of Plato, before becoming fervent Christians, faithful even to martyrdom. In spite of this exception, the portion of M. Renan's book concerning Greece is a master-piece in literature. The same may be said of his description of the fierce and bigoted Judaism at the beginning of our era. He has made skillful use of the Talmudic literature, and has justly characterized those little Jewish colonies scattered over the whole surface of the Roman empire, as islands of monotheism in an ocean of Pagan corruption, shut up in themselves and clinging to their prejudices as the bulwark of their nationality.

The critical part exhibits caution on the part of the author. He denies the authenticity of none of the epistles except those to Titus and Timothy. We do not agree in this exclusion. We find the demonstration of M. Reuss on this point entirely conclusive. M. Renan steadily accepts all the other epistles, and leaves us a solid and indestructible basis for the history of early Christianity. He is sure that we possess reliable documents of the year 54, which contain, not only the substance of the gospel history, but, besides, the doctrinal foundation of the fourth gospel. Such, without doubt, is the opinion of the learned writer, as the following remarks show:—

"He it was," he says, in speaking of Christ, "always he, who was the inspirer, the master, the principle of life in his Church. His divine character grew more imposing each year, and with reason. He was not only a man of God, a great prophet, a man approved and authorized by God, a man mighty in deeds and words. These expressions which were sufficient for the faith of the disciples in the earliest days, would pass now for very weak ones. Jesus is the Lord, the Christ, a personage entirely superhuman, not altogether God, yet very nearly so. We live in him, we die in him, we rise in him; almost everything that is said of God, is said of him. He is already a sort of divine hypostasis. We shall see that Paul comes to this himself. The most advanced formulas which we find in the Epistle to the Colossians, exist already in the germ in the older epistles. 'But to us there is but one God, the Father, of whom are all things, and we in him; and one Lord Jesus Christ, by whom are all things, and we by him.'"

It follows, from this frank recognition of the evangelical doctrine of the first century, that the metaphysics of the fourth Gospel is not, in his view, the result of scientific elaboration, nor the mongrel offspring, as it were, of a marriage contracted about the year 160 between the Church and Platonism. No; according to M. Renan, this philosophy is the natural evolution of Christian thought, in its primitive and truly original beginnings. It incorporates itself with Apostolic Christianity. It follows, then, that those who hold it as the very essence of Christianity are not so foolish, nor so ignorant, as is sometimes pretended. It would be difficult to conceive of the apotheosis of Jesus of Nazareth in the heart of a monotheism the most fierce and the least inclined to elevate the creature to the rank of the Deity. It must then be, that the doctrine of the disciples of Jesus rests on his teachings, which were confirmed by his resurrection. The defence of Christianity will legitimately derive much support from this declaration of M. Renan, who is the most disinterested of historians on this question.

The author doubts the credibility of the Book of Acts, in which he sees only a narrative, arranged afterwards to extenuate the pretended conflicts between Peter and Paul. He makes Luke a good provincial, who offers no resistance to the haughty bearing of his superior, and has been so well brought up in fear of that functionary, that he has only admiration for all the subordinate officers that he meets. Where, in the Acts, the author finds all these fine things, we are ignorant; but if he found them there, he would have no right to use the narrative of Luke as he has done, for he takes it for a guide, with a confidence that never contradicts itself. Under the fancies of M. Renan's narration, we find continually the strong woof of the Acts of the Apostles. It is at once easy and contradictory to draw in this way from a source that has been declared suspicious.

As regards the subject of the book—the life of St. Paul,—we do not believe that it makes any addition to the cause of sacred science. M. Renan has done little but to popularize the *Paulus* of Baur, the leading proposition of which he adopts. He has taken good care to conceal the severe line of argument it contains, and substituted for it agreeable foreign colorings. He is truly the Gustave Doré of theology, or rather he resembles those miniature painters of the Middle Ages who spent their time in decorating the Scriptures with paintings in brilliant colors. He

especially recalls their manner in the pleasant way in which he brings near to us the characters of the gospel history, and gives to them the appearance of being contemporaneous. We know that the good monks of the 12th century decked the holy women of Galilee with the head-dresses of their own time, and that they placed the scenes of the Gospel in houses with triangular roofs, like those they themselves were wont to see. Jerusalem became another Nuremburg, and Herod had the appearance of a prince of the Empire. M. Renan, though he has not inherited the simplicity of the missal-painters, nevertheless follows their method.

For instance, the early Christians did their preaching after the manner of the socialist workmen, in the public-houses of our large cities. Athens was another Oxford for the young aristocracy of the Roman Empire, which did not hinder its having its Franconi circus. We hardly expected to see Franconi in this connection. These attempts to bring the past into the present, are constant and minute. It is in this way that the relations of Paul with the church in Jerusalem are made similar to the contest of the radical protestants with the consistory of Paris. It will be enough to cite this curious passage:—

"French Protestantism, in our day, presents a similar phenomenon. Two opposing parties have arisen in the bosom of the reformed church, one desiring, above all, the preservation of the old symbols, the other, capable of gaining to Protestantism a vast array of new adherents. The conservative party has stirred up against the latter a furious strife. It has repelled with scorn every thing that looked toward a giving up of the familiar traditions, and preferred to the brilliant destiny held out to it, the pleasure of continuing to be a small upper-room gathering, of no importance, exclusive, composed of well-disposed people, that is, of those who partake of the same prejudices and view the same things as aristocratic."

We must be allowed to think that St. Paul would have regarded with surprise those who claim to be his direct descendants, but who have nothing more at heart than the overthrow of his most essential doctrines. If the miniature-painters of the middle ages made anachronisms which now provoke a smile, they, at least, escaped moral contradictions. Scholarship may have been ab-

sent, but the heart was not deceived. They preserved in Jesus and the Apostles a holy and sublime expression, which revealed all their mystic devotion. They often reached the loftiest poetry, because their souls had more than once come into unison with the divine, by a deep and tender intuition, that is well worth the local coloring. This local coloring, however, is not neglected by M. Renan, in spite of his constant allusions to the more actual present. With him, we are really in Antioch, Ephesus, and Corinth, under the glowing light of the East, in the midst of those strange customs of expiring Paganism; we visit the public bath, the circus, and the theater. There is indeed a historic outline, but the figures it ought to include are entirely unnatural. M. Renan still speaks to us of the delicate wit, the gaiety, and the sarcasm of Jesus. The Christians of Thessalonica become "an association of clever workmen, merry and contented, who placed superior business talent among the chief virtues."

The author describes St. Paul in these singular words: "He was at once brilliant, rude, polished, malicious, sarcastic, then again, tender, full of delicacy, almost mischievous, wheedling, skillful in filling his style with reservations, with numberless precautions, with malignant allusions." "The Frenchman, born malicious, composes ballads." Paul, not less ill-natured, wrote the epistle to the Romans! Who does not admire this unparalelled invention of the ill-will of the Apostle to the Gentiles?

Description, I have said, occupies a large place in M. Renan's book; this is entirely in keeping when he treats of the great centers of Christian missions, as Ephesus or Corinth, because the population of these cities felt the influence of nature, which this portrays. But it is no longer so, when the landscape brings no element to the history of ideas. Then it is only a means of amusement and romance. M. Renan, who excells in this, makes a lavish use of it. He relates to us the travels of Paul from one town to another, as if the chief aim of the Apostle had been to visit Asia or Greece, whereas it is certain that, lost in thought, he passed by in indifference the grandest views of nature and of art. It is important, doubtless, to know the situation of Philippi and Thessalonica; but how is the history of early Christianity enriched by the detailed account of the way leading from one of these places to the other? Of what advantage is it, in view of the facts which ought to be prominent in such a history, to learn that, on leaving the plain of Philippi, there is a view of a smiling valley,

where flax is cultivated; that on every upland we find deep wells, and that cliffs of white marble give openings to rivulets of remarkable clearness? M. Renan could have compiled this guide for the traveler in Macedonia and Asia Minor, without adding to it the part of St. Paul, for, in this way, he gives an air of romance to a history of the severest character, and thus conveys, on the whole, a false impression. Moreover, these descriptions often take the place of decided proof, almost like the sprightly and interesting dialogue that was formerly substituted for the piece of music in a concert—only here the art of pleasing occupies the position of the strict language of science.

The superficial reader will imagine that poetry has every thing to gain from this profuse decoration. Not so; it lacks in pathos, in true grandeur. Take the chapter on Athens. M. Renan here allows his talent full play. We see the best side. I know of no finer description of the enchanting city; but the author does not stop in time; there is an evident disproportion between the frame of the picture, and the picture itself. The light in this great canvass is thrown on the Parthenon, on the Pnyx, while the grand figure of Paul remains in the shade. In a word, it is sacrificed wholly to the magnificence of Pagan art. We may judge from the following passage:—

"So many wonders scarcely affected the Apostle. He saw the only perfect things that ever existed—that ever will exist; the Propylæum, noblest of master-pieces; the Parthenon, with its surpassing grandeur; the temple of wingless Victory, worthy of the battles it consecrates; the Erectheum, marvel of elegance and delicacy; the Arrhephoroi, those divine maidens, with a bearing so full of grace: all these he saw, and his faith was unshaken, he exhibited no emotion. The prejudices of the Jewish iconvelast, insensible to plastic beauty, blinded him. He took these incomparable statues for idols. 'His spirit,' says his biographer, 'was stirred within him, when he saw the city wholly given up to idolatry.' Ah! chaste and beautiful images, true gods and true goddesses, tremble! Here is one who will lift the hammer upon you. The fatal word is spoken: you are idols! The mistake of this ugly little Jew will be your sentence of death."

Compare with this brilliant passage, the page of Bossuet on the preaching of Paul. It lacks the sharp lines of profound

scholarship. Nevertheless, to say nothing of Christian feeling, this matchless orator is strictly faithful to the rules of art, for he calls up before us, instantly, the scene of the Areopagus, in all its grandeur; nor can he forget that this is above all moral grandeur. I cannot resist the pleasure of quoting this remarkable portion of the panegyric upon St. Paul:—

"He is to go, this man, ignorant of the art of oratory, rude in speech, with a dialect that marks the stranger, he is to go into cultivated Greece, the mother of orators and philosophers, and in spite of the opposition of the world, he will there establish a greater number of churches than Plato gained of disciples by that eloquence which we think divine. He is to preach Jesus in Athens, and the wisest of her Senators will come from the Areopagus to the school of this Barbarian. He will extend still further his conquests; he will cause the majesty of the Roman fasces to bow at the feet of the Saviour, in the person of a pro-consul, and will make the judges before whom he is brought tremble on their seats. Rome even will hear his voice,—and this imperial city will one day deem herself more honored by a letter from the hand of Paul to her citizens, than by all the famous orations of Cicero. And whence comes this, Christians? It is that Paul has means of persuasion not taught by Greece and not learned at Rome. A supernatural power that takes pleasure in raising up what the proud despise, is recognized and blended in the august simplicity of his words. This is why we admire in his epistles a more than human efficacy, which persuades contrary to rules, or rather does not persuade so much as it leads captive the understanding; which does not flatter the ear, but carries its blows straight to the heart. Just as a large river, flowing through the valleys, preserves the violent and impetuous force gained in the mountains whence it sprung, so this celestial power, contained in the writings of Paul, even the simplicity of his style, retains all the vigor brought from that heaven whence it descends."

M. Renan, in his desire to bring the past vividly before our eyes, does not hesitate at any conjecture. He can be at once a romancer and a realist. He has positive information in regard to the manner in which the Jews at Rome supported themselves, to which he attributes the introduction of Christianity into the imperial capital. Not satisfied with knowing that they were in

general poor, he describes the wretchedness of their condition as if he had himself inhabited the Ghetto in the time of the Cesars. "A small company of Christians came together—everybody smelled of garlic: these ancestors of Roman prelates were poor outcasts, filthy, clad in foul rags and having the offensive breath of ill-fed people."

It is true that to counter-balance the disagreeable effect of this coarse way of living, M. Renan tells us that St. Paul drank milk every day and lived on vegetables. He knows too that he traveled on foot, although he ought to have perceived that the text by which he supports this view, means simply, that in one of his journeys, he chose the way by land. Not content with asserting that the Apostle, like all the Jewish teachers, worked with his hands for his subsistence, he makes him to have kept an upholsterer's shop, with Priscilla and Aquila. But the author gives us another piece of information, to which no one will refuse the merit of novelty, namely, that in all probability Paul was married at Philippi to the wealthy Lydia, seller of purple. I confess that this fine invention surpasses everything of its kind that I know of. Alexander Dumas, in the fictions which he heaps upon history, never imagined anything like it. At this place, M. Renan returns to his favorite theory in regard to the share of woman in the foundation of religions. Just as Jesus marched in triumph, surrounded by the beautiful creatures who were the shining ornaments of the Galilean Idyl, so likewise St. Paul found in the daughters of Greece, new amazons, noble and perfectly teachable, who greatly helped his undertaking by the influence they exerted.

"To the Jewish women, at times so brave, so devoted; to the Syrian woman, who owes to the languid softness of a sickly organization flashes of enthusiasm and of love; to Tabitha, to Mary Magdalene, succeed the women of Greece, Lydia, Phebe and Chloe, lively, gay, active, gentle, well-bred, frank in every thing and yet discreet; leaving every thing to their master, subordinating themselves to him; capable of the greatest things, because they were content to be helpers and sisters to men, to aid them when they performed good and noble deeds. These Grecian women, of a brave and generous race, on the arrival of old age, experience a change which wholly transforms them: they become pale, their eyes wander idly, then, covering with a black veil

the fillets of straight hair that encircle their faces, they devote themselves to sober cares, and to these they bring an active and intelligent ardor."

Elsewhere, M. Renan thinks proper to embellish with his loathsome fondling the solemn ceremony of the love-feast, and the Lord's Supper.

"They loved," he says, "to fancy two invisible servants, Irene, (Peace), and Agape, (Love), one pouring the wine, and the other mingling with it warm water, and, it may be, at certain moments of the repast, they were heard to say to the two deaconesses, whatever their names may have been, '*Irene, da calda; Agape, misce mi.*'"

All the expedients of M. Renan may be summed up in one:—*perhaps.* This is his magic wand, with which at will he forms anew the past. He has a decided talent for Arabian tales. The author of the "Thousand and One Nights" shows us that the learned do not succeed so poorly!

Every picture which he draws of the worship of the church in the time of St. Paul is fanciful. He does not hesitate to transfer from the third century to the first those ascetic practices praised by Tertullian. There is an entire confusion of epochs. It is easy to see why he closes his description of primitive Christianity by saying, "it was a sort of moral romance."

Two main propositions are embodied in M. Renan's book—one, theological, the other, psychological. The first is the fundamental idea of the Tübingen school respecting the radical disagreement between Paul and the Christianity of Palestine. The second is a repetition of one of the favorite opinions of the author of the "Life of Jesus," namely, that we cannot act upon men without fatal compromises, so that moral degradation must correspond with the activity which men display. Let us examine briefly each of these propositions.

The historic system of Baur forms a harmony, in which every thing is united and linked together. In order to maintain that there exists a radical difference between early Christianity and the doctrine of Paul, it is absolutely necessary to blot out the part of Jesus, and, like the Tübingen critic, to see in him only a mythical Jew restoring the true religion of the Old Testament and freeing it from the additions of the Pharisees. Now,

this is not what M. Renan has done, for he proclaims continually the superiority of the master over his disciples: he does not cease to speak of the lofty spirituality of Jesus, and he attributes to him, without hesitation, that grand declaration of freedom—"God is a spirit, and he must be worshiped in Spirit and in truth." After such a concession he has no right to say that Paul freed the new-born Christianity from the swaddling-clothes that bound it. The child was born free and not a slave. In the second place, Baur, in order to make room for his hypothesis, rejects almost all of the Apostolic literature, uses it again at his pleasure, and in particular denies the authenticity of the Acts. M. Renan has not followed him into these extremes. But then he is obliged to reduce to very slender dimensions the famous conflict by which, it is claimed, every thing in the early church was turned upside down. He leaves out of the contest him whom he calls the good Peter, who plays the part of a simple monk. James, the brother of the Lord, is made to represent all the narrowness of Palestinian bigotry. He is a man of prayer, wearing out his life in exercises of devotion, the pharisaical fanatic, who deserved to be the mark for the keenest sarcasm of the brother whom he refused to recognize. His letter is a long argument against Paul. He organizes an opposing mission to destroy his influence throughout the East, and even the West; he does not hesitate to call him an intruder and an impostor. When we look for the proof of these assertions, we find a calm, serious epistle, devoted simply to combatting bigoted views, and in the fullest harmony with the moral conception of sanctifying faith contained in the epistle to the Romans. The pretended emissaries of James were the delegates of the council at Jerusalem, commissioned to carry to the churches the decision so full of liberality, which had been decreed there, and which, according to M. Renan himself, resulted from the interviews between Paul and the Christians of the Jewish capital. In order to give some appearance of reason to this alleged hostility, he does not hesitate to make use of apocryphal literature, and boldly puts into the mouth of James the violent invective in which "the Clementines," a mongrel romance of the second century, attacked St. Paul under the name of Simon the magician. That is to say, in a theological argument of the most weighty character, he uses a document destitute of truth, and one which he himself states is of no historical value! By what right does he insert in his narrative fragments of a base

Jewish libel, written nearly a century after the events it records? Is this consistent with sober science?

M. Renan elsewhere contradicts himself, for he admits that Paul never quarreled with the church at Jerusalem; he shows that he gathered abundant contributions for it, carried them himself, with the delegates of the Gentile churches, and on his arrival in Palestine, conferred familiarly with James. Such conduct is not credible, if James had placed Paul beyond the pale of the early church, or if there was a contest between them in all the churches. The hypothesis of radical and entire opposition between the two portions of the Apostolic church thus falls to pieces.

If we now examine the psychological proposition of M. Renan, we find it just as open to criticism. We will allow him to develop it in his own fine language.

"Paul was eminently a man of action, of a brave, aggressive, enthusiastic spirit, a conqueror, a missionary, a propagator, all the more zealous, because he had first displayed his fanaticism on the opposite side. Now the man of action, noble as he is when he aims at a noble end, is not so near to God as he who lives in the pure love of the true, the good, or the beautiful. The Apostle is by nature of a somewhat narrow mind:—he desires success, and for it makes sacrifices. Contact with reality always leaves a slight stain. The chief places in the kingdom of heaven are reserved for those upon whom the beams of divine grace have fallen, who have adored the ideal alone. The man of action is always a weak artist, for his single aim is not to reflect the grandeur of the whole; he cannot be a scholar, for he regulates his opinions by political utility; he is not even a very virtuous man, for he never is irreproachable, the foolishness and wickedness of men forcing him to make a compromise with them."

This psychological proposition of M. Renan is, first of all, contrary to morality. If it is true that purity reveals itself in the idle contemplation of the ideal, and that all activity which attempts to realize it, is condemned to defile itself with the dust of the arena, then good exists nowhere, for good is not a beautiful dream, an enchanting vision; it is, according to the expression of Plato, a great contest, a struggle against evil and error, the gift of itself. To live at ease on some height of glory, saying "it is good to be here· here let us pitch our tent," is the dilettantism

of a refined epicurean. The spotless exaltation, that is preached to us, is the Tabor of egoism. It is not true that we influence men only by flattering their evil propensities; moral power, on the contrary, plants itself on what is noblest in their natures. It was long ago observed that we never dare appeal to baseness and crime in the presence of a large audience. Humanity, however fallen it may be, demands respect, and it is singular that Christians, who are accused of disparaging it, should be obliged to remind those who deify it, of its grandeur.

If, leaving generalities, we consider St. Paul as a type of the man of action, I do not see how his energy as an Apostle degraded him. Doubtless he always remained a fallible man; an infinite distance separating him from Jesus. Who was more sensible of this than he himself? Who has a more ardent longing for the ideal? This great saint was a great penitent; this former Pharisee, become the ablest of Christians, always preserved the attitude of the publican of the gospel, beating his breast before God. But I ask, how he would have been morally superior, if he had remained in a state of transport; if he had never left the desert of Arabia, where he spent three years after the light which shone around him on the way to Damascus. He is charged with intolerable pride. It is said that "men of action commit great violations of the affections;" and this because he separated from Barnabas from a perfectly just motive, though ever remaining, it is admitted, profoundly attached to him. What was there wrong in this? This man who is set forth as a hardy athlete, an implacable leader of a party, has a heart most tender, most easily touched. He it is who cries, "The more I love, the less I am loved." He is censured for his zeal in controversy, but the flame that causes his writings to glow, was kindled at the same fire as his love for Christ and for souls. He will have nothing to do with anything which would diminish the glory of his master, the grandeur of the work of redemption, or which would bring again under the yoke of the law those made free by the Cross. "Time, and especially experience," says M. Renan, "are necessary in order to produce a conviction that no dogma is of sufficient value to justify the open resistance and the wounding of charity. Paul is not Jesus. How far we are from thee, dear Master; where is thy gentleness, thy poetic spirit? Dost thou, whom a single flower delights and fills with rapture, dost thou recognize this disputer as thy disciple?" The author of "St. Paul" here forgets

that he has written the "Life of Jesus," and that he has there described this gentle master, whom a flower delights, as a grim giant, when he sees him, armed with a whip of cords, chase the money changers from the temple, and when he hears him pronounce upon this Pharisaism, so tenacious of life, the most terrible anathema which the world ever heard. He should at least have been consistent.

No; the morality of Jesus had nothing to do with the weak scepticism which asks, after its own fashion: "What is truth?" The morality of Pilate is not that of the crucified one, who styled himself a king, on the day when he was slain for his teaching. He who loves truth and goodness, not as beautiful marbles to be admired, but as the most sublime realities, and those alone able to elevate and save humanity, he can show indignation, he can fight, as he can die for his cause. And he will prefer to bind upon his forehead the thorn that wounded the greatest witness of truth, rather than the most delicious flowers. What M. Renan finds to blame in Paul, we admire most of all. Yes, we admit that he hated sin and evil, and this hatred, a hatred of love, was a consuming fire. We can understand how from the same mouth whence, like burning lava, issued the condemnation of the reviving Pharisaism, also flowed heavenward the glowing and sacred hymn of love. What further charge is brought against the Apostle to the Gentiles? His miracles? But did not Jesus Christ perform more than he? And besides, are we not forced to admit that he did them in good faith, and believed in them himself? We can then blame only his want of intelligence here, if at any price we would eliminate the supernatural element so prominent in that noble life. Nothing then in his activity has lessened his character. If Jesus is greater than he, it is not only by his nature, it is still more by his work. He gave himself more entirely to man; he descended lower into the depths of our miseries, and his last words on the cross were: "It is finished." What do we hear of the rose-laurels of the lake of Tiberias? The sovereign of the church is a man of sorrows and of sacrifice, who gave his life for his brethren,—he who on the mount of transfiguration spoke only of his cross, to show that love here below is not a contemplation, but an immolation. Restrain then your eulogies which are insults, and cease to call him: "the great artist, the divine poet." He deserves neither the honor, nor the indignity

of such homage. We know what it is worth. At the moment when you proclaim him to be God, you add—"all we know of the word and character of Jesus, is that he is the life of Christianity.' "He alone," you add, "is seated on the right hand of God forever more." Two things only are wanting to this glory: God the Father, who, in your belief, does not exist, and personal immortality, which, in your view, has never been demonstrated!

We are weary of this sugared antagonism, which conceals the sharp claw under the velvet which envelops it, for it takes away the very substance of religion, its moral basis. In brief, the "St. Paul" of M. Renan is worthy of his "Jesus," which he gave us a few years ago, only his methods are better known, and all the prestige of his talent does not avail to give success to the enormous falsification of the greatest memorials of humanity. There is enough in some portions of the epistles of Paul, finely translated in M. Renan's new work, to give to history the victory over romance. The elegant modern fripperies which he has attempted to stitch upon the old cloth, tear, of themselves, and nothing except the firm texture of the reality remains.

EDMOND DE PRESSENSÉ.

XXXI.—THE PRESENT PHASE OF MATERIALISM.*

From the one-sided course of philosophy in taking no notice of the great discoveries of the natural sciences, zoölogy and kindred branches, has arisen an equally one-sided, but far more pernicious form of speculation—materialism. Philosophy was once predominantly ideal. The time has come when this purely ideal mode of philosophizing, without regard to the real, is felt to be unsatisfactory. But, in the process of reconstruction, men have fallen into the other extreme; they reject every thing ideal and place the real upon the throne. Now what is meant by the real? The investigations of a series of naturalists into the various phenomena of life, the action of the brain, and indeed all the organs of the animal body, together with the observed fact that the existence of animal life depends upon the activity or changes of matter, call for an answer. Materialism stands ready with its reply—the only thing real is matter. Materialism, therefore, is in no sense philosophy. Resting as it does, entirely upon questions in physics, it is, whenever it attempts to appear as philosophy, nothing but an application of the results obtained in the natural sciences to philosophical and religious views, with no power to penetrate to the final ground of our knowledge. It consequently has never been accepted among our philosophers. It is only among naturalists that it has been defended and been made a creed. The leaders of this party are, as respects the systematic elaboration of the system, Moleschott and Vogt; as respects its exhibition in a popular form, Büchner. And who are its adherents? They are men who, rejecting the principles of religious faith, and finding no comfort in the various philosophical systems, which were too deep for them, took refuge in materialism, which offers to be intelligible at least to the most ordinary intellect. Persons of higher culture, on the other hand, it can never satisfy, for it takes from them every thing exalted and holy, and gives

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Translated and condensed from a review of Büchner's *Kraft and Stoff*, 9th Ed., 1867, in the *Beweis des Glaubens*, June, 1869.

them in return nothing, absolutely nothing. In just this and not in its scientific grounds, lies its danger and its strength, viz: that in virtue of its apparent intelligibleness, materialism finds it easy to attract persons of little cultivation and limited powers of judgment. Of all the writings of this school, none has been more widely read than the work of Büchner, entitled "Force and Matter," which has now reached its ninth edition. Since it is the only book which brings the substance of the materialistic theory within the compass of a few pages, we will make it the basis of our remarks, as we proceed to examine the scientific grounds of the system. The first task to which Büchner sets himself, is to banish from the realms of reality all supernatural, creative force. The material force of matter is his God, but not force which stands alone—this he regards as a senseless assumption—but force inseparably connected with matter. Force and matter are one. Force is the property of matter. You cannot think of matter without force; else matter could not be in any state whatever, and consequently even the thought of matter must disappear, and conversely, it is impossible to think of force without matter; for what would the force of attraction be, for instance, without attracting molecules?

The second fundamental principle of materialism is the indestructibility of matter. No atom of matter is ever lost either by dissolution or by life. Matter may indeed assume various forms, but its quantity ever remains the same. Take any body whatever, *e. g.* a stick of wood and burn it; we find, on weighing the elements which compose it, that not an atom of the matter has been lost; the aggregate product of the combustion constitutes exactly the same matter of which the wood was composed. Thus a restless process of transmutation of matter is ever going on, which we can trace from earth through plants and animals up to man. The essential permanency of matter itself, whose various combinations alone have a beginning and an end, proves this transmutation process to be eternal. Matter is indestructible, and so also is force, which admits of change, but not of destruction. The quantity of lost caloric reappears in the quantity of motion, and conversely the quantity of lost motion in the quantity of caloric. Consequently, matter and force are imperishable. But what is imperishable cannot be created. Matter is therefore eternal, and also infinite, and hence it follows that its laws are immutable; for if its laws admitted of change, matter would not

be what it is. They are therefore eternal, like matter itself. This also is the teaching of experience, for never have the laws of matter suffered change. The world is eternally governed by a mathematical and mechanical law, which proceeds from the nature of matter, and in like manner the great changes in the surface of the earth, which geological researches disclose, have occurred only in virtue of the same laws of matter which exist to-day.

Not only the inorganic, but the organic world also, is subject to the forces of matter. Life is only a combination of matter under certain favorable conditions. Hence it naturally follows, that when these favorable conditions exist, new living organisms still spring into being. Büchner is, therefore, a defender of the doctrine of "spontaneous generation," a hypothesis accepted until recently by most naturalists, on account of their inability to explain how the infusoria in apparently pure water were produced. Of late, however, this theory has received many a hard blow and at present appears to be almost wholly untenable. This Büchner himself feels and hence places beside it another hypothesis, viz: the existence, from eternity, of all living creatures and their development under favorable circumstances. Neither of these hypotheses, however, explains the existence of the higher animals. He is obliged, therefore, to call to his aid a third theory, which we may style the Darwinian. No one will pretend, that, through forces now operating, a highly organized being, such as an ape or a man, is or could be created. Büchner avoids this difficulty by saying: They are not created, but have arisen, like all organic creatures, through unobserved changes from something antecedent. The germs of species are all alike, and the young animal in his development passes through all lower forms, or exhibits at least their leading types. The fossil animals appear to be lower forms of development of the existing animal world, as has been partially proved. We even find in the still existing non-placental mammalia of Australia, simply a lower grade of our mammalia.

Must not, consequently, the present organic world have been developed from original and extremely simple organisms? Of course on this view there can be *no plan* in nature. Every thing must take place according to the blind laws of chance. Besides, if there were a plan in nature, why is so much that is useless made? Why, for example, rudimentary organs, which are entirely superfluous? Why abortions, which contain no capacity of

life? Büchner cannot, it is true, deny the adaptations in nature, but he maintains that they are not designed, but simply a result of certain accidental causes. He appeals to the theory of natural selection and the struggle for existence. After having thus traced the origin of organism to force and matter, he endeavors to account for mental phenomena in the same manner.

He sets out with the proposition that the brain is the instrument of the mind's action. The animals which have no brain, or only the rudiments of one, stand upon the lowest plane, in respect to mental activity. Just in proportion to the development of the brain, is the development of mental power. Among the higher animals, we find a second stage, corresponding to the coils of the brain. In the child these are quite undeveloped. With his bodily growth they continually increase, and so, side by side, does his mental capacity. In all animals, the degree of intelligence is measured by the development of the brain. The two correspond to each other. Hence Büchner infers that the soul, the mental activity, is only an organic movement of the brain, or the brain in action: thought is the resultant of all the forces centered in the brain.

This in brief, is an outline of Büchner's system. Let us now examine it in particulars.

With Büchner there is, as we have seen, nothing but force and matter: heaven and earth and all that therein is, consist in force and matter. The entire hypothesis of materialism is built upon these two ideas, and—we seek in vain for a *definition* of them. What is matter, what is force, what is the bond which holds them so indissolubly together? Where shall we find this matter? It is said to be omnipresent, but in vain do we seek for it in nature. Chemistry indeed has pointed out more than sixty simple substances, which are different from each other and cannot be changed into each other, but Büchner's matter, so far as I know, has not yet been manufactured in any labaratory. If, in our conception, we separate force from matter, what remains except the essence of matter? Simply extension. But what, then, is the difference between a particle of matter and a particle of space? Is this matter, perhaps a mere spiritual essence, a simple abstraction of our brain activity? The definition becomes still more confused, when we are told that this matter is infinitely divisible. A body is divisible only when it is composed of single parts. If it had no parts it would not exist. The composite has only the re-

ality of its parts. But since matter on this theory is infinitely divisible, these parts in turn have only the reality of *their* parts, and so on to infinity. We shall thus, if there is no final limit, be able to go on forever without discovering the essence of matter.

If the principle on which the hypotheses of materialism rests is to the last degree obscure, it cannot be surprising that the deductions are characterized by the same quality. Matter, says Büchner, is eternally self-derived. It moves in an eternal circle. But whence comes this movement of matter? Natural philosophy teaches us that matter, whatever may be its essence, is certainly subject to the law of inertia. It is difficult to reconcile this with the self-caused motion of matter. According to LaPlace, the law of inertia is as follows: "A point, existing in a state of rest, cannot give itself any motion, because there is no reason why it should move one way rather than another. But when it is put in motion by any force and then is left to itself, it always continues to move in the direction of this force, if not opposed by any resistance. This tendency of matter to continue in its condition of motion or of rest we term its inertia. This is the first law of motion for all bodies." In virtue of this law the self-caused motion of matter is obviously impossible. Consequently, motion can only come from without, and we find as a matter of fact that every body is moved by some other. This other body, however, can derive its motion not from itself, but must be moved by another body still, which in turn cannot move itself, and so we might go on forever and never reach the cause of motion, unless we recognize a principle which, capable of moving itself, is able to communicate motion to matter. Clear and simple as the demonstration at first appears, it is yet attended with several difficulties. We set out with the law that matter originally exists in a state of rest. But, it may be replied, the natural state of matter is not rest, but motion. It is certainly true that the natural state of matter is not rest, but for the same reason it cannot be motion. Matter is equally indifferent in its relation to rest and motion. But still, since it moves, we are obliged to seek the ground or reason of this motion in some first matter. As to another objection, that inertia is only an abstract, mathematical idea, and that the first moving cause is the force of attraction, experience teaches us that the inertia of matter is not at all an abstract idea, but a fact, and therefore the force of attraction cannot be the first moving cause. If we suppose even that it is, a new argument arises

for our earlier position that matter is a conditioned thing. For the force of attraction depends upon mutual action and reaction. Two molecules, by the supposition, must exist. Neither of these molecules, however, has the ground of motion in itself alone; this ground lies in the other molecule also. Were it otherwise, no motion would take place. Each of these molecules, therefore, has not the ground of its existence in itself, and matter is consequently not an unconditioned but a conditioned thing.

It is plain, then, that materialism is not capable of explaining the origin of the unorganic world; and the question arises, whether it is more successful in its explanation of the organic world. That which distinguishes the organic from the unorganic world is life. But how comes life to exist in matter originally dead? Büchner answers: life is nothing but a certain combination of matter, which becomes possible under favorable conditions. Its forces, however, are from eternity the same. Hence the forces which once called forth life, as if by enchantment, still exist, and matter has still the capacity of producing living beings. Now this theory of spontaneous generation, so far from being something new, is quite old. The origin of many animals was formerly unknown, especially of those which live in mud and hidden places, and it was easy to conceive of them as produced from the matter about them. In this way, in ancient times, the existence of eels, serpents and frogs was accounted for.

On the revival of the study of zoölogy in the 16th century, this opinion was firmly held, and the most convincing evidence of its truth was supposed to be found in the production of small worm-like creatures in putrid animal matter. In the 17th century, a distinguished Italian naturalist investigated the question, and after a thorough series of experiments ascertained that these worm-like creatures are the larvæ of insects, which, guided by instinct, deposit their eggs in putrid flesh, since it is only there that the young larvæ can live.

In consequence of this discovery, the doctrine of spontaneous generation was much narrowed, and the entire theory would perhaps have been forever abandoned, if a new event had not revived it. This was the employment of the microscope in the natural sciences. With its aid the hitherto invisible world of infusoria was discovered. How was the origin of these to be explained? In pure rain-water and in the atmosphere of a chamber, the presence of infusorial germs was considered impossible, neither

could they be supposed to exist in the organic substances employed, and yet the most careful experiments, as they were then regarded, showed that on pouring pure rain-water on hay and the like, infusoria regularly appeared. Nothing was more natural, therefore, than that the old doctrine of spontaneous generation should be again received. A new discovery gave further strength to this view. Worms were found in the intestines of animals, whose entrance from without appeared impossible, because they possessed no means of boring, and besides, many of these creatures were destitute of the organs of production, in consequence of which, propagation in the ordinary manner was apparently out of the question. In respect to infusoria and intestinal worms, therefore, the supposition of a spontaneous generation was, at that time, a necessity. But since then, zoölogy has made astonishing progress, and shed such light in respect to these creatures as to render the supposition of spontaneous generation manifestly untenable. The existence of intestinal worms has ceased to yield any support to the theory, since their actual entrance into the closed apertures of an organism has been observed, and since it has been discovered that the creatures which have no organs of propagation are in a nascent state, and under favorable conditions are developed into creatures with perfect powers of propagation. It was shown, further, that the germs of infusoria are contained partly in the water and the organic substances, and are partly carried in the air. For it was found that if the air was heated to the boiling point, and then the vessel was closed so that the external air could gain no access to it, no infusoria appeared. But to this it was replied, "the heated air and all these precautions exclude in advance all the conditions of life. Where the existence of a complete organism is physically and chemically impossible, it cannot be originated." This objection, however, has been refuted by the later investigations of Pasteur. This eminent French chemist took a quantity of germ particles floating in the air and boiled them in a vessel heated to the boiling point, and then kept it a year and a half without finding in it any development of life, when by an ingenious contrivance he let in external air, and infusoria appeared.

We must, therefore, decidedly reject the doctrine of spontaneous generation. In the progress of science it has been crowded, step by step, from the higher animals into the region of the infinitely small. Yet never has a case of spontaneous generation

been observed, and never, when the requisite care was taken, has anything of the kind been obtained. Every alleged proof brought forward in favor of this doctrine has been refuted by experiment, and finally it has been demonstrated that the creatures in question have sprung from parent creatures. Unless, therefore, materialism breaks with science, it must abandon this hypothesis. The second hypothesis, from which Büchner seeks support, namely, that the sperms of the living being have existed from eternity, scarcely needs refuting.

The third, or so-called Darwinian hypothesis, which, it is claimed, accounts for the existence of the higher animals, is attended with still greater difficulties. It will be found fully exhibited in Darwin's able work "On the Origin of Species," to which we must refer the reader. It is a comprehensive and ingenious hypothesis, and contains certainly many truths; but before it can be accepted as true throughout, it must be demonstrated with scientific exactness, and this has never been done. In the present state of science it can, in our view, neither be proved nor disproved, since we lack the knowledge of very many things indispensably necessary to a decision. Not till this is obtained, will it be possible to take up the question with any prospect of success. But one conclusion which materialism, without foundation as it appears to us, has drawn from it, we will consider a moment:—we mean the origin of man from the ape. We are thus brought to the last principal point of Büchner's system—the tracing of intellect to force and matter.

We begin by inquiring how is man distinguished from the ape? The external form of the least civilized man and the highest order of apes affords no essential marks of difference. It consequently can only be in the mind's activity, which has its seat in the brain. But according to Büchner, the mind's activity is only the activity of the brain. We have, therefore, to do only with the brain, and C. Vogt has shown that the brain in men and apes has no observable difference. Shall we, therefore, conclude that no difference exists? Materialism here falls into inextricable difficulties. In order to make out the derivation of man from the ape, it is obliged to maintain the resemblance of the two, while, on the other hand, it must insist upon the difference, since it cannot deny this in respect to spiritual faculties. From the demonstration of a resemblance between the brain of man and the ape it follows, on the assumption of mental activity as consisting only in

brain activity, that men and apes resemble each other in intellectual capacity. But this is refuted by all experience. Between the intelligence of the lowest savage and the most highly organized ape there is a wide chasm. Have apes ever made tools, built houses and founded states? or will any one regard it as possible that they will ever do it? The assumption, therefore, that mental activity is a function of the brain is no explanation at all. It is simply to hide behind the life of the brain, which no physiologist has ever been able to explain. Of course, on this theory the freedom of the mind becomes an impossibility, for all which occurs in the province of matter occurs according to the laws of necessity. The mind remembers. It looks forward into the future and backward to the past. But if the thoughts are only a function of the brain, and consequently of matter, a recollection of them would be impossible, unless we assume that they leave material traces in the brain, which in that case would naturally lie beside each other,—a conception which is at once set aside by the immense multiplicity of our thoughts. The materialistic theory gives us only dead, unthinking matter in place of the all-creating, all-governing Mind to which everything points and draws us, and is a failure in respect to establishing the unity it claims.

XXXII—LORD HERBERT OF CHERBURY.*

The works of English Deists are now but little read, and their names almost forgotten. Yet they are so connected with the history of religious thought both in England and Germany, that to all who at the present time are studying the progress of theology, some knowledge of what they said and did must be interesting. It is a complaint frequently made that they have not received justice at the hands of professed theologians. This may be true. To remove every appearance, therefore, of the want of impartiality, I shall confine myself, in treating of the distinguished nobleman whose name is at the head of this paper, to giving a simple exposition of his doctrines, for the most part in his own words. I shall try to put the best—that is, the most charitable and orthodox—construction upon what he has written. And that both sides may be fairly represented, I shall add the substance of the replies which were made to him. Our apologetical literature can never be fully understood without an accurate knowledge of the Deistical writings, nor can any account of these writings be of great service for our object without some knowledge of how they were met by contemporary Christian writers.

Dr. Leland makes Lord Herbert of Cherbury the first of the English Deists, and Robert Hall calls him "the first and purest of our English free-thinkers." The name of Herbert is a name dear to the Church of England. The quaint, but devout poet who sung of the priest and the temple was himself the high ideal of the temple priest. He was the representative man of the early Reformed Church of England. His brother, Lord Herbert of Cherbury, was no less the representative of the age in which he lived. He was a man of extensive learning, a brave knight, "a mirror of chivalry," as one of his admiring countrymen called him, as familiar with the sword as with the pen, a royal ambassador, a skillful diplomatist, and a refined courtier. As a child, he was sickly. It was a long time before he learned to speak. His

* From the *Contemporary Review.*

first inquiries were concerning his coming into this world. Some laughed, but others wondered at the anxious thoughtfulness of the child.* When he grew older he meditated much on the strange mystery of finding himself in possession of a conscious existence, though oblivious of any sufferings which he might have had at his birth. From this he was comforted by the hope that the agonies of dissolution might be no more than the pains of being born into another world. "For as I believe," he said, "that I shall then be admitted to a more happy state by God's grace, I am confident I shall no more know how I came out of this world than how I came into it." As he reflected how all the wonderful organs of speech and sense were formed with a prospective adaptation to this life, he concluded that the faculties of hope, faith, love, and joy, which are being formed now, and which cannot rest on objects that are perishing and transitory, would find their true satisfaction in the life to come. They reach out beyond the temporal and the finite. They crave the perfect, the eternal, and the infinite. "The proper object of these faculties," says Herbert, "is God only; upon whom faith, hope, and love were never placed in vain, or remain long unrequited." Again, in one of his poetical pieces, which reminds us of his brother's verses, he says:

"I am most sure
Those virtuous habits we acquire,
As being with the soul entire,
Must with it evermore endure.
* * * *
Else should our souls in vain elect—
And vainer still were Heaven's laws—
When to an everlasting cause
They gave a perishing effect."†

* Herbert wrote his autobiography, in which he records many curious things of himself and of the times in which he lived. He was sent to France as ambassador by James I., with whom he seems to have been a favorite. In the differences between Charles I. and his Parliament, Herbert took the side of the Parliament, and had his castle of Montgomery destroyed by the Royalists. Horace Walpole says of his autobiography, that "it is, perhaps, the most extraordinary account that was ever given seriously by a wise man of himself."

† Lord Herbert had a chaplain in his house, who read prayers twice a day in his family, and sometimes a sermon, generally one of Smyth's. When he was dying, he requested Archbishop Usher to give him the sacrament, remarking that it mattered little whether he received it or not; but at the same time saying that if there was good in anything it was in that. The Archbishop declined to administer it, for which he has been much blamed. He probably took the same view as Herbert, reckoning that the sacrament was of benefit only to those who needed the help of external rites.

Lord Herbert's theology is of necessity a philosophy, as all natural theology must be. It has its foundation in reason, and is thus connected with a system of metaphysics, or at least a doctrine of mental science. Herbert was an ontologist. He believed in the capacity of the human mind to penetrate the reality of being. Since Nature has gifted us with faculties to discern sounds and colors which are but the "fleeting qualities" of things, she must, he thought, have given us the sure means of discovering the truths which are internal, necessary, and everlasting.

Herbert's metaphysics are somewhat abstruse, but that need not trouble us. They have no inseparable connection with his religious system beyond the general fact that he believed in the capacity of the human mind to know truth. Hallam quotes his axioms and propositions at some length, and then excuses himself for not going into Herbert's arguments. "Partly," says Hallam, "by not thoroughly grasping his subject, partly by writing in Latin, partly, perhaps, by the 'sphalmata et errata in typographo, *quædam fortasse in seipso*,'* of which he complains in the end, Herbert often fails to make himself intelligible." This obscurity, however, does not affect the great outlines of his system. His religious teaching, and the grounds on which it rests, are clear and definite.

The difficulty which pressed on Herbert's mind, and which separated him from the Christianity of his day, was the same which meets every reasoning man when he is first told that the Divine Being has in any way limited the salvation of the human race. In his time the religious world was divided into two parties, which seemed to him about equally irrational, and both as corruptors of simple Christianity. These were the Sacerdotalists, who suspended all on the Church, and the Puritans, who resolved the

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The following epitaph was written by Herbert for himself:—

"READER!

"The monument which thou beholdest here
Presents Edward, Lord Herbert, to thy sight:
A man who was so free from either hope or fear
To have or lose this ordinary light,

"That when to his elements his body turned were,
He knew that as these elements would fight,
So his immortal soul would find above
With his Creator, peace, joy, truth, and love."

* Hallam has facetiously added, "quædam fortasse in seipso." The words are not in Herbert's postscript.

everlasting condemnation of the greater portion of the human race into the mere will of God. If there is no salvation out of the Church, if God has left it to depend on the mere accident of being baptized by a properly ordained priest, or on having received the other sacrament, according to certain prescribed rites and ceremonies, where is the goodness, not to say the justice, of God towards the heathen, and those who are without the pale of the Church? And if He is good, and merciful, and just, how can He take pleasure in the eternal reprobation of those to whom He never even offers salvation? Herbert laid it down as a first principle that God must, in consistency with His own character, have given to all men the means of being saved. He found that his difficulty was not a new one. Some divines had tried to obviate it by supposing that Christ was revealed to the heathen at the moment of death. Others—the Schoolmen for instance—taught that saving grace was never wanting to those who did their best. Moreover, he found that many of the ancient Fathers believed the heathen could be saved. This belief seemed not only reasonable, but necessary for the vindication of the universality of Divine Providence.

Starting with the conviction that God must in some way have revealed Himself to all men, Herbert prosecutes the inquiry, how far, and in what way, He has revealed Himself. In his book, "On Truth as it is distinguished from Revelation, Probability, Possibility, and Falsehood," he tries to discover what are the truths of reason concerning religion; that is, the truths which are intuitive or innate. These being revealed directly to the mind, he holds for the only certain truths. Some men put faith before reason, but this is to invert the proper order. It is to pronounce judgment before the cause is heard. There is a catholic or universal reason of mankind. What agrees with it is true. It is catholic truth. Religion is innate in man. It is a *common notice* in the mind. No nation, no age, is without religion in some form. This is the distinguishing mark, "the ultimate difference" between man and the brute.* No man, says Herbert, with sound faculties, can be an atheist. Religion is as natural to man as faith or hope, love or intellect. It is religion which makes him a man. The universal reason testifies to five articles which are *common notices*, or in-

* Hallam notices that the same distinction was made by John Wesley, who says that the true difference between man and the brute creatures is not reason, but that we are formed to know God and they are not. George Herbert has said something of the same kind:—

nate ideas, in the soul. (1.) That there is a God. (2.) That He ought to be worshiped. (3.) That virtue and piety are the chief parts of worship. (4.) That we are to repent and turn from our sins. (5.) That there are rewards and punishments in another life.

All the heathen nations acknowledged one God. The Romans called Him "greatest and best;" the Greeks, "God over all, self-produced, beginning and end of all things." The Mahometans call him "Allah," and the Indians, "Brahma." It is admitted that in one sense the Pagans were polytheists, yet they all had a supreme God who ruled over all worlds both of gods and men. He was the first of beings, the only true Being, the permanent amid all change; in the words of the Orphic verses, "the beginning, middle, and end of all things," corresponding to the words of a New Testament writer, who says, "Of Him, and to Him, and through Him are all things." What we know to be good in ourselves as partakers of Divine reason must be supremely in Him whom we call God. Author of all good, He must Himself be good. He is just. There are anomalies in the world which we cannot explain, yet He rules in righteousness. He is wise. All things bear witness to His wisdom. The infinity of space is the infinity of God, for He pervades the boundless universe. His infinity proves His omnipotence, and His omnipotence proves His freedom to will and do according to His pleasure.

That God ought to be worshiped is the second *notice* in the mind. It is a plain dictate of reason. Our relations to Him, our daily dependence on Him, and the benefits which we receive at His hands, show how natural and becoming are thanksgiving,

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"Of all the creatures, both on sea and land,
Only to man Thou hast made known Thy ways,
And put the pen alone in his hand,
And made Him secretary of Thy praise.

"Beasts fain would sing, birds ditty to their notes,
Trees would be tuning on their native lute,
To thy renown; but all their hands and throats
Are brought to man, while they are lame and mute.

"Man is the world's high priest; she doth present
The sacrifice for all; while they below
Unto the service mutter an assent,
Such as springs use that fall and winds that blow."

Did not Ovid mean much the same when he says—

"Os homini sublime dedit cœlumque tueri jussit?"

prayer, and praise. All nations have expressed this in some form or mode of worship, in shrines, in temples, in vows, in sacrifices, and in consultations with the Deity as to future events. There have been indeed many errors connected with religion, and many superstitious ceremonies, yet the catholic reason or *common notice* plainly teaches that the chief part of Divine worship is virtue joined with piety. This, Herbert says, is and always has been, considered the essential part of the worship of God. By virtue he seems to mean morality, or a certain rectitude of the whole man in all his faculties and affections. The necessity of repentance is inferred from the dread which always rests on the minds of wicked men, showing that they are not ignorant of their vices. It is true indeed that the priests, both in old times and in the present day, have devised many ways of expiating sin. The Romans had their lustrations, their purifyings. All nations have their sacrifices. The universal consciousness of guilt, the reasonableness of repentance, and the need of atonement, led men to build altars, and to offer oblations, to the offended Deity. As to rewards and punishments in a future life, no nation is so barbarous as not to have acknowledged them. Some have pronounced the reward to be in heaven, some in the stars, and some in devout contemplation. The punishment was in the infernal regions, in hell, either a hell that burned or smoked—sometimes in metempsychosis, or in death, temporal or eternal. Conscience, as well as all religion, law, and philosophy, distinctly proclaims that there is a reward to the righteous, a God that judges the earth and that He will avenge in His own time all the wickedness which escapes punishment in this life.

In his book "On the Religion of the Gentiles," Lord Herbert goes to the heathen world to show that these five articles were universally received. This he holds to be certain proof from simple facts that they are *common notices*, or parts of God's universal revelation to man. Sallust says that the inhabitants of Crete first invented religion, a statement which Herbert indignantly rejects, religion being "written in the hearts of men." There is in the world a universal dissatisfaction with this life. Its brevity, its uncertainty, and the sorrows consequent on change and separation, make it not only unsatisfactory, but sad. The sun goes down while it is yet day. The fairest promises of life and enjoyment are often blighted, as the early leaves in the spring-time. No man has such satisfaction in this life as to suffer him to

believe that he was created for it alone. The mind is greater than the world. It craves something more than the world can give. Even the ancients, who enjoyed the pleasures of sense with all the eagerness of youth, confessed that they were not satisfied with them. The Greek dwelt amid visions of external beauty. He drank in all that pleased the eye and the ear, and yet he longed for something higher. He craved the infinite. He *felt after* the living God. "And God," says Herbert, "inspiring all men with a desire of an eternal and more happy state, tacitly discovered Himself, who is eternal life, and perfectly blessed."

It is confessed that the Gentiles had many errors concerning the first article of the catholic faith. Yet the wiser among them found their way out of the labyrinth. And even these errors are capable, if not of extenuation, yet of explanation, by a more comprehensive view of the philosophy of religion. The multitude of the Pagan deities is reducible to the manifold names of the one Infinite God, according to the saying of Seneca that "God may have as many names as he dispenses benefits." Each of the greater deities is represented by some of the poets or philosophers as the Pantheus, or All God, who was in all, and over all, and through all. Besides the *certain* or known gods according to Varro's classification, there were *dii incerti*, the gods of whom nothing was sufficiently known to admit of regular worship. That these views of the Divine nature were much nearer the Christian than is generally supposed, we may see from the character of the worship they rendered to God. "The polemical writings," says Herbert, "of the heathen theologists and philosophers who lived among Christians show that they acknowledged piety and virtue to be the chief part of the Divine service. Celsus even dared to challenge the learned Origen to point out anything in the Christian religion that tended more to the establishing of virtue than the Pagans had before acknowledged. They no more doubted that a virtuous man should arrive at the seat of the blessed, though he knew not where it was, than that a traveler going on in the right path which leads to any magnificent city must come to the place he intended." Plato said, "We should endeavor to be like God by prudence, justice and holiness." The Christian religion has no higher precept than this, and this was the teaching of many of the philosophers of the heathen world.

There are many passages in the writings of the philosophers which show that the Gentiles had the same ideas of good and evil which we have. They ascribed all sin to anger, malice, concupiscence, and depraved desires. They knew that wars and fightings came from lusts that war in the members. They knew also that repentance was the way to amendment and forgiveness. "The knowledge of sin is the beginning of salvation," said Seneca; and again, "He that repents of his sins is almost innocent." They knew, too, from whom forgiveness was to be obtained. Cicero says expressly, "There is no expiation of sin or impiety to be had from men." Even Lucretius could feel how terrible was the

> "Mens sibi conscia facti
> Præmetuens. . . . . .
> Nec videt interea, qui terminus esse malorum
> Possit; nec qui sit pœnarum denique finis."

And Ovid could say:—

> "Ah nimium faciles, qui tristia crimina cædis
> Fluminæ tolli posse putatis aquâ."

The hope of a future life pervades all the literature, and forms a prominent part of all the philosophies of the ancient world. In that life the Gentiles looked for the rewards and punishments which they could not always discover in the present life. To this their Elysium and Tartarus, their good demons and their judges in hell are all witnesses. Philosophers comforted mourners concerning their departed friends, that they had gone to a better world. They were now to complete their happiness, to be rewarded for their virtues and recompensed for their sufferings. Death was even less terrible to them than it is to us. Already they rejoiced in the prospect of victory over the terrible destroyer who triumphs now.

"They did not represent death," Herbert says, "as we do, with a meager countenance, thin-jawed, and deep forehead, but pleasant and composed, the image of sleep; and they generally said, '*Such a one has gone from amongst us*,' that the fear of death might not strike terror, and the minds of men be possessed that nothing but their bones remained after this life. For this reason they were more valiant and inclined to the practice of virtue, because death was esteemed by them only as a passage from a good to a better life; thinking it very base and mean that nothing of those who had led exemplary lives here should remain after death."

Herbert admits that it was with great labor that he found these five articles of religion among the Pagans. But he did find them, and the discovery made him "more happy than Archimedes." He had found, as it were, a lever with which to move the world of superstition, and at the same time a place on which to stand, from whence he might vindicate the moral character of God. It rejoiced his heart to know that the Divine mercy was not limited to an elect few, to a baptized church, to Jews or Christians, but that it extended to the whole race of Adam. It was manifested in past ages and in other dispensations. Wherever there were men, there God had left witnesses of Himself, *and in every nation he that did righteousness was accepted of Him.* It is true these *five articles* were dug, as it were, out of the accumulated superstitions of ages. These superstitions were the work of the priests, who were interested in multiplying ceremonies and keeping the people in ignorance. What priests did of old time they do now. All the perversions of doctrine, all the irrational dogmas that are imposed upon the world, all additions to religion which are not found in the universal or catholic reason of mankind, are the inventions of priests. In all ages priests have claimed supernatural powers, and in all religions they have been the opponents of reason, and of that only pure religion which has its foundation in reason. It was the glory of Christianity that it summed up, so to speak, all that was good in the Pagan world; and when that was placed in contrast with the superstitions superadded by the priests, heathenism naturally expired. It could not withstand the raillery of the fathers of the church. "But," says Herbert, "by *their* means other articles were substituted in the room of the former, which gained belief, though very slowly, for some ages; yet at last they obtained, and are very universal at this time. *The hierarchy also remained, in which was the authority in sacred matters.*"

Herbert nowhere professes opposition to Christianity, nor even to *revealed* religion, as that expression is generally understood in the religious world. But he wished to rest Christianity upon the internal rather than the external evidence. The *five articles* which constitute "the only true catholic religion" he regarded as embracing the substance of what is taught in the Scriptures. Whatever external revelation adds to these is not so evidently true, yet it is not on that account to be rejected. "There is," he says, "a certain revealed truth which, unless ungrateful, we can-

not pass over in silence. But it is not of the same kind with that which is derived from the faculties. It has not the same certainty, for it depends on the authority of the revealer, and is not a truth of the mind." He lays down several tests of an external revelation, but they are so strict as to leave but little authority for any revelation which is not immediate. A revelation to be believed must be made to oneself. Such a revelation Herbert had when the Divine Being, by a "gentle noise" in the heavens on a calm summer day, intimated that it would be for the benefit of mankind if he published his book "De Veritate."

The concluding chapters of this book "On Probability, Possibility and Falsehood," need scarcely be noticed. Probability is that which depends on the authority of a person or persons, as history or tradition; Possibility concerns things future; and Falsehood is simply that which can neither be said to be probable nor possible, but is so opposed to truth, whether common, probable, or revealed, that it implies some contradiction. To the "De Veritate" Herbert appended two tracts, one "On the Causes of Error," and another "On the Religion of a Layman." In the latter he shows the difficulty which the layman must have in finding out which is the best religion, when the clergy are advocating a faith scarcely to be distinguished from credulity, and denouncing reason as too depraved to be of any service. He recommends the layman to use his reason in the spirit of faith and prayer, and promises that he will find "those truths which flourish always," for they are inscribed on the human mind, and depend on "no tradition, either written or unwritten." Past things being only among the probable, books professing revelation are to be received with caution, and only that in them which is conformable to right reason. In reading the Holy Scriptures we should be careful to notice that all things spoken there are not of equal authority. More than once Herbert intimates that he is far from desiring to injure Christianity, "the best religion in the world." He wishes to establish both it and the universal religion, which he says "answers the ultimate designs and end of Holy Scripture, for all the doctrines there taught aim at the establishment of these five articles, as we have often hinted. There is no rite or ceremony there enjoined but what aims, or seems to aim, at the establishment of these five articles." He concludes his book "On the Religion of the Gentiles," with a declaration of his willingness to submit to "the censure of the catholic or orthodox church, but not to the impious enemies of universal Divine Providence

and the *public peace.*" Herbert was a Parliamentarian, but this is an obvious fling at those of the Puritans who believed that *particular grace* was only given to them and a few others.

Though Herbert built his theology on his metaphysics, they were not, as we have already said, necessarily connected with each other. Locke, in his "Essay on the Human Understanding," controverted the doctrine of *innate ideas*, or *common notices;* yet he admitted the five articles of religion to be discoverable by reason. It is probable that Herbert would have acceded to the greater part of Locke's criticism. They both seem to mean much the same thing, only Locke contends that ideas which are not found to exist universally—as, for instance, in children and idiots—cannot be called innate. This is like saying that physical strength is not innate because young children have not reached maturity, or that the capacity to know good and evil is not natural, because there are men, and perhaps nations, who have not yet reached the ordinary standard of mankind. Herbert, assuming that the capacity of development existed in every mind, pronounced ideas *innate.* Locke, seeing the existence of the ideas clearly manifested only in the developed mind, ascribed their origin to reason and reflection. "They equally forsake the truth," he says, "who, running into the contrary extremes, either affirm an innate law, or deny that there is a law knowable by the light of nature; *i. e.*, without the help of positive revelation." Though denying that Herbert's five articles are *common notices*, Locke yet admits them for clear truths of reason. He raises doubts about the meaning of virtue in the Pagan world, and the sins to be repented of, and he cites the case of some nations who are without gods, temples, or idols: yet he admits that the wise men of all nations have arrived at the true conceptions of the unity and infinity of the Divine Being. "His name being once mentioned to express a powerful, wise, and invisible Being, the suitableness of such an idea to the principle of common reason must everywhere be readily received." Locke disputed Herbert's axiom that God must have implanted a knowledge of Himself in the minds of all men, because it seemed suitable to the Divine goodness. The Romanist thinks it best that the Church be infallible, but not on that account is it infallible. Locke's cautious principle is sound; we must rather look to the way in which God works than conclude beforehand *how* He must work. But here again, on the essential question, Locke does not differ from Herbert. That all men, to be responsible,

must have some religious knowledge, is all for which Herbert contended. Locke admitted the main proposition, but differed as to the mode in which God reveals Himself. For innate ideas he substituted reason, by which man could feel after God, and find Him.

Locke's treatise 'On the Reasonableness of Christianity" is supposed to have been written with special reference to Herbert's system. The title at once suggests the object, which is to inquire concerning the nature of the Christian religion, and how far it is agreeable to reason. The treatment of the subject is only partial. Nothing is said of the grounds on which we are to receive the facts and doctrines in the Scripture, which, though reasonable, are not discoverable by reason. With Locke's usual caution and precision, and, at the same time, with his natural deficiency in comprehensiveness, he limits himself to the question of the reasonableness of Christianity considered as a scheme proposed for our reception on what he regards as good evidence. He is equally severe with Herbert against the priests, who, to procure reception for their irrational dogmas, forbid the exercise of reason. Sacerdotalism and Calvinism he regarded as the great corruptors of Christianity; the former as the promoter of superstition, the latter as shaking the foundation of all religion. Eternal punishment for the sin of Adam, whom we never authorized to act as our representative, scarcely falls in with our ideas of what is right. Locke speaks of some who, recoiling from this, went to the other extreme, denying that redemption was necessary, and making Jesus Christ nothing but "the restorer and preacher of a pure natural religion." This reference is probably to Herbert, but there is nothing in Herbert's writings to show that he would not have taken the same view of Christianity which was taken by Locke.

Setting aside systems of divinity, Locke restricted his inquiry to the Scriptures. He found that the doctrine of redemption—the chief doctrine of the Gospel—was founded upon the supposition of Adam's fall. The true way, then, to find out what we regain in Christ is to consider what we have lost in Adam. That plainly was immortality, the right to the tree of life, whereby men would have lived forever. There is nothing unjust in God's permitting us to fall in Adam. There would have been had He doomed men, or any man, to a state without remedy on this account, because such a state would have been worse than non-

being. But as the present existence is better than non-existence, we are still debtors to God. And as to things eternal, He will reward every man according to his works. By sin came death. By Jesus Christ came life. We cannot keep the law of works whereby Adam had life, but God has given us the "law of faith." Those who keep this law are saved—that is, they gain immortality. Those who do not keep it lose their souls—that is, according to Locke's interpretation, their lives. But in what does this faith consist? It is said Abraham believed Sarah would have a son, and this was accounted unto him for righteousness. What merit was there in this? Abraham believed something contrary to the usual order of nature. Is the reasonableness of Christianity to be staked on its requiring from us belief in something miraculous? Jesus required that the Jews should believe Him to be the Messiah. Was there any merit in their believing except in proportion to the evidence he gave them? We have now to believe in the incarnation, death, resurrection, and ascension of Jesus Christ, on the testimony of the apostles and evangelists. But, again, what can be the value of mere belief in testimony? It can only be an historical faith. St. James says the devils believe and tremble. Locke feels that such objections have some validity. He answers that this historical faith may be a justifying or saving faith if God chooses to make it so. It was never promised to the devils that their faith should be accounted for righteousness. The whole of this seems against the reasonableness of Christianity. It is just the ground on which such as Herbert would have refused belief. It is the great stumbling-block which stands in the way of the reception of Christianity by rational men. It is virtually putting aside reason. It is contrary to all that Locke teaches, in his "Essay on the Human Understanding," concerning the relation of reason to revelation. Yet the truth dawns upon him at last, as if unconsciously. He sees that the faith of the Scriptures has more to do with the disposition of those from whom faith is required than with the things to be believed. It must be a faith "producing fruit"—a faith that has more to do with the heart than the intellect. It is no blind credulity, no spirit of believing whatever is told us; but, from the examples given by the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews, it is plainly a steadfast reliance on the goodness and faithfulness of God for those good things which either the light of nature or particular promises had given ground to hope for.

But the crucial question remains. Jews and Christians had something proposed to them for belief. They could be divided into the two classes of believers; but what was to become of the heathen who had never heard of the Messiah? Locke had but one answer to this—the answer which Herbert gave; the only answer which reason can give—they shall be rewarded according to what they have done, and not according to what they have not done. God will not expect ten talents where He gives but one; He will not require that any should believe promises of which they never heard:—

"Yet God," says Locke, "had by the light of reason revealed to all mankind who would make use of that light that He was good and merciful, and he that used the candle of the Lord so far as to find what was his duty, could not miss to find also the way to reconciliation and forgiveness when he had failed of his duty."

It is generally supposed that in showing Christianity to be reasonable, Locke eliminated its chief doctrine—that of the Atonement. Such a passage as the one just quoted concerning the heathen may seem to sanction this belief, for it resolves forgiveness simply into the mercy of God. It provides salvation for those who have never heard of Jesus Christ, as well as for those who have believed on His name. And yet Locke did not deny the atonement; he did not try to explain it; he did not know in what it consisted; but he believed there were "*transactions* between God and our Saviour in reference to His kingdom which were out of the reach of our ken or guess."

Thomas Halyburton, a minister of the Church of Scotland and Professor of Divinity in the University of St. Andrews, wrote an elaborate answer to Herbert's whole system. Halyburton was an entirely different kind of man from Locke. As the advocate of a Calvinistic creed, he had little sympathy with reason in its claim to be the judge and examiner of religious belief. Herbert's great object was to vindicate the justice of God. Halyburton was satisfied that however unjust it might appear to us that God should sentence the majority of mankind to everlasting misery because of Adam's sin, yet it was perfectly just in God. In other words, we have not capacities to constitute us judges of what is Divine justice. From Halyburton's lament of the universal prevalence of Deism, which he says was the religion "in vogue among the

great wits" of the time, it would seem that there was a general recoil on the part of all thoughtful and intellectual men from the Sacerdotalism and Calvinism that had been alternately in the ascendancy during the course of the seventeenth century. For the present state of the religious world he chiefly blames the great divines of the Church of England, who had preached so much about the reasonableness of religion, and, as he says, "put ethics in the place of the Gospel." He calls them Arminians and Socinians, affirming that they made the law of grace nothing but a restitution of the law of nature. He judged that the best way to bring men to accept revealed religion was to show the insufficiency of the natural light. He does not seek to extinguish it. He admits that all nations have some idea of God, and that the more obvious of the Divine laws has been known by nature's light. The heathen said some good things. In fact, they knew just enough *to justify the Divine Being in punishing them.* This was all the knowledge that any Calvinist ever required to find in the Pagan world. Concerning Herbert's five articles, Halyburton pronounced the Scotch verdict, "not proven." The heathen world was not agreed upon them, and, moreover, "the best things which are generally ascribed to the light of nature were derived from the tradition of an original universal revelation."

The question of the heathen world was made the subject of a learned treatise by one of the most earnest and impartial of the great theologians of the Church of England. This was Daniel Whitby, D.D., Chanter of Sarum. Whitby never mentions Herbert, but he evidently had before him the question as it had been raised by Herbert, and continued by those who replied to Herbert's books. With something of Locke's scholar-like caution, he modestly called his work "A Discourse on the Necessity and Usefulness of the Christian Revelation by Reason of the Corruption of the Principles of Natural Religion among Jews and Heathens." This coupling the Jews with the heathen as equally in need of a new revelation shows how little Whitby undertook to prove, and how much he assumed as to what constitutes a revelation. All had a knowledge of God at one time, but when Christ came they were in darkness. The Jews' religion was so corrupted that it had ceased to serve the end for which it was given. They had perverted the plainest precepts, and turned even the special favors that had been bestowed upon them to the uses of bigotry and superstition. They imagined that God had made the world specially

for them, and that while his providence watched over them, the other nations were under the power of the Prince of Darkness. They weakened the doctrine of future rewards and punishments, teaching that as Jews, as Abraham's seed, as hearers of the law, they *must* be saved, while the nations of the earth were doomed to destruction without end. They thought they did well when they kept one precept of the law though neglecting all the others. They were averse to government, supposing that God was their king. They made void the duties of children by their doctrine of *Corban*, and by causing proselytes of the gate to forsake their relations. They violated the sixth commandment in their hatred to others; the seventh, by their proneness to impurity; the eighth, by their disposition to rob and plunder; the ninth, by their common swearing; the tenth, by their covetousness and love of the world.

The corruptions of heathendom were corruptions of an original *revelation* as well as those of Judaism. Whitby lays down the wide principle that the doctrines of natural religion are as truly the revelations of God's will to the heathen as Scripture is to the Jews or Christians; and yet he paints a picture of the heathen world as dark as if his object had been the same as Halyburton's. He quotes extensively from the Pagan philosophers to prove how small was their knowledge, and how uncertain they were about the little which they did know. They spoke tragically indeed of the miseries of life. They called Nature "a doleful step-mother." They said they would not have accepted life had it not been given them when ignorant of its sorrows. They accounted it the greatest happiness *not to have been born;* and the next after that, *to die soon.* They called death "*the best invention of Nature,*" but never once do they mention in connection with this desponding view of human existence the only satisfactory answer—the life to come, with its rewards and punishments. Indeed, Socrates testified that but few believed in the soul's immortality, and Cicero says that the most learned men have always despised this doctrine. All the philosophers have spoken of it doubtfully. The only consolation that even a Seneca could give the bereaved concerning the departed was a *beatus aut nullus*—he is either happy or he *is* not. Cicero says that although something may be true, yet we have no certainty concerning good or evil, for "Nature has hidden the truth in the deep;" and again he says, "Many things happen which so disturb us as to make us sometimes think

there are no gods." Pliny denied the power of God to raise the dead, and Cicero said it was impossible for Divine wisdom to know future events. When the philosophers looked at the evils and confusion of the world, they even taunted the gods, saying, "What apology will Jupiter or Apollo make for these things?" The consequence of this uncertainty was to overthrow the foundations of virtue and religion. Hence the worship of the heathen was imperfect, idolatrous, unbecoming. They were really *without God in the world.* Their religious rites were obscene and filthy, as the Floralia in honor of the impure Flora. They were celebrated in the vilest manner, as the Bacchanalian or Eleusinian solemnities; and yet those initiated were said to be *regenerated*, and after death to be among the blessed, while the uninitiated went to Hades or Tartarus. The vilest things were objects of worship. The philosophers were immoral. The Spartans gave their wives to strangers. Other nations had them in common. This is saying nothing of incest and worse sins, not now to be named, which were generally practiced in the heathen world. Whitby does not wish to conclude, from the dark condition of the heathen world, that there are no principles of natural religion, but only the necessity and usefulness of such a revelation as the Christian. He was too wise to argue from the scepticism of some of the philosophers, or even the corrupt condition of the ancient world, against the light of Nature. He knew that even Job had cursed the day of his birth, had threatened to come even to the seat of the Almighty to order his cause before Him, and that excepting the disputed verse about the Redeemer, he had no answer from the hope of a future life to the fact that the righteous were often overtaken by calamities. Whitby knew also that there were men under the dispensation of Christianity who doubted of the existence of a Supreme Being, and as to the future life, trembled on the borders of an unknown land, hoping they might be blessed, and yet fearing lest they should not *be*. He knew also that the argument from the evil lives of the heathen, if directed against natural religion, might be easily turned against the Christian revelation. He testifies concerning the Christians of his day that "adultery, theft, rapine, lying, swearing, bearing false witness, and coveting what belongs to others, are now become as common as they were formerly among the heathens." He is satisfied with showing the need of further teaching, of republishing the doctrines of natural religion, and these he identified with the

practical precepts of Christianity. He explains them as only the results of natural religion, drawn forth to our advantage in plain rules, adapted to the capacity of the meanest, and recommended to our practice from the most excellent example of our God and Saviour. To these, as constituting the sum of the Christian revelation, he adds "the articles of the Christian faith which our reason was not able to discover. Moreover," he continues, "these laws of nature may be said to be implanted in the hearts of men in general, not that God has put any innate ideas or natural impressions of them on the souls of all men. The apostle plainly seems to found them on the *reasonings* of men." (Rom. ii. 14.) This is quoting St. Paul to show that he agreed with Locke against Herbert, and that St. Paul and Whitby, as well as Locke and Herbert, were agreed on the main question concerning natural religion and its relation to the Christian revelation. Christianity made its way in the world because of its reasonableness. The apostles showed that its "doctrines were conformable to the principles of natural religion which were known from the beginning."

We have reserved to the last Richard Baxter's remarks on Herbert. They were, however, in the order of time the first. Baxter says expressly that he took notice of Herbert's books, "lest having been unanswered, they might be thought unanswerable." He says at the same time that he is so far from writing against the whole of the "De Veritate," that he takes most of Herbert's rules and notions to be of singular use. The "five articles" he pronounces such "natural certainties that the denying of them would unman a man." Baxter has written a work on "The Reason of the Christian Religion," in which he made no reference to Herbert. In this book he maintains that we have natural evidence of the being of God, the necessity of holiness, and a future life of retribution; and not only have we natural evidence of them, but he shows by long citations in the margin that the wisest heathens confessed the same as we confess, though less distinctly than they might have done. The law of nature is a clear *revelation* of God's will. It tells us to keep our reason clear; to govern our thoughts, affections, passions, senses, words and actions. It was well said by Plato, "The temperate man has God for his law; the intemperate, pleasure."

In proof of the life to come Baxter adduces the constant testimony of conscience in all men "that have not mastered reason by

sensuality." He appeals also to the universal consent of all that are worthy to be called men in all ages and countries, that this is a truth naturally revealed and most sure. He quotes Seneca, Cicero, Plutarch, Plato, Plotinus, Jamblichus, Proclus, Porphyry, Julian the Apostate, Antoninus, Epictetus, Arrian, and others, as heathens among whom he found "much good, who had a very great care of their souls, and many of whom exercised great industry in seeking after knowledge, especially in the mysteries of the works of God." Some of them even "bent their minds higher to know God and the invisible world." He considers Theophilus of Antioch to have been very unjust towards the heathen philosophers, and he praises Clement of Alexandria, who said he was certain that philosophy had been blessed to the saving of many souls, for "the Eternal Word, who is Jesus Christ, gave them light and mercy, though they were unconscious whence it came."

A passage concerning the Scriptures in his book on "The Reason of the Christian Revelation" was animadverted upon by an anonymous writer, which caused Baxter to write another work called "More Reasons for the Christian Religion, and No Reason against It." In the second part of his book were "Some Animadversions on a Treatise, 'De Veritate,' by Lord Herbert." The passage concerning the Scriptures was this:—"The Scriptures are so entirely the product of the Spirit's inspiration that there is no word in them which is not infallibly true; no one error or contradiction in any matter can be found in Scripture, but those of the printers, transcribers, and translators." In Baxter's day it was almost necessary for a man to maintain this position to be within the pale of Christianity. Even Locke had spoken of the Scriptures as "truth without any mixture of error." The anonymous writer noticed some evident mistakes in the genealogies of the Bible, such as Matt. ii., 8, 9, where it is said Joram begat Ozias, Ozias begat Joatham, while in Kings and Chronicles there are three generations intervening between Ozias and Joatham. He also pointed out some passages in the Gospels not easy to be reconciled with each other. Baxter himself took every history, chronology, and genealogy in Scripture as certainly true. He made, however, several remarks which are hardly consistent with this assumption; such as that we might have a certainty of the Christian religion if it could not be proved that every word of the Scriptures is true, nor the writers infallible; that the Holy Scriptures contain *all our* religion, and *somewhat more*, that is,

the accidents and appurtenances of it, just as the body of a man has its accidents besides the parts which are *essential* and *integral*. He says that a multitude of such-like historical, chronological, topographical, physical, accidental passages are not strictly a part of the Christian faith; that it is possible for a man to believe one part of the Bible to be God's word, and not another part; that the disciples of Christ were not absolutely and in all things infallible; that it is possible for a good Christian to doubt whether those that were but evangelists, as Mark and Luke, had the same promise of the Spirit's infallible assistance as the apostles. He compares the words to the *body*, and the meaning to the *soul*, saying that there was more of the Spirit's assistance in the meaning and soul of the Scripture than in the *words* or body, and he adds significantly, "It is the devil's last method to *undo* by overdoing, and so to destroy the authority of the apostles by overmagnifying."

Baxter professes to receive the doctrine of innate ideas as taught by Herbert, but he explains his belief so as to agree with Locke. He calls the understanding "a bare sheet of paper," which has no actual innate knowledge. He dissents most from Herbert on the question of testimony, or the value of external evidence. Nothing was so certain to Herbert as the truth which he believed God had inscribed on his mind. Baxter was satisfied of the certainty of this truth, and that it did not require Scripture to discover it. Yet he said, after he had silenced all his doubts about the life to come, he still felt in himself "an uncouth, unsatisfactory kind of apprehension till he looked to *supernatural* evidence." He confessed, indeed, that this was but the weakness of "a soul in flesh," which desires a sensuous apprehension. This, he says, may be a disease, but it is a disease which shows the need of a physician and of some other satisfying light. He dwells on the mode of revelation by prophecy, by miracles, by inspiration, as these things were understood in his day; and he pronounces the evidence so satisfying that it is "beyond our reach to know what could be more satisfying." With evidence so clear, we should not hesitate to believe the most terrible passages in the Scripture, such as those which seem to say that only a few shall be saved, and all the rest tormented for ever and ever. As to the supernatural evidence, Baxter manifestly spoke as if it had come direct to us, and not through the medium of testimony, which was Herbert's reason for making it secondary to intuitive knowl-

edge. And yet, when all is said, it is not on the external evidence, not on testimony, not on the supernatural, that Baxter rests the reason of Christianity. He lays the foundation, first of all, in "the natural verity and its admirable concord with the Gospel of Christ." Grace is medicinal to Nature; where the natural light endeth, supernatural beginneth. The superstructure which Christ has built upon Nature is wonderfully adapted to its foundation.

"The sin and misery of the world," says Baxter, "is such that it groaneth for a Saviour, and when I hear of a physician sent from heaven, I easily believe it, when I see the woeful world mortally diseased and gasping in its deep distress. The condition of the world is visibly so suitable to the whole office of Christ and to the doctrine of the gospel that I am driven to think that if God have mercy for it, some physician and extraordinary help will be afforded it; and when I see none else but Jesus Christ, whom reason will allow me to believe is that physician, it somewhat prepareth my mind to look towards him with hope."

And again he says:—

"As there is no other religion that a man can with any strong show of reason entertain, and seeing that he that will appear a reasonable creature must be of some religion, it followeth that to renounce the Christian religion is to renounce reason, and to doubt of it is to be injurious to reason itself."

The excellency of the Christian religion becomes its great evidence. Men feel its truth. The Holy Spirit, working faith, holiness and comfort in the hearts of men, is an everlasting witness. It is the main argument by which the Christian religion has been proved, and will be proved to the world's end. The actual saving of men by the renovation of their hearts and lives is a standing seal and witness of Christ. It is no question of genealogies, or histories, or topographies. There may be no testimony as to Joram's descendants, nor clear proof that Paul left his cloak and parchments at Troas, but there is a witness to the fact of men being reclaimed from selfishness and sensuality, and re-made in the image of God. Christianity is a life. Let men live it, and they will feel its truth. The greater progress we make in righteousness, the clearer will be our views of its everlasting foundations. It is God's method, says Baxter, "to cause the growth of faith at the root in proportion to its growth and tallness in fruit."

XXXIII.—CHRISTIANITY AND CULTURE.*

The name of Matthew Arnold will always, in this country, be associated with the doctrine of culture. Others have written about it before, but none so definitely and fully as he. None have used the term with quite the same wide and precise meaning. He seems to regard it as his mission to awaken the interest of his countrymen in it. This pervades, and gives the dominant tone and aim to, all his previous writings. But the times, he thinks, are favorable for a fuller enunciation of the doctrine; it is deeply needed. We are hurrying on to the vortex of social anarchy, and nothing can save us but immediate and general attention to culture.

And what is culture? According to Arnold it is a certain habit of mind, not of mere manners. It is the study and pursuit of perfection—of perfection harmonious and general—the main characteristics of which are "sweetness and light," or, in other words, beauty and intelligence. It sees the standard of this perfection in right reason and the will of God; it seeks therefore to make them prevail. It strives to get at reason and the will of God by reading, observing and thinking, by turning a current of fresh and free thought on all matters even the most sacred and time-honored, which claim belief and call for action. It is not satisfied to regard things through the medium of traditional opinion and feeling. It strives to see things as they are. It is not in love with any mere machinery as such. It has no sympathy with the tendency to immediate action of some kind or other which so generally prevails, and is so much applauded. It is more given to consider how to act in the best way. It does not tend to self-isolation. Indeed, according to its expositor, it has a passion for doing good. It believes that individual perfection very much depends on the progress of society in the same direction. It is therefore bent on affording society all the help it can in the way of pointing out its

* From the *London Quarterly Review*, Oct., 1869. A Review of *Culture and Anarchy*, by MATTHEW ARNOLD.

real evils, suggesting the means of removing them, and indicating those courses which will best tend to its general and harmonious perfection.

With these qualities and aims, culture in the person of Mr. Arnold, looking abroad over the state of things prevailing in this England of ours, finds much that needs instant remedy. In politics, in literature, in religion, things appear to be sweeping on to anarchy. The forces which have long been urging us towards this frightful goal exist partly in what is common to human nature everywhere, partly in what is peculiar to the English character, and partly in certain bad habits which are fostered by some of our most cherished institutions. There is the natural inclination to the bathos common to human beings as such, parading itself in hideous or ludicrous forms, gravely unconscious that it is not sublimity itself. There is the national preference of doing to thinking, which finds its counterpart in the worship of wealth, coal, free-trade, bodily vigor, population, and organizations of all sorts. There is the all but universal disbelief in an absolute right reason, and impatience with any authority which does not depend upon, and therefore merely represent, the opinions and prejudices of our own particular class. All which evils, so far from being held in check, are really promoted and strengthened, by our public speakers and writers. The result is that we are rapidly approaching the vortex of general confusion. Mr. Arnold's national plan of salvation is attention to culture, as that habit of mind which is essentially opposed to these causes of our danger.

The cure of anarchy is the restoration of belief in, and regard for, competent authority. Culture, looking about for such authority to remedy the tendency which it observes to a general break-up of society, cannot find what it seeks in any of the principal classes of which society consists. They are all living in their ordinary selves. They have no notion of a best self—of a paramount right reason. To invest either of them with supreme authority would be but the triumph of vulgar, ungenial, intolerant class prejudices. Turning away then from Barbarians, Philistines and Populace, culture points us to its idea of the *State* as the organ of the collective right reason of the nation —the active embodiment of its best self. The State, then, whatever its defects, culture suggests, must be upheld, and those who would weaken or pervert it must be promptly put down. For if

it has not done much for us yet, who knows what good things it may accomplish by-and-by? In the meanwhile order is the prime condition of progress. Mourning over our anarchical tendencies in literature, Mr. Arnold thinks he sees a proper center of authority in the notion of an academy after the French model. But he sighs to think how impossible at present is the realization of his dream, so potent are the blind conflicting forces of national self-assertion and prejudice; and as to religion, why should not the State establish Presbyterianism or Congregationalism on the same footing with Episcopacy? Then surely all reasonable and cultured men would find in the one or the other ample room for the employment and satisfaction of their religious faculties, moving at the same time in the healthful current of national life, and leaving to incurable fanatics their hole-and-corner systems, and the blind worship of their own peculiar fetiches.

It may betray a sad want of culture on our part, but to a great deal of this we can only say, *non placet*. But culture itself must not be confounded with Mr. Arnold's private opinions. It may be successfully pursued by those whose views on many important questions differ widely from his own. We are not disposed to undervalue Mr. Arnold's teaching, so far as it decribes the essential nature of culture and points out the serious need for calling general attention to it at the present time, because we cannot endorse *all* his views and suggestions. That teaching in the main is sound, valuable and timely. Certainly the nation needs culture as *defined* by Arnold, but not altogether as *exemplified* by him. It needs culture, but not Arnoldism. We say this because, unless we greatly misunderstand him, his views as to some of the most important matters affecting human interests generally, and the interests of the nation at this particular juncture, are essentially wrong. The "current of fresh and free thought" which he has turned upon these subjects has somehow led him far astray. But culture itself is not to blame for this. It is not too much or too free thought, but too little and too superficial, which has done the mischief. With regard to the great questions with which religion deals, and with regard to Christianity in particular, he seems to have attained the shining mists of philosophical indifference to which so many cultured and imaginative natures find their way. And this not because of their culture and imagination. We believe that the chief element in the solution of this fact consists in what old-fashioned Christians

call human depravity. It is only one of its innumerable forms and evidences. But we are persuaded that the world, which has a wonderful instinct for selecting what is necessary to its health and growth, will take and assimilate the truly valuable part of Arnold's doctrine of culture, that which relates to the essence of the thing itself, and leave what is merely Arnoldism, like an empty shell, to swell the heaps of similar exuviæ which mark the several stages of human progress. There is but too much truth in the author's description of the present state of things. Nor is it likely, notwithstanding the assertions of the popular newspapers to the contrary, that such a condition of things can continue as it is, or that it will improve itself into something better. And it would be well if, instead of crying "peace, peace," or fostering these evils and the bad mental habits which produce them, the professed teachers and guides of the nation would urge upon its attention more of the sort of thing which Arnold recommends as culture. We have little expectation that this will be done, or that it would accomplish all that Mr. Arnold looks for if it were done. Our hope for the continued organic existence of society and for its improvement is not in culture alone, which even if generally pursued is inadequate to the task, but in religion. Not that religion can supply the place of culture any more than culture can be a substitute for religion. Their functions are quite different. Religion develops and directs the moral powers of man. And without this, society cannot long continue in freedom, health, and progress. Religion, then, supplies those conditions in which alone culture can work with certainty and success.

But culture, as Mr. Arnold seems to apprehend it, is a far wider thing than will come within the definitions of it given in this volume. The more we read Arnold's writings, the more convinced we are that he does not really differ from Goëthe in his view as to what is the chief end of man. His position seems to be this—man is greater than all systems and doctrines; whatever is according to nature is right; human nature is a very various and many-sided thing; the perfection of this nature of ours is the harmonious development, employment, and gratification of all its constituent parts; this should be our aim and object in life as far as circumstances permit; nature, reason, and the will of God are different expressions of the same thing; conformity to nature under the guidance of reason, which takes all

the surrounding facts into account, is really conformity to the will of God, and in this consist our duty and happiness.

The fundamental tenet of this theory is self-sufficiency. Our great duty is to make the best we can of ourselves, with a view to our present happiness—to develop ourselves as much as possible on all sides—and to this end to adapt ourselves wisely and cautiously to the requirements and promptings of the nature within and without. And we must by no means relegate our bliss to a future life, if indeed there be one beyond an endless transformation of impersonal and unconscious force.

But one fatal mistake marks this theory of culture. It ignores the fact of man's moral weakness. To this sad fact passing events, the course of history, and the common conscience of men, abundantly testify. And if Mr. Arnold had been as well acquainted with human nature as he is with human opinions, he would not have overlooked it. But it is here that all such theories inevitably break down. When applied to actual life they prove their impracticability, and by their failure witness for the need of some superhuman power to correct this inherent weakness, and enable us to attain that perfection of character which excites the admiration and desire of all candid souls. But while the culture-theorists will not admit the existence of this weakness, or if they do, that it is from the cause and of the nature and extent that believers in the Christian revelation hold, they nevertheless feel obliged to recognize it practically, and to make some sort of provision for it. Mr. Arnold points us to Hebraism, of which Christianity is the latest and most powerful embodiment, as affording that support and nourishment which our moral nature requires. But he must surely know that Hebraism derives whatever power it possesses over man's moral nature from its supernatural facts and doctrines. Take away men's belief in these, and the marvelous influence it has so long exerted on the world's mind and on the course of human progresss—the energy which has adorned that course with such conspicuous and affecting monuments of moral worth—will vanish at once. Now it is as far as possible from our wish to misrepresent Mr. Arnold. But we cannot, while reading his books, resist the conviction that, whatever his own view of the Christian revelation may be, it it does not at all resemble that of a man who recognizes its exclusive Divine efficiency, and the objective reality of its alleged supernatural facts. We cannot imagine what can remain in

Christianity for Mr. Arnold except a *caput mortum* of bewildering and powerless legends. What, in such a case, can Hebraism avail to correct man's moral weakness, and to sustain his faltering purpose against the assaults of temptation?

But the advocates of culture go a little further in tacitly admitting man's moral inability. They accommodate their theory itself to that inability. They do this, first, by deposing the moral from the grand and far excelling eminence which it has hitherto occupied, and placing it on a level with the intellectual. Hebraism and Hellenism are made to stand side by side as equal and component forces necessary to bring about human perfection. There is nothing intrinsically more excellent in the former than in the latter. Its chief value is that it supplies a sort of toughness to the character without which Hellenism would be imperfect and unstable. But sin does not really possess the specially evil and fatal character which Hebraism assigns to it. Nor is obedience to what is called the moral law of such exclusively vital importance as Hebraisers commonly consider it to be. All this, if not dogmatically expressed, seems to us fairly implied in the doctrine of culture, as Mr. Arnold holds it. And its obvious tendency is to lessen our reverence for moral excellence, and to weaken the force of conscience.

But the culture theory is still further accommodated to man's moral weakness by practically lowering the standard of morals. We do not charge the promoters of this theory with consciously tampering with the interests of morality. What we mean is this. Little or no regard is paid to any supreme authority on morals such as exists in Divine revelation. That is right which commends itself to the cultivated mind as allowable, or expedient, or conformable to nature. The prevailing sentiment of cultured people thus becomes the sole standard of morals. We need not stay to show how shifting and uncertain such a standard must be, nor how surely it would be continually reduced. The path of virtue, while still retaining its name, would become more and more easy and pleasant, until at last human desires, attended by self-satisfaction and the approving smiles of the cultured, unchecked by such old-world things as conscience and revelation, would roam over all the ground left undisputed by the dread of unpleasant temporal consequences. And would they always certainly remain even within these limits? What support can a human soul, trembling with the energy of mighty

passions, find in the well-reasoned considerations of ethical theorists elaborated in the cool retirement of their studies? A rare combination of favorable circumstances may enable some men of uncommon endowments to attain a high degree of moral and general excellence. But to how few does it happen to be placed in such circumstances. And even such rare cases when they do occur, looked at from a Christian point of view, will not be found quite so satisfactory as the advocates of these theories appear to consider them to be. And what are the masses of men to do, amid the ordinary surroundings of life, with no more effectual help for such feeble hesitating impulses towards the right and good as may exist within them than the doctrine of culture, or some other more or less ethical theory, can supply? With such views and aims, with a refinement destitute of spirituality, with a conscience supported only by the vaguest and feeblest of religious convictions, with no high and distinctive moral purpose, with neither faith nor hope worth calling such, what can life become, even in the best of such cases, but a piece of washed and scented secularism, a course of philosophical sensuousness, Sadduceeism baptized with the modern spirit and clad in modern manners? But what neither culture nor any similar system can effect, Christianity and Christianity alone, is able to accomplish. It is true, Christianity does not profess to be a cure for all forms of anarchy. It does not come to us as the sole and sufficient means of harmonious and general perfection. It says nothing about these things. The aspect it wears is that of a specific remedy for a definite disease. It addresses itself directly to man's moral nature. It seeks to correct his weakness and to put him right there. And thus it lays the foundation for rectification and improvement on all sides—for the attainment of all that is meant by culture. But how does Christianity make men morally strong? By the influence of its truths and by the accompanying grace of the Holy Spirit. These truths are preëminently solemn, wonderful and affecting, and that grace of the Holy Spirit is given to all who rightly regard and heartily embrace Christianity. And these truths and this Divine power thus brought constantly to bear upon their conscience, their needs, their aspirations, their hopes and fears, cannot fail to create and maintain a moral strength which enables them to resist temptation and successfully to strive after perfection. Thus Christianity effectually corrects man's moral weakness, and opens the way for the pursuit of culture and

all virtue. And that it does so, the experience of multitudes abundantly testifies. It accomplishes the task to which culture itself is utterly inadequate.

But, although Christianity does open the way for culture, it does not do so expressly. It does not necessarily impel its professors to the study and pursuit of harmonious and general perfection. It makes no statements, gives no directions, affords no special provisions for its attainment. And, notwithstanding the need for it, and the fact that Christianity alone renders it possible, there are great numbers who, through want of knowledge on this subject, and the pressure of adverse circumstances, never set themselves to reach it, even to the extent that Christianity allows and justifies. Not that culture can ever be regarded by the true Christian as the principal aim of life. The salvation of ourselves and of the world through the merciful provisions of the Gospel must still be first. The stake is too great to place it on a level with anything else.

This brings us to notice for a moment the purport and scope of the Christian revelation, and the utter inconsistency of the demands of the culture theory with its just claims. In the writings of Mr. Arnold, and of others like-minded, we do not, indeed, mark any express and formal rejection of Christianity, but only a quiet ignoring of it as generally understood and believed. It is regarded merely as a means of culture, though a very important means, and each man is to use it according to his own independent reason and taste. It has to undergo a searching scrutiny by the critical faculty. All that offends the cultivated judgment or taste must be suppressed or explained away, and the whole enveloped in the graceful folds of philosophy and imagination, and thrown into an interesting and unexceptional pose; and when it has thus been rendered acceptable to modern culture, it may be admitted among the forces which are needful for the general and harmonious perfection of society. But how does the religion of Christ present itself to us? Certainly not as merely one among many co-ordinate means of perfection. Nor can any one receive it and make right and full use of it as such. Mr. Arnold regards Christianity as pervaded by the element of Hebraism. This determines its doctrines and aim. The characteristics of Hebraism are the prominence given to the doctrine of sin and the weight it attaches to obedience. "It is of wonderful power," says Mr. Arnold, "in correcting the

obvious faults of our animality," in forwarding habits of self-restraint, and in toughening the moral fiber, and, so far it plays an important and necessary part in culture. But he thinks too much is made of it, too much is expected of it. To be religious is regarded as the be all and end all. Other sides of our nature, which religion does not touch, are neglected. A narrow, rigid Puritanism is the result, and the full development of this is considered as perfection. We are not disposed to advocate the Puritanic view of religion in all its extent. We admit that there is room for culture, and that it is much needed, and nowhere more than among the professedly religious portion of the nation. Yet we quite demur to Mr. Arnold's view of religion, which he seems to consider the one sanctioned by culture. What is the aspect under which Christianity has ever presented itself to the world? What have the candid and earnest ever seen when they have turned their gaze on the religion of Christ? Have not all eyes fastened on the amazing spectacle of the Person and Work of a Divine Redeemer? And has not the Gospel been always understood as declaring that the whole work of this Redeemer had reference to and was necessary in order to bring about the pardon of sin and the salvation of man? Indeed, salvation is the central and determining theme of revelation. It seems as if the view which God takes of man's case is just this. To Him the human race appears wrapped in the embrace of various evil forces which are sweeping it along to ruin. And the source of these evil forces, the spring of their being and deadly energy, is sin. The essential and enormous evil of sin is clearly estimated by God. He hates it. In the interests of His Government, and in those of His creation too, He must adequately deal with it. By His appointment sin is ever pursued by death. But the Divine pity gives birth to the purpose of salvation. That purpose God has been working out from the beginning, and. it finds its final embodiment in Christianity. To it all His dealings with men are subservient. To Him men must appear not so much beings of culture, as beings needing salvation before all things else. Now, if this be the view which God takes, what view should we take? What but the same? And it is obviously reasonable that such an apprehension of our case should give the dominant coloring to all our views of things, and the ruling tone and direction to our whole life. How, then, can a man in the presence of the whole wonderful system of salvation, coolly propose to himself

culture as the great aim of life? We can understand a heathen or an infidel doing so, but we cannot understand any one who believes in the Divine origin of Christianity doing so. To such a man it must appear that his first duty is to extricate himself from the crushing evils of sin, and this by falling in with the Divine plan of salvation; and next that when he has thus secured his own safety, he should spare no pains to save others. This view of our case and of the duties arising out of it lies upon the very surface of New Testament teaching. And men are bound to accept and act upon it. Salvation must occupy the first place. It is all very well for Mr. Arnold to bestow a pitying smile upon those who show extreme concern about saving their souls. But can he make it appear that such concern is irrational in any one holding the ancient and orthodox view of Christianity? Of course if one has some grand transcendental notion about it which takes from it all obvious meaning and point, and removes it to the far cold distance of philosophical contemplation, such extreme concern, or indeed any concern at all, about salvation, would be the height of absurdity. Devotion to culture in Mr. Arnold's sense is only possible when all belief in the objective truth of Christianity has vanished away.

Nevertheless there is room for some attention to culture without relaxing our regard for those great ends which religion puts before us. It is really pitiable to see whole masses of our countrymen blindly hurrying on, full of energy, empty of thought, crowding with unquestioning confidence the old ways of traditional opinion and usage, losing sight of ends in means, worshiping facts and heedless of their real nature and bearing. And some even of the best and noblest are borne along the confused and mighty torrent. But action is easy, thought is hard. More thought, fresh, free, patient, reverential, conscientious thought is the great thing wanted. Little worth calling thought is ever given even by the educated and respectable classes to any matters beyond the region of their most importunate needs. It is wonderful with how few ideas people manage to get decently through life.

But it is in our public affairs that this want of ideas finds its most striking illlustration. Witness our patchwork legislation, our lumbering educational system, our numerous benevolent institutions, far less efficient than they might be through defect of thought and want of concert; our vast and expensive machinery

for baling out the evils which threaten to sink us, and the all but entire neglect of the yawning leaks which ceaselessly admit the flood. The nation is a well-meaning but weak-eyed Titan, whose prodigal energy is largely wasted through want of light. There is surely room for culture here. But culture also includes sweetness—that is, a disposition opposed to narrowness, bigotry and all self-complacent assumptions of the perfection and universal fitness of the views and practices of our own class, school, or denomination—a disposition that, unappalled by the authority of names or the fierceness of party clamor, waits and watches for the true, the beautiful, and the good, and welcomes them in whatever quarter, and amid whatever surroundings, they present themselves—a disposition that reverently regards all the hints of many-voiced nature, and looks on all that is with tolerance and hope. There is more of the Roman than the Grecian in our national character, more of sternness and rigidity than of sweetness and grace. And how much need there is for the latter any one may feel who, hushing if he can the tumult of passion in his own breast, listens to the uproar of societies, parties, and institutions, ignoring or combating each other, struggling for existence or supremacy, and pursuing their several ends with unlimited self-assertion.

But culture has its dangers. It needs the safeguards of common-sense and Christian principle. Its love of light and realism, its Hellenic tendency, of which our own Shakspeare is a fine though unconscious example, may develop into the beautiful, sensuous, classic naturalism of Goëthe, or the daring and fanatical paganism of Swinburne. On the other hand, its sweetness and grace may degenerate into the indifference and license which express themselves in much of our high-class current literature, and in the habits of too many of our educated and cultured youth.

And now we must say farewell to Mr. Arnold for the present. We have read his essay with pleasure and profit, notwithstanding we have felt obliged to differ from him in several important particulars. His clear, flexible style, his delicate humor, his imperturbable good temper, make his book very pleasant reading, while there is much in the matter advanced that must engage the serious interest of thoughtful minds. Beneath the play of *badinage* there is an earnest meaning, sometimes a profound pathos. If he trifles at times on the edge of great questions, almost like a heartless skeptic, it is because he sees more keenly

and truly than many how great and deep these questions are, and because he despairs almost bitterly in his secret heart of any solution of them, at least in our time. He has merited thanks by his caustic exposure of the superficiality and ignorance of much that has long passed in England for unquestioned truth and wisdom. Boldly has he, with his sling and stone, assailed the Goliath of our newspaper press, and he has left his dint and mark upon the brow of the great Philistine. He has helped to abate our ignorant national self-confidence on the subject of education. He has taken down a little of our tall talk on several pressing questions. He is, indeed, too much of an exquisite in all things, and more self-conscious than is really beautiful or graceful, whatever he may imagine, or than is consistent indeed with the truest and noblest culture. Apollo among the gods is too much his model; among the saints he has too little sympathy with the soul of Paul. In a word, he verges upon effeminacy, and has as little as possible of the heroic in his composition. He neither glories in the Cross, nor is prepared to address himself to any labor of Hercules. Still we have always considered that those were wide of the mark who regard Mr. Arnold as a mere dreamer, a superfine amateur reformer. We wish, however, that this opinion had not so much coloring of excuse. There is a sort of gay-hearted innocence about him, or rather perhaps a wonderful assumption of it. There is an apparent want of earnest recognition of the ills and needs of society. We are sure, however, that he is not without deep and manly feeling on these subjects; only he believes that what is wanted now is not so much an instant application of some remedy or other, as more thought about the whole matter. Yet it would be better for the effect of Mr. Arnold's exhortations if he threw into them a little more feeling, and if he showed some appreciation of his countrymen's sincerity and labors. There is a trifle too much mere fault-finding. Mr. Arnold has Hellenised himself too completely. And pleasant as it all is while he discourses, we are apt to get cloyed with the sweetness and wearied with the light, and to long for a little Gothic ruggedness, strength, and gloom. Above all, it would be well if, upon the true and firm convictions of a Christian believer, were built up in his character the strength and hope of the Christian life.

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
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